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ABSTRACT
THE GOOD G O VERNA NCE AGEND A 
OF IN TERNA TIO NA L D EVELO PM ENT INSTITUTIONS
Kerry L. Hofheim er 
Old Dom inion University, 2006 
Director: Dr. Francis Adam s
International developm ent institutions (IDIs) have increasingly emphasized good 
governance and dem ocratic reform in the provision o f  foreign assistance. This is 
especially apparent w ith respect to the United Nations Developm ent Program me 
(UNDP), W orld Bank, European Union (EU), and U nited States A gency for International 
D evelopm ent (USAID). This project describes and explains the good governance and 
dem ocracy prom otion program  o f  each institution.
Previous studies have accounted for ID Is’ good governance and dem ocracy 
prom otion in the 1990s in a generalized way. They have taken into consideration 
external international changes such as the fading o f  the Cold W ar and increased global 
interdependence betw een the North and the South. They have also discussed how 
international norm ative changes such as dem ocracy’s strengthened position in the post- 
Cold W ar world and civil society’s newfound viability have affected developm ent 
programs. Som e studies have attributed the enhanced attention to dem ocracy and good 
governance prom otion in the 1990s to a general learning curve or better understanding o f  
what local characteristics facilitate developm ent and w hat IDIs can do to encourage such 
characteristics.
This pro ject’s contribution to the fields o f international political econom y and 
developm ent studies is its m ore distinctive focus on the each o f  the four institutions
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
m entioned and on how each one 's  specific program s reflect differences in the power 
distribution am ong m em ber states or stakeholders. This provides a richer, more nuanced 
explanation, as well as a clearer understanding o f  how ID Is' im m inent pow er structures 
have and are continuing to influence and shape broader shifts in developm ent thinking.
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IN T R O D U C T IO N
International developm ent institutions" (IDIs") approaches to the goals and 
processes o f  developm ent can be seen in their statements, docum ents, studies, policies, 
and program s over the years. A trend em erges am ong the leading IDIs in the early 1990s. 
reflecting a new sense o f  what developm ent involves and necessitates. Term s such as 
“good governance,” the “developm ental state," and “social progress” figure largely 
around this tim e period, reflecting an heuristic and epistem ological change in beliefs 
about how developm ent can be achieved and sustained. Surfacing around this tim e is a 
growing recognition that developm ent is context-dependent and that states need to take 
active roles in providing the right policy environm ents and governance conditions for 
developm ent to occur.1 A lthough their stances were by no m eans the uniform , these IDIs 
increasingly viewed, and still view, the state as part o f  the process o f  developm ent, rather 
than as an obstacle to it, as had often been the case with earlier neoliberal reform 
program s such as the controversial structural adjustm ent program s prescribed by the 
W orld Bank and the International M onetary Fund. In the early  1990s, Adrian Lefhvich
The form at for this dissertation follows the current style o f  requirem ents for Kate L. 
T urabian 's A M anual fo r  Writers o f  Term Papers, Theses, and D issertations, Sixth 
Edition (Chicago: U niversity o f  Chicago Press, 1996).
'Scholar G eorg Sorensen wrote in 1998 that a new m odel is currently gaining 
ground in W estern theory and practice. It takes a broader view o f  the political and 
econom ic issues at stake in that it com bines ideas about a state that is dem ocratic in the 
sense o f  being responsive, legitim ate, and under the rule o f  law. with ideas about a 
strong, developm entalist state, better capable o f  prom oting econom ic and social 
developm ent. This is a fresh turn in W estern thinking....” G eorg Sorensen, F ailed States 
and International Security: Causes, Prospects, and  Consequences (W est Lafayette: 
Purdue University, 1998).
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aptly asserted that a "new  orthodoxy dom inates official W estern aid policy and 
developm ent thinking. At its core is the confident assertion that good governance [is] not 
sim ply desirable, but essential" for developm ent in all nations.' Good governance 
notions differed betw een IDIs, as will be explained, yet an overriding them e emerged that 
em phasized a rule-based liberal polity which protected human and civil rights, with an 
effective, non-corrupt public adm inistration accountable to its citizenry and open to 
citizen input. State capture and corruption were discouraged and sim ultaneously 
transparent and effective states attentive to the needs o f  citizens from the bottom  up, as 
well as to long-term  country growth, were prescribed.3 As the 1990s progressed, 
econom ic crises that occurred in M exico, South East Asia, Eastern Europe, and Russia 
served to confirm  the value o f  good governance, as states with poorly established 
institutions and system s o f  governance were particularly susceptible to econom ic travails. 
A rgentina’s econom ic troubles in the early twenty-first century, following troubles in 
Brazil, provided further affirm ation o f  the need for good governance, as m any o f  these 
countries' problem s w ere blam ed on undeveloped legal system s, poor governm ent 
institutions, lack o f  governm ent responsiveness to peoples' needs, and states' difficulties 
collecting taxes. C ontinuing poverty in m ost African countries was persistently  linked to 
poor governance, as civil wars broke out, and chaos and poverty increased. Further, in 
the w ake o f  the terrorist attacks in the United States on Septem ber 11. 2001, scholars and 
policy m akers noted the connection betw een terrorism  and chronic weak or illegitim ate
2Adrian Leftwich, "Governance, Dem ocracy, and Developm ent in the Third 
W orld," Third World Q uarterly  14:3 (1993): 605-6.
3Lynda Chalker, G ood G overnance and A id  Programm es (London: O verseas 
Developm ent A dm inistration, 1991), 1-3.
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governance. Troubles in the Middle I last, made more public than ever by growing media 
attention, and the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq reiterated such concerns. 
Credible and enduring democratic or "well governed" states were called for as a panacea 
for a host o f  new international problems with widespread repercussions.
As scholar Carlos Santiso contends, in the 1990s. the "strengthening o f  good 
governance in developing countries... [became] both an objective o f  and a condition for 
developm ent assistance.”4 Instead o f  urging a generic recipe for minimal state control as 
it had throughout the 1980s. the W orld Bank around this tim e becam e more flexible and 
open to the notion that m ore state legitim acy was desirable and that developm ent would 
likely proceed diversely in states with their own unique histories and characteristics. The 
historically non-political W orld B ank 's new em phasis on poverty reduction and equitable 
distribution signaled a profound shift in rhetoric and to some degree policy toward 
developm ent initiatives. There was a growing recognition that developm ent requires not 
less, but a different sort o f  state involvement, and that good governance contingent upon 
and reflective o f general citizens' needs and desires is most often a precursor to 
developm ent, not a result, as had been believed by many in earlier decades. The United 
N ations Development Program me (UNDP). European Union (EU). and U nited States 
Agency for International Development (USAID) also increased their em phases on their 
often sim ilar but in important ways variant notions o f  good governance, as well as on 
dem ocracy assistance, for developing countries. For all four o f  these IDIs. the 
strengthening o f good governance became a priority both rhetorically and
4Carlos Santiso 's often quoted statement about the purpose and requirem ents o f 
good governance prom otion appears in various o f  his articles, including “Governance 
Conditionality and the Reform o f M ultilateral Development Finance.” GS G overnance  
Scries. Num ber 7 (W ashington. D.C.: Johns Hopkins University Press. 2002). 4.
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4
program m atically. All o f  them, although m inimally in the case o f the W orld Bank, also 
openly prom oted democracy, which overlapped with and informed their interpretations o f 
good governance. This project will take a broad and nuanced view o f  the factors 
underlying such changes for each o f  these four IDIs and o f how each one developed good 
governance and democracy prom otion program s and policies amenable to its unique 
goals and values em bodied by its stakeholders.
Purpose o f  the Research 
M any scholarly exam inations have recognized the shifts in focus to good 
governance and dem ocracy prom otion in the 1990s.5 Some have gone further to note the 
diversification between ID Is’ good governance and democracy assistance rhetoric, 
program s, and policies, usually with special emphasis on the differences betw een the 
W orld B ank 's (and often the International Monetary Fund's) and the I rN D P 's 
approaches, or between m ultilateral and bilateral good governance designs and efforts. 
Few. if  any. studies, however, have expressly set out to explore the institutional reasons 
for the variance between the actual program s and policies o f  particular IDIs and what this 
signifies in term s o f  IDI agendas and constitutional or associational identities. Good 
governance and dem ocracy prom otion programs and policies are distinctive in substance 
and focus for each o f  the IDIs exam ined here for reasons o f  their origins and ID Is'
5Adrian Leftwich. “ Forms o f  the Democratic Developmental State: Dem ocratic 
Practices and Developmental C apacity." in The Democratic D evelopm ental State, eds. M. 
Robinson and G. W hite (New York: Oxford University Press. 1998). 52-83. Also see 
Adrian Leftw ich. States o f  Development: On the Primacy o f  Politics in D evelopm ent 
(M alden: Blackwell, 2000). 152-70; Samuel Barkin. “Resilience o f  the State: The 
Evolution and Sustainability o f  Sovereignty." Harvard International Review  22:4 (w inter
2001): 42-7.
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allegiances to their stakeholders, and these program s and policies are better understood 
when viewed as such. A fuller grasp o f  the institution-specific rationales for the 
particular nature o f  these new program s and policies can be instructive, particularly as 
critical scholars and policy makers continue to evaluate what is useful for helping spur 
lasting and inclusive developm ent that broadens peoples' access to wealth, resources, and 
opportunities. This project attempts to provide a fuller description o f  when, how, and why 
the UNDP, W orld Bank, EU, and USAID began to prescribe good governance. It also 
seeks to differentiate between the actual program s and policies o f  each o f  these 
institutions and to demonstrate how the program s and policies reflect their unique power 
structures.
Since the 1960s, if  not earlier, issues regarding developm ent aid have been among 
the m ost controversial within the N orth-South discussion, and the fact that the leading 
IDIs have finally reached seem ingly com parable conclusions and begun to strive towards 
descriptively sim ilar goals masks a still extant ideological divide. It is im portant to probe 
m ore deeply and remain cognizant o f  how pow erful shareholders in the leading IDIs are 
shaping developm ent policies. A careful exam ination o f  good governance policies and 
program s can help reveal some fundam ental differences betw een them  and show how this 
new developm ent agenda is indeed variable and reflective o f  donors' own often complex 
and m ultifaceted goals and desires. Such an analysis is significant as developm ent with 
its m ultiple interpretations continues to be a vital goal, perhaps increasingly so due to 
globalization’s impacts, and scholars' and policy m akers' understanding o f  what 
developm ent entails rem ains both fluid and consequential. Still today, as the wealth and 
privilege o f  the richest are showcased through the m edia like never before in Northern 
countries, roughly twenty percent o f  the w orld 's m ore than six billion inhabitants live in
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severe poverty, and that percentage is predicted to increase as the global population 
continues to grow exponentially. Developm ent policies and the rationales behind them 
have the potential to affect not only individual lives, but entire com m unities, countries, 
and continents. It is perhaps m ore im perative today than ever before to clearly assess the 
value and aims o f  such policies as globalization increasingly interconnects hum an lives, 
entire societies, and the international landscape.
M ethodology
This project describes and analyzes ID Is’ increased good governance and 
dem ocracy prom otion efforts in the 1990s by conducting case studies o f  four individual 
IDIs: the UN DP, W orld Bank, HU, and USAID. In order to provide a broader analysis o f  
this phenom ena, the enhanced yet versatile IDI attention to good governance and 
dem ocracy prom otion in the 1990s, and why it has been variable, a w ide array o f  IDIs 
have been selected. Three are m ultilateral: the UNDP, W orld Bank, and EU. One. 
U SA ID , is bilateral. These four influential IDIs have unique m andates, rules, 
organizational structures, and shareholders to satisfy. They have been selected to present 
a far-reaching range o f  relatively powerful and visible IDIs. Since by their charters and 
m andates, each has its own independent goals and approaches, certainly it is interesting 
that all four institutions began concentrating m ore on good governance and dem ocracy 
prom otion in the 1990s. Yet even m ore notew orthy are the differences exhibited in each 
ID Es version o f  good governance and dem ocracy promotion and how these differences 
reflect their pow er bases. A m ore individualized, institution-specific study provides a 
fuller, richer, and m ore nuanced explanation o f  good governance and dem ocracy 
prom otion in the 1990s. Surely it is with limited vision that one, for exam ple, would
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
a ttem pt to attribute the U N D P 's  and the W orld  B an k 's  increased prioritiz ing o f  good 
governance  to s imilar institutional factors.
Additionally, it should be noted that as international political econom y is in m any 
ways a m ulti-disciplinary field, spanning foreign policy, political science, security, 
developm ent, and econom ic studies, so too is this project. The field o f  IPE and this 
project are based on the view that politics and econom ics are inseparable; politics help 
determ ine international econom ic relations, and international econom ic relations help 
determ ine politics. The challenge o f  IPE is how to best to understand these relationships 
and the outcom es they generate. A ccordingly, this project concerns itse lf w ith how 
econom ic and political forces worked together to help propel different IDIs to concentrate 
m ore on good governance and dem ocracy prom otion in the 1990s. Som e overlap in 
political and econom ic detenninants will exist, as all o f  these IDIs are located in the same 
international system, yet perhaps it is the differences in the m otivations o f  these IDIs that 
will be  m ost intriguing. By studying these dissim ilarities, the overall trend towards more 
attention to good governance and dem ocracy prom otion can be better understood and 
m ore critically evaluated.
This project is organized as follows. This chapter concludes with a review  o f  the 
h istory and role o f  foreign aid. The second chapter reviews the leading theories and 
argum ents about the relevance o f  the state to the workings o f  the m arket and to 
developm ent theories and then traces changes in developm ent theories since W orld W ar
II. N ext analyzed is literature on the general factors leading IDIs to increase their foci on 
good governance and dem ocracy prom otion in the 1990s as well as on critical accounts o f  
the nature o f  effects o f  such efforts. The subsequent chapters turn to each o f  the 
institutional case studies.
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For the UNDP (chapter III), first a description o f the UN and the I rN D P‘s pow er 
structure, history, and evolution o f  policies is provided. The U N D P 's good governance 
program s, which em phasize both top-dow n and bottom s-up efforts to create equitable and 
environm entally friendly reforms, are characterized, and the way in which the U N D P 's 
good governance and dem ocracy prom otion policies reflect its one-country, one-vote 
pow er structure are explained. Also explored is the fact that the UNDP functions as an 
institution w ithin the broader UN and how its good governance prom otion reflects goals 
o f  the larger organization. For the UNDP, good governance translates into program s 
aim ed at im proving quality o f  life and quality and quantity o f  governm ent services 
provided. Policies stress the im portance o f  fostering human rights protection, structural 
equity, and respect for the environm ent.
For the W orld Bank (chapter IV). an institution with weighted voting dom inated 
by richer N orthern countries, a description o f  its pow er structure and organizational 
im peratives is followed by  an account o f  its history and the evolution o f  its developm ent 
policies and program s. Next, the B ank’s good governance program s, which them selves 
broaden in scope throughout the course o f  the 1990s, are characterized. The Bank is 
forbidden by its charter to m ake political prescriptions or attach political conditions to its 
loans, and hence its new concentration in the 1990s is on good governance in a m ore 
technically-defined sense, rather than on dem ocracy with its m ore partisan o r ideological 
overtones. Due to the B ank 's own elitist pow er structure and the fact that it is financially 
beholden to Northern countries, it has tended to lim it the concept o f  good governance to 
conditions that m ake poor countries m ore am enable to Northern standards o f  conduct, 
particularly  those that create m arket econom ies conducive to intervention by and 
exchange with Northern-dom inated m arket econom ies. In the early 1990s. little attention
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was given to the complicated processes through which the poor and disenfranchised 
m ight gain genuine access to influencing political processes and hence expand their own 
resources and opportunities. Rhetorically and som etim es program m atically, this technical 
em phasis was expanded during the decade, yet the ways in which the B ank 's good 
governance program s continued to reflect its distinctive power structure are shown.
For the EU (chapter V). an increasingly integrated institution itself despite 
challenges to its unity, its power structure, history, and evolution o f  policies is described. 
The E U 's  Third W orld developm ent efforts evolved in a more gradual and incremental 
m anner than did the W orld Bank's, as they com prise a relatively sm aller portion o f  the 
larger institu tion 's purpose. T his is elucidated by briefly tracing their evolution w ithin 
the larger framework o f  EU activities. I he way in which the promotion o f  dem ocracy and 
the strengthening o f  good governance in the 1990s reflect the E U 's delicately balanced 
pow er structure is explained. For the EU. the m anagem ent o f foreign assistance has 
sought to overcom e credible claims o f  ad-hocism  due to strong bilateral im peratives and 
issue-oriented NGO influences overshadow ing an institution-wide imperative. The F.l >’s 
dem ocracy and good governance promotion in the 1990s revealed a lack o f  cohesiveness 
that can be traced to its struggles to achieve m ore harm onization o f  national, and 
som etim es transnational, civil society prerogatives.
As a bilateral institution. USAID (chapter VI) docs not face the dilem m a o f  
reconciling goals o f  multiple countries w ith seats at the decision-m aking table like the 
other IDIs studied here. It does, however, struggle with reconciling its identity as a 
developm ent institution with pressures to serve United States com m ercial, political, and 
social interests. This is no simple feat. A description o f the current state o f  the nearly 
fifty-year-old institution and its unique power structure is provided, followed by a review
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o f  U SA ID 's history and the evolution o f  its policies. Next. U SA ID 's good governance 
policies are exam ined, as is the m anner in which these retleet the institu tion 's pow er 
structure. USAID attem pts to remain a technically sophisticated, independent 
organization, yet its good governance and dem ocracy promotion program s and policies 
reveal its persistent accountability to United States foreign policy and business interests.
A concluding chapter (chapter VII) sum m arizes the pro ject's findings. Then a 
b rie f com m entary on each institu tion 's progress in facilitating developm ent in the 1990s 
and present points o f  concentration are included. A review o f  the current state o f  
institutional developm ent efforts and what this project has provided in terms o f  an 
enriched understanding are also presented.
H istory and Role o f  Foreign Assistance
Good governance and dem ocracy prom otion are recent trends in developm ent 
assistance, an enterprise with a long history characterized by diverse m otivations and 
m ixed results. A fter m ore than fifty years o f  organized multi- and bilateral spending on 
various form s o f  foreign assistance, the intentions and value o f  that spending rem ain 
controversial. Som e believe that foreign aid has largely been m otivated by altruism .6 
while o thers see it as largely a vehicle for cultural and econom ic im perialism  by the 
N orthern countries. It is often difficult to determ ine what role developm ent assistance 
has played in prom oting growth and developm ent in poor and beleaguered countries for
6David Lum sdaine, M oral Vision in International Politics: The Foreign A id  
Regime, 1949-1989  (Princeton: Princeton U niversity Press. 1993).
Theresa Hayter and Catherine W atson, Aid: Rhetoric and Reality  (London: Pluto 
Press, 1985).
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m ultiple reasons. First, no clear and universally accepted context for evaluating the 
impact o f  various sorts o f  assistance activ ities exists. Second, various forms o f  aid from 
different sources have had distinctive goals. Bilateral aid, with its traditionally more 
strategic focus, m ay have served its critical function for the donor involved, yet failed to 
alleviate hum an suffering or reduce global poverty in ways with which m ultilateral 
donors often at least rhetorically concern them selves. Aid in som e cases m ay have helped 
in the short-term , yet not over the long-term. Because foreign aid has goals distinctive to 
its donors, its value is not easy to assess. Further, research data designed to determ ine the 
role o f  foreign assistance is problem atic in and o f  itself. For exam ple, low-incom e 
countries such as m any in Africa, Asia, Latin A m erica, and the M iddle East often lack 
credible system s for com piling econom ic statistics, and much o f  the data used to evaluate 
the quality o f  life or hum an welfare is itself subject to interpretation. Political econom ists 
gauge developm ent by differing measures. W hile per capita income, em ploym ent rates, 
and access to health care and adequate nutrition can be m easured, other phenom ena such 
as availability o f  opportunity and freedom valued by hum anists such as Am artya Sen and 
M ahbub ul Haq are difficult to fairly or uniform ly quantify .8 Further still, the factors 
driving m aterial and social progress are extrem ely com plex and m ulti-faceted. H istorical 
and geopolitical processes that influence countries’ routes to developm ent, a concept in 
and o f  itse lf subject to debate, are obviously influenced by m any factors. Som e are not 
easy to identify, and foreign assistance is only a part a larger, com plicated process. M any
8For a useful discussions on developm ent as freedom  o f  choice and opportunity, 
see A m artya Sen, Inequality Reexam ined  (Cam bridge: Harvard University Press, 1992) 
and m ore recently, A m artya Sen, D evelopm ent as Freedom  (New York: A nchor Books. 
1999); also see M ahbub Ul Haq, Reflections on H um an D evelopm ent (Oxford: O xford 
University Press, 1995).
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political, cultural, and econom ic trends may occur together with the ilow  o f  international 
assistance, which makes determ ining and assessing causality enigmatic.
In any case, a w ide review o f  the literature on developm ent suggests that foreign 
assistance, under the best o f  circum stances, has played only a m odest role in prom oting 
econom ic developm ent and im proving hum an welfare. So far in recent history, neither 
bilateral nor m ultilateral aid has ever amounted to the grand project once envisioned in 
m onetary figures and less em pirical quality-of-life descriptions. Though in rare cases the 
average am ount o f  foreign assistance transferred can com prise a substantial percentage o f  
a recipient coun try 's  gross national product in a given year, the average am ount given to 
developing countries w orldw ide is small com pared w ith the size o f  their econom ies—2 
percent to 3 percent o f  their GNPs. W ealthy donor countries have typically given less 
than 1 percent o f  their GN Ps toward developm ent assistance, even when dom estic public 
support for foreign aid has been high.9 Further, the gap between the rich and the poor has 
grown unprecedentedly wider. In the period betw een 1960 and 1995. the incom e ratio 
between the w orld 's  richest and poorest twenty percent grew from 30:1 to m ore than 
80:1, and the gap continues to increase. Som e predict that w ithin the next decade it could 
widen to 150:1 . l0 Clearly, the processes o f  intervention need m ore careful thought.
Despite the N orth 's  declining interest in dispensing aid, few would disagree that 
the quality o f  aid needs to be im proved, and the likelihood o f  reaching the poorest needs 
to be enhanced. Further com pounding the dilem m a is the trend o f  increasingly rew arding 
the haves and ignoring the have-nots. As M ichael M andelbaum  contends, in the post-
For an insightful analysis o f  dom estic politics and foreign assistance, see M ark 
Otter, "D om estic Public Support for Foreign Aid: Does it M atter?” Third World 
Quarterly  24:1 (February 2003): 115-25.
l0Peter Jay. The Wealth o f  Man (New York: Public Affairs. 2000). 246-47.
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C old-W ar world, a new “basis lor political legitim acy emerged: prosperity.'"11 With 
private capital tlow s com prising o f a nation 's potential resources.1'  the poorest countries 
have m ore stake than ever in being viewed as credible sites tor investm ents, yet they need 
to dem onstrate a certain level o f  success to even be considered worthy in this regard for 
investors to take notice. Som etim es the problem  o f poor institutions is compounded by a 
nation 's  lack o f  resources deem ed valuable by rich countries and organizations.
The challenges facing developm ent assistance today are well known, yet m any do 
not realize just how young the developm ent industry is. Institutionalized foreign 
assistance did not becom e com m on until after W orld W ar II, although various western 
European countries have had small bilateral program s and engaged in sm all-scale
^M ichael M andelbaum , The Ideas That Conquered the World: Peace,
Democracy, and  Free M arkets in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Public Affairs.
2002), 379.
l2The flow o f  private capital to developing countries increased substantially in the 
early 1990s and has continued to increase in an unprecedented m anner. These private 
capital flows include foreign direct investment, international or regional lending by 
international banks, and equity flows (stock m arket investm ent). They do not include 
private grants by non-governm ental organizations, which have represented less than 5 
percent o f  all private flows. Private capital flows to developing countries were about 
US$2.2 billion in 1962, about a third o f  official aid flows. D uring the 1980s, 
intergovernm ental foreign assistance, which includes concessional and non-concessional 
funds, was usually greater than private flows. Since 1991, however, foreign assistance 
flows have rem ained fairly steady in constant dollars, and private capital flows to 
developing countries have risen sharply. Private capital flows peaked at around US$300 
billion in 1997, while aid flows have rem ained constant, or in som e years, declined. 
M anuel Pastor and Eric H ilt, “Private Investm ent and D em ocracy in the D eveloping 
W orld,” Journal o f  Econom ic Issues 29:1: 23-243; Ian Vasquez, “Official Assistance. 
Econom ic Freedom , and Policy Change: Is Foreign Aid Like C ham pagne?" Cato Journal 
18:2 (fall 1998): 275-86.
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m ultilateral lending dating hack to well before the twentieth century. Foreign aid first 
gained m om entum  when the United States, with its $13 billion Marshall Plan aid 
allocated over the period o f  1947-1951 (at an average annual 2.5 o f  A m erica's GNP).
This aid. designed to help rebuild Europe following the war. helped popularize foreign 
assistance, draw ing attention to its hum anistic value and strategic u tility .13 The success o f  
the M arshall Plan led Am erica to establish the Point Four program  in 1951. to provide 
technical assistance to poor countries, and soon thereafter to create the Development 
Loan Fund, offering concessional loans earm arked for specific developm ent projects. In 
the m eantim e, the W orld Bank, created as one o f  the Bretton W oods institutions after the 
war, shifted its em phasis from post-w ar reconstruction to dispensing developm ent loans. 
The num ber and size o f  developm ent agencies o f  the UN increased in the 1950s and 
1960s.
Europeans' com m itm ent to foreign assistance has traditionally always been and 
continues to be higher than that o f  the United States. The United States' M arshall Plan 
and leadership in founding the BW Is, though, in addition to its unprecedented post- 
W orld-W ar-II power, have highlighted the A m erican contribution to the form ation o f  
w idespread foreign aid program s throughout the developed world. United States 
com bined bilateral and m ultilateral assistance peaked at $51 billion (in 1997 dollars) in 
1947—the height o f  post-w ar reconstruction. By the end o f  the century, Am erican foreign 
assistance totaled about $14 billion. D espite a small peak in the w ake o f  the Asian 
financial crises o f  1997, at less than 1 percent o f  the federal budget. United States annual
^D on  Babai, “W orld Bank," in The O xford Companion to Politics o f  the 
World, 2d ed., ed. Joel Krieger and others. 911-18 (New York: Oxford University Press. 
2 0 0 1 ).
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spending on foreign assistance was at its lowest level o f  the postw ar e ra .14 Am erican 
foreign aid world rise slightly in the new m illennium , particularly for strategic uses such 
as post-conflict reconstruction, yet rem ained a low priority com pared to other federal 
programs.
Bilateral assistance, which still accounts for about 70 percent o f  foreign aid, 
generally reflects a country 's national priorities. The United States, for exam ple, gave 
m ost o f  its aid to its form er wartim e allies in W estern Europe in the 1940s to help the 
continent rebuild its national econom ies and infrastructure conducive to Am erican 
political and econom ic interests. In the 1950s and 1960s, the United States allocated 
about h a lf  o f  its foreign aid to Asian countries o f  perceived strategic significance— 
particularly South Korea, Taiwan, and South Vietnam . In the 1970s, as concerns over oil 
intensified. A m erican priorities shifted to the M iddle East. The United States began 
transferring large security and economic assistance program s to Israel and Egypt, two 
countries that still receive m uch o f  A m erica's bilateral a id .15 Since 1979, the year o f  the 
Cam p David A ccords, countries in the M iddle East have received about h a lf  o f  all United 
States bilateral assistance.1*’ O ther bilateral donors have also directed their foreign 
assistance spending towards pursuing their political or econom ic interests. Japan, for
l4See A ge F. P. Bakker, International F inancial Institutions (New York: 
Longm an Publishing, 1996). 46-9: European Com m ission, Green Paper on Relations 
between the European Union and the AC P Countries on the Eve o f  the 2 I s1 Century 
(Luxem bourg: O ffice for Official Publications o f  the European Com m unities, 1997).
l5Israel also assum ed greater significance to the United States, as the pro-Israel 
lobby grew increasingly influential.
16See, for exam ple, Vernon W. Ruttan. United States D evelopm ent 
Assistance P olicy: The D om estic Politics o f  Foreign Economic A id  (Baltim ore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1996); Robert Packenham , “ Political Developm ent D octrines
in the Am erican Foreign Aid Program s," World Politics 17 (January 1966): 231.
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exam ple, devotes the majority o f its assistance to other Asian countries. During the Cold 
War. France and Britain allocated most o f their aid towards form er colonies, though now 
that trend is loosening as more o f  their funds go towards newly independent Fastem  
European states and to trading partners in the more developed Asian countries. Bilateral 
assistance appears to be less strategic, however, for some o f  the sm aller donors: the 
countries o f  Scandinavia, for example, have tended to devote their funding to poor 
countries, with foreign policy concerns playing a less notable role.
M ultilateral institutions and regional m ultilateral developm ent banks, which also 
becam e more prevalent and active in the decades since W orld W ar 11. have in some cases 
favored the poorest countries as well. In the early 1990s multilateral donors gave more 
than 45 percent o f  their concessional assistance—grants or loans at low interest rates—to 
the least developed countries. The IJNDP has long been known for its tendency to favor 
the poorest countries and regions. By contrast, individual nations gave less than a fourth 
o f  their concessional assistance to that same group o f  countries.17 Often multilateral 
institutions and banks have also shown preference for assisting the countries with the 
greatest political and economic significance to their stakeholders. Politics play a large 
role in many o f  their aid decisions. The E U 's allegiance to form er European colonies 
throughout the Cold W ar evidences a strong nationalistic rationale, w ith aid decisions 
reflecting the ongoing com prom ises between the un ion 's  m ost powerful m em bers.18 The
l7Steven W. Hook. "Foreign Aid and the Illogic o f  Collective A ction." in Foreign  
A id  Toward the M illennium, ed. Steven W. Hook (Boulder: Lynne Rienner. 1996).
l8For m ore  on this controversial topic, a good starting p lace can  be found in 
Bakker. 46-9.
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W orld Bank has targeted many countries posing obstacles to an open world econom y.1'
Differences between the types o f aid have also emerged. In 1962. Hans 
M orgenthau delineated “hum anitarian, subsistence, military, bribery, prestige, and aid for 
developm ent." ' These labels are mostly self-explanatory and are sim ilar to other 
descriptions o f  types o f  aid that have emerged over the years. M orgenthau 
conceptualized hum anitarian aid as the only non-political form o f  assistance, given to 
help countries or peoples during times o f  great duress. Subsistence aid. in his view, was 
allocated to prevent social crises in order to maintain the geopolitical status-quo. M ilitary 
aid was o f  course alliance, war. or battle-related aid. and bribery was as its name 
suggests. Prestige aid encom passed m odem  resources such as technological innovations 
given to im prove the donor’s image. -Aid for developm ent referred to assistance geared 
towards spurring econom ic developm ent. This typology is still m ostly relevant, although 
the same assistance often does encompass more than one o f  these categories, having 
m ultiple primary and secondary goals. Yet another useful category o f  aid is project aid. 
given specifically for a specific plan or project, as the W orld Bank was well-known for 
during several Cold W ar decades. This form o f  aid is less com m on today due to criticism  
o f  the “ islands o f  luxury” it created in many otherw ise devastated com m unities and its 
failure in most cases to relate to long-term developm ent goals. As stated, the efficacy o f  
foreign aid in helping alleviate suffering in poor countries rem ains disputable, and donors
l9John Van Oudenaren, Uniting Europe: European Integration and  the Post- 
C old War W orld (Lanham : Rowman and Littlefield, 2001). 244-46.
20Rita A braham sen. D isciplining Democracy: D evelopm ent D iscourse and G ood  
Governance in A frica  (London: Zed Books. 2001), 38-42; consult also Hans M orgenthau. 
“A Political Theory o f  Foreign Aid.” The Am erican Political Science Review  (1962): 
301-309.
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and outside observ ers have m ade a cottage industry out o f attem pting to discern how and
under what conditions it should be allocated.
The prim ary argum ents about the w eaknesses o f  foreign aid are that it is used to
satisfy donor rather than client needs; creates dependence; does not reach the intended
beneficiaries; supports corrupt regim es; does not help because it prescribes flawed
policies; is underm ined  by  contrad ic tory  policies; facilitates cultural imposition; causes
environm ental problem s; and exacerbates inequalities w ithin and between countries.
M ost o f  these view points have been well-docum ented, studied, and taken into
consideration, at least rhetorically, by the larger aid agencies and institutions. These
criticism s, nevertheless, still have merit in m any instances.
The contention that foreign aid is often m ore donor- than client-driv en is a weighty
one that this project exam ines in part. Certainly this is true in certain cases. Politicians.
for example, m ay be rew arded for appearing generous with foreign aid. M otivated by
bureaucratic self-preservation, IDls m ay also base som e o f  their aid decisions upon
publicity concerns. T hey m ay grant m ore assistance to countries or plights that the media
has spotlighted to boost their own im ages and reputations. W hen debt relief becam e a
popular issue in the late 1990s, for exam ple, m any aid institutions quickly took up this 
21cause. Aid agencies m ay also provide assistance to countries and regions in which their 
stakeholders have political and econom ic interests. They m ay m ake their aid conditional 
upon “reform s" that serve their stakeholders’ strategic interests.2" It would not
 —
‘ See, for exam ple, Denise Froning, “W ill Debt R elief Really Help?" The 
Washington Quarterly 24:3 (sum m er 2001); 199-211.
For a useful cr itique o f  the N o r th 's  uses o f  foreign aid, see G raham  Hancock, 
Lords o f  Poverty: The Power, Prestige, and  Corruption o f the International A id  Business 
(N ew 'Y ork; Atlantic M o n th ly  Press. 1989).
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necessarily m atter if  aid were donor-driven, as long as it was forthcom ing, if in fact aid 
always helped the client countries. As other argum ents about the usefulness o f foreign 
aid assert, this is not alw ays the case.
The argum ent that aid creates a cycle o f  dependency has been well-docum ented." ’ 
M any countries, particularly in Africa, that have depended on foreign aid for decades 
rem ain dependent. SAPs and later good governance prom otion have been ways some 
IDIs have addressed this problem ; the im plicit argument is that i f  countries adopt certain 
program s and policies, they will become less reliant upon their creditors. This does not 
alw ays or even often w ork as planned, however, as Africa, a prim ary target o f  SAPs and 
now o f  good governance prom otion program s, still lags behind in the world econom y and 
rem ains indebted to its creditors. Only during the 1990s did m any countries in Africa 
undertaken reform s, and m any o f  these reform s were cosm etic or those conducive to 
quick im plem entation. Sim ilarly. Russia, new ly freed from C om m unist rule, underwent 
shock therapy at the behest o f  its creditors in order to purportedly help it stand on its own 
feet; unfortunately, the neoliberal m acroeconom ic reforms only helped create an 
environm ent where corruption ran, and still runs, rampant. In m any ways, foreign aid 
does create dependence, even if  this is what IDIs m ean to avoid. It is not generally the 
case that IDIs desire this; it is rather that developm ent is a m ore com plex process than 
had been anticipated and that countries’ unique circum stances play a larger role than is 
often accorded them.
The argum ents that aid does not reach its intended targets and that it is squandered
" See Robert Z im m erm an, Dollars, Diplomacy, and D ependency: D ilem m as in 
U.S. Economic A id  (Boulder: W estview Press, 1993); Sarah Tisch and M ichael W allace. 
D ilem m as o f  D evelopm ent Assistance: The What, Hhv, and  Who o f  Foreign A id  
(Boulder: W estview Press, 1994).
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on corrupt argum ents have in fact been fairly well addressed, though not always resolved, 
by the m ajor IDIs in recent years. M ore consideration has been placed on transparency 
and accountability, which are o f  course easier to require w ithout the im peratives o f  the 
Cold War. For decades, rent-seeking diplom ats hoarded and squandered vital aid funds. 
IDIs granted or lent m oney to Chile under Augusto Pinochet. Ethiopia under M engistu 
Haile M ariam, the Philippines under Ferdinand M arcos, and Rom ania under Nicolai 
Ceau<;escu. Also, the poorest w ithin countries were som etim es further harm ed by sharp 
cuts in social spending resulting from neoliberal economic reform s that were part o f  aid 
packages. Decreasing the size o f  the public sector, for instance, invariably m eans m any 
o f  the poorest paid workers lose their jobs. D evolving certain state activities to the market 
can raise the level o f  exclusion o f  the poor through new pricing policies in discrim inatory 
markets. A ccountability to local clients can also be underm ined when public service 
functions are contracted out to the private sector or to NGOs. IDIs have for the most part 
acknowledged such facts, although often blam ing these problem s on the client countries 
rather than on their own program s and policies. Charges o f  corruption targeted at poor 
country governm ents and elites, though often valid, have been used by IDIs in attempt to 
help excuse their failed program s and policies.
Others have expressed concern that foreign aid does not help because it prescribes 
flawed policies or works against natural conditions in developing countries. High-yield 
seeds that were distributed by aid institutions during the “Green Revolution," for 
example, ended up delivering higher costs than benefits to countries. These seeds 
produced m ore food, required m ore fertilizer and attention, and proved disruptive too. 
Fortunately, most IDIs now incorporate equity the status-quo farm ing cycles in m any aid 
recipient countries. In Kenya in 1985. food aid intended to help ease a tem porary famine
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continued to he flown in long alter the crisis. This overabundance overw helm ed m arkets, 
depressed prices, and reduced tanners ' incom es.' In Egypt, the United States sent 
surplus food for decades during the Cold W ar to the detriment o f  local fanners, who 
could not compete. In the 1970s. Egypt could feed itself, but by the 1990s, was 
im porting close to half o f  its food supply. Another example o f  perceived flawed 
prescriptions o f  IDIs includes m any o f  the shock therapy program s advocated in post- 
Soviet Russia. The rapid adoption o f  neoliberal capitalist practices proved disastrous 
since the country did not have the political experience or institutional m echanism s in 
place to support a free market. Som e observers even attribute M exico 's  1994-1995 
currency crisis partly to adherence to IMF and N A FTA financial liberalization 
conditionalities.25 Not every attem pt to help is indeed helpful, partly because countries 
are so diverse in their histories, circum stances, and needs. M ost aid institutions o f  any 
repute have gradually realized this, but this lesson has too often been slow in coming.
Another credible argum ent against foreign assistance is that it is som etim es 
underm ined by contradictory policies. A bilateral donor may. for instance, provide aid to 
a country to help it im prove its industry and prom ote exports, while the donor country 
uses protectionist m easures that sim ultaneously harm the poor country. Am erican 
authorities urged the Bangladeshi governm ent, for example, to prom ote labor-intensive 
goods during the 1980s, but then set Am erican im port quotas on these goods.26 The EU
24Lloyd Tim berlake, “The Politics o f  Food Aid," in Earth Report: M onitoring the 
Battle fo r  Our Environment, eds. E. Goldsm ith and N. Hildyard (New York: M itchell 
Brazley, 1988). 23-24.
25See John Dillon, Turning the Tide: Confronting the M oney Traders (Ottawa: 
Canadian Centre for Policy A lternatives, 1997), 70-76.
26Anne Krueger, Econom ic Policies at Cross-Purposes: The I nited States and
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also has fairly received criticism  for its highly protectionist Com m unity Agricultural 
Policy, which often works to the detrim ent o f  m any o f the poor countries the EIJ claims 
to care about. Foreign aid loses its utility and legitim acy when contradicted in such ways. 
D onor countries do not always practice good governance policies them selves, and this 
hypocrisy does not go unnoticed. A dditionally worth noting is that com plem entarity 
between  donor policies is im portant; som etim es problem s are caused not by  a single 
donor, but by m any donors allocating aid to the sam e country. Kenya in the early 1980s, 
for exam ple, was receiving funds, som e o f  them conditional, from at least 60 donors. It is 
easy to see w hy this overw helm ed the governm ent's capacity to use this assistance 
w isely.2.
A nother objection to foreign aid policies centers on the cultural im position that 
aid entails. Structurally, the donor is always in a position o f  superiority in the aid 
dynam ic, and this opens way for m anipulation and tacit and explicit pow er plays. This 
contention m ay be particularly w ell-founded when aid is conditional upon reform s 
subject to donor agendas. W ith conditional aid, countries are often required to dism antle 
their entire formal or informal system s o f  governance and to alter their w ays o f  life in 
order to gam er aid. Yet no  gift or concessional loan truly is free in the sense that even if  
conditions are not attached, expectations are. The substantial aid packages that the 
United States has provided to Egypt over the last several decades, for exam ple, have had 
strong political m otives behind them . Egypt has long known that it owres the United 
States a certain amount o f  allegiance, particularly in a conflict situation. W eaker
D eveloping Countries (W ashington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1993), 63.
27See Sajal Lahiri and Pascalis Raim ondo-M oller, "Coordinated and 
U ncoordinated Foreign A id," in N ew  Perspectives on Foreign A id  and  Development, ed. 
B. Mak Arvin (W estport: Praeger. 2002). 124-38.
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countries have little leverage in m any cases against stronger ones, the latter prescribing 
policies they m ay not even adhere to them selves.'1' A com m on charge against the 1:U is 
that it prescribes and even requires dem ocratic reform s in its aid allocations, yet suffers 
from a dem ocratic deficit itself. U nfortunately, poor countries have little pow er to 
rem edy this and other related issues. They often find them selves stuck in situations o f 
powerlessness.
A nother criticism , that foreign aid causes or exacerbates environm ental problem s in 
recipient com m unities, has received m uch attention from NG Os and environm entalists. 
M arket capitalism  in general has been blam ed for increasing the range and extent o f  
global warm ing, ozone depletion, resource depletion, and toxic pollution, as well as 
intensifying the problem s o f  acid rain, nuclear radiation, and chemical releases. As was 
evident in recent Kyoto Protocol m eetings, capitalist expansion into developing countries 
has been blam ed for m any o f  these assaults and for causing levels o f  pollution and decay 
that w ould be unacceptable in the rich Northern countries. The W orld Bank m ost 
specifically has been rightly accused o f  paying little attention to the ways its program s 
have affected the environm ental quality in recipient countries.29 Fortunately, likely 
largely due to the negative press it has received over this issue, today this ID1 is m ore 
conscientious about how its policies affect or alter the environm ent, as are m ost o f  the
‘ M any wealthy countries and m ultilateral aid agencies for instance, require that 
client countries rem ove all barriers to trade, while m aintaining their own protectionist 
m easures. The United States, for exam ple, uses tariffs as high as 45 percent on m any o f 
the products that poor countries produce, such as agricultural staples, textiles, and 
apparel. See Froning, 202, and Ha-Joon Chang, K icking Aw ay the Ladder: D evelopm ent 
Strategy' in H istorical Perspective  (London: Anthem  Press, 2002).
29For an account o f  the W orld B ank 's environm ental degradations, see Bruce 
Rich, M ortgaging the Earth: The W orld Bank, Environm ental Impoverishment, and the 
Crisis o f  D evelopm ent (Boston: Beacon Press. 1994).
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m ajor aid institutions. “Sustainable developm ent" has becom e a popular m ovem ent. The 
m ore vehem ent critics, though, are still not satisfied, nor are they likely to be. Industrial 
developm ent causes pollution. Yet at least there is a growing awareness o f  m any o f  these 
degradations, m ade possible largely due to increased global interconnectedness. This 
m akes aid agencies increasingly accountable for—but m any contend not sufficiently 
responsive to—the environm ental im pacts o f  their policies.
Y et another com m on com plaint about foreign aid is that it exacerbates inequity, both 
within and betw een countries. The form er charge has often been well justified, as corrupt 
leaders in developing countries have m isdirected funds for personal gain and as 
neoliberal m arket reform s have often been enacted without due attention to the needs o f  
the poorest w ithin countries. As corruption has been less tolerated in recent years and as 
m ore attention has been paid to the disruptive effects o f  inequity within countries, foreign 
aid, however, is heading in a more prom ising direction. Donors have undertaken various 
initiatives to help the poorest and to prevent state capture. M ore work, though, certainly 
needs to be done in addressing this problem . The latter charge that aid contributes to 
inequality  betw een nations continues to be a com plicated problem . Rich countries 
becom e richer and m ore powerful when aid institutions require countries to open up their 
econom ies. These poor countries usually  have the potential to benefit in the long-term  as 
they are increasingly exposed to the w orkings o f  regional and international trade and 
m arket forces and as they acquire new skills and knowledge. This learning process, from 
the position o f  a weak country with an underdeveloped econom y and political structure, 
m ay be  quite painful, though. M ore could be done to help poor countries through such 
difficult times.
O ver the years, m ost donors have com e to believe that m any different factors
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contribute to developm ent and that foreign aid should be tailored to consider countries" 
unique historical, geographical, and cultural contexts. Particularly since the 1980s, donors 
have concluded that the basic neoliberal prescription that sound econom ic m anagem ent 
and an outw ard-oriented trade and industrialization strategy are im perative econom ic 
com ponents o f  successful developm ent; nonintlationary  m onetary policies and low 
budget deficits provide a favorable clim ate for saving and the accum ulation o f  capital: 
and the extent o f  a country's openness and its integration into the world econom y and 
trading system are significant for the developm ent o f  viable economies. Increasingly, 
especially since the 1990s, aid donors generally agree that the political and econom ic 
choices developing countries m ake also p lay  im portant roles in determ ining how well and 
how fast they develop, and that developm ent cannot be imposed on a country purely from 
the outside. Structural adjustm ent lending that reached the height o f  its popularity in the 
1980s helped reveal this fact. Previous experience and the lessons o f  others have 
dem onstrated to m ost bilateral and m ultilateral donors that certain characteristics o f  
governance are vital for developm ent to occur. To various degrees, m ost donors now 
agree that countries that have had a high m easure o f  political stability and social order are 
m ore likely to develop than countries that have experienced instability and chaos. Most 
also concede that the less corrupt and self-serving a developing country's governm ent, the 
m ore likely it is to achieve long-term developm ent. This involves not sim ply a 
deconcentration, but a devolution o f  state power, so that all citizens have opportunities to 
participate and influence outcomes. A lso com m only accepted today am ong donors is the 
belief that successful developm ent usually depends on developing countries having the 
m eans to protect property rights and m aintain efficient institutions. This usually  m eans 
haying institutions such as an impartial legal system  and a w ell-regulated central bank or
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banking system . Investment in the growth o f  a nation 's inhabitants such as funding 
education system s and various training program s has also been accepted as a constructive 
use o f  foreign aid. Countries that are rich in the social and political institutions that 
stim ulate interpersonal trust, civic cooperation, and social cohcsiveness usually have 
m ore efficient, responsible, and responsive governm ents; have better governance system s; 
and grow  faster.
D onors have also com e to see that greater quantities o f  assistance are not always 
m ore helpful or effective at alleviating poverty and nurturing opportunity. A country 
given too m uch foreign assistance m ay not have the capacity, experience, or even the will 
to effectively use it to its best advantage. Donors have learned that even a small quantity 
o f  w ell-targeted, w ell-m anaged aid can be useful in achieving results. G reater quantities 
o f  assistance that are poorly used will not necessarily solve or even help ease a na tion 's  
problem s. Donors have largely come to understand that essentially, foreign assistance 
given to developing countries reinforces what is already there. If  a country has good 
econom ic and governance policies, the result is likely to be m ore o f  the same. If  a country 
has inefficient econom ic policies and a corrupt or poorly m anaged political system , the 
result is likew ise generally m ore inefficiency and m ism anagement.
T he m anner in which donors provide foreign assistance m ay also influence the 
value o f  this assistance. W hen aid is given to achieve m ore than one objective, for 
exam ple, it m ay not be as useful to the recipient's growth and developm ent. For exam ple, 
when assistance goes to an ally to further strategic objectives, as with United States 
assistance allocated to Honduras in the 1980s, it m ay reinforce unproductive econom ic 
choices. In addition, other econom ic or trade policies sometimes underm ine the 
developm ental goals o f  a donor's foreign assistance program. An extreme exam ple
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occurred when the United States set quotas on Bangladeshi textile imports soon after 
providing foreign assistance that this country used to expand its textile exports, f  oreign 
aid. donors have learned, must be granted considering the larger econom ic and political 
context in which the both donor and recipient are situated, t hese contexts help determ ine 
the ways aid ends up being utilized.
In recent years, most IDIs. bilateral and m ultilateral, have come to recognize that 
foreign assistance is but a small com ponent o f  a larger picture. In 1996. M ancur O lson.
Jr.. sum m ed up the sentiments o f  many foreign aid donors when he reported that factors 
such as access to knowledge and capital cannot explain the relative income differences 
between nations: "The only rem aining plausible explanation is that the great differences 
in the wealth o f  nations are mainly due to differences in the quality o f  their institutions 
and econom ic p o l ic ie s ." ID Is  have largely concluded that poor nations with the best 
econom ic and governance policies consistently grow the fastest. Donors typically agree 
that factors such as the quality o f a poor country's economic and governance policies 
appear to be considerably more important in prom oting growth and developm ent than the 
quantity o f  foreign assistance the country receives. In fact, how successful foreign 
assistance is in promoting growth critically depends on such background conditions, 
which are highly contingent upon a com plex array o f  political and econom ic factors.
Donors have learned through experience that although foreign assistance appears to 
have only a m arginal effect overall on the im m ediate or short-term  quality o f  life in a 
given country, it may promote developm ent in the long term, depending on the 
environm ent in which that assistance is used and the larger fram ework in which it is
^'M ancur Olson, Power am i Prosperity: Outgrowing Communist and  C 'apitalist 
Dictatorship  (New York: Basic Books, 2000).
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given. A ssistance offered to countries that are well-governed and have adopted 
m arket-oriented econom ic policies and socially inclusive political policies m ay provide a 
boost to their developm ent. On the other hand, assistance given to countries that have 
been governed poorly or have em ployed restrictive economic and political policies is less 
likely to positively contribute to their well-being and future prospects.'11
D espite these agreem ents by m ost foreign aid donors, though, the good governance 
and dem ocracy prom otion program s that have proliferated in IDIs vary considerably. 
Some, such as the W orld B ank’s, stress qualities such as financial openness, 
transparency, accountability. The U N D P 's good governance program s take a m ore 
holistic view  tow ards developm ent and foreign assistance, em phasizing equity w ithin 
countries in the developm ent process and the im portance o f  participation and locally 
grown civil society as powerful moral forces to regulate a country 's econom ic and 
political decisions and its use o f  foreign aid. The EU ’s good governance policies largely 
stress the im portance o f  dem ocracy, hum an rights, poverty alleviation, and open access to 
political participation by citizens in poor countries. U SA ID 's good governance program s 
reveal a heightened concern with the stability o f  political and econom ic system s. The 
good governance term inology IDIs is often similar, but the pow er structures that rule 
them  still influence their priorities, policies, and program s. Globalization, or the 
w eakening o f  borders and intensified penetration through borders o f  ideas, people, 
money, and other resources, has helped propel m any foreign assistance donors to think 
more clearly about to whom  and how they give. Most donors have realized the value o f
3'Joachim  Ahrens, “Tow ards a Post-W ashington Consensus: The Im portance o f  
G overnance Structures in Less-Developed Countries and Econom ies in T ransition," in 
State, Society, and  Developm ent: Lessons fro m  Africa, eds. N iels Hermes and W iem er 
Sal veda (Groningen: University o f Groningen, 1999). 18-64.
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sound econom ic policies and credible governance institutions, yet differences and 
disparities persist about how to best help the w orld 's poorest and how to best safeguard 
and im prove the freedom and security o f  those who already have it. IDIs new emphasis 
on good governance and dem ocracy prom otion is not sim ply a fad; there is much truth to 
the rationale behind such program s and policies. Yet underneath the rhetoric, more 
individualized m otives continue to surface albeit in new ways. The value o f  foreign aid in 
the future lies partially with learning to discrim inate what truly is in the best interests o f  
poor countries and what perhaps is donor-serving and less relevant to the actual needs o f 
the poorest.
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CHAPTER II
TH E EM ERGEN CE OF THE GOOD GOVERNA NCE AGENDA
The early 1990s were a turning point o f  sorts in the history o f  foreign assistance. 
The ending o f  the Cold W ar and its strategic prerogatives coincided with the apparent 
trium ph o f  dem ocracy. Also, a general decline in public support for foreign aid program s 
surfaced in the U nited States and abroad. Such factors and others led the aid industry in 
general to reevaluate its m ethods and motives. The good governance agenda evolved 
during this time.
Part o f  this new agenda relates to changing views o f  the significance o f  the state 
in the W estphalian sense. A review  o f  tim ely literature on the role the state can and 
should play in the developm ent process helps explain significant aspects o f  the good 
governance agenda.
Relevance o f  the State 
A num ber o f  scholars have provocatively argued that the state is less relevant in 
this era o f  globalization, or international interconnectedness that intensified in the 1990s 
and continues today. K enichi Ohm ae, for exam ple, is known for his statem ent that the 
state is an “artifact o f  the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries" that has already lost its 
role as a m eaningful participant in the global economy. He contends that states are 
increasingly ineffective at satisfying the needs and desires o f  citizens and that their most 
vital reasons for being (controlling m ilitary strength and the use o f  natural resources) are 
no longer im portant. N ational m ilitary strength is too expensive to m aintain, and the 
world is now inform ation-, not natural resource-based, Ohm ae argues. Nations also no
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longer m aintain their territorial identities, for globalization enables people to 
com m unicate in real time any time: states have becom e virtual. People 's physical 
locations are less im portant, as technology, com m unications, and travel have made the
world essentially borderless.1 This argument does raise im portant considerations: the 
state is less im portant in fulfilling certain functions. Ohm ae, however, fails to consider 
new roles that the state has assum ed as the world has changed, as m ediators in the 
processes o f  globalization, as will be discussed. Perhaps instead o f  calling the state 
“dead"’ or “useless,” it would be m ore appropriate to call the state “changed.”
Others who question the relevance o f  the state to m odem  life argue that not only 
are the reasons for the existence o f  the state dim inished, but also that the state is no 
longer able to m anage its econom y or its citizenry. S tates' claim s to autonom y such as 
the ability to control cross-border econom ic negotiations, investm ent, monetary’ and fiscal 
policy, imm igration, em igration, and even exposure to ideas are all dim inished. 
Transnational corporations (TNC's) search out cheap resources, labor, and tax systems 
from global offerings and becom e in essence nation-less. National governm ents have 
trouble taxing businesses with m ultiple operations in different countries, and thus collect 
less revenue to provide for social welfare. People travel in search o f  opportunity and 
eventually many, including the generations that follow them, lose connection with their 
original national identities. Ideas and information know no borders and are increasingly 
difficult to m onitor or control. These points are largely legitim ate, as the international 
landscape has m arkedly changed over the past few decades: the s ta te 's  form er loci o f  
control have indeed shifted. The sta te 's  usefulness has not, however, becom e eradicated.
r Kenichi Ohmae, “The End o f  the Nation State," in The Globalization Reader. 
eds. Frank l.echner and John Bob (Oxford: Blackwell. 2000). 207-11.
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The state today by necessity assum es a different, albeit no less im portant role. For 
developm ent to be sustained or for it to occur, the state m ust provide not only a certain 
level o f  openness but also a responsiveness to how this openness affects its citizenry.
The state chooses to participate in the global political econom y by its rules, regulations, 
and conventions. National leaders, influenced by their constituents, then m ust assess how 
globalization is affecting them  and the country’s position in the larger world political 
econom y and gear its responses tow ards self-preservation. W hen the Asian financial 
crisis occurred in 1997, for exam ple, the United States and other Organization for 
Econom ic Cooperation and D evelopm ent (OECD) states provided funds in attem pt to 
help assuage the global and regional impacts, and each state m ade adjustm ents in its own 
decisions about how to best protect itself. The emergency was not handled perfectly by 
OECD states, or even well by som e standards, but few could dispute that this situation 
required an active response by the state. In essence, the state’s role is not dead. It is 
sim ply different.
M any scholars further argue that national governm ents have becom e in a sense 
slaves to the m arket’s forces—they have becom e reactors to the m arket, rather than actors. 
Governments, alert that they m ust com pete to lure and retain vital factors o f  production, 
lower taxes and thus their spending. The provision o f  public goods decreases with the 
revenues, and as capital and labor becom e more fluid, “dollars begin to count for more 
than v o te s .. . and dem ocracy is defeated.” People m ay believe they live in dem ocratic 
societies, these critics assert, but this is a mere illusion. In less or non-dem ocratic 
societies, people m ay believe their leaders are basing their policies on their stated goals 
and plans, but instead they are playing a game o f  continuous catch-up with m arket forces
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over which they have little control.~ This argument makes som e well-grounded 
contentions, yet also fails to consider that entering the market by reducing protectionism  
and opening borders is a conscious choice by states in order to gain perceived rewards. 
And such rewards have indeed been forthcoming: m any once im poverished Asian 
countries have transform ed them selves into wealthy, vital nations by em bracing the 
m arket and actively seeking to use it to their best advantages. China today is an apt 
exam ple o f  a country that is actively pursuing m arket and political openness, although 
som etim es warily, in order to acquire the gains other nearby nations have reaped. In 
doing so, China is by no m eans retiring its state control: it is consciously shifting it to 
m eet the dem ands o f  a changing world.
The claim s that declare the state, and all o ther international or regional actors, are 
less relevant do have som e merit and do provide som e needed insight. Susan Strange 
writes that due to globalization, “state authority has leaked away, upwards, sideways, and 
downwards. In som e m atters, it seem s even to have gone nowhere, ju st evaporated. The 
realm o f  anarchy in society and econom y has becom e m ore extensive and all kinds o f 
authority have dim inished.” In S trange 's opinion, the state is “hollow ing out” and this is 
dangerous, for “some necessary authority once exercised by states is now exercised by no
one.”3 According to such critics, supranational organizations are, like the state, market- 
bound. N ot even the rising force o f  civil society can m ake m uch im pact on the market- 
driven world, they say. States have lost power, and no entity has m ade m arked progress 
as a counter-force against wild capitalism . Som e cite recent uprisings o f  cultural groups
^ “M arkets Go Global," Economist 344 (20 Septem ber 1997): 23-6.
3 Susan Strange, “The Defective State," Daedalus: .Journal o f  the Am erican  
Academ y o f  Arts 124:2 (1995): 56-59. 71.
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with shared histories or religious convictions as a sign that the state and the sense o f order 
and com m unity it once imparted are no longer sound. Theodore Levitt contends that the 
‘ obsolete" state is sounding its “ last violent death rattle," and that this rattle is now being 
heard in the form o f  virulent nationalism  or ideological sentiment expressed by many, 
m ostly from developing countries. It is largely a backlash against globalization and its 
weakening o f  national cohesion, Levitt asserts, and against neoliberal orthodoxy (which 
is hegem onic due to the econom ic pow er o f  the North, particularly that o f  the United
States).4 Certainly the tragic events o f  Septem ber, 11, 2001, drew attention to this 
conviction. Even before Septem ber 11, Peter D rucker aptly wrote that the state “has 
shown am azing resilience.”5 Its roles have changed; the international social, political, 
and econom ic landscape has changed and continues to evolve. States have adapted or at 
least begun adapting to their new duties and obligations. Economist M artin W olf also 
sees the state as still not only viable, but vital. He writes that "[gjlobalization is a journey 
. . . towards an unreachable destination.” A fully “globalized w orld” is im possible, he 
contends, since in such a w orld, the costs o f  transportation and com m unication would be 
zero, and the barriers created by  different national leaderships would have vanished 
completely. W olf argues further, echoing the thoughts o f  many, that globalization is not 
an inevitable process, but rather, a choice that states and national leaders make.
6
“G lobalization can progress only as far as national policy m akers will allow ,” he writes.
Theodore Levitt, “The G lobalization o f  M arkets," I la n a r d  Business 
Review  (M ay/June 1983); 101.
5 Peter Drucker, “The G lobal Econom y and the Nation-State: A True 
Survivor,” Foreign Affairs  76:5 (Septem ber/O ctober 1995): 159.
0 M artin W olf, “W ill the N ation-State Survive G lobalization?" Foreign A ffairs 
80:1 (January/February 2001). 178.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
States opt to participate in the international econom y and to partake in the international 
social environm ent because doing so increases their capacities to provide for and protect 
their citizens. M ost every econom ist, Gini index in hand, can tout the long-term  gains o f 
open m arkets, for rich and poor nations alike.
The fact is that since the developed world has embraced globalization to the 
extent that it has, the dev eloping world has little choice but to follow suit. Yet 
unfortunately, even though it will be o f benefit, the developing world in itially  has little 
choice in the m atter and is forced to play by the developed w orld 's  rules in the developed 
w orld’s game. Even if  in the long run, globalization brings absolute gains to all o f  its 
participants, it can still be uncom fortable to m ake the shift to a m ore open econom y and 
society (especially under the tutelage o f  another).7 Yet this is where the Third-W orld state 
has enorm ous potential and also the daunting challenge o f stepping in to help buffer and 
protect its citizens in the process. Richard fliggott writes tellingly about how states can 
step in to help m itigate the short-term  painful effects o f  globalization, particularly in 
developing countries. An im portant step states can take, lie aptly contends, that is often 
overlooked is to open far-reaching channels o f  com m unication w ith citizens and help 
m ake them  aware o f  the process o f  globalization, what it entails, and w hat its short- and 
long-term s effects m ay be. A fter that, national leaders can m ake efforts to becom e attune 
to the segm ents in their societies that m ay be suffering the m ost and attem pt to increase
their livelihoods and opportunities.8 In an ideal world, that is what m odem  developing 
states w ould do. This ideal is indeed at least part o f  many good govem nance agendas.
Tbid.
8Richard Higgott, "Econom ic, Politics, and the (International) Political 
Economy: The Need for a Balanced Diet in an Era o f  G lobalization,” N ew  Political 
Econom y  4:1 (M arch 1999): 23-36.
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State m ediation is an im portant com ponent o f  the developm ent process, and 
where no functioning, coherent, and com m itted state exists, this absence is felt. The 
world has witnessed the difficulties m any states have experienced while opening up their 
econom ies. The "shock therapy" o f  Eastern European and Russian states following the 
Soviet U n ion 's collapse serves as a cautionary tale: too much swift econom ic 
restructuring w ithout a capable state accountable to its citizens' basic needs can not only 
be too painful to bear but also m akes conditions ripe for state re-capture. The state, rich 
or poor, continues to have profound significance, but its methods, responses, duties, and 
roles have m arkedly changed.
States can indeed becom e m ore powerful and impactful than ever before. 
Econom ist Hendrik Spruyt rightly argues that it is “possible to argue that globalization 
actually enhances sovereign authority ."9 National governm ents becom e more valuable in 
their abilities to affect dom estic w ellness and to secure a place in the larger world for 
their citizenries through international involvem ents, whether formal or informal. Ian 
Douglas calls the new charge to states a responsibility o f "know ing the terrain within 
which we are situated" and o f  w orking flexibly w ithin this new terrain. States are not 
stronger in and o f  them selves, yet because they are more networked, they are connected 
with m ore pow er channels. D ouglas continues to assert that states are "not w itnessing the
evaporation o f  authority but its reverse: the deeper em bedding o f  order.” 10 States actually 
have m ore potential to partake in international public goods and gam er influence than in
9Hendrik Spruyt, “D ecline Reconsidered." H a n a r d  International Review 17:3 
(sum m er 1995): 38-9.
10 Ian Douglas. "G lobalisation and the End o f  the State?" New Political Economy  
2:1 (7 M arch 1997): 165-77.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3 7
any previous tim e, but they m ust work through new complex venues and use m ore 
sophisticated m ethods to perform their duties and rem ain viable.
States are still learning how to claim  their new  power and m ake it last. The rise o f 
civil society, once thought o f  as a check on state power, m ight actually end up 
em pow ering the state by helping prevent it from self-destructing w ith wild capitalism . 
Local, regional, and international civic activism  can help instruct and guide states as they 
attem pt to bolster the quality o f  life o f  their citizenries. The transform ation and potential 
increased role o f  the state, for believers, requires that states become m ore cosm opolitan. 
Knowledge is an ever stronger source o f  power. Territoriality is no longer relegated to 
geographical space. Soft power is more relevant than ever before, as states learn from 
other states they respect and admire.
The state has clearly lost control in certain dom ains as a result o f  globalization, 
but this does not m ean it is no longer pertinent. In fact, it has the potential to be more 
significant than  ever before, by actively embracing the benefits o f  globalization and 
presciently w orking to counter the negative aspects.
Econom ic developm ent requires the transform ation o f  state institutions, which 
cannot occur w ithout political and social reforms fostered and consistently m onitored by 
the state. The good governance agenda o f  various IDIs is in many w ays an outgrow th o f  
the altered roles states m ust adopt in the world o f  the new centurty. W ith m ore 
interconnectedness and trans-border activity, greater, not fewer, state-im posed rules are 
often necessary to provide a semblance o f  order and predictability in the m idst o f  new 
forces and im pacts. M any states are taking m easures to provide good governance in 
various form s, such as providing reliable institutions. Leading IDIs are encouraging
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this, as well as efforts to attach states to supranational good governance agreem ents.11 
No clear and error-free road map for what this entails exists, however. Shifting roles can 
be a daunting process for states with little or no experience in these realm s. Additionally, 
m otivations o f  intervening institutions are not always benign. As Bruce R. Scott 
contends, the “W ashington consensus on the universality o f  the rich-country [state] 
m odel" can be "both sim plistic and se lf-se rv ing ." '‘ Many have said the sam e o f  the post- 
W ashington consensus, or the conclusion that politics m atter as m uch if  not m ore than 
economics.
Participating in globalization is a conscious choice states m ake, albeit oftentim es 
out o f  desperation. In a general sense, the rew ards clearly outweigh the dow n sides. Yet. 
particularly early on, developing countries often have little influence in shaping their 
involvem ent in the world econom y, and som e prescribed "rules o f  the gam e" are 
w eighted against them. The W orld Bank estim ates that the developing countries would 
gain about S30 billion a year in w ealth i f  the rich countries lowered their own agricultural 
trade barriers alone.13 W ealthy nations often limit imm igration from poor countries into 
their own, yet insist that their TN Cs have open entry into poor countries. Because 
developing countries lack w isdom  and influence in the world econom y, their own states 
are particularly vexed by having to m ake decisions about whether and how to integrate. 
There is no easy resolution to these problem s, yet a recognition o f  the v iability  o f  sound.
11 For m ore on these supranational efforts, see Susanne Soederberg. “Grafting 
Stability onto G lobalisation? D econstructing the IM F’s Recent Bid for Transparency." 
Third World Quarterly 22:5 (2001): 849-64.
12 Bruce R. Scott, “The Great D ivide in the Global V illage,” Foreign Affairs  80:1 
(January/February 2001): 176.
M Cited in "Hunger: Always with IJs." Economist 363:8277 (15 June 2002): 73.
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credible states experienced in taking care o f their constituents and capitalizing on the 
opportunities available with increased international transactions is a beginning.
It is useful to review not only theories on the relevance o f  the m odem  state, but 
also the history o f  developm ent theories as precursors to an exam ination o f  ID Is' good 
governance agendas. As views on the role o f  the state inform the program s and policies 
o f  IDIs, so too do opinions on what developm ent means and how it can be achieved.
Theories o f  Development 
M any scholars and practitioners agree that as the twenty-first century has set in. 
developm ent theory has either becom e less relevant, reached an impasse, o r becom e too 
esoteric and disjointed to be o f  use. The Third W orld, the periphery, or the satellite 
countries, as different writers prefer to term the less-developed countries, are still largely 
im poverished, and the developed world still cares, but maybe not as m uch as it once did. 
N eoliberalism  seem ed to “win"’ the w ar and the world wdth the collapse o f  the Soviet 
U nion in 1991, yet the absolute gains o f  free trade seem relatively slow in com ing to poor 
nations. The problem s o f  underdevelopm ent still abound, with people dying o f  hunger 
and the diseases o f  poverty in the South at inexcusable rates. Civil wars and high crim e 
rates continue to plague the poorest countries. Natural resources are still utilized at 
alarm ing rates, and the N orth-South incom e gap continues to widen. The excluded in the 
Third W orld have not yet discovered any universally or even largely effective form ula for 
increasing their opportunities and access to prosperity or even improved w ell-being. 
A dditionally, byproducts o f  poverty and poor governance such as more sophisticated 
international drug trafficking and terrorism  have surfaced with unprecedented 
repercussions.
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M any recent approaches to distill postm odern or new radical theories where 
“helping rediscovers its innocence"14 are still them selves being better form ulated and 
articulated as the state o f  the international political econom y field progresses. No single 
im pactful theory has emerged in recent years that has provided m eaningful insight and 
clarity to theoretical debate, yet m any sm aller theories have provided som e degree o f  
illum ination. 1 he recent emphasis on good governance and dem ocracy is not really a 
theory, yet it draws from a growing understanding provided by the m any theories and 
ideas about developm ent that have gained attention over time and from donors' 
experiences.
In any case, it is w orthw hile to survey the m ajor developm ent theories that have 
captured attention since the end o f  W orld W ar II as their rises and in m any cases demises 
help illum inate the ongoing developm ent debate. Som e scholars m ake an interesting 
distinction between political theories o /deve lopm en t and political theories for  
developm ent. The form er theories chiefly explain, while the latter (m ostly Northern in 
origin) chiefly prescribe. This chapter will briefly review both o f  these types, exam ining 
m ainly the dom inant theories: m odernization theory, dependency theory, world system s 
theory, neoliberalism , postm odernism , fem inist developm ent theory, postcolonial theory, 
and the relatively new good governance and dem ocracy prom otion agenda. All o f  these 
purportedly concern them selves with im proving the living conditions in and levels o f  
prosperity o f  the poorest countries. D evelopm ent is often m easured with standardized 
indicators such as real gross dom estic capita, life expectancy, adult literacy, daily  caloric 
supply, access to safe drinking water, and infant or under-age-five m ortality rates. Some 
believe, however, as is evident in m uch o f  the U N D P 's recent literature, that such
^  Quote from M arianne Gronem eyer, "Helping," in The D evelopm ent D ictionary: 
A Guide to Knowledge and Tower, ed. W. Sachs (London: Zed Books. 1992), 66.
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indicators cannot conic close to m easuring w ell-being 's intangibles, which theories tor 
developm ent tend to overlook with their loci on econom ic progress. Development is 
difficult to define and to m easure, regardless o f  the theory or theories used.
The lifespan o f developm ent theories is relatively short: they becam e popular in 
the w ake o f  W orld W ar 11, as countries looked to reconstruct their econom ies and 
societies after this period o f  devastation and uncertainty. Europe and Japan faced the 
enorm ous task o f  rebuilding what had been destroyed, the United States looked towards 
building a new world conducive to its interests and values, and Third W orld countries 
faced new  opportunities and challenges as m any o f  their former their colonial ties were 
w eakened or severed. The issue o f  how the British, French, Portuguese, and other 
European colonies and form er colonies could be m ade more productive called for 
practical responses. About 35 percent o f  the world remained in a colonial or sem i­
colonial condition. Everyone, o f  course, had his or her own ideas about how nations 
should design their foreign econom ic policies. Initially Keynesian econom ists 
form ulated prescriptions based on a “positivist orthodoxy." It was inspired by the success 
o f  the w artim e and post-w ar state intervention in the econom y and by the M arshall Plan. 
New ly independent countries and African colonies vying for independence were urged to 
increase rural productivity and to shift unnecessary agricultural labor into industry. By 
the end o f  the 1950s, though, this early faith in neo-classical developm ent econom ics had 
begun to fade, as developm ent failed to proceed. Laggard econom ic growth in countries 
such as India revealed that developm ent was m ore complex than had been assumed.
A new school o f  m ostly Am erican theorists soon began to dom inate the 
developm ent discourse. They cam e from outside o f  the two largest aid organizations in 
the world then, the W orld Bank and USAID, with their explanations for previous failures
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at facilitating developm ent by powerful policy makers. With a degree o f  hubris 
undisguised, m odernization theorists, or structuralists, held up the N orth 's historical 
developm ent experience as the model o f progress all nations should, and inevitably 
would, follow. For these theorists, with their pride in the A m erica 's newfound global 
pow er and the notew orthy pow er o f  her W estern European allies, econom ic developm ent 
w ithin a “m odem " (or liberal dem ocratic) society was the goal all countries should seek. 
Authors cited different characteristics o f  m odernity, but most descriptions included 
secularization, urbanization, scientific and technological advancem ent, and social 
m obility. They also em phasized supposed precursors to developm ent such as m erit-based 
wealth, regard for social innovation and intellectual diversity, an independent private 
sphere, rule by law, private property rights, and an advanced labor division. They argued 
that such com ponents com plem ented the growth o f  m odem  capitalism , which would, in 
turn, spur developm ent. Development w as believed to involv e m ovem ent through certain 
econom ic stages.15
As Christine Sylvester writes, the
usual recipe called for the local use o f  resources rationally, in tandem  with 
assistance from developed countries, and w ithin a dem ocratic environm ent. By 
follow ing the rationality  o f  m odernization, a country afflicted by 
underdevelopm ent could hope to m ove briskly  into the m odem  tem po o f  life 
w ithin a relatively few years, perhaps a decade.16
M odernization theory, though, began to be increasingly challenged by the late 1960s, as
developm ent did not occur as anticipated in m ost poor countries, and the growth o f
authoritarian regim es and revolutionary struggles in the Third W orld increased. It
15 Cyril Black, The Dynam ics o f  M odernization  (New' York: Harper and Row.
1966).
16 Christine Sylvester, “Development Studies and Postcolonial Studies:
Disparate Tales o f  the Third W orld," Third W orld Quarterly 20:4 (1999): 703-21.
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becam e m ore and m ore clear that not all countries could achieve developm ent by 
following a N orthern-draw n road map. M odernization theory obviously was not 
universally applicable to the Third W orld. Transitional countries were often less stable 
than either traditional or m odem  ones. V iolence and instability resulted from rapid social 
change in countries without effective political institutions to m ediate and moderate.
In the m eantim e, the developing countries still faltered behind, showing few signs 
o f  progress. Latin Am erican countries in particular felt slighted, as they had been 
form ally independent for a century or more, with little share o f  the N orth 's  wealth. 
Additionally, critics, often rightly, accused m odernization theorists o f  acting out o f  class 
and ideological self-interest. Later observers would contend that the United States in 
particular structured developm ent policies which bolstered its econom y and pow er in 
absolute term s and relative to the power o f  its ch ie f rival, the Soviet Union. Others 
would reproach the North for believing its particular developm ent model was suited for 
countries w ith vastly different histories and cultures. The loudest condem nation at the 
time cam e from  the people o f  Latin America. Their protests were credible, yet their 
proposed alternatives would not prove viable.
N eo-M arxist dependency theory, popularized in the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
arose out o f  objection to m odernization theory and its pro-N orthem , capitalist orientation. 
D ependency theorists did not reproach the virtues o f  m odernization, but held that 
delinking from  the world econom y through a Socialist revolution was the only fair and 
effective developm ent solution. Socialist nations could then pursue their own 
independent developm ent processes, without Northern in terference.17 Andre Gunder
1 'D avid  Booth. "M arxism  and Developm ent Sociology: Interpreting the 
Im passe." W orld D evelopm ent 13:7 (19X5): 761-X7.
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Frank echoed the ideas o f  scholars such as Raol Prebisch and drew from I.atin Am erican 
historiography as he critiqued the North. With an unsettling degree o f m erit to his 
claims, Frank blam ed rich capitalist countries for having exploited the developing 
w orld 's natural resources and labor and for creating dependent elites. He and others 
contended that the rich countries extended control over the developing world through 
exploitative trade structures, such as the BW ls. The North was in essence developing  
underdevelopm ent, so that the Third W orld would rem ain eternally dependent and 
powerless. D ependency theorists had a right to feel this way, and they progressed 
som ew hat at having their voices heard. International institutions took a few o f  their ideas 
into account in form ulating policy, yet underdevelopm ent remained, and the N orth-South 
incom e gap continued to widen. Delinking from the w orld economy, though an enticing 
idea for m any exasperated by the w orld 's inequity, did not prove to be a realistic solution.
Theorists carried on and looked for new' ideas to help stim ulate the w orld 's  poor 
countries and econom ies. W orld systems theory, a som ewhat more virulent form o f  
dependency theory, grew out o f  m any o f  dependency theory 's assum ptions. It. however, 
m ade the world system , rather than the individual state, the proper unit for developm ent 
analysis. I f  w ithin a developed country the contradistinction between labor and its 
ow nership led to class struggle, then on a global scale it led to struggle betw een 
countries. This was because the concentration o f  industry and capital in som e countries 
was form ed at the expense o f  the developing world. The prim ary conflict o f  capitalism  
was not betw een the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, but between the developed and the 
developing countries, or the core and the periphery. The labor class in the core countries 
helped exploit the periphery, and. therefore, proletariat revolutions could not solve this 
larger conflict. Rich countries like the United States were thought to exert structural
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power over poor countries by influencing financial and m onetary arrangem ents and 
determ ining the price o f  the w orld 's trading and reserve currency. This insightful yet still 
not solution-oriented approach focused on the dynam ic o f  interdependence and the 
global system ic structure and connected processes. Developm ent trends and cycles were 
analyzed using a large-scale and long-term  fram ew ork. Immanuel W allerstein argued that 
due to concentrating on m anufacturing industry, labor specialization and organization 
enabled W estern Europe and the United States to develop strong state system s. In 
contrast, the less-developed countries adopted a form o f  production requiring relatively 
little skill. These countries becam e exporters o f  basic products. Over tim e, the 
developed countries becam e increasingly able to extract surplus from the weaker 
countries, due to their capable state system s. Because o f  their increasingly strong 
position, the developed countries began im posing term s o f trade, which only exacerbated 
global economic and social inequalities. These theorists asserted that the developed 
world did not sincerely wish to prom ote Third W orld developm ent, but sim ply wished to 
further its own gains in this exploitative relationship .Ix They m ade their points well. The 
problem  with this approach was that despite its perspicacity, it offered little practical 
advice on how to rem edy this system ic injustice. It also failed to account for the fact that 
some Third W orld countries were in fact becom ing econom ically sturdy in the face o f 
these well-articulated odds.
Another theory, neoliberalism , attem pted to prescribe rem edies for 
underdevelopm ent that world system s theory could not. Lack o f  developm ent in poor 
countries was ascribed to import substitution, expansion o f  the governm ent sector, and a
l8Immanuel W allerstein, “The Rise and Future D em ise o f  the W orld 
Capitalist System ,’’ Com parative Studies in Society and  H istory  16 (1974): 387-415.
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large-scale regulation o f  the private sector o f the economy, or basically, too much state. 
N eoliberalism  becam e popular in the late 1970s after the debt crisis o f  the time, the 
w idespread econom ic stagnation o f  the 1970s, and the grow ing plight o f  Socialist 
econom ies. N eoliberals shared a belief that state intervention, rather than providing 
necessary stability, interfered with development. Deepak Lai. P.T. Bauer, Bela Balassa. 
Ian Little, and others from  the new right called for a less-regulated global m arketplace 
that they argued w ould spur growth and developm ent everywhere. The invisible hand o f  
the m arket could benefit rich and poor nations alike. G overnm ent spending reductions 
and m arket-enhancing policies were advocated. Neoliberalism  had an ideological 
com ponent, as “containm ent liberalism " aimed to deliver econom ic growth through 
foreign aid. This w ould reduce the attractiveness o f  Com m unism  in the Third W orld and 
ensure that the N orth could continue exercising and expanding its control there .19 M any 
o f  these theorists supported conditional BWI loans to developing countries to help 
stim ulate their econom ies. The debt crisis o f 1982 served as the opening for structural 
adjustm ent program s (SAPs), which sought to roll back the state even further from 
econom ic life. SA Ps intended to weaken dom estic entrepreneurial groups by elim inating 
protectionist barriers to N orthern imports, lifting foreign investm ent restrictions, and 
integrating poor econom ies into the Northern-dom inated global econom y. Structural 
adjustm ent loans (SA Ls) were quick-dispersing loans which could relieve a country’s 
balance-of-paym ents deficit or repay interest due to private banks or the BW Is. 
Conditions w'ere attached. Receiving countries often were required to reduce governm ent 
spending, in order to control inflation and reduce the dem and for capital inflows from
l9John Brohm an, “Universalism , Lurocentrism, and Ideological Bias in 
Developm ent Studies: From M odernisation to Neoliberalism ," Third W orld Quarterly
16:1 (M arch 1995): 121-40.
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abroad, a practice often resulting in reduced social spending. Receiving countries often 
had to cut wages to reduce inflation and make their exports more com petitive: liberalize 
restrictions on imports; remove foreign investment restrictions: devalue local currencies 
relative to hard currencies like the dollar: privatize state enterprises: and embark upon 
extensive deregulation programs. If the receiving country did not follow these 
guidelines, often successive loan dispersions would be w ith h e ld .C o m m o n  challenges to 
SAPs have been num erous and justifiable. Structural change does not happen easily. 
Those with personal and institutional interests in m aintaining the status-quo in Third 
W orld countries have worked to sabotage the SAP process. The governm ent elite often 
do not want to lose their own power or curb state spending, and the em ergent capitalist 
classes resent paying higher taxes. Another challenge is that the poorest offer suffer 
initially as welfare program s are cut. Further still, the lending institutions often lack the 
authority to successfully m onitor the structural adjustment process. M any in the Third 
W orld seek to subvert this Northern imposition.
Neoliberalism  in general is susceptible to many o f  the sam e sorts o f  criticism s as 
m odernization theory , such as universalism. Eurocentrism. and ideological bias. John 
Brohm an, for example, writes that neoliberalism , like m ainstream  developm ent theory, 
has been largely inspired by the social and historical backgrounds and experiences o f 
Northern industrialized states.21 This approach, like m odernization theory, attem pts to 
form ulate universally valid concepts and models, overlooking the vast differences o f
20Stephen N degw a. “A Case Against Structural A djustm ent.” New Political 
Econom y  2:2 (July 1997): 318-22; Jam es Manor. “Politics and the N eoliberals.” in States 
or Markets'! Neoliberalism and  the Development Policy Debate, eds. Christopher 
Colclough and James M anor (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1991).
21 Brohman. 121-40.
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nations' experiences and realities.“  Further, the North obviously has a stake in open 
access to Third W orld m arkets and resources, which neoliberalism  promotes. Also, there 
is the contention that since the developed world has embraced neoliberalism  to the extent 
that it has, the developing world has little choice but to follow suit. Even if  it will 
benefit, the developing w orld has little choice in the matter and is forced to play by the 
developed w orld 's  rules. Even if  in the long run, neoliberalism  brings absolute gains to 
all o f  its participants, it can still be uncom fortable to make the shift to a m ore open 
econom y and society.
As neoliberal practices benefitted some countries yet w ere not easily applicable to 
or useful for others, new  developm ent theories began to em erge in the late 1980s and into 
the 1990s. Jan N everdeen Pieterse m akes a useful distinction betw een alternative 
developm ent theories and som e o f  the new er theories proposing alternatives to 
developm ent. Recent theories have tended to fall into one o f  these categories. The 
form er ones pay attention to the S outh 's lack o f  popular participation in developm ent, 
while the latter, in deconstructing the underlying premises and m otives o f  developm ent, 
end up rejecting the very concept o f  developm ent altogether. A lternative developm ent 
theories express a broad range o f  concerns, such as how civil society m ight help the 
developing world shape its ow n developm ent course and how ethnic identities im pact and 
are im pacted by developm ent. The idea o f  sustainable developm ent also has becom e 
increasingly popular. M ost theories concerned with alternatives to developm ent attempt 
to reveal the developm ent's Northern bias and to negate the very value o f  developm ent as
M ancur Olson, for exam ple, writes tellingly about how certain institutions 
conducive to neoliberalism  and capitalism  such as secure property rights evolved as a 
m atter o f  course in the North, yet were never well or largely im plem ented in the South. 
This in turn hindered the natural developm ent o f  capitalist system s in m any Southern 
economies. Olson. 25-44.
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conceived by the N orth.' ' These theories denounce m any aspects o f  the Northern-led 
developm ent ideas, yet most are under-speeilied or, like dependency and world systems 
theory, fail to propose viable rem edies to w idespread poverty.
One notew orthy alternative developm ent approach em phasizes the rising force o f  
civil society as a means to help developm ent proceed in a m ore hum ane m anner.24 The 
developm ent com m unity generally has portrayed civil society as a positive 
counterbalance or dem ocratic corrective to both the authoritarian or otherw ise repressive 
or corrupt state and to the potentially unsettling and destructive aspects o f  globalization. 
In the latter decades o f  the twentieth century, civil society gained influence due to 
technological advances and other facets o f  globalization that enabled w ider and broader 
com m unication and m obilization. The appeal and legitim acy o f  civil society was 
enhanced by the im portant role civic groups played in rallying against Com m unism  and 
authoritarianism  in the Soviet Union and Asia in the years prior to 1989 and later in 
m obilizing against apartheid in South Africa. Jessica T. M atthews writes about how the 
1990s ushered in “no m ere adjustm ent am ong states but a novel redistribution o f  power 
am ong states, m arkets, and civil socie ty ." ' National governm ents now share pow er with 
businesses, international organizations, and a w ide variety o f  non-governm ental 
organizations (NGOs). Civil society in its various form s has grow ing clout and 
increasing political, social, and even security roles that were once the sole dom ain o f
--------------------- «yy--
'  Jan Neverdeen Pieterse. “ After Post-D evelopm ent,” Third W orld Quarterly 
21:2 (2000): 175-91.
24John Boli and George Thom as, "W orld Culture in the W orld Polity: A Century 
o f International Non-G overnm ental O rganization,” in The G lobalization Reader, eds. 
Frank Lechner and Boli (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000): 262-68.
25Jessica T. M atthews, “ Pow er Shift: The Rise o f  Global Civil Society."
Foreign Affairs 76:1 (January/February 1997): 50-66.
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states. NGO-driven international standards o f conduct arc shaping policies like never 
before. M any NGOs are particularly  concerned with the unprecedented grow th o f  and 
rising pow er o f  TN Cs during the past few decades. Their efficiency and international 
m obility endow them with vast political power and influence. TNCs invest heartily in 
developing and industrialized countries, use local resources, hire native workers, and 
im pact local state policies and quality o f  life. M any NGOs view TN Cs as im posing and 
exploitative to societies and their environm ents. Som e NGOs em brace particular issue 
areas, such as gender equality, hum an rights, and environm ental preservation, while 
others raise awareness about local or regional social, economic, and political concerns. 
O thers keep watch on institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank, the W orld Trade 
O rganization (W TO), and the O rganisation for Economic Cooperation and Developm ent 
(OECD) as they play increasingly large international roles. N G O s' pow er has unleashed 
enorm ous criticism , some m erited and som e not. NGOs are often believed to be playing 
a grow ing role in giving developm ent a hum an face.
Som e worry, though, that in recent years particular NGOs and even entire networks 
o f  NG Os have becom e servants to N orthern countries and institutions. M arxist and 
critical theorists have voiced suspicions that these organizations are increasingly 
becom ing arms o f  TN Cs and U nited States-dom inated international organizations.26 The 
tem ptation is great because civil society organizations often depend on financing from 
N orthern institutions.27 N orthern institutions have a vested interest in prom oting their
0  ft Jam es Petras and H enry V eltm eyer, "U nm asking G lobalization: The Dynam ics 
and A ntinom ies o f  Imperial Pow er" [lecture delivered at the Robert Kenny Prize 
proceedings, U niversity o f  Toronto, Canada] (30 M ay 2001). <http://w w \v.topia. 
com .ar/articulos/35-int-petraseng.htm l> [8 February 2003].
~7Jenny  Pearce. "D ev e lo p m en t.  N G G s. and Civil Society: T he  D ebate  and its
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agendas, and NGOs often have access they lack. I .aura M acDonald aptly asserts that
many NGOs are well positioned to “ penetrate into the very fibres o f  a com m unity.
creating new forms o f clientelism  and co-option.”2X NGOs are not im m une from bribery:
some can be bought. Others, however, truly are comm itted to hum anistic concerns. Some
contend that whatever their m otivations, the NG O-ization o f  world politics is even more
dangerous than overweening state power, since at least democratic states are accountable
to people. NGOs are not necessarily. There is some reason for wariness. Studies reveal
that in 1970. public grants com prised about 1.5 percent o f N G O s' incom es; by the end o f
the m illennium , this figure had risen to about 40 percent.24 This trend obviously threatens
the independence o f some NGOs. as well as jeopardizing their legitim acy. Robert Cox
has ventured so far as to propose that civil society work may likely be a “top-dow n
process" in which the capitalist class enervates the working class. O ften those whose
who participate in civil society (including in the share o f the benefits) do not represent
the poor and disenfranchised and are in fact the more powerful m em bers o f  societies. In
many countries, formal and informal institutions may limit the chances o f  certain groups.
such as women and the landless, to participate in a meaningful m anner.30 It is important
to realize that NGOs are not necessarily beneficial or even neutral players and that their
Future,” in Development, NGOs, and  Civil Society, ed. Deborah Eade (London: Oxfam . 
2000); Jude Howell and Jenny Pearce. Civil Society and Development: A Critical 
Exploration  (Boulder: Lynne Rienner. 2001), 20-43.
28Laura M acDonald. “A M ixed Blessing: The NGO Boom  in Latin Am erica." 
NACLA Report on the Am ericas 28:5 (1995). 35.
Ed Brown. “Social M ovem ents, the State, and Civil Society." in Structural 
Adjustm ent: Theory. Practice, and  Impacts, eds. Ed Brown. Bob M ilward, G iles M ohan, 
and Alfred B. Zack-W illiam s (New' York: Routledge, 2000). 178.
30Robert Cox. “Civil Society at the Turn o f  the M illennium: Prospects for an 
Alternative W orld Order.” Review o f  International Studies 25 (1999): 7-8.
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m otives, too. are not beyond question. As stated, m any NGOs do, nevertheless, have 
adm irable goals. They strive to he autonom ous and endeavor to prom ote the 
globalization o f  issues, enable groups o f people to transeend the normal channels o f  
diplom acy, and create action and awareness through new methods. They already have 
m any successes behind them , but m any believe NGOs need to expand their diplom atic 
channels and to establish m ore credibility with traditional forms o f  governance, such as 
states and international institutions. Tens o f  thousands o f NGOs have debuted on the 
international stage in the past decade, m any o f  them  since the end o f  W orld W ar 11.
Som e are dom estic, others international, with w idely ranging m em berships and m issions.
In addition to enabling an increased role for civil society, globalization has 
opened w ay for soft pow er to assum e a stronger role in international affairs.
D evelopm ent studies have focused on the role played by countries' regional or 
international reputations in their efforts to develop. Some scholars write about “social 
capital" w ithin and betw een nations. Others discuss the rise o f  the “brand state." Still 
others describe an increased need for international legitim acy and global credibility .31 
W hatever the term inology, in the present era countries need to be seen in positive ways 
for econom ic and political reasons. China, for instance, was long denied M ost Favored 
N ation status in the W TO largely due to its reputation for egregious hum an rights abuses. 
China suffered financially, and though it has been granted MFN status, still suffers to 
som e degree due to its poor international reputation. Turkey too has faced difficulties in 
trading arrangem ents because m any view its culture with suspicion and unease. The 
im portance o f  international reputation cannot be overstated, and developm ent institutions
3IPeter van Ham. “The Rise o f  the Brand State: The Postm odern Politics o f 
Im age and Reputation." Foreign A ffairs 80:5 (Septem ber/O ctober 2001): 2-6.
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have become well aw are o f this. Heine a World Hank client, lor exam ple, can bestow a 
nation w ith a certain degree o f legitim acy: if the W orld Bank trusts a country, the country 
“ m ust be trustworthy." Though aw areness o f social capital is important and useful, some 
ID ls have used its new relevance to increase their ow n power over client countries. 
Developm ent institutions have leveraged the significance o f  social capital to urge non- 
m arket im provements (such as respect for hum an rights). Obviously such leveraging can 
be construed as self-serving, but on balance. Southern countries are probably helped more 
than harm ed albeit in a somewhat m anipulative manner.
Another recent influence on the evolution o f  developm ent theory is the field o f  
ethnodevelopm ent studies. These look at how traditional developm ent theories overlook 
or m arginalize the importance o f  ethnicity to developm ent trends and prospects. Manx 
ethnic struggles all over the world reveal that econom ic developm ent has a differential 
im pact on various ethnic groups that is not attended to by mainstream  or less critical 
developm ent theory 's prescriptions. This approach is concerned with how econom ic 
problem s may influence ethnic relations in a wide variety o f  w'avs. such as producing 
internal colonialism , distributional conflicts, regional imbalances, com petition for scarce 
resources, labor/market conflicts, and other difficulties. M ultiethnic societies often 
experience more severe problem s with uneven developm ent, which leads to protests and 
further dilemmas. These theorists call for greater attention to cultural pluralism , internal 
self-determ ination, territorialism , and environm ental sustainability. They raise the issue 
o f  how  material improvements can be m ade com patible with the m aintenance o f  basic- 
cultural identities.32 These ideas are thought-provoking and should indeed inform
32R. Stavenhagen. “Hthnodevelopment: A Neglected Dimension in D evelopm ent 
Thinking.1' in Development Studies: Critique and Renewal, eds R. Apthorpe
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developm ent policies, but are often difficult to sell to those concerned with bottom -line 
facts, figures, and other data. Sensitivity to ethnic differences and racial or cultural 
prejudices has never been easy to instill in those who need it most.
The concept o f "sustainable developm ent" also became popular in the late 1980s 
and 1990s and helped lead to the creation o f the United Nations Environmental 
Program m e (UNEP) and environmental units in other aid agencies. Most understand the 
term to m ean environm entally conscious developm ent, though sometim es the definition 
has been broadened to include social concerns such as equity and w om en's rights. 
Sustainable developm ent advocates worry that careless pollution o f  the environm ent and 
squandering o f  natural resources w ill hami peoples' well-being in the long term .33 Such 
concerns are generally valid and ask that people, organizations, and nations be more 
conscientious about how' their choices and decisions affect the environm ent.
Perhaps the most radical o f the newest varied approaches to international
developm ent is postm odernism , also a difficult concept to sell to those with little interest
in changing the status-quo. This approach provides useful insights into the Northern bias
o f  developm ent theories. Postmodernists have attempted to add historical, cultural, and
spatial nuance and context to development understanding and approaches. Building upon
dependency theory', these theorists view developm ent as a Northern notion that needs to
be deconstructed in order to be well understood. Development, many o f  these theorists
contend, has been oftentim es considered a universal and timeless goal, when it actually is
rooted in the specific historical and economic circum stances o f  post-W orld W ar 11
and A. Krahl (Leiden: E.J. Brill. 1986); Bjom  llettne. I f  Women Counted: A S ew  
Feminist Econom ics  (San Francisco: Harper Collins. 1988).
33For more descriptions o f what is mean by sustainable developm ent, see A nders 
W ijkm an, "D oes Sustainable Development Require (iood Governance?" United S a t ions 
Chronicle  35:1 (1998): 86-88.
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Northern societies. Postm odernists urge developm ent practitioners to consider how the 
very notion o f  developm ent itself reveals the bias that a m odem  capitalist lifestyle is 
preferable to all others. M odernity and all that is associated with it is idolized by 
Northern societies, according to this view, while other states o f  existence are seen as 
backward, non-progressive, and primitive. This enables the North to rem ake the world in 
its image. Developm ent, like colonialism, attem pts to produce the export o f  Northern 
ideas and values on a grand scale.34
Postm odern studies, which becam e popular around 1980, reassert the value o f  
local history and culture often ignored or overlooked by Northern creeds o f  “progress.” 
These theorists do not reject the North, but attem pt to insert the periphery' by recovering, 
rediscovering, and rem em bering what has been left out or hidden. Postm odernists attempt 
to deconstruct developm ent's core assum ptions that capitalism , progress, rationality, and 
m odernity are desirable. Poverty, for example, is not necessarily the problem  that many 
in the first world believe it to be. Economic poverty in the Third W orld m ay be less a 
problem  than the moral or spiritual poverty believed to be com m on in the First W orld. 
Som e do not feel that people in Third W orld countries are suffering by living at the 
subsistence level. Som e actually view the sim ple living that accom panies poverty as a 
resource for personal growth that should not be discounted or necessarily changed. The 
same can be said for other developing world characteristics that the North attem pts to 
correct. These theorists look not for alternative developm ent theories or m odels, but for 
alternatives to developm ent.
Fem inist postm odernists add to this theory that the idea o f  developm ent is based
34For m ore on postm odernist approaches to developm ent, consult the entries in 
W. Sachs, ed.. The Developm ent Dictionary: A (lu idc  to Knowledge and Power 
(London: Zed Books. 1992).
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upon a male bias o f  Northern philosophy and theory. Instead o f  simply viewing this bias 
as sexism or patriarchy, this approach sees it as seeping out into the production o f 
dichotom ies such as m an/wom an, public'private. culture/nature, rational'em otional, 
am ong others. The first term in each o f  these dichotom ies is given prim acy, and the 
interdependence and overlap o f  the characteristics between the first and second term is 
ignored in order to reinforce this primacy. W omen are thus less valued and often 
confined to the "less significant” private realm, when really they have much to o ffer.’5 
Despite the awareness they provide, these newer, more radical approaches to 
developm ent have had a marginal impact upon developm ent practitioners in recent years. 
The latest tendency am ong practitioners has been to promote various versions o f  good 
governance. Instead o f  viewing concepts such as state intervention and market forces as 
opposites or treating structural reform and human developm ent as irreconcilable, 
these new ideas increasingly looked for ways in which such approaches might 
com plem ent each other. Good governance is not truly a developm ent theory because it is 
more concerned with results than with concepts: yet this agenda in its various forms has 
taken hold o f  the developm ent discourse since the 1990s. Studies on policy reform began 
to increasingly suggest in the 1990s that the influence o f  political context on economic 
outcom es is crucial. Researchers contended that weak institutions and political system s 
were partly or even largely responsible for laggard economic developm ent. As will be 
later exam ined, different IDIs had their own unique versions o f  how to improve 
countries' system s o f  governance. Good governance promotion, considered an updated
35Ruth Pearson. “ Rethinking Gender M atters in Development." in Poverty and  
D evelopm ent into the 21st Century, eds. T. Allen and A. Thomas. 383-402 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 2000) and the essays in M axine M olyneux and Shahra Razavi. 
eds.. Gender. Justice. Development, and Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2002).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
version o f  m odernization theory by some, usually entails urging poor countries to adopt 
the basic neoliberal econom ic tenets in addition to adopting habits, custom s, and 
institutions deem ed "good." Often dem ocratic regim es and features are urged. Good 
governance program s and policies differ in aims and constitution, but com m on themes 
emerge: sound econom ic m anagem ent and accountable, transparent, and reliable legal 
and governm ental institutions. Som e IDI program s reveal a strong interest in prom oting 
participatory governm ent, an active civil society, and “ fair" m ultiparty elections. The 
combination o f  neoliberal econom ic prescriptions and good governance qualities are 
believed to be conducive to capitalist expansion, m aking developing countries more 
productive and dependable. V iolence and social unrest, which im pede the stable 
functioning o f  the m arket and society, are believed to be discouraged with good 
governance practices and dem ocratic societies. These beliefs, as one m ight expect, were 
m utually reinforcing.
To the standard characteristics usually deem ed crucial for good governance, m ore 
traits were deem ed indispensable by m any IDIs in the late 1990s. Local senses o f 
ownership o f  the developm ent process and m ore pro-active, or developm entalist, state 
leaderships were urged. It cam e to be believed that governm ents that understood and saw 
the need for reform  w ere indeed m ore likely to enact reform. To achieve successful 
developm ent, the new prescription was for the donor and the recipient country to choose 
realistic and appropriate goals and policies that would help the developing country 
achieve these goals. In order for foreign assistance to spur developm ent. IDIs contended 
that donor and recipient countries needed to agree on com m on definitions o f  developm ent 
and sim ilar areas to target with foreign aid. M any IDIs began paying m ore attention to 
the role o f  dom estic politics, and those with stringent conditionalities looked more
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carefully at how effective they were. Some IDIs becam e m ore selective in their aid 
allocations, favoring countries that dem onstrated com m itm ent to reform.
In the mid- to late 1990s, IDIs also displayed a heightened concern with reducing 
governm ental corruption. Patron-client networks in developing countries that led to 
factionalism , adm inistrative deception, lack o f  legitim acy and transparency, and a weak 
state influenced by dem ands o f  elite political supporters were increasingly blam ed for 
poor developm ent outcom es. As the “c" word was targeted, certain general ideals were 
also advocated: em pow erm ent, participatory governm ent, hum an-oriented developm ent, 
and pro-poor policies. Heightened em phasis was also put on public relations for IDI 
programs. D em onstrable results o f  developm ent assistance w ere required. As Cold W ar 
prerogatives no longer provided clear rationales for supporting certain aid allocations, 
taxpayers wanted to see how their dollars were being spent and what the results were in 
tangible terms. A lthough the m otivations behind the good governance agenda are not 
always wholly altruistic, as will be shown in later chapters, good governance promotion 
that values individual country predicam ents and needs and that addresses structural 
inequities w ithin and betw een countries holds out the greatest potential yet to help poor 
countries. This type o f  good governance prom otion is clearly political and should not 
attempt to m ask this fact. Effective dem ocratic institutions can com plem ent 
m acroeconom ic policy reform s, provide social safety nets, and cushion countries 
attem pting to participate m ore vigorously and successfully in the world economy. 
Countries comm itted to enhancing their own system s o f  governance can find ways o f 
m eeting their citizens’ needs with stronger and m ore reliable state institutions that are 
representative and responsive. Dem ocracies that are genuinely dem ocratic can provide 
the conditions for equitable and dynamic developm ent.
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Good governance prom otion, though, is also highly fraught with potential perils. 
Political conditionality can be very intrusive, im posing Northern desires on vulnerable 
countries. It can be used to further the N orth 's agenda at the S outh 's expense, while 
appearing on the surface benign if  not friendly. Political conditionality can also becom e 
a perverted part o f  the developm ent dynamic, as state leaderships becom e m ore beholden 
to donors than to their citizens. Also, as stated, each country has its own circum stances 
that require different versions or incarnations o f  good governance. The sequencing and 
tim ing o f  reforms, for exam ple, needs to vary depending on country conditions. Support 
for reform s needs to develop locally in its own way and cannot be im posed in a top-down 
fashion. Donors also need to be careful to avoid facilitating new forms o f  corruption.
Good governance assistance is im portant and influential work; it dem ands keen 
attuneness to m any factors and dynam ics and should not be reduced to technical 
formulations.
In conclusion, developm ent theories since the end o f  W orld W ar II have been 
largely colored by the perennial North-South debates about powrer and privilege. The 
North clearly wants to help the South, but the innocence o f this desire has been and 
rem ains questionable. W ithout doubt, some credible ideas about how' developm ent 
should occur have surfaced from the North. But the South, too, and those observers truly 
concerned with its fate for hum anitarian reasons have had justifiab le reasons for being 
skeptical o f  the N orth 's  intentions and means. As m any theories have surfaced and later 
becom e obsolete, one can only w onder what developm ent practitioners will be purporting 
is essential in ten or twenty years. Still, though, for the purposes o f  this project, the 
popular good governance agenda leading IDIs began prom oting in the 1990s requires 
m ore careful scrutiny.
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The Rise o f  Dem ocracy Assistance 
Scholarly explanations for ID Is' increased attention to good governance and 
dem ocracy promotion in the 1990s are surprisingly vague, considering the potential 
significance o f  the shift towards increased Northern intervention in the South 's national 
affairs. M ost often, the literature endeavors to describe the nature o f  the shift, not the 
particular, distinctive goals o f  each ID I's  policies and programs. W hen rationales for the 
new good governance and dem ocracy prom otion programs and policies are provided, 
they are not usually institution-specific. Instead, they tend to justify  the new emphases as 
resulting from comm on trends. M ost often without differentiating betw een the 
institutions’ unique program s and policies, they concentrate on the follow ing factors: 
conditions stem m ing from the fading o f  the Cold War, increased interdependence 
between the North and the South, aid fatigue in countries from the North, international 
norm ative changes, and lessons from past developm ent efforts. This review  will briefly 
present and evaluate these positions. It will then describe and assess the m ajor argum ents 
on the effectiveness o f  dem ocracy prom otion. These include contentions that dem ocracy 
prom otion has been largely successful, and in a less positive vein, that it continues to 
exacerbate global inequalities, has centered too narrowly on the Northern m odel, overly 
emphasized the formal features o f  dem ocracies, been haphazardly and unevenly applied, 
overlooked consolidation difficulties and challenges, and relied too heavily on Northern- 
based civil society rather than on engaging dom estic political actors them selves.
Political and Economic Changes
M any scholars assert that the developm ent com m unity 's good governance and 
dem ocracy promotion in the 1990s resulted at least partly from the ending o f  Cold W ar
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prerogatives. Certainly this was a m ajor impetus. The fading o f  the Cold W ar's East- 
W est ideological tensions rem oved much o f  the rationale for previous strategic efforts to 
asym m etrically gam er Third W orld influence. This change would ostensibly pertain 
more to bilateral than m ultilateral aid. though some scholars aptly view the m ajor 
m ultilateral IDIs as oftentim es principally motivated by their most powerful country 
m em bers. W hen the Soviet Union collapsed, Am erican national interest shifted its 
prim ary em phasis from containm ent and other Cold W ar security concerns to 
perpetuating an open, stable global econom y conducive to its econom ic and security 
interests. O ther Northern countries shared sim ilar goals. Scholars claim  that good 
governance promotion followed from such m otivations, as econom ically open, politically 
stable countries generally require sound leadership practices and policy environm ents. 
Som e assert more particularly that after the Cold W ar ended, the international financial 
institutions expanded their m andates and their SAPs to include good governance 
prom otion in order to m ove countries towards em bracing Northern econom ic and 
political ideals and values. O thers argue that the IFIs and m any IDIs have used the ending 
o f  the Cold W ar to expand the scope o f  their conditionalities to gam er m ore economic 
gain from as well as pow er and influence over the developing w orld.36
Such argum ents are instructive: the fading o f  the Cold W ar certainly rem oved 
justification for supporting corrupt leaders, and it opened up opportunities fof countries to 
assum e new values, political system s, and market economies am enable to Northern 
interests. Yet the argum ents m entioned tend to be overly universalized. Not all o f  the
36Jan Nijman. “United States Foreign Aid," in The (rlohal Crisis in Foreign  
Aid, eds. Richard Grant and Jan Nijman (New York: Syracuse University Press. 1998). 
29-33: M artin Doom bos. “Good Governance: The Rise and Decline o f  a Policy 
M etaphor." .Journal o f  Development Studies 37 (August 2001): 93-1 12.
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IDIs and bilateral aid agencies have had similar goals and visions in the post-C'old War 
world, and their good governance prom otion program s and policies are not all alike in 
substance and em phasis. It would be difficult to argue that the UNDP, for example, has 
been m otivated by rich country interests or driven to construct a neoliberal world order. 
Further, even am ong the m ore N orthern-led IDIs, different factors and m otivations have 
shaped their good governance prom otion agendas. The fading o f  the Cold W ar is a 
significant explanatory factor, yet in a broad, general sense.
Another view is that since after the Cold War, there was no longer as strong a 
geopolitical reason for IDIs to support authoritarian and corrupt political regim es, IDIs 
were freed up to consider other goals. Hence, the easing o f  international security 
concerns allowed IDIs to reorient their foci and take other issues m ore seriously. Good 
governance policies, which were increasingly believed to prom ote peace and stability, 
rose to the forefront o f  ID Is' priorities and agendas. Also, dem ocracy prom otion, a 
Northern ideal, was believed to have resurfaced in less M anichean times. Scholars have 
identified various reasons for believing that dem ocracies tend to m ake the world a 
friendlier place. They note that elected legislatures and other dem ocratic structures and 
institutions often restrict the ability o f  leaders to m obilize societies for war, that the 
norms o f  peaceful conflict resolution that dem ocracies nurture locally carry over into 
foreign affairs, and that dem ocratic institutions generate m ore transparent, honest, and 
credible inform ation about national intentions than do non-dem ocracies. Also, since 
dem ocracies are built on shared social purposes and interests, the rise o f  conflicts, 
especially ones strong enough to preem pt war. is generally lim ited.37 Here again, these
37Mark Duffield, Global Governance and the AVu I tars: The M erging o f 
Development and Security  (London: Zed Books. 2001).
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viewpoints help explain some ol the motivations behind the new 11)1 program s and 
policies in a general sense. They tail, however, to differentiate between more 
individualistic IDI intentions and motivations and to look specifically at 11)1 stakeholders 
and power structures. USAID, for example, has always been beholden to American 
foreign policy objectives, and in the 1990s was increasingly called upon to prove its 
m erits with results-based approaches. This more signally explains U SA ID 's fine-tuning 
and reshaping o f  aspects o f  its development agenda, including its increased em phasis on 
good governance promotion.
It was even easier to justify the promotion o f  good governance and democracy, 
some assert, because o f  the failure o f  the Asian model evidenced in the 1997 Asian 
economic crises. Before this spiraling calamity, a feasible alternative to dem ocracy was 
the m odernizing autocratic leadership that managed noteworthy growth rates in A sia 's 
newly industrializing economies. In the 1960s and 1970s, authoritarian regim es in A sia 's 
tigers— Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, and South Korea— all sustained yearly growth 
rates o f  about 9 percent. The model o f Hast Asian exceptionalism  contradicted the 
democratic model as a promising alternative for developing countries. Som e scholars and 
policy makers saw autocracy as amenable for developm ent, at least in its early stages. 
This view was weakened, though. Triggered by events in Latin Am erica, W estern 
investors lost confidence in securities in Hast Asia and began to pull money out. A rapid 
snowball effect led many Asian countries into times o f  duress, and countries around the 
world, particularly wealthy ones, felt the crunch. This exigency did serve to buttress 
democracy further as the preferred political environment, yet there are num erous 
interpretations o f  w hat actual lessons were learned.38 The Asian crisis, o f  course, does
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not explain IDI m otives for good governance and democracy prom otion, which were 
already being carried out at the time: yet it did provide further support for the belief in 
democratic governments.
Also resulting from increased interdependence. IDIs are described as desiring to 
make developing countries more secure for private investment and more reliable sites in 
which to conduct transnational business in the 1990s. Some argue that the increasing 
prioritization o f  neoliberalism  has undermined genuine efforts to help the South develop 
and elevated Northern efforts to exploit the South's resources: good governance 
prom otion, it follows, extends this latter goal. This is an extension o f  M arxist and critical 
theories, which m ake valuable points about the general inequities in the world system. 
Northern countries increasingly depend upon resource-rich developing countries. The 
rapidly growing num ber and size o f  TNCs begun in Northern countries rely upon the 
developing countries for inexpensive primary products and labor.30 By the m id-1990s, 
there were more than 40.000 TNCs in the world, with more than 250.000 foreign 
affiliates.40 Additionally, since the oil crisis o f  the 1970s. oil had been a particular
---------- Tg—
The financial crisis started in July 1997 in Thailand, and affected 
currencies, stock m arkets, and asset prices o f several Asian countries, including some o f  
the East Asian tigers, as well as other regions. For more inform ation on this subject, see. 
for instance. M ark Beeson. “Politics and Markets in East Asia: Is the Developmental 
State Com patible with G lobalisation?" in Political Economy and  the Changing Global 
Order. 2d ed., eds. Robert Stubbs and Geoffrey R.D. Underhill. 352-61 (Toronto: Oxford 
University Press, 2000); Kanishka Jayasuriya and Andrew Rosser.“ F.conomic Orthodoxy 
and the East Asian C risis." Third World Quarterly 22:3 (2001): 381-96.
30David A. Leblang. “ Property Rights. Democracy, and Economic 
Growth," Political Research Quarterly  49: 5-26: Robert Kiely. “N eoliberalism  Revised? 
A Critical Account o f  W orld Bank Concepts o f Good Governance and M arket F riendly 
Intervention," Capitalism  and Class 64 (1998): 63-88; Enzo Grilli. The European  
Com munity and  Developing Countries (Cambridge: Cam bridge University Press. 1993). 
146.
40United Nations. W orld Investment Report 1995 (Geneva: United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development. 1996).
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concern, with demand for it growing steadily. W hile these points arc pertinent, they are 
broadly construed and fail to exam ine IDI program s and policies specifically and 
carefully. Interdependence betw een countries and regions has always existed, and rich 
countries have m any choices about where to base their businesses and operations and 
how to gam er needed resources and labor.
Scholars also point out that in the 1990s, addressing global problem s and potential 
problem s such as overpopulation, the spread o f  HIV/AIDS, drug trafficking, terrorist 
threats, and environm ental degradation increasingly required Third W orld cooperation. 
They note that it was m ore apparent in the early and later 1990s that political/econom ic 
affairs and decisions in one country or region increasingly affected the global landscape. 
As Deborah Brautigan contends, the fact that globalization had intensified international 
interconnectedness on m any levels m ade the stability o f  developing countries more 
pertinent to the developed countries than ever before.41 Scholar Thom as G. W eiss adds 
that the extrem e torm ent in countries such as the form er Y ugoslavia. Som alia, and 
Rwanda in the 1990s provided an entrance for increased dom estic intervention in 
floundering states. This was particularly true, as the international com m unity often ended 
up paying for hum anitarian re lief in conflict or post-conflict societies. Increased 
availability o f  m edia coverage o f  such tragedies enhanced this sense o f  global 
interconnectedness.42 This likely was part o f  the reason some IDI leaders began to 
increasingly prom ote good governance, in hopes o f  m aking the political and economic
4'D eborah Brautigan, “Governance, Economy, and Foreign A id," Studies in 
Comparative International D evelopm ent 27:3 (fall 1992): 3-25.
4 "Thomas G. W eiss, “G overnance. Good Governance, and Global Governance: 
Conceptual and Actual Challenges." Third World Quarterly  21 :5 (O ctober 2000): 795- 
814.
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environm ents o f  developing countries more stable and more open to the North and its 
ideals. Yet again, this interdependence did not occur suddenly in the 1990s, although it 
was m ade m ore publicly known; clearly more was behind the elevation o f  good 
governance prom otion in the 1990s.
Yet another rationale for ID ls’ increased emphasis on good governance and 
dem ocracy promotion in the 1990s centers on aid fatigue in Northern countries. In many 
cases, the decade o f  the 1990s brought with it less incentive to spend energy and m oney 
on helping developing countries.41 ODA reached its peak in the early 1990s and then 
declined steadily throughout the decade. In just ten years, overall ODA rates fell by about 
10 percent. For various reasons, including sim ple frustration with past failures, m any in 
the general public as well as those in national leadership roles were increasingly tired o f  
dispensing foreign assistance. The United States in particular was finding little support 
for foreign aid program s in the early 1990s. due in part to a Republican-led House and 
Senate and o f  course the changed security environm ent. Japan 's own financial problem s 
caused its aid budget to fall, G erm any 's fell as the country adjusted to reunification 
concerns and costs, and the EU becam e preoccupied with internal m atters including 
preparations for expansion and a new single currency. Some scholars assert that by 
im posing good governance criterion on aid decisions, IDls could m ore conveniently 
justify  foreign aid reductions. The concept o f  good governance was in essence, 
sufficiently vague so that donors with aid fatigue could explain away their new lack o f
41For a useful discussion o f  the effects o f aid fatigue on IDI program s, see Julie 
Aubut, "The Good G overnance Agenda: Who W ins and W ho Loses, Som e Empirical 
Evidence for 200T ' (2004). <http://w w w .lse.ac.uk/collections/D ESTlN /W orking 
Papers.htm l> [8 January 2005]; see also Richard Gibb. "Post-Lom e: The European LJnion 
and the South." Third World Quarterly  21:3 (2000): 457-81.
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interest in strategically less important countries and regions.44 Africa neglect could be 
blamed on Africans, rather than on donors' lack o f  altruism. This was likely part o f  the 
appeal, or at least not an unwelcom e “benefit" o f  using good governance conditionalities 
for some donors. Use as a potential eseape elause from the com punction to dispense aid 
and unsatisfactory relationships with client states is not, though, enough reason for the 
spawning o f  the whole good governance discourse and for the widespread developm ent 
o f  new program s and policies.
Some scholars assert that good governance promotion was m eant to help prom ote 
foreign investment and locally-driven econom ic com petence so that some o f  the 
developm ent agencies’ burdens m ight be lifted. Increased private capital flows and trade 
opportunities put developing countries in positions to fend m ore for them selves, but at the 
same tim e revealed their inexperience with doing so. If aid weary developed countries 
wanted to increasingly abandon the project o f  aid. poor countries needed not to be given 
fish, but to learn to fish them selves. Good governance prom otion intended to help them 
do this.45 This contention m akes sense, but does not account for the fact that aid in the 
1990s favored m iddle-incom e countries and countries o f  strategic im portance to donors.
It is also somewhat incom patible with the fact that aid levels began increasing in the new 
millennium.
^ P e t e r  Burnell adds that post-Septem ber 11, 2001. aid am ounts have been 
resurgent due to renewed security concerns, as well as increased awareness o f  the uneven 
effects o f  globalization. See Peter Burnell, “ Foreign Aid Resurgent: New Spirit or Old 
Hangover?" Research Paper No. 2004/44 (July 2004). <httpV:ww \v.w ider.unu.edu/ 
publications/ rps/rps2004/rp2004-044.pdf > [25 January 2005].
45Ian Smillie. M astering the A id  M achine Revisited: Poverty. Aid. and  
Technology (London: ITDG Publishing. 2000). 17.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Still others assert that good governance and democracy prom otion provided 
funding-deprived developm ent agencies with a post-Cold W ar rationale or purpose. They 
contend that bureaucratic survival m otivated this new agenda and that popular democratic 
trends such as em pow ering civil society and ensuring that decision-m aking processes 
were transparent were embraced by the IDls. This could well be part o f  the reason some 
aid institutions took up these new m issions. Democracy was so popular in the North that 
m any in the 1990s, especially the early 1990s, saw it as a cure for all sorts o f  malaises, 
from ethnic strife to extrem e poverty. In the United States in particular, the concept o f 
dem ocratic enlargem ent was extrem ely popular, and U SA ID 's ability to help foster this 
added to its perceived usefulness. For supposedly apolitical organizations like the W orld 
Bank, however, appearing pro-dem ocratic was less viable or even acceptable. Still, 
though, there was probably some truth to this claim for most o f  the m ajor IDls.
O thers argue that m any IDls attem pted to link developm ental assistance more 
closely with security objectives, in order to increase the viability o f  foreign aid in light o f 
increasing aid fatigue.4h Hence, developm ental assistance was linked to good 
governance, which in turn was linked to international security. The construction o f  this 
new relationship helped provide a new post-Cold W ar paradigm for foreign assistance. 
This argum ent is intriguing and thought-provoking, yet difficult to prove. It is also more 
relevant to certain IDls, such as USAID, than others, such as the W orld Bank, which by 
its charter is m andated to be apolitical.
Still others hold that good governance promotion began largely as an effort by the 
m uch-m aligned BW Is to gain legitim acy. Aid fatigue and increased criticism  left them 
particularly vulnerable to losing their influence, and good governance prom otion was an
4<’See Duffield. (Hohal (.ioxcrnamw  1-12.
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attempt to gain more respect. Rita Abraliamsen contends that generally for the Northern- 
led BW Is, good governance prom otion was "seductive" with its use o f  term s such as 
“em pow erm ent," but that in the end. it truly offered the South no new independence or 
power. She writes that the good governance discourse, despite the efforts o f  its 
proponents to present it as radically different from past developm ent doctrines, 
“reproduces the hierarchies and relationships that have been the hallm arks o f 
developm ent ever since its inception in the post-w ar period.’"47 Abraham sen uses 
com pelling language to m ake these charges, yet she does not augment her argum ent with 
careful exam ination o f  the B W Is' actual policies. She does, however, successfully 
invoke researchers to investigate her claim s with m ore detailed studies.
International N onnative Changes
By the 1990s. a general sense o f  agreem ent that liberal dem ocracy was conducive 
to prosperity and peace had emerged. M any developing countries were ready or more 
ready than usual to accept or even em brace this.48 Dem ocracy was consolidated in 
W estern Europe with the transitions in Greece, Portugal, and Spain. This was particularly 
true for Central and Eastern European countries, recently freed from Soviet leadership 
and influence. Apartheid in South Africa was in its final stages, and soon the first 
Chinese dem ocracy would take form in Taiwan, as would the first Korean dem ocracy in 
the South. The new preparedness o f  m any countries to accept dem ocratic ideas and forms
47Abrahamsen. 139.
48Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seym our M artin Lipset. "Introduction: 
Com paring Experiences with Dem ocracy," in Politics in D eveloping Countries: 
Com paring Experiences with Democracy. 4 vols.. eds. Larry Diamond. Juan J. Linz, and 
Seym our M artin Lipset (Boulder: Lynne Rienner. 1990). 1-37.
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o f  governance, including an increased role for civil society, helped propel m any IDls to 
prom ote dem ocracy and good governance .41 Clearly the nonnative inclinations o f  m any 
developing countries did help propel IDls to increasingly concentrate on good 
governance in the 1990s.
O thers argue that the developed countries, particularly the United States but also 
W estern Europe, began attem pting to im pose their values on the rest o f  the world m ore 
ardently with the fading o f  the Cold War. W estern triumphalism  translated into W estern 
attem pts to direct and control the norm s and principles guiding countries throughout the 
world. The doctrine on non-interference in another nation 's affairs was being upheld less 
and less fervently in the 1990s. The United States, for example, began a series o f  
hum anitarian interventions to stop hum an rights abuses that would have been untenable 
during the Cold War, when security concerns overrode more value-laden dom estic 
interests. Both o f  these contentions help explain the popularity o f  good governance and 
dem ocracy prom otion in the 1990s, but they do not scrutinize particular IDI m otivations.
Som e scholars contend that m ore focus on good governance and dem ocracy 
assistance happened because such program s becam e increasingly acceptable throughout 
m ost o f  the international com m unity in the 1990s, and hence were no longer considered
4,01ufem i Babarinde, "The European U nion 's Relations with the South: A 
Com m itm ent to Developm ent?" in The European Union in the World Com munity, ed. 
Carolyn Rhodes (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998), 143. It must be added, though, that as 
the 1990s ended and the new m illennium  was ushered in. the promises o f  the world 
em bracing dem ocratic norms were beginning fade slightly. Reform efforts were often 
thwarted in their early stages. Countries such as Pakistan vacillated betw een dem ocratic 
and authoritarian regim es, Peru 's dem ocratic prospects remained dim as President 
Fujim ori held onto his rule, and C hina 's  Com m unist party continued its autocratic ways. 
Russia, once believed to be fertile soil for new democratic governm ents and processes, 
rem ained largely in the hands o f  controlling elites. Few Middle Eastern countries had 
com m itted to em bracing dem ocratic ways, and Africa remained not only poor, but ridden 
by often violent internal conflicts.
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o ff limits. The tim e was indeed ripe for sueli efforts, and if  even the W orld Bank w as 
entering this realm, then it seemed perm issible for other aid agencies to follow suit. Such 
claims do m ake som e sense: the W orld Bank has long been considered a pioneer in 
international developm ent efforts, and pioneers are subject to imitation. But not all good 
governance and dem ocracy assistance program s resem ble the W orld B ank’s even 
slightly. As will be demonstrated in later chapters, m ore duplication o f  rhetoric existed 
than o f  actual policy.
Som e m aintain further that the grow ing pow er o f  TNCs based in the developed 
world helped create and instill this norm ative view, since reliable trading partners and 
stable investm ent sites require a certain level o f  good governance and dem ocracy.50 
TNCs have becom e increasingly selective about governm ents. Often i f  rulers do not 
govern well and adhere to ffee-m arket policies, they reduce their operations or withdraw 
altogether from developing countries. The increasing status and pow er o f  TNCs 
unquestionably altered the relationship betw een First and Third W orld countries, yet the 
m anner in which this in turn affected IDI m otivations has not been studied in detail.51 
The W orld Bank, for example, is m ore associated with a pro-business agenda than is the 
UNDP, whose policies often intend to protect developing countries from corporate and 
m ore generally capitalist imperialism.
Some scholars assert that m any ID ls attem pted to take advantage o f  the nearly 
ubiquitous acceptance o f  dem ocracy in the 1990s. Because o f  the new seductiveness or 
at least widespread legitim ating o f  dem ocracy, IDls began prom oting good governance:
Thom as D. Lairson and David Skidm ore. International Political Economy: The 
Struggle fo r  Pow er and Wealth (New' York: Harcourt Brace, 1997). 83-84, 306-7; Steven 
P. M cGiffin. The European Union: A Critical Guide (London: Pluto Press. 2001). 137- 
40.
^1 Ibid.
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this agenda, though, com prised only very superficial democratic institutional forms that
were com patible with continued neoliberal econom ic reforms desired by the IDls. A G24
discussion paper about the international financial institutions' new good governance
focus, for instance, described it as follows:
The new m ission [good governance] arrived at a moment when grow ing doubts 
regarding the purpose and effectiveness o f  the IFIs seemed to threaten their 
funding, and even their continued existence. Suddenly the IFIs have jum ped in to 
the front lines o f  m ultiple wars being fought by humanity: against AIDS, hum an 
rights violations, gender discrim ination, environm ental degradation, drug 
trafficking, authoritarian governm ents, etc. To drive the point home, the W orld 
Bank has recently started to draw attention to those objectives, and to its ow n role, 
in CNN advertising.52
Critics charge that while taking up the veil o f  institutional reform, political openness and 
participation in the fight against poverty, the international development com m unity was 
continuing to if  not increasing its efforts to peddle its own value-laden nonnative view o f  
social relations and assum ing ever-higher righteous ground. They contend that in the 
process, the IDls were avoiding or m erely paying lip se n  ice to the vital issues o f  social 
sendee provision, redistribution, econom ic dem ocracy, and the unequal relationship 
betw een people and capital. These critics point out that so long as the neoliberal 
econom ic m odel rem ains unquestioned, the IDls will be dispensing a program  which fails 
to decrease the S outh 's poverty. This argum ent is rem iniscent o f  the ideas o f  dependency 
theory. It does hold som e truth, yet, again, it is a criticism  too genetically applied. Such 
w holesale protests fail to acknowledge the differences between the IDls and their 
m otivations and the distinctions between their particular programs, policies, goals, and 
pow er structures. They also fail to acknowledge that some degree o f  order in society can
52Devesh Kapur and Richard W ebb, “Governance-related Conditionalities o f  
the International Financial Institutions." G-24 Discussion Paper Series (N ew  York: 
UN CTAD. 2000).
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actually help citizens and that the opportunity tor participation in or influence on a 
society 's political processes, as advocated by m any o f  the IDls, can indeed benefit the 
least advantaged. Further, such rebukes undercut the m otivations for some o f  the truly 
hum anitarian program s sponsored by some IDls. It is difficult to attribute program s that 
prom ote politieal equality for the landless, for example, to the N orth 's pow er concerns.
Increased Cognizance
Others contend that sim ple awareness and experience helped m otivate ID ls to 
focus on good governance in the 1990s. As Santiso asserts, in “the 1990s, concerns over 
the relative ineffectiveness o f  aid and the pervasive effects o f  endemic corruption 
prom pted the IFIs to revisit their traditional approaches and to question their original 
assum ptions."53 The neoliberal W ashington consensus prom oting fiscal restraint, trade 
liberalization, sound economic m anagement, deregulation, and privatization, shared by 
som e but certainly not all IDls, o f  the 1980s had becom e W ashington confusion by the 
early 1990s, m any claim ed.54 The "best and the brightest" o f  developm ent theory had 
been w rong about m any things, the most im portant o f  which was how to help alleviate 
poverty. It increasingly made sense that a free m arket could not much benefit from an 
antiquated, distorted, poorly established, or undeveloped state system  o f  governance. 
ID ls' field presences in developing countries had by the 1990s alerted Northern 
practitioners o f  the serious problems poor countries faced enacting seem ingly sim ple
53Santiso, “Governance Conditionality," 4.
54For a useful description o f  what the “ W ashington Consensus" entails, see 
John W illiam son, “W hat W ashington M eans by Policy Reform ," in Latin Am erican  
Adjustm ent: H ow Much has Happened?  ed. John W illiam son (W ashington, D.C.:
Institute for International Economics, 1990).
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reforms. Further, m ore understanding o f  the need for good governance was partly the 
result o f  SAPs, som e contend. A side effect o f  structural adjustment was the exposure o f  
the unreliability o f  transitional m arkets' access to global international capital markets. A 
num ber o f  studies seeking in part to explain the failure o f  SAPs emanated from 
universities and institutions such as the W orld Bank. They quantified connections 
betw een good governance, democracy, and developm ent.55
ID ls' experience increasingly led them to believe that national leaders needed not 
only the will to prom ote developm ent in their countries, but also the capacity, and that 
depended on the nature o f  the extant policy environm ent and state institutions.56 Som e 
argue that in spite o f  the 1997 financial crisis (which was blamed on the lack o f 
dem ocracy by som e), the success o f  the East Asian tiger countries in the late 1980s and 
early to m id 1990s was particularly instructive, especially when juxtaposed with the lack 
o f  progress in A frican countries. Srategists saw that establishing m arkets required p ro­
active governm ent policies, as had been the case in the East Asian successes. Advanced 
industrialized econom ies could no longer assum e that simply adopting certain sound 
m acroeconom ic policies could produce developm ent. Sound institutional infrastructures 
like those in the tigers required governm ent action to establish and maintain. Som etim es 
governm ent interventions had been useful to if  not instrumental to East A sia 's  success.57
5Craig Burnside and David Dollar, "A id, Policies, and G row th,'' Policy Research 
W orking Paper no. 17777 (W ashington, D.C.: The W orld Bank, 1997); Paul Collier,
“The Failure o f  C onditionality," in Perspectives on A id  and Development, eds. Catherine 
Gwin and Joan Nelson (W ashington, DC: Overseas Development Council, 1997); 
W illiam  Easterly and Sergio Rebelo, "Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth: An Empirical 
Investigation," Journal o f  M onetary Economics 32(3)( 1993): 417.
56Peter G ibbon, "Structural Adjustm ent and Structural Change in Sub-Saharan 
Africa: Som e Provisional Conclusions,” D evelopm ent and Change 27 (1996): 751-84.
^  -T
For som e onlookers, the financial crisis in East Asian countries beg inn ing  in
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Africa, on the other hand, had not progressed because it lacked effective institutions, 
enforceable laws, governmental transparency, and com m itm ent to change, among other 
factors. The later failure in some o f  the East Asian tigers better revealed what these 
countries had done right and what they had failed to do. Certainly there were valuable 
lessons learned. Corruption and cronyism did contribute to the problem s, yet American 
bankers and investm ent m anagers were the ones who poured billions o f  dollars into those 
em erging m arkets. The success and the subsequent crisis did highlight the opportunities 
and risks o f  international financial flows, with relevance to foreign assistance transfers. 
IDls were encouraged to continue em phasizing the building and securing o f  reliable and 
transparent state institutions, as well as policy environm ents where national leaders were 
held accountable.
In the 1990s, analysis from scholars and practitioners in the North increasingly 
focused on the need for both a strong, developm entalist state and a m ore democratic, 
responsive state. A ccording to M erilee Grindle, for exam ple, a strong developm ental state 
has the follow ing capacities: institutional, technical, adm inistrative, and political 
capacity, where the latter includes legitimate authority and responsive and representative 
governm ent.59 The state, such research contends, needs to be effectual as well as 
responsive, or both developm ental and representational. M any IDI leaders were educated
1997 would further highlight the need for good governance. The com m on explanation 
for the crisis would be that while m any o f  these countries had som e o f  the good 
governance prescriptions in place, they lacked other ones. Bridget W elsh. "Lessons from 
Southeast Asia: Growth. Equity and Vulnerability," in M odels o f  Capitalism: Lessons fo r  
Latin America, ed. Evelyne Huber. (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University 
Press, 2002), 237-276
c o
Joseph Stiglitz, “An Agenda for Developm ent in the Tw enty-First Century,"in 
The Global Third If ay D ebate . ed. Anthony G iddens (M alden: Polity Press, 2001).
341-2.
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in the North and cam e to believe this new popular wisdom. The proliferation o f  non-state 
actors helped spread the message. International NGOs. TNC's, and global media 
increasingly influenced policy m akers from m any venues. M any urged that more 
attention be paid to various facets o f  good governance, such as reliable institutions, non­
corrupt representation, respect for human rights, and equitable access to econom ic 
resources and opportunities.60 This broadened endorsem ent o f  the good governance 
agenda unquestionably influenced and directed the international developm ent 
com m unity 's new  em brace o f  dem ocracy and good governance prom otion in the 1990s.
These argum ents explaining the establishm ent o f  the good governance and 
dem ocracy prom otion agenda in the 1990s are largely credible and useful. W hile 
providing m any valid points, however, they tend to be overly generic and to largely 
overlook the institutional identities and internal dynam ics o f the specific IDls. Each IDI 
is in the end beholden to its key stakeholders, and leaders within the institutions m ust be 
convinced that their institution is satisfying goals o f  im portance to them. It is particularly 
helpful to take a closer, m ore nuanced view o f  the m ajor IDls and their good governance 
policies and program s to exam ine the changes in agenda. Good governance prom otion 
varies betw een the different IDls and serves different purposes for each, as will be later 
demonstrated. This project will delve more deeply into the individual characteristics o f 
the UNDP, W orld Bank, EU, and USAID which led to their increased emphases on their 
own unique versions o f  good governance and dem ocracy promotion in the 1990s
M erilee Grindle, Challenging the State: Crisis and Innovation in Latin  
Am erica and  A frica  (Cam bridge: Cam bridge U niversity Press. 1996).
60See the essays in John Boli and George Thom as, eds. Constructing World 
Culture: International Nongovernm ental Organizations Since I S 75 (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1999), W eiss. 797-99.
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Viability o f  Good G overnance Promotion
As stated, the argum ents about the m otives for and efficacy o f  good governance 
and dem ocracy prom otion programs and policies are many. Som e contend that such 
programs have generated m any positive outcom es, or less positively, that they have 
overly em phasized the Northern model, focused too m uch on the formal features o f  
democracies, been applied unevenly or not selectively enough, not sufficiently 
acknowledged consolidation difficulties and challenges, and unduly em phasized civil 
society prom otion rather than strengthening political institutions themselves.
W hile good governance and dem ocracy prom otion have not yielded perfect 
results, the results are prom ising. G overnm ents that arc dem ocratic, responsive, and 
concerned with social equity can well serve as the foundations for prosperous, peaceful 
countries. The num ber o f  stable dem ocracies w orldw ide continues to grow, and certainly 
developm ent institutions' emphases on good governance and dem ocracy prom otion have 
played som e role in this trend. There are plenty o f  reasons to criticize developm ent 
agencies' efforts, yet it is tem pting to overlook the fact that dem ocracy prom otion has 
helped in some countries and could potentially help in m any others. Good governance 
and dem ocracy prom otion can be very altruistic goals, i f  pursued for the right reasons in 
ways that take into account client needs above all else. As developm ent policy makers 
worry about corruption in developing countries, it is im perative that they m ake sure their 
own m otives and practices rem ain transparent and pro-poor.
Dem ocracy prom otion, though, gives rise to im portant ethical as well as 
theoretical and practical concerns. It is often at least partially the result o f  sincere aims to 
help countries develop and to improve the well-being o f  their citizens. Yet it is still 
subject to criticism. Some claim that without significant changes, the softening and
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widening o f  the W ashington consensus, although a positive developm ent, is not going to 
m ake m uch headway in addressing the injustice, poverty and inequality issues that have 
been extant for m any decades.61 It is true that a m ajor international problem  o f  the late 
twentieth and early twenty-first century is that across the world, lines have been emerging 
between fast-growing, resource-poor, undercapitalized, and uneducated populations on 
one side, and technologically advanced, resource rich, and politically powerful societies 
on the other. Good governance and dem ocracy prom otion efforts are unlikely to 
substantively alter this, yet there are signs that IDls are increasingly aware o f  these 
inequities and are at least attem pting to be responsive to them .62 M arkets greatly 
influence the distribution o f  pow er and policy choices, and if  developing countries 
improve the reliability and accountability o f  their governance institutions and policy 
environm ents, they can increm entally strengthen their positions in the market.
Empowered Southern states can affect the nature and distribution o f property rights and 
the rules governing the production and distribution o f  wealth in their societies and on the 
larger, international playing field. IDls are providing new opportunities for developing 
countries to leam  how to m ake them selves stronger both politically and econom ically, yet 
this process is com plicated and not w ithout potential peril.
One such peril is that not all developing countries fit sim ply into any ascribed or 
prescribed mold. A m ong the loudest voices criticizing m any aid institutions claim  they 
are trying to im plant Northern m odels o f  governance and dem ocracy in societies with
51 See the essays in Phoebe Griffith, ed., Unbinding Africa: M aking Olobalisation  
Work fo r  Good G overnance  (London: The Foreign Policy Centre. 2003).
62European Com m ission, Sum m aries o f  the D iscussions on the 
External A id  Reform o f  the European Union (Luxembourg: Office for Official 
Publications o f  the European Com m unities, 2001); Lawrence H. Summers. “ International 
Financial Institutions Reform : Renewed Global Focus on the W orld 's Poor." I'ital 
Speeches o f  the Day  67:1.
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vastly different historical backgrounds and geopolitical circum stances.6' Each particular 
society has its own features that must be taken into account when designing and 
im plem enting governance reforms, these critics rightly point out. Countries as diverse as 
Cam eroon and Singapore should not be expected to have identical governm ents, nor is it 
possible to create such constructs. Each country can and should have its own distinctive 
governance system s and characteristics that work best to serve its own citizens. The 
United States and France do not have sim ilar governance system s, so why should this be 
expected o f  developing countries? Development policy m akers and practitioners should 
strive to be conscientious and flexible. Most o f  the m ajor developm ent institutions are 
aware o f  these im practicalities, yet som etim es tend to forget them  as they eagerly 
im plem ent reforms agendas. Engaging with com m unities throughout the reform  process 
is still sometim es not given the attention it needs. G overnance reform  is not m erely 
technical; it is political. W ithout entering this murky territory, learning its unique 
dynamics in different countries, and em bedding reform s within the political context, the 
reforms will be m erely cosmetic. Som e have argued that Northern governm ents tend to 
narrowly focus on installing the formal features o f  dem ocracy in a top-dow n fashion.64 
The tendency to do so often arises from the hurried or stressful circum stances 
developm ent practitioners find them selves in and is understandable, yet ultim ately not 
viable. A handful o f  dem ocratic features does not constitute a dem ocracy: dem ocracy is a 
far-reaching system that needs to be em bedded in a society’s values as well as its regime 
features. As has been seen in countless cases, these formal dem ocratic features can be
63Abrahamsen, 1-5.
64B. Raman, “M aldives: A Mini Ukraine in the M aking?" New Delhi: South Asia 
Analysis Group, Paper No. 1 194 (20 Decem ber 2004).
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quickly corrupted or overturned if  they arc not connected to supportive bottom s-up 
created institutions, with the requisite societal participation and support for long-term, 
holistic reform. Som e scholars m aintain that often times Northern countries narrowly 
focus on installing the institutions o f  formal dem ocracy in attem pt to instill the values o f 
economic liberalism  and supply the needed institutions for a m arket econom y.65 
Evidence o f  this trend can be seen in the way m any Northern ID ls focus their democracy 
prom otion and assistance program s in m iddle-incom e countries, or countries with valued 
comm odities. Certainly this is evidence o f  the North im posing its values and desires 
upon the South. Fortunately, there have been recent efforts to m ake aid m ore inclusive. 
The M DGs are a step in the right direction.
A com m on them e in recent developm ent literature has been that focusing too 
narrowly on electoral dem ocracies or certain other adm inistrative features ignores the all- 
important and always com plex political environm ents that exist in poor countries. 
Leftwich offers a very revealing argum ent along these lines about the W orld B ank 's good 
governance agdenda. He divides this agenda into three realms: the “system ic," “political, 
and “adm inistrative." The first realm  includes the rules governing the distribution o f  
power; the second m echanism s such as free and regular elections, checks and balances on 
power, structures o f  accountability and pluralism; and the third on available and 
trustworthy inform ation, efficient and credible public services, and an accountable and 
transparent public adm inistration. Leftwich argues that this institu tion 's good 
governance prom otion fails to understand that good governance is a function o f  the state 
and its capacity. Sim ply creating an “enabling environm ent" for an open market and
6?Larry Diamond, "Prom oting D em ocracy in the 1990s: Actors and Instruments, 
Issues and Im peratives" (1995). ^ ww ics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/di.htm  > [20 
Novem ber 2005j.
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dem ocracy is not offering much new, he claim s.66 W ithout understanding and working 
with and w ithin extant power channels, true reform  is not achieved, and genuine 
dem ocracy assistance efforts are hijacked. Such claim s are reasonable ones, but 
som etim es installing certain technical features can indeed be a starting point for 
dem ocracy and good governance to take root. It is o f  course useful for IDls to 
acknowledge that governance reform  is indeed not only political but usually  highly 
political. Ignoring or m aking light o f  this fact can only be counterproductive.
The assertion that good governance and dem ocracy prom otion and policies have 
been applied inconsistently has grown stronger in recent years and not w ithout warrant. 
M any contend that Northern donors strategically prom ote good governance and 
dem ocracy in places where they have vital interests and overlook o ther countries and 
regions that they perceive to be less relevant. This contention is not difficult to verify, 
and certainly bilateral governance aid tends to be used in these ways. The U nited States, 
for example, increased the breadth and scope o f  such program s in M exico and Latin 
Am erica shortly after signing the North Am erican Free Trade A greem ent. Similarly, 
throughout the 1990s, France applied much o f  its bilateral good governance and 
dem ocracy prom otion funding to its former A frican colonies and to the form er franc-zone 
region. Japan prom otes good governance m ost em phatically in Asia. D em ocracy 
prom otion reflects donors’ desires as well as clients’ interests. W hile this is difficult to 
change, it is still useful to be aware o f  underlying m otives and the reasons w hy 
dem ocracy is often promoted in an uneven fashion. For m ultilateral agencies, this
66V ladim ir Shkolnikov, “Recom mendations for D em ocratization A ssistance in the 
Caspian Region” (Vienna: Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 2004); 
Leftwich, “G overnance,” 363-386.
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unevenness stem s from other m otivations and reveals itself differently. Favoring middle- 
incom e countries or m ore trusted clients helps guarantee dem onstrable success and loan 
repaym ent. As will be explained, m ajor m ultilateral agencies have acknow ledged these 
tendencies and taken steps to not be perceived as overlooking the poorest countries, yet 
there is still a tendency to do so.
O ther critical claims, that aid agencies often do not sufficiently acknowledge 
dem ocracy consolidation difficulties and challenges, have been proven valid tim e and 
again in recent years,67 as fledgling dem ocracies in Africa, Latin Am erica, Asia, and 
Eastern Europe have faltered and som etim es failed altogether. Som e attribute these 
failures to the lack o f  established personal property rights and other institutions 
developed countries often take for granted and to aid agencies’ overlooking these 
prerequisites to good governance. O thers see such failures as resulting from ID ls’ 
overem phasis on dem ocratic features and lack o f  attention to creating strong 
developm entalist states, or states com m itted to both acquiring better governance 
institutions and behaviors. Civil society proponents often contend that dem ocracy must 
be created from  the bottom  up and that failure to do so yields fragile or superficial
reform s. Political com m itm ent to dem ocratic reform  m ust be em bedded in deep layers o f
68a society. Certainly dem ocratic consolidation is complex. D em ocratic governance 
encom passes a whole range o f  processes through which a society reaches consensus on 
and im plem ents regulations, hum an rights protection, policies, social structures, and laws.
67Letitia Lawson, “External D em ocracy Promotion in Africa: A nother False 
Start?” Commonwealth and  Com parative Politics 37:1 (1999): 23.
/o
Carlos Santiso, “Prom oting D em ocratic G overnance and Preventing the 
Recurrence o f  Conflict: The Role o f  the United N ations Developm ent Program m e in 
Post-conflict Peace-building,” Journal o f  Latin Am erican Studies 34:3 (A ugust 2002): 
55-86.
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Laws are devised and implemented by m any institutions: the legislature, judiciary, 
executive branch, political parties, private sector, and civil society. Consolidating 
dem ocratic governance involves the m any ways society organizes itse lf to ensure equality 
o f  opportunity and equity (in terms o f  social and econom ic justice) for all citizens. M ost 
aid agencies have com e to realize this and do not underestim ate the challenges involved 
in prom oting and nurturing democratic developm ent.
Som e argue rightly that it is particularly difficult for poor people to take 
advantage o f  the opportunities dem ocracies can provide due to a variety o f  institutional 
constraints. Free flows o f  information are often lim ited, and even i f  this is not the case, 
poor people often have trouble knowing how to increasingly participate in influencing 
politics. A lso, pro-poor projects and initiatives can be hijacked in a great m any ways. 
Funds allocated for m icro-loans for poor wom en, for instance, m ay be used as bribes, or 
service deliverers m ay receive paym ent but fail to deliver. W eak capacity leads to rent- 
seeking pressures in a variety o f  ways. States m ost in need o f  dem ocratic reform s are 
often tim es the least able to carry out such reform s.69 It is true that poor people w ho m ost 
need assistance are often the least able to voice their needs and to stand up for them selves 
w hen these needs are not being met. People accustom ed to having little pow er often do 
not know  how to take advantage o f  resources provided them. Thankfully, aid agencies 
have been paying m ore attention to this fact, although in some cases belatedly. The 
U N DP has been a pioneer with its pro-poor focus, and other aid institutions are gradually 
incorporating m ore program s and policies that help ensure that people are not left out. 
The W orld B ank 's Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), also adopted by other
69Congressional Budget Office, “The Role o f  Foreign Aid in D evelopm ent: South 
K orea and the Philippines” (W ashington, D.C.: CBO, 1997).
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ID ls, aim  to m ake the benefits o f  aid m ore inclusive. Still, m ore work needs to be carried 
out in this area, though.
The argum ent that too m uch em phasis has been put on developing civil society 
organizations and involving them in political processes, neglecting other elem ents such as
70state apparatus, certainly has merit. Som e IDls have a tendency to portray civil society 
as “good” and the state as “bad,” while both are needed in the creation and livelihood o f  
viable democracies. A fter decades o f  neglect, civil society has probably been given too 
m uch credence in recent years as the facilitator o f  sound dem ocracies and cham pion o f  
hum an rights and equitable developm ent. It is im portant not to idolize civil society. Civil 
society includes some organizations that contribute little or nothing to society’s ability to 
serve and protect its citizenry. Violent groups that incite hatred, religious extrem ists, and 
narrow  special interest groups o f  various kinds are part o f  civil society, too. Som e civil 
society organizations are not dem ocratic, and concerns can credibly arise about their 
legitim acy, accountability to their m em bers, and right to represent the interests in their 
sector. There are often disputes and differences in interests between NG Os w orking in 
different sectors or geographical regions. M any are underfunded and beholden to 
governm ents or foreign donors. In general, though, the growing im portance o f  civil 
society both locally and on the international stage, and the positive roles they p lay  in both 
places, m ake significant contributions to the efforts o f  the world's people to em pow er 
them selves. As m any have elucidated, civil society is not all good and always for 
dem ocracy or for the people, though o f  course it can be. Involving civil society is
?0Francis Fukuyam a, “State Building: G overnance and W orld O rder in the 
Tw enty-first Century,” transcript o f  Carnegie Council “Author in the A fternoon” speech 
(New York: M errill House, M ay 19, 2004).
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important, but so are building strong representative political parties and finding dynam ic, 
responsive leaderships.
Review and Suggestions
Perhaps m ost o f  all, IDI’s dem ocracy and good governance prom otion efforts o f  
the 1990s have revealed that there is no silver bullet or magic answer for either how to 
consolidate vibrant dem ocracies or even how  to help  nations develop. Donors have 
largely adopted the cause o f  good governance prom otion, and it is a w orthw hile cause, 
yet donors’ w ishes still often overpow er c lien ts’ needs. This is unfortunate, but 
unavoidable. The only w ay poor countries and people can gain pow er in unfair structural 
relationships is to m ove out o f  and beyond their weakened positions; on the positive side, 
elements o f  good governance and dem ocracy prom otion, whatever donors’ m otives, do 
help equip the beleaguered to m ake such moves.
M any early attem pts to foster dem ocracy and good governance failed, largely 
because pluralism  is difficult to create in countries and com m unities with high levels o f  
inequality. G overnance reform s often threaten extant power relations w ithin countries; 
patronage system s through which power is acquired and m aintained are at stake, as are 
formal and inform al channels o f  collusion through which public w ealth and resources are 
allocated to citizens. The elite within those countries desire to m aintain the status-quo and 
fear any sort o f  change. Further, dem ocratic reform s have often been required in tandem  
with neoliberal econom ic reforms, which include cuts in social spending and program s 
that jeopard ize existing regimes. Leaders are tem pted to close dow n or m anipulate 
dem ocratic channels w ithin their societies that threaten their positions. M any o f  the 
major ID ls have encountered this resistance and the corruption or lack o f  accountability
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that often accom panies it. They then added anti-corruption program s and policies to 
conditionalities, yet still faced resistance to their agendas. In order to avoid such 
resistance from recipient countries, better com m unication and coordination between 
donors, national leaders, civil society, and citizens in general is crucial. fDIs will 
continue to have complex m otives, but they can build trust and thus better cooperation 
w ith countries they aid i f  representatives from all parties devise clear, realistic, and 
appropriate goals. These goals should o f  course take into account the recipient coun try ’s 
unique situation and potential challenges.
Further com pounding the problem  o f  nurturing good governance is the fact that 
the conditions that m ake such reforms possible are ideally a capacity  to improve 
econom ic m anagem ent and balance this with attention to social interests and needs; 
im proving governance often requires a certain level o f  good governance to already be in 
place. The conditions that m ake good governance com e to fruition in one country m ay 
not be im itable in another country with a w holly different cultural, geographic, and 
political environm ent. IDI program s and policies need to be flexible and attune to such 
differences.
A lso o f  significance is the amount o f  legitim acy an external institution has w ithin 
a recipient country  and the degree and strength o f  political will w ithin the recipient 
country that is attached to good governance reform s. Im portantly, in order to foster long­
term  developm ent, ID ls need to continue to increasingly help recipient countries 
understand the value o f  im proving the welfare o f  the poorest citizens first to earn support 
for developm ent prospects and projects. Countries that understand the stakes involved in 
equitable developm ent will be better equipped to carry out m easures to im prove basic 
livelihood o f  citizens. This in turn will increase c itizens’ desires and abilities to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
livelihood o f  citizens. This in turn will increase c itizens’ desires and abilities to 
cooperate and contribute to the welfare o f  their com m unities and nations.
It is im perative that IDls supporting good governance and democracy carry out 
more careful and thorough studies to understand the true pow er dynamics w ithin recipient 
countries. Lack o f  know ledge and conception o f  pow er structures in local contexts often 
underm ines attem pts to introduce reform, as do com peting agendas by various IDls with 
similar rhetorical goals but little inter-agency cooperation or understanding. Also, the 
pace and sequence o f  governance reform s in recipient countries should be based on 
careful studies o f  the netw orks o f  m ediation betw een states and society that are used to 
instigate and secure appropriate reform s. Credible parties, unions, business organizations 
and associations, ethnic solidarities, and other special interest groups can indeed 
negotiate reform  where there is true incentive for reform . IDls need to increasingly adm it 
that reform is alw ays political, and politics is always particular, sometimes tenuous, and 
often m essy. Technical reform  agendas m ust confront and becom e part o f  both formal 
and informal channels o f  power. Reform s that help create well-m anaged economic 
systems cannot proceed without facing inequities in econom ic and political 
environments. The efficacy o f  a governm ent is alw ays contingent upon that 
governm ent’s legitim acy and fairness. O therw ise, cosm etic democracies only 
tem porarily cam ouflage scars and cleavages that are in the long term irrepressible. 
Electoral non-dem ocratic states still exist in m any countries and regions. Additionally, 
Northern leverage is not often enough to induce good governance and dem ocratization. 
Linkages that provide real incentive to em brace reform , coupled with widely 
representative senses o f  ownership and political will, are needed to instigate the seeds o f  
genuine reform.
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Proposed Argum ent
This project proposes that the UNDP, EU, W orld Bank, and USAID have created 
different good governance program s and policies that particularly reflect their distinctive 
power structures. Certainly the shift in emphasis w ithin each o f  these organizations 
deserves a m ore particular and clear justification than has been provided in the literature. 
Each o f  these ID ls has an individual historical background, set o f  stakeholders to satisfy, 
internal com position, world view, international role, and predisposition that affects its 
reactions to changing realities. Obviously, a different com bination o f  reasons led each to 
heighten its em phasis on good governance prom otion in the 1990s. This project argues 
that the particular nature o f  the U N D P’s, W orld B ank’s, EU’s, and U SA ID ’s good 
governance program s and policies reflect individualized, institution-specific goals. A 
closer look at the variances betw een these ID ls’ program s and policies reveals goals 
germ ane to each institution’s unique power structure.
The UNDP, for exam ple, saw the opportunity to help define the international 
understanding and prom otion o f  good governance as a m eans to increase the institu tion’s 
relevance and advance its own agenda o f  helping create to som e extent a m ore equitable 
world system. The U N D P’s good governance prom otion, with its em phasis on hum an 
rights protection, environm ental protection, issues o f  equitable distribution, special 
attention to the needs o f  the poorest countries and people, and fair access to a country’s 
resources, reflects its noticeably non-N orthem  dom inated pow er structure. The U N D P’s 
good governance program s reflect a particular em phasis on reducing the inequity 
betw een the N orth and the South and on hum an rights protection. Less obviously, a 
careful reading o f  UN and UNDP documents written throughout the 1990s shows that the 
UNDP, often overlooked or disregarded by powerful countries such as the LInitcd States,
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is working on its own institutional renewal; by linking good governance, democracy, and 
respect for hum an rights to peace, stability, and econom ic conditions conducive to market 
economies, the UNDP increasingly links its own equity goals to m otivations o f  ID ls such 
as the W orld Bank and other rich country-dom inated pow er structures. This new 
institutional lin k ag e '1 helps the UNDP build a case for its own renew ed relevance in the 
post-Cold W ar world. The UNDP in its docum ents positions itse lf as a dem ocracy 
prom oter, peace m aker, and efficient traditional econom ics-focused developm ent 
institution. This new linkage also gives the U N DP renew ed purpose w ithin the UN itself, 
as other UN agencies, such as UNICEF for Children and the W orld Food Programme, 
had taken over areas previously under the U N D P’s mandate.
The W orld B ank’s emphasis on good governance m ay appear an adm irable goal 
but this institution is still overly comm itted to ensuring that poor country economies 
becom e m arket-ready; w'ith its orthodox econom ic approach that relies heavily on 
quantitative indicators and its adherence to its restrictive m andate, the W orld Bank 
continues to be m otivated by efficiency concerns rather than legitim acy concerns. In 
m ost cases, governance reform s are actually oriented towards strengthening m arket 
reform s instead o f  genuine dem ocratization and attainm ent o f  hum an rights. The W orld 
B ank’s good governance program s reveal a focus on m any o f  the qualities conducive to 
an open m arket econom y that earlier SAPs addressed. W ith their em phasis on 
transparency, accountability, and openness to trade and the international market
7IJ. Zoe W ilson in “W ishful Thinking; W illful Blindness, and Artful Amnesia: 
The UN and the Prom otion o f  Good Governance, Dem ocracy, and Hum an Rights in 
A frica” (Ph.D. diss., Dalhousie University, 2004) studies this linkage in her attem pt to 
compare and contrast her own field experience surveying UNDP good governance 
program s with the institution’s rhetorical goals.
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econom y, they go even further than the SAPs in reflecting the W orld B ank’s Northern- 
dom inated pow er structure. In short, W orld Bank good governance prom otion program s 
in the 1990s and beyond show continued emphasis on traditional orthodox econom ic 
principals that are clearly m otivated by economic efficiency concerns. The W orld Bank 
has included politics in its agenda, but in a lim ited way. Political stability is seen as 
necessary to create and protect m arket economies. Dem ocracy prom otion has been 
view ed by m any N orthern policy m akers as a needed support to the new patterns o f  
econom ic relationships associated w ith econom ic globalization, and the W orld B ank’s 
dem ocracy assistance program s support liberal dem ocratic values conducive to freer trade 
and the expansion o f  investm ent opportunities for private, m ostly Northern capital. 
Governm ental legitim acy is stressed in W orld Bank docum ents and program s, but it is 
m ostly top-dow n state authority that is stressed. Further, the quantitative indicators that 
are used to m easure progress do not truly address the com plicated spectrum  o f  issues 
involved in the relationships betw een econom ic and political reform . By adding on 
concerns such as m any voiced at the UNDP, for an increased role for civil society and the 
elevation o f  w om en’s rights, W orld Bank good governance program s and policies appear 
increasingly proactive tow ards general equity issues, yet they continue to em phasize top- 
dow n reform s that avoid the m essy process o f  em pow ering citizens. The complex 
spectrum  o f  issues in the relationships between economics, politics, and social issues is 
given little o f  the attention it so desperately needs.
The EU ’s good governance program s differ in substance from the U N D P 's and 
the W orld B ank’s. They dem onstrate the desire o f  this IDI’s stakeholders to prom ote 
accountability and stability in nearby regions and in potential trading partners, as well as 
to justify  reductions in special privileges accorded to form er colonies. M otivations
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toward good governance and dem ocracy promotion that gained strength in the 1970s and 
1980s were given m om entum  in the 1990s with the signing o f  the Treaties o f  M aastricht, 
Am sterdam, and Nice. In addition to poverty alleviation, electoral assistance and judicial 
reform have becom e areas o f  key emphasis, revealing a desire for m ore dem ocracy and 
accountability on the continent and with trading partners and countries that have large 
populations o f  m igrants to the continent. EU governance aid has becom e specifically 
political, yet the EU has had difficulty translating its lofty program  goals into 
com m unity-specific program s. The EU essentially “wants it all” in terms o f  the general 
goals o f  good governance and dem ocracy prom otion— econom ic and security gains for 
its own m em ber countries and aid recipients, as well as em pow erm ent and hum an rights 
protection for poor people in aid-receiving countries. Its good governance program s 
reflect a lack o f  transparency and cohesiveness in the EU leadership itself, as well as 
inexperience. The EU does not have the research capabilities o f  the W orld Bank, nor has 
it arrived at the right m ix o f  positive and negative incentives to spur reform  and progress. 
Its incentive conditionality som etim es works against its stated aim  to help the poorest, 
because perform ers are rew arded and the m ost desperate in the m ost backward states do 
not receive m uch needed assistance.
U SA ID ’s good governance and dem ocracy assistance program s throughout the 
1990s and beyond reveal this institution’s own complex m otivations, different from  any 
o f  the m ultilateral institutions exam ined here. They evidence a growing desire to 
stim ulate genuine participatory bottom s-up dem ocracies that em pow er the poor, yet they 
reflect a bias towards quantifiable indicators rather than the m ore intangible qualitative, 
behavioral change aspects o f  dem ocratic reform  characteristic o f  UNDP program s and 
policies. The agency has had the m ost success with program s fostering the developm ent
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o f  civil society, independent media, local governm ent party form ation and consolidation, 
and electoral processes.72 This engagement is worthwhile, yet USAID program s have not 
m ade m uch headway in reaching deep into the political climate o f  societies, connecting 
people with its program s and policies. USAID programs also show' w eaknesses in the 
agency, which is a visible democracy prom oter yet is dependent on governm ental 
bureaucratic prerogatives. Its program s are often hampered by w orking at cross purposes 
w ith the State D epartm ent’s top-down programs. United States dem ocracy assistance is 
channeled through so many governmental arm s and agencies, including not only the State 
D epartm ent but also the W hite House, the Treasury Department, U nited States 
Em bassies, and the newly created M illennium Development Goals, that USA ID  has to 
com pete w ith other organizations promoting democracy in different ways. Through 
USAID, NG Os are granted contracts to carry out nearly 80 percent o f  U S A ID 's 
dem ocracy assistance program s, which focus on electoral assistance and em pow ering 
independent media and grassroots groups and organizations. These program s overall, 
however, have not yet found the means to stim ulate the structural changes needed to 
m ake lasting equitable changes.
The international donor com m unity needs to view democracy as a long-term  
process o f  building trust from wdthin, rather than as a quick rem edy or solution that can 
be im planted from the outside. EU and UNDP programs most clearly reveal this 
understanding, yet both face their own handicaps. EU programs in general suffer from
72 See three documents prepared by M anagem ent Systems International for 
USAID and issued in M ay/June 2001: The Transition to Sustainable D em ocracy in South  
Africa  and  the Strategic Role o f  USAID; The Transition to Sustainable D em ocracy in 
Bolivia and  the Strategic Role o f  USAID; and The Transition to Sustainable D em ocracy  
in Bulgaria and  the Strategic Role o f  USAID.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
9 3
too m uch bureaucratic differentiation and confusion, m aking them difficult to monitor 
and perplexing to initiate and im plem ent in recipient countries. UNDP program s lack 
resources and sometim es legitim acy with client countries. W orld Bank and USAID good 
governance and dem ocracy prom otion program s typically show m ore consistency and 
have m ore leverage with aid-receiving countries; the reform s prescribed and implem ented 
by  both o f  these IDIs,'though, are not as genuine and deeply em bedded as they m ight be, 
reflecting the need for m ore understanding o f  and w orking conscientiously with 
countries’ unique political climates.
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CH APT ER III
THE UNITED N A TION S DEVELOPM ENT PROGRAM M E
Roughly 30,000 United Nations staff are involved in developm ent work, with a 
roughly estim ated $10 billion a year being spent on development. These funds are 
channeled through many agencies and program s, many not earm arked for developm ent 
exclusively or specifically.1 The UNDP, the largest UN agency providing developm ent 
aid, gives a surprisingly modest portion o f  the overall institution 's aid. about $2.5 billion 
annually, including the funds it channels through other United N ations agencies and 
program s. The goals o f  the UNDP, which has about 6,000 em ployees w orking in 186 
countries, are expansive, and its work is well-known.2 Human developm ent, poverty 
elim ination, equitable distribution, and environm ental protection are its tradem ark areas 
o f  focus. Few would criticize such altruistic concerns, yet because UNDP m em ber 
contributions are voluntary and many o f  the developed countries prefer to allocate their 
aid through their own bilateral program s or other multilateral institutions, the institution
^ a r e  Short, “Foreword” in Reform ing the UN System: U N ID O ’s N eed-D riven  
Model, George A ssaf and others (N ew  York: Kluwer Law International, 2001), xv. This 
figure reveals an increase from the early 1990s, when United N ations aid w as assessed as 
m ore than $6 billion for the each o f  the years 1992, 1993, and 1994 by the O rganisation 
for Econom ic Cooperation and Development. Organisation for Econom ic Cooperation 
and Developm ent, Development Cooperation: 1995 Report (Paris: O rganisation for 
Econom ic Cooperation and Development, 1996). As Nicholas Eberstadt argues, however, 
these figures are a bit controversial and certainly difficult to evaluate. He wrrites that a 
“com prehensive assessment would require, at the outset, evaluation o f  thousands upon 
thousands o f  developm ent projects, m ountains o f  policy documents, and the by-now' 
nearly countless action programmes and agendas....” Nicholas Eberstadt, “The Im pact o f  
the U N ’s Developm ent Activities on Third W orld Development,” in D elusions o f  
Grandeur: The United Nations and  G lobal Intervention, ed. Ted Galen C arpenter 
(W ashington, D.C.: The Cato Institute, 1997), 224, note 2; also 213-14.
2Figures from United Nations Developm ent Programme [homepage] (no date). 
<http:/Avww.undp.org/'> [10 January 2005],
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
9 5
has never had the m eans to readily or easily achieve its extensive developm ent goals. 
M any o f  the U N D P’s strongest supporters are them selves developing countries without 
the financial clout to m atch their aspirations for the program. Due to this system  o f  
elective funding and the larger system  o f  one country/one vote in the UN, UNDP goals, 
program s, and policies do not tend to m irror those o f  the developed and m ost powerful 
countries. They instead tend to reflect a panoply o f  desires that either w ealthy and poor 
countries can agree upon, or ones that poor countries believe are not w ell-represented 
elsewhere. Hence, U N DP endeavors often com bine universal hum anitarian im pulses 
with desires to create m ore opportunity  and advantages for those often m arginalized poor 
countries and the poorest or m ost overlooked groups w ithin countries.
Additionally, because m any leaders in developing countries w orry about the 
short-term  w ell-being o f  their countries, citizens, and selves and have not yet decided
i
whether m ore open and interdependent econom ies will benefit the poorest in the long- 
run, a w ariness persists about w hether to and how to support neoliberal m arket reform  
program s and policies. A s the U N D P’s Human D evelopm ent Report 1999  states, 
globalization “seeks to prom ote econom ic efficiency, generate growth, and yield profits. 
But it m isses out on the goals o f  equity, poverty eradication, and enhanced hum an 
security.” The UNDP, w hich claim ed in its 1996 Hitman D evelopm ent Report that “there 
is no autom atic link betw een econom ic growth and hum an developm ent,” has generally 
attem pted to include hum anitarian goals in its developm ent work help m itigate the 
uneven effects o f  globalization. This em phasis has been one o f  the hallm arks o f  its 
prrogram s and policies. This is in addition to concerns about equity btw een and within 
recipient countries.3
^United N ations Developm ent Program me, Hum an D evelopm ent Report 1999
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U N D P assistance is allocated through three “program me levels.’’ The 
global/interregional program m e prom otes activities to benefit the international UNDP 
system. This program m e aims to support the developm ent o f the policies and goals o f  the 
UN system. Regional support program m es form  the second level. They have a distinctly 
regional focus (Arab, Africa, Europe and Com m onw ealth o f  Independent States, Asia and 
Pacific, and Latin A m erica and the Caribbean) and work to foster the exchange o f  
regional know ledge and experiences. Finally, country-level program m es are designed to 
support national developm ent priorities. M ost UNDP aid channeled through all three o f
n
these levels is not conditional. Also, recipient countries sometim es pay h a lf  or a part o f  
project costs.
W hat the UNDP calls “core” funding (m oney given to help w ith im m inent needs, 
yet without a specifically designated purpose) peaked at $1.2 billion in 1992 and had 
dropped to about $700 m illion by  the end o f  the 1990s. There w as, how ever, a rise in 
“non-core” funding, or funding earm arked for particular projects o r program s; non-core 
funding reached an average o f  $ 1.6 billion by 2001 .4 All levels o f  UNDP program s, 
including its international network o f  country offices, work with public and private sector 
partners, civil society, and increasingly other IDIs, to prom ote sustainable developm ent. 
T he organization, which reports to the General Assem bly, funds projects and program s 
and helps governm ents, civil society organizations, and other aid institutions address 
poverty and its m any related problem s. The U N D P is the most pro-poor o f  the
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1999); idem , Human D evelopm ent R eport 1996 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
4U nited Nations Developm ent Program m e, “UNDP and Governance:
Experiences and Lessons Learned,” Lessons Learned  Series no. 1 (1998). 
< http://m agnet.undp.org/D ocs/gov/Lessonsl.htm > [30 Novem ber 2001].
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m ultilateral IDIs. According to its own analyses, about 99 percent o f its m ain program s 
focus on the 66 countries where about 90 percent o f  the w orld’s poorest live. The U N DP 
is led by an Adm inistrator responsible to a 36-m em ber Executive Board. This Board, in 
turn, reports to the United Nations Econom ic and Social Council (UNESC).
UNDP capital has been used to provide food, clothing, and shelter; m edical care;
education; agricultural supplies; infrastructure planning and construction; skills training
and em ploym ent assistance; technological apparatus and training; policy advice; and
dem ocracy assistance, among other goods and services. Increasingly in recent years, the
U N D P has provided developm ent advice in addition to funds. Despite criticism  over its
efficacy throughout the years, the U N DP has been im portant sym bolically as well as
practically. As even one-tim e UN critic Nicholas Eberstadt concedes, the organization
has “played a critical, arguably a central, role in the globalization o f  what are now called
‘developm ent assistance policies.’” He further states about the larger United N ations’
developm ent assistance policies,
N ot only was the UN ‘present at the creation’ o f  that new [post W orld-W ar-11] 
instrum ent o f  diplom acy and finance; in the decades that followed, the UN system  
helped secure worldw ide acceptance o f  the proposition that m assive state-to-state 
resource transfers in the name o f  growth and progress for low -incom e areas 
should be a regular feature o f  the m odem  international order.5
The U N D P’s annual Human D evelopm ent Reports  have been w idely influential in 
shaping the international developm ent discourse. The institution, however, consistently 
struggles to raise funds to carry out its expansive goals.
5Eberstadt, 213.
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The UNDP, despite its own w ell-docum ented problems and issues,6 has helped to 
create norms and establish standards that continue to affect m ultilateral and bilateral aid 
policies today. Am erican diplom at Jam es F. Leonard contends that it is one o f  the most 
productive and best m anaged United N ations organizations.7 W ith m ore financial 
support and a stronger endorsem ent from the developed countries, though, the program  
could be more instrum ental in helping direct international efforts to prom ote developm ent 
that prioritizes hum an welfare and equality.
As the new m illennium  approached, the UNDP had achieved its goals to som e 
degree. As C lare Short contends, the organization has “played a valuable ro le in helping 
peop le .... It has played an im portant part in the advances in hum an developm ent over the
Q
last 50 years.” Despite its difficulties securing funding, the UNDP has financed many 
valuable projects, and as Eberstadt contends, “Pockets o f  excellence do exist w ithin the 
UN developm ent apparatus....”9 But the UN DP has not by any m eans reached its full
6UNDP critiques usually target the program ’s perceived inefficiency, internal 
bickering, and m anagem ent and financial problem s. Catherine Gwin and M aurice 
W illiam s, “The U.N. and Sustainable D evelopm ent,” in U.S. Foreign Policy and  the 
United Nations System, eds. Charles W illiam s M aynes and Richard W illiam son (New 
York: W .W . Norton, 1996); United N ations, The United Nations in D evelopm ent: Reform  
Issues in the Econom ic and  Social Fields, N ordic United Nations Project (Stockholm : 
Alm qvist and W iksell International, 1991); United Nations, “A New U nited N ations 
Structure for Global Econom ic C ooperation: Report o f  the Group o f  Experts on the 
Structures o f  the United Nations System ,” EC /A C.62/9 (New York: U nited N ations, 28 
M ay 1975); Robert Jackson, A Study o f  the Capacity o f  the UN D evelopm ent System  
(Geneva: United Nations, 1969).
7James F. Leonard, “U.S. Policy Tow ards the United N ations” in U.S. Policy and  
the Future o f  the United Nations, ed. R oger A. Coate, (New York: The Tw entieth 
Century Fund Press, 1994), 223.
8Clare Short, “Rethinking the U nited N ation’s M ission,” USA Today  130:2674, 
July 2001, 54-7
9Eberstadt, 215.
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potential. M uch o f this stems from its financial struggles. The initial aim  o f  the m erger 
that created the UNDP was to marry technical assistance with financing, and to reduce 
interagency com petition for funds, but the second o f these goals has not been achieved as 
planned. Throughout the Cold War, the UNDP struggled financially, never acquiring the 
budget needed to m eet the many dem ands placed before it. This made rivalry for funds 
intense. In recent years in particular, such competition has been stronger than ever.10 
The collapse o f  the Soviet Union and Eastern European dictatorships has increased 
dem ands on the UNDP, and problem s such as ethnic violence, refugee crises, 
environm ental degradation, drug trafficking, disease, and chronic poverty continue to 
strain the organization’s m anagement and funds. The fact that the United States, the 
U nited Kingdom , Austria, and Belgium have all markedly reduced their contributions to 
the UN in recent years has not helped m atters.11
These continued pressures on the UNDP have resulted in strengthened efforts to 
prom ote developm ent in the 1990s and beyond. UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros- 
Ghali placed renew ed em phasis on sustainable developm ent,12 also calling for greater 
coordination betw een m ultilateral and bilateral efforts towards this goal. A dditionally, he
10 Rosem ary Righter, Utopia Lost: The United Nations and  W orld O rder  (New 
York: The Tw entieth Century Fund Press, 1995), 57-8.
n R. Cassen and others, Does A id  Work? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1986), cited in Righter, 5.
12The UNDP defines “sustainable developm ent” as “developm ent that em pow ers 
the poor and generates growth which is equitably distributed. Such developm ent 
preserves the environm ent rather than degrades it, and advances wom en instead o f  
discrim inating against them. It prom otes job-led growth rather than job less grow th. In 
other words, it is developm ent that stresses em powerm ent, employm ent, equity , and the 
environm ent.” United Nations Development Programme, “UNDP and G overnance."
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em phasized the linkages between peace, developm ent, and dem ocracy.13 On D ecem ber 
20, 1993, for exam ple, in an address to the Foreign Correspondents club in Tokyo, Japan, 
he asserted that
[t]hree challenges are before us: peace, developm ent, and democracy. W ithout 
peace, there can be no developm ent and there can be no democracy. W ithout 
developm ent, the basis for dem ocracy will be lacking and societies will tend to fall 
into conflict. And without democracy, no sustainable developm ent can occur. 
W ithout sustainable developm ent, peace can no longer be m aintained....14
B outros-G hali’s broadening o f  the discussion on developm ent to consider its im plications 
not only  for basic hum an welfare but also for conflict and war prevention revealed and 
underscored an even w ider dimension to the developm ent debates. This m ade the 
U N D P’s work even m ore relevant to the peace and security prom otion o f  the United 
N ations generally.
History and Evolution o f  Policies 
The UN began w orking in the developm ent field right from its start. In the mid- 
1940s, UN developm ent agencies were created to assist people in war-torn countries. The 
first agency created, the UN R elief and R ehabilitation Adm inistration (UNRRA), was 
soon jo ined  by  eight others, each with its ow n m andate and mission. Unlike the W orld 
Bank, these agencies provided grants rather than loans in addition to their services. As 
the U N ’s developm ent work expanded, better coordination betw een the agencies was 
sought. W ith the encouragem ent o f  less-developed m em ber countries, the UNDP was
13A w hole literature exists on the relationships betw een peace and democracy. 
Bruce Russett, for example, argues that dem ocracies rarely fight one another. Bruce 
Russett, G rasping the D em ocratic Peace: P rinciples fo r  a Post-C old War Peace  
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).
l4“Three Challenges: Peace, D evelopm ent, and D em ocracy,” United Nations
Chronicle 31:1 (M arch 1994): 2
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created by the UN General Assembly in 1965. It was a joining o f  two other United 
N ations agencies: the Extended Program o f  Technical Assistance (EPTA) and the Special 
Fund prom oting public and private investment. The purpose was largely to integrate and 
better coordinate United Nations aid. Poor countries also hoped its creation would 
translate into more aid for the South.15 The new  organization, led by A dm inistrator Paul 
Hoffm an, w as to support developing countries by providing funding and technical 
assistance derived from national developm ent goals. This m ission reflected the 
developm ent thinking o f  this time period, em phasizing the needs o f  developing countries 
to becom e self-reliant and to create the conditions necessary for poverty alleviation. 
Popular developm ent theories at the time were based on the assum ption that clearly 
defined stages o f  econom ic growth existed: w ith the right urban industries and 
infrastructure, countries would inevitably grow m ore prosperous and efficient.16 The 
U N D P’s m andate provided it w ith the status o f  a fund adm inistration program  rather than 
a developm ent agency; it did, though, have appreciable influence over the nature o f  
developm ent policies other United Nations program s pursued due to its benefactor ro le .17 
The UNDP used country quotas based on GNP per capita, population size, and other 
indicators, as well as its own discretion, to decide how to best allocate its funds.
r5U N D P’s Adm inistrator, Paul Hoffman, who had previously helped distribute 
M arshall Plan aid, initially planned to attem pt to coordinate UNDP aid with W orld Bank 
loans, but did not succeed in his early efforts to do so. He ended up abandoning this early 
intention, which set the stage for a general lack o f  coordination between U N DP and 
W orld Bank efforts. The W orld Bank was m ore intent on using the IDA rather than the 
UN DP to gage how to best direct its developm ent efforts. Righter, 57-8.
l6W alt Rostow, The Stages o f  Economic Growth  (Cambridge: Cam bridge 
University Press, 1960).
17By 1985, thirty-seven United Nations agencies and participating organizations 
were vying for UNDP funding. Righter, 58.
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To better understand the UNDP, it is helpful to first review  the nature o f  the larger 
organization in which it is located. Originally, o f  course, the United Nations was 
designed prim arily as a security organization. The end o f  each o f  the W orld W ars o f  the 
twentieth century led to the creation o f a world organization dedicated to conserving the 
post-war pow er arrangem ent and promoting peace. The League o f Nations, originally 
promoted but never jo ined by the United States, never becam e widely influential in the 
international arena. Its post-W orld-W ar-11 successor, the United Nations, however, 
which the United States and other major powers did jo in , was more successful. It 
survived the Cold W ar despite its sometim es difficult life course.18 Some contend that 
the United N ations has been useful in preventing a third world war, while others see it as 
largely a waste o f  tim e and resources.19 Certainly it has and continues to undergo 
international scrutiny and to experience various controversies, especially about the 
allocation o f  and contracting o f  funds. M ost scholars and policy makers, though, contend 
that the United N ation’s history has included both failures and successes and that the very 
existence o f  the organization has been significant for international peace and cooperation 
efforts.
The UN, created on October 24, 1945, with fifty signatory state m em bers, em erged 
from the A llied coalition o f  the same name that was bom  on January 1, 1942. Its 
carefully deliberated Charter, designed with the m ost input from the United States,
l8For a useful history o f  the UN, see the essays in Benedict Kingsbury and Adam  
Roberts, eds., Presiding Over a D ivided World: Changing UN Roles, 1945-1993  
(Boulder: Lynn Rienner, 1994); Max Jakobsen, The United Nations in the 1990s: A 
Second Chance? (N ew  York: The Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1993); G eoff Simons. 
UN M alaise: Power, Problems, and Realpolitik  (New York: St. M artin’s Press, 1995).
19See the essays in Ted Galen Carpenter, ed.. Delusions o f  Grandeur: The United  
Nations and G lobal Intervention  (W ashington, D.C.: Cato Institute. 1997).
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Russia, and the U nited Kingdom , evidenced the view that the system  o f  states required an 
international organization to foster not only security but also justice and hum an rights.20 
The C harter’s 111 articles form alized the U N ’s purposes, principals, structures, 
procedures, tasks, and financial arrangements. M em bership was lim ited to states, and six 
principal organs were defined: the General Assembly, the Security Council, the 
Econom ic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, the International Court o f  Justice, 
and the Secretariat. T he General Assembly, the plenary organ, controls m uch o f  the 
U N ’s work: it approves the budget, plans international conferences, sets priorities, 
oversees the work o f  subsidiary bodies, and adopts resolutions. It m eets in regular session 
for the last quarter o f  each year. The Security Council has five perm anent m em bers (the 
U nited States, Russia (form erly the Soviet Union), the United Kingdom , France, and 
China). Originally, it had six other m em bers elected for two-year term s by the General 
Assembly. Since 1965, it has had ten additional elected m em bers. D ecisions require a 
positive vote from at least nine m em bers, and any o f  the perm anent five m ay issue a veto. 
The Council m eets often throughout the year and m akes decisions com pelling all 
m em bers to cooperate. It has a broad m andate to take action in response to threats, 
breaches o f  the peace, and acts o f  aggression. The 54-m em ber Econom ic and Social 
Council (ECO SOC) seeks to coordinate efforts o f  the organization’s specialized agencies 
in econom ic and social m atters, including human rights. The Trusteeship Council was 
established to supervise the transition o f  trust territories to self-governing states. W ith the 
ending o f  the Trust territory  o f  the Pacific Islands in 1994, it suspended operations. Since
20Peter R. Baehr, “O rganization o f  the UN: A Tale o f  Tw o W orlds,” in The United 
Nations in the N ew  W orld Order, eds. Dimitris Bourantonis and Jarrod W iener (New 
York: St. M artin’s Press, 1995), 177-88.
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m ost cases o f  decolonization did not involve trust territories, m ost decolonization 
processes were superintended by different UN bodies, such as the Com m ittee on 
Decolonization (established in 1961). The International Court o f  Justice in the Hague, o f  
which all UN states are m em bers, has twenty-five judges elected for nine-year terms by 
the General Assembly and the Security Council. It considers cases introduced by states 
and provides legal opinions to other UN organs and bodies. Before June o f  2000, it had 
handled seventy cases betw een states and provided tw enty-four advisory opinions. The 
Secretariat is com prised o f  m ore than 9,000 UN staff m em bers at the headquarter in N ew  
York and in other scattered offices. UN leaders have included Trygve Lie (Norway, 
1946-53), Dag Ham m arskjold (Sweden, 1953-61), U Thant (Burm a, 1961-71), Kurt 
W aldheim  (1972-81), Javier Perez Cuellar (Peru, 1982-1991), Boutros Boutros-Ghali 
(Egypt, 1992-96), and Kofi Annan (1997- ).21 The UN system  also includes many other 
bodies and specialized agencies. One-hundred and ninety-one states now belong to the 
UN.
Though its original purpose has rem ained, the particulars o f  the United N ations’ role 
and the pressures on the organization have changed over time. East-W est anim osity 
handicapped m any Security Council efforts to take decisive action in the organization’s 
first forty-five years.22 As Lev Voronkov contends, the East-W est confrontation “ left a 
substantial mark on the UN, as the stand-off pervaded all spheres o f  life, and was
^^Jnited Nations, “Basic Facts.’’
22By 1990, the Soviet Union had vetoed 114 Security Council resolutions, the 
U nited States 67, the U nited Kingdom 30, France 18, and China 3. M ost o f  the Soviet 
U nion’s vetoes occurred before 1966 (103), while m ost o f  the United States’ occurred 
afterwards. This evidenced the United States’ growing disenchantm ent with the UN and 
its increasing view  that the organization was dom inated by angry Third W orld and 
Com m unist states. In the century’s last decade, after the Cold W ar, only nine vetoes 
were put forth: United States 5, Russia 2, and China. Ibid.
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reflected in the powers, structures, and program s o f  the UN and its special agencies.
From the early 1960s, the developing countries have attempted to use their grow ing 
m ajority within the United Nations to receive more attention for their particular concerns. 
It was this pressure that largely led to the creation o f  the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964.24 UNCTAD, created by the General 
Assem bly, institutionally em bodied the specific Third World perspective on international 
political and economic affairs. Northern countries did not support the creation o f  this 
new agency, yet in this case the South prevailed. UNCTAD was established as an 
Assem bly organ agency, rather than as a specialized agency, to help ensure that it would 
receive adequate financial support. Argentinean economist Raul Prebisch, knowTi for his 
articulation o f  dependency and world system s theories, helped create UNCTA D and 
served as its first secretary-general. The new  agency imm ediately becam e an 
uncom fortable multilateral setting for developed countries. Over the years. UNCTAD 
has served as a potent symbol o f  unity and a gathering place for Third W orld expression. 
Additionally, developing country econom ists such as Prebisch helped provide the 
intellectual underpinnings for various new  dem ands for a better arrangem ent in world
25trade for poor countries.
The creation o f  the UNDP followed the General A ssem bly’s 1960 proclam ation
23Lev Voronkov, “ International Peace and Security: N ew  Challenges to the UN," 
in The United Nations in the New World Order, eds. Dimitris Bourantonis and Jarrod 
W iener (N ew  York: St. M artin’s Press, 1995), 2.
24Richard Rothstein, Global Bargaining: UNCTAD and  the Quest fo r  a  New  
International Economic Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1979). Since the 
1980s, though, U N CTA D’s significance has declined.
25Graham Evans and Jeffrey New m an, The Penguin D ictionary o f  International 
Relations  (New York: Penguin Books, 1998), 384-85.
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that the United Nations would pursue four successive developm ent decades, to em phasize 
the need for international cooperation to foster development. Part o f this new focus was 
due to developing countries’ increased pow er w ithin the United Nations and their desire 
to lessen the gap between rich and poor countries, or at least to help the im prove the 
welfare o f  the latter. Before the end o f  the first o f  these decades, the need for such 
cooperation was as critical as ever, as early efforts to spur developm ent in the poorest 
countries revealed the difficulty o f  this challenge and as the decolonization process 
proceeded, accom panied by challenges facing the newly independent states. During the 
second developm ent decade, the success o f  the Organization o f  Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) revealed new possibilities for poor countries to increase their stature in 
the international arena. Follow ing the new fortunes o f  the OPEC, in 1974 the General 
A ssem bly adopted the Declaration and Program m e o f  Action on the Establishm ent o f  a 
New International Econom ic O rder (NIEO). It was based on “equity, sovereignty, 
interdependence, comm on interests, and cooperation among states, irrespective o f  their 
econom ic and social system s” and was m eant to increase the relative econom ic and 
political power o f  developing countries. D eveloping countries also jo ined to form  the 
Group o f  77 (in contrast to developed countries’ G roup o f  8, later 9) for sim ilar reasons.
The U N D P’s early years were a tim e o f  new hopes for m any developing and newly
26independent countries.
These hopes, however, largely faded as poor countries rem ained m ost often 
m arginalized. Conservative groups w ithin OPEC cooperated with the North to recycle 
petrodollars, and threatened developed countries survived the crisis with little loss in 
relative power. O ther com m odity cartels were not established as m any had expected, and
^V oronkov, 3-4.
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in the end, the OPEC cartel’s actions proved more injurious to developing countries, 
leading in part to the South’s subsequent debt crisis. Further, the first oil crisis created 
new  rifts among countries in the South, rifts that would grow deeper as the N ew ly 
Industrialized Countries (NICs) began to em erge.27 Instead o f gaining prosperity and 
pow er relative to that o f the North, the 1970s and early 1980s saw the South more 
divided w ithin the United Nations and more dependent upon the North. But this has not 
been true only w ithin the context o f  the United Nations. As R.J. Barry Jones contends, 
over the years, the United Nations has “ remained fundamentally, a creature o f  the
* * ) g  •
international system within which it is located.”'  Power struggles, pertinent issues, 
controversies, and concerns from the larger international system o f  states are  reproduced 
to  varying degrees within the United Nations.
Throughout its early years and particularly following the OPEC debacle in the 
1970s, the United N ations’ policies generally did not reflect a neoliberal agenda. Instead, 
they favored state regulation, econom ic intervention, and hum anitarian social 
considerations. UN programs and policies reflected the view o f m any sta tes—including 
the Soviet bloc, the Third World, the Asian tigers and the West Europeans—m ost o f  
w hom  opposed neo-liberal prescriptions. Even as neoliberal beliefs strengthened in the 
1980s in the United States and parts o f  W estern Europe, the United N ations and the 
U N D P worked from the position that the poor and marginalized in the w orld needed state 
protection from Northern capitalist exploitation. This led to even less support for the 
institution. The United Nations attem pted to rem ain relevant to the post-C old-W ar world.
There is some discrepancy about the m em bership o f  the N ICs, yet H ong Kong, 
South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore are the indisputable members.
28R.J. Barry Jones, “The United N ations and the International Political 
System ,” in The United Nations and  the New World Order, eds. D m itris B ourantonis and 
Jarrod W iener (New York: St. M artin’s Press. 1995), 19.
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Its role in lending credibility to the Persian G ulf war effort was lauded, fueling hopes for 
a m ore united, cohesive, and effective future United Nations world role. These hopes, 
however, were largely short-lived, as the organization becam e involved in various 
intractable intra-state conflicts.29 Throughout the 1990s, the United N ations’ 
peacekeeping am bitions and m issions increased nevertheless. The UN rem ained 
continually active and was perhaps m ost innovative in preventative diplom acy and fact­
finding m issions; yet its em phasis on hum an rights and focus on sustainable developm ent 
increased as well.
Particularly since the m id-1990s, the prom otion o f  hum an rights has becom e a vital 
goal for the United Nations. Throughout the early 1990s there was a resistance among 
m em ber states to com m it to financing projects dealing with hum an rights protection. 
Som e m em ber countries did not want scrutiny turned to their own human rights abuses. 
The UN Center for H um an Rights in G eneva lacked adequate staff and financing, with 
ju st 0.7 percent o f  the U N ’s overall budget dedicated to bum an rights activities. This was 
despite the fact that the U N ’s top leadership rem ained m ore firmly com m itted than ever 
to the cause. Boutros-Ghali advanced this stance with eloquence at the Hague in January, 
1994: “ Indeed, the notion that individual hum an rights can be protected by the 
international com m unity is one o f  the great practical and intellectual achievem ents o f  
international law ,” he said. The United N ations Charter included m any references to the 
value o f  and need to protect human rights. Despite the resistance o f  some country 
m em bers, the UN has been committed to protecting hum an rights since its inception, but 
its focus was renew ed in the 1990s. This was partly due to the end o f  the Cold W ar
Ram esh Thakur, “ A Crisis o f  Expectations: UN Peacekeeping in the 1990s” (no 
date). <http://w w w .questia.com /popularSearches/u_n_peacekeeping.jsp> [10 January 
2005],
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allowing for m ore attention to he paid to this issue and was inspired partly by the wide 
awareness o f  hum an rights abuses in m any countries and regions made possible by 
technology’s increased impact. In 1993, the second W orld Conference on Hum an Rights 
in V ienna was widely heralded and attended by  representatives from m ore than 170 states 
and about 2,300 N G O s.30 Attention to this issue has only increased since in both the 
world at large and w ithin the UNDP.
Developm ent has always been a UN priority, and several o f  United N ations’ 
agencies in addition to the UNDP work specifically  to prom ote developm ent. As its 
various agencies work together, the U nited N ations’ developm ent efforts have com e to be 
com m only known as the “UN developm ent system .” Today the United N ations’ m ain 
goals are still to prom ote international peace and im proved hum an welfare, and a large 
com ponent o f  this increasingly involves w orking to solve economic, social, and political 
problem s. A rising awareness o f  the connections betw een all o f  these goals, in addition 
to the effects o f  globalization, has m ade all UN aspirations particularly relevant yet no 
less challenging.
The organization also has an interesting history. Over the years, the U N DP has 
been progressively transform ed from a passive grant provider into an active dispenser o f  
policy advice. In its first decade, it struggled to form  a single identity out o f  the program s
30The Universal Declaration o f  H um an R ights adopted by the General Assem bly 
includes a list o f  the organization’s principles and standards on human rights. Taken 
together with the two international conventions adopted by the United N ations in 1966 
and two Optional Protocols to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
adopted in 1966 and 1989, it is com m only called the “ International Bill o f  Hum an 
Rights.” Edward New m an, “Realpolitik and the CN N Factor o f  Hum anitarian 
Intervention,” in The United Nations in the N ew  W orld Order, eds. Dim itris Bourantonis 
and Jarrod W iener (New York: St. M artin’s Press, 1995), 190-211 and Benedict 
K ingsbury and Adam Roberts, eds., United Nations, D ivided World: The U N ’s Role in 
International Relations, 2d ed. (New York: O xford University Press, 1993).
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from which it em erged, one (the EPTA) having a m ore project-oriented em phasis and the 
other (the Special Fund), a m ore country-specific focus. As the new IDI worked to better 
to discover its own m ission, a “capacity” study was perform ed in 1970 to m ake 
suggestions. Findings were highly critical o f  the UNDP and urged that a needs-based 
system  be instituted and that country bureaus be established. These suggestions were 
adopted, and the UNDP began to reveal its distinctiveness from bilateral and other 
m ultilateral aid program s. The UNDP would at least attem pt to be genuinely com m itted 
to helping countries w ith the greatest needs by know ing first-hand local situations and 
challenges.
A fter Rudolph Peterson becam e the UNDP A dm inistrator in 1972, the UNDP 
com m itted to strengthening country ownership o f  program s. Urging that its program s 
address national priorities, the UNDP less often supported scattered individual projects. 
Instead it began to takes a m ore holistic, integrated "program m e approach," assisting 
activities linked to countries’ own developm ent goals. The UNDP itse lf m ainly focused 
on the technical aspects o f  institution-building in developing countries during the m id-to- 
late 1960s and the 1970s. UNDP and other U N -funded agency officials in poor countries 
contracted w ith m ostly  inside experts to assist w ith various projects.31 These included 
helping governm ents m anage state affairs and provide for citizens’ basic needs, such as 
for water, food, clothing, housing, health care, and education. M any projects included 
the building o f  m odem  infrastructure and the creation o f  new industrial sites that w ould
31In his little-heeded 1969 study, Robert Jackson argued that the system through 
which specialized United N ations proposed projects, vied for funding and then selected 
experts to oversee projects was inefficient and even corrupt. Agencies essentially built 
their own em pires in developing countries using their ow n specialists. They attem pted to 
preserve their own niches and to secure funding, Jackson contended, and m any projects 
were o f  little use to long-term  poverty alleviation. Jackson, Capacity o f  the UN , 49-52.
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utilize local com m odities and labor. Little attention was given to the ability o f  the 
recipient governm ents to broadly m anage such needs from long-term  perspectives, nor to 
the governance m ethods and policy environm ents present. D evelopm ent results did not 
match expectations; the plight o f  all but a handful o f  poor countries did not m arkedly or 
in m any cases, noticeably, improve. The plight o f  som e countries even appeared to grow 
m ore dire, in term s o f  GDP and citizens’ access to life’s basic necessities.32
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the UNDP began em phasizing m ore 
participatory and inclusive approaches to developm ent, realizing the benefits o f  wider 
citizen involvem ent to the developm ent process. During this tim e, the UN DP began 
increasingly w orking with NGOs, and it started to m ore often apply private sector 
techniques and strategies to public sector enterprises and projects. The U N ’s 
international conferences during this period, such as ones on Basic Needs, W omen, and 
Education, reinforced the participatory m ethods the UNDP was advocating and 
teaching.33 M any lauded these efforts, but som e held that m any corrupt governm ents 
went along with program s superficially only to insure their continued stream s o f  aid.34
The U N D P’s efforts did not m irror those o f  m ost other developm ent organizations 
at the tim e. As other donors, both m ultilateral and bilateral, began to increasingly 
em phasize structural adjustm ent and other form s o f  conditionality throughout the 1980s, 
the UN DP, as well as other UN agencies involved in developm ent work, continued to 
stress poverty alleviation and the end o f  hum an suffering due to poverty above any other
‘ United Nations Developm ent Program m e, “UNDP and G overnance.”
33Ibid.
34UNDP, Structural Adjustm ent with a H um an Face (N ew  York: UNICEF, 1991).
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goals.35 The UNDP and the agencies it funded becam e involved in countless developm ent 
projects towards these ends, but efforts were often largely uncoordinated, and som etim es 
the advice dispensed was not the m ost competent available.36 Even the U N D P’s new 
N ational Technical Assistance Cooperation Assessm ents and Program s (NATCAPS), 
designed to help local governm ents “identify, assess, and rank their hum an resource 
needs. . . and provide the basis for m ore rational allocation o f  funds,"37 did not seem to 
help efforts. O ften attem pts to devise developm ent strategies instead resulted in lists o f
38projects. In addition to these problem s, the UNDP increasingly experienced problem s 
raising funds,39 accom m odating the desires o f  m em ber countries and various internal and 
external critics, and, m ost importantly, achieving its goal o f  helping to alleviate poverty 
and suffering. Early expectations that the program  could m ake a notew orthy difference 
in the lives o f  m illions w ithered, yet were given a needed boost with the creation o f  the 
H um an D evelopm ent Reports  and Human D evelopm ent Index(HD l).
The launch o f  the U N ’s now yearly Human D evelopm ent Reports and Hum an  
D evelopm ent Index (HDI) in 1990 reflected the organization’s renew ed focus on 
developm ent generally and on the m ore specific hum an aspects o f  poverty and its 
alleviation. The H D I  m easures developmental progress by com bining m easures such as 
per capita incom e, life expectancy, and educational attainm ent, and it ranks countries
35Ibid.
36Righter, 268-69.
United N ations Developm ent Program me, W orld Developm ent Annual Report, 
1987  (New York: UN DP, 1987), 30-33.
38Righter, 276-77.
39Stephan Klingebiel, Effectiveness and Reform o f  the United Nations 
D evelopm ent Program m e  (London: Frank Cass, 1999).
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from best to worst. Excitem ent over the first publication was part o f a larger sense o f 
anticipation that the UN was on the verge o f  a renewal, as international events were 
shifting dram atically, and hopes for the end o f  the Cold W ar were raised. W hile not 
everyone was enthusiastic about the launch o f  the report.40 many heralded it as an 
im portant effort to re-focus aid on its m ost adm irable if  not always most efficient 
purpose: helping to alleviate human suffering.41 Due partly to this focus in the 1990s, 
the UNDP experienced a period o f  attem pted rebirth that was shared with the larger 
United Nations organization. The UN generally was attempting to make its work in 
various realms m ore holistic, relating security, econom ic, and social issues to the goal o f  
im proving peoples’ lives.42
The UNDP aim ed to increasingly becom e an agency that coordinated 
developm ent efforts and continued to distribute funds.43 This was intended to preserve 
the U N D P’s relevance and its usefulness. The UNDP would serve as a dispenser
40M. M cGillivray, “The Human Developm ent Index: Yet Another Redundant 
Com posite Indicator,” W orld D evelopm ent 19:10 (1991): 1461-68 and T.N. Srinivasan, 
“ Hum an Developm ent: A New Developm ent or Reinvention o f  the W heelT'Am erican  
Economic Review. AEA Papers and  Proceedings 84:2 (1994): 238-43.
41 See M. H opkins, “Human Developm ent Revisited: A New UNDP Report,” 
W orld D evelopm ent 19:10(1991): 1469-73.
42In 1990, at a special UN, the General Assembly, for instance, adopted the 
Declaration on International Econom ic Cooperation. M em ber states pledged their 
“strong com m itm ent to a global consensus to prom ote international econom ic 
cooperation.” In 1991, the General Assem bly adopted a resolution to strengthen United 
N ations work in the econom ic and social fields. United N ations, Basic Facts about the 
United Nations (N ew  York: United N ations Departm ent o f  Public Inform ation, 1993), 
94-5. Also, the finalizing o f  the Uruguay Round o f  the General Agreem ent on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) and its transform ation into the W TO within the United Nations 
system  revealed a broad new dedication to econom ic matters. See Voronkov, 7.
43Ruben P. M endez, “ United N ations Development Program m e” (no date). 
<http://w w w .yale.edu/unsy/U N D Phist.htm > [12 January 2005].
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
114
o f  knowledge, advice, counsel, and guidance on developm ent issues, largely those 
concerning governance.44 The Human Development Reports analyze the relationships 
between growth, consum ption, inequality, poverty, and the environm ent. They include 
various indices that rate countries on quality o flife , satisfaction o f  c itizens’ basic needs, 
hum an freedoms and opportunities, and other facets o flife . Scholars Adil Najam  and 
Ambuj Sagar contend that the annual reports have becom e the “flagship publication o f  
not only the UNDP, but possibly o f  the entire UN system .” They further contend that 
since the publication o f  the first report, the “concept o f  hum an developm ent as 
cham pioned by the United Nations Development Program  has m oved from  being just 
another interesting idea on the periphery o f  the developm ent debate to its very core.”45 
In addition to the U N D P’s principal report, hundreds o f  individual country reports, as 
well as several sub-national reports, have been com pleted. The H D R ’s focus is on 
enlarging hum an choices and freedoms. Tellingly, the first report begins with the lines, 
“This Report is about people, and about how developm ent enlarges their choices.”46
W illiam  D raper’s III wanted to make certain that peoples’ choices were respectful o f  
the environm ent. During his presidency o f  the UNDP from 1986 to 1993 he prioritized 
the environm ent, w om en’s participation, and an increased role for N G O s as institutional 
goals. U nder his leadership, Agenda 21 was set. A genda 21, adopted in June 1992 in Rio 
de Janeiro, was the first m ajor international environm ental initiative that aim ed to
44David Forsythe, "The United Nations, Human Rights, and D evelopm ent,” 
H um an Rights Q uarterly  19 (May 1997): 334-49.
Adil Najam  and Ambuj Sagar, “Shaping H um an Developm ent: W hich Way 
N ext?” Third W orld Q uarterly  20:4 (1999): 743.
46United N ations Development Programme, H um an Developm ent Report 1990 
(New York: O xford University Press, 1990), 1.
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com bine sound environmental practices with sustainable developm ent; it basically 
asserted that sustainable developm ent could not occur without paying heed to 
environm ental concerns. This was an im portant linkage that helped develop the 
groundwork for the U N D P’s later initiative at the 2002 m eeting o f  the W orld Summit on 
Sustainable Development. Here the UNDP and other m ajor developm ent agencies 
pledged to m aking environm ental respect an elem ent in all future international 
agreements. Draper, suggested for the position by form er United States president and 
one-tim e United Nations am bassador G eorge Bush, Sr., also worked to involve the 
private sector in developm ent discourse and efforts. He incorporated som e business 
practices such as training w orkshops and formal corporate appraisal system s in the 
UNDP system .47 James Gustave Speth becam e the new UNDP adm inistrator in 1993, and 
he furthered D raper’s efforts. Aw are o f  the potential o f  private investm ent to raise living 
standards in the South, he worked to involve corporations in num erous UNDP initiatives 
and further raised the profile o f  private sector developm ent in organizational programs.
Speth, an environm entalist and intellectual, also em phasized “human  sustainable 
developm ent.”48 He synthesized this w ith the them es o f  poverty alleviation and wom en 
in developm ent, and he stressed country ow nership o f  reform  program s.49 The UNDP 
defined poverty as Am artya Sen does, as “capability deprivation,” and its capacity 
building program s comprised an ever larger portion o f  its developm ent agenda. Many 
com ponents o f  the U N D P’s developm ent agenda attempted to address the unjust
47M endez, 8.
48Jam es Gustave Speth, “On Governance for Sustainable Hum an Developm ent” 
(January 1997). <http://m eltingpot.fortunecity.com /lebanony 254/cheem a.htm >
[12 January 2005].
49M endez, 5.
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distribution o f power w ithin countries and to insure basic services to the population.
Speth also furthered D raper’s early efforts at setting the U N D P’s good governance 
agenda.50 In m any ways the UNDP and the U nited N ations seemed vital. Pressure from 
various sources, though, was bearing down on the U nited Nations in the early 1990s. For 
one, Europeans wanted m ore control over the organization. In 1998, Europeans clam ored 
to have one o f  their own appointed as the U N DP adm inistrator upon Speth’s leaving. 
After all, not only had A m erican nationals m onopolized the position for thirty-tw o years, 
but also the United States owed the United N ations $1.4 billion in arrears. Further, 
European m em ber states paid approxim ately 60 percent o f  the U N D P’s core funding 
budget at the tim e and contributed the highest percentage o f  the U nited N ations funding, 
Europeans pointed out. The United States was attem pting to further reduce its share o f 
U nited Nations funding, and its contribution to the UN DP, which had peaked in 1985 at 
$160 m illion, had fallen to $151 m illion in 1996.51 Despite their contentions, Kofi Annan 
appointed an Am erican, M ark M alloch Brown, for the job. The choice o f  M alloch 
Brown, previously the W orld B ank’s vice-president for external affairs, was perceived by 
m any as a concession to the United States intended to w in favor and support from this 
country.52
In the late 1990s, the U N  and the UNDP increasingly courted favor w ith two
50James Gustave Speth, “W elcom e Address: International Conference for 
Sustainable Growth and Equity” (1997). <http://m agnet.undp.org/D ocs/ 
speeches/Speth.htm > [10 D ecem ber 2005],
51T halif Deen, “U nited Nations: US and Europe Battle for Top UNDP Job” (3 
N ovem ber 1998). <http://w w w .sunsonline.org/trade/process/follow up / 1998/
11030398.htm > [1 January 2005].
52Ellen Paine, “The Road to Global Com pact: Corporate Pow er and the Battle 
over Global Public Policy at the United N ations” (O ctober 2000). 
http://w w w .globalpolicy.org /reform /papers/2000/road.htm > [1 January 2005].
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unlikely friends—not only the United States but also TNC's. The UN closed dow n its 
Centre for Transnational Corporations that had promoted corporate behavior sensitive to 
the needs o f  the South. It also abandoned early efforts to create a Code o f  Conduct for 
TNCs. M ost believe that such actions resulted from the U N ’s "realist” position: it 
acknowledged it needed to befriend powerful players. Many deemed Annan to be very 
friendly w ith W ashington, despite A m ericans’ continuing criticism o f  the UN and Annan 
him self.53
Annan even increased cooperation efforts between UN agencies and the IFls. In an 
effort to prom ote good governance, an endeavor all were comm itted to in various ways, 
the first high-level meeting betw een the UN and the BW Is was held on 18 April 1996. 
Annan called* for closer coordination o f  efforts between the institutions. Increased global 
interdependence and the international ram ifications o f  the Asian financial crisis that was 
still unfolding revealed the necessity o f  such coordination and cooperation, Annan 
asserted. He urged the institutions to put past differences aside and to begin a new spirit 
o f  cooperation.54 In Septem ber o f  1999, the UNDP issued a press release announcing 
that the organization would w'ork more closely with the World Bank on future good 
governance prom otion efforts.55 Part o f  these efforts would focus on dispensing m ore 
advice collaboratively with the W orld Bank. In late 1999, UNDP A dm inistrator M alloch 
Brown publicly announced plans that had been in process internally for several years to 
work to transform  the organization from a funding agency to a resource for developm ent 
^ b id .
54United Nations, “Developm ent M ust Remain Top Priority o f  United Nations, 
Agrees UN -Bretton W oods M eeting,” United Nations Chronicle 35:2 (1998): 75.
55“UNDP to Join the W orld Bank in a Partnership Focused on Good 
G overnance.” (no date), <http://wvvvv.undp.org/dpa/pressrelease/rele ases/1999,' 
Septem ber/29sep99.htm > [15 January 2002],
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
know ledge and expertise. The UNDP stepped up efforts to speak highly o f  the IFIs and 
increasingly toned down public criticism  o f  corporate m isbehavior and exploitation by 
N orthern countries.
In the 1990s, the UNDP also began paying m ore attention to its public image. 
Conferences w ere held to teach UNDP staff m em bers how to best represent the UNDP 
“brand” and describe UNDP program s in a favorable light. The institution becam e more 
assertive in leading and participating in various developm ent conferences internationally. 
It also took a visible role in coordinating and prom oting the M illennium  Developm ent 
G oals (M DGs), an effort to halve global poverty by the year 2015. The M DGs, adopted 
in Septem ber o f  2000 at the United Nations M illennium  Summit, involve m any 
international and national actors, including the W orld Bank. The M DG s are aim ing for a 
dram atic reduction in poverty and m arked im provem ents in the health o f  the poor. 
M eeting these goals is possible but far from assured. Success in achieving them  will 
require notable dedication, political resolve in countries, and an adequate flow o f  funds 
and other resources from high-incom e to low -incom e countries in a sustained and 
carefully targeted m anner. A nnan asked M alloch Brown, in his capacity as chair o f  the 
UN Developm ent Group, to coordinate the M DGs in the UN system —  to m ake them  a 
focal part o f  the UN's work worldwide. These goals have given the UN DP a renewed 
m ission in the new m illennium .
Good Governance Program s 
A decade before the form ulation o f  the M DG s, the UNDP began prom oting its 
evolving version o f  good governance in various ways. The UNDP governance agenda 
em erged gradually and evolved throughout the 1990s. This is evident by the creation o f
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
119
different governance offices and organizational structures as the need arose throughout 
the decade. In 1994, for example, the UN Em ergency Response Division w as developed 
to collect inform ation and share it w ith the UNDP about governance reform s needed in 
crisis, post-crisis, and conflict situations. The following year, 1995, saw the creation o f  
the M anagem ent Development and G overnance Division (an expansion o f  the 
M anagem ent Developm ent Program m e begun in 1989). This unit was installed and later 
reorganized to help the UNDP respond to governance needs in countries. In the late 
1990s, the UNDP Regional Bureau for Latin Am erica and the Caribbean w as 
increasingly used to collaborate good governance and dem ocracy prom otion resources 
with the U N D P’s Barcelona policy headquarters, the International Institute in 
Governance. Later, as the new m illennium  began, a new facility was established in Oslo, 
N orw ay to help with the design and im plem entation o f  democracy and governance 
program s.
This incremental developm ent o f  governance units m irrored the U N D P’s 
progression into governance work. Its good governance and dem ocracy prom otion 
program s and policies were unique from  the very beginning, partly stem m ing from  UN 
policies o f  the 1980s. W hereas the IFIs were then prescribing “adjustm ent,” the UN was 
then u rg ing  “transform ation.” The U N ’s Econom ic Com m ission for A frica (ECA), for 
exam ple, in the late 1980s urged not reduced state spending overall but reduced m ilitary 
spending and continued or even increased spending on social program s; not deficit 
e lim ination necessarily but m ore careful, socially conscious deficit financing; not greater 
exporting o f  all agricultural products bu t o f  those that did not deplete the natural 
environm ent; not reduced interest rates across the board but interest rate policies designed 
to prom ote productive investments; not steady repaym ent o f foreign debts bu t credit
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arrangements that did not reduce social program s for the poorest. ECA proposals 
incorporated principals that would later figure largely in the U N D P’s Hitman 
Developm ent Reports. Its 1980s program s helped create the framework for the U N D P's 
good governance efforts.
By the early to m id-1990s, the U N DP was spending roughly h a lf  o f  its budget on
good governance promotion, and the num bers o f  related program s and projects continued
to grow rapidly. By 1998, there were nearly  1,000 active UNDP and U N DP-funded
projects. Good governance and dem ocracy prom otion have becom e increasingly
im portant UNDP goals, and this prom otion has becom e a more focal com ponent o f
UNDP programs over the years.56
The UNDP not only has a broad definition o f  good governance, but also attempts
to link good governance prom otion to its other prim ary goals, such as sustainable
developm ent. In the 1990s, the UNDP defined governance as:
The exercise o f  economic, political, and adm inistrative authority to m anage a 
country’s affairs at all levels. It com prises the m echanism s, processes, and 
institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise 
their legal rights, meet their obligations, and m ediate their differences.
For the UNDP, the challenge facing countries is to establish a system o f  governance that
“promotes, supports and sustains hum an developm ent, especially for the poorest and
m ost m arginal.” Further, according to the UN DP, good governance has three
components: economic, political, and adm inistrative. In a sim plistic diagram depicting
how “ [gjood governance reaches beyond the state,” the UNDP depicts the state, civil
society, and the private sector as three equal spheres intersecting. Further, with good
56For a description o f  early UNDP governance efforts, see Kathryn G. Sessions 
and E. Zell Steever, “The UN Com m ission on Sustainable Development: Building the 
Capacities for Change,” in U.S. Policy and  the Future o f  the United Nations, ed. Roger 
A. Coate (New York: The Twentieth C entury Fund Press, 1994), 193-215.
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governance, as the UNDP describes, the three spheres work together in the follow ing 
ways:
the state creates a conducive political and legal environment. The private sector 
generates jobs and income. And civil society facilitates political and social 
interaction, m obilising groups to participate in economic, social, and political 
activities. Because each has w eaknesses and strengths, a m ajor objective o f  our 
support for good governance is to prom ote constructive interaction am ong all 
th ree.57
Though the UNDP notes that the traits o f  good governance are difficult to characterize, it
suggests the follow ing qualities as “good” : participation; rule o f  law; transparency;
responsiveness; equity; effectiveness and efficiency; accountability; and strategic vision.
It views these characteristics as interdependent and m utually reinforcing and
acknow ledges that they reach for a certain non-extant ideal; countries ought to
aim , through broad-based consensus-building, to define which o f  the core 
features are m ost im portant to them , what the best balance is betw een the state 
and the market, how e a c h .. .setting can m ove from here to there.58
The U N DP acknow ledges that countries have diverse goals and that different governance 
system s can help them achieve these goals; there is no single recipe for good governance 
prescribed. Ideally, the state, m arket, and civil society work together to help represent the 
interests o f  the people.59 At least rhetorically, the U N D P’s good governance prom otion 
is above all flexible and contingent upon local needs. The U N D P’s definition o f  good 
governance is notably broader than that o f  the W orld Bank, encom passing not only the 
technical aspects o f  governance but also governm ents’ relationships with NGOs and civil
57 United N ations Developm ent Program m e, “Good Governance— and Sustainable 
Hum an D evelopm ent” (no date), <http://inagnet.undp.org/ policy/ chapterl .htm > [10 
January 2005],
58Ibid.
59 U nited Nationd Developm ent Program m e M anagem ent Developm ent and 
G overnance Division, Reconceptualising (iovcrnance  (New York: UNDP, 1997).
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society and the private sector as well as all sectors’ levels of inclusiveness, dem ocracy, 
and respect for human rights.60 Democracy is intertw ined with good governance, and the 
UNDP urges that vote and voice are not the sam e thing; the latter, voice, is truly more 
important, and the former is only one means to achieving the latter.61 The way a country 
is established and managed, as well as the ways in which it interacts with civil society 
and private enterprises, are viewed as significant not only in term s o f  econom ic growth 
but also in term s o f hum an welfare. For the UNDP, governance is im portant in so far as it 
influences the treatm ent o f  and opportunities afforded to each citizen, w om en’s rights and 
opportunities in particular, and the preservation o f  the environm ent.62
The UNDP visibly and unapologetically prom otes democracy. A 1998 UN 
publication contends that the challenge facing all societies is to forge a system  o f  
governance where the rights o f  the individual constitute not a threat, but rather the very 
foundation upon which policies fostering the com m on good can be built. O nly  [italics 
mine] dem ocracy can successfully strike this balance, and the historic m ove towards 
dem ocratic rule that has taken place over the past decade represents a powerful 
affirm ation o f  this notion.63
Dem ocracy, however, is not promoted by the UNDP as an end in and o f  itself; 
rather, it is seen as a useful if  not necessary condition for hum an developm ent.
For descriptions o f  Boutros B outros-G hali's and A nnan’s connecting good 
governance and hum an rights promotion, see Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda fo r  
D em ocratisation  (New York: UNDP, 1996).
61 Ibid., 2.
62United Nations Development Programme, Integrating Human Rights with 
Sustainable D evelopm ent (New York: 1998).
63W ijkman, 86-7.
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developm ent that prioritizes human health, happiness, and access to opportunities. The 
H um an D evelopm ent Report 2002 elaborated on the concept o f  “dem ocratic governance,” 
or governance that prom otes hum an developm ent. Like the U N D P’s concept o f ‘‘good 
governance,” dem ocratic governance requires efficient institutions and a reliable 
econom ic and political environm ent necessary for econom ic growth and effective 
functioning o f  public services. The concept o f  dem ocratic governance also promotes 
political freedom  and hum an rights. It aims to create institutions and rules that are 
efficient bu t ju st as crucially fair, and that are developed through a dem ocratic process in 
which all citizens have a real political voice.64 Hence by  including politics, equity 
concerns, and hum an rights emphasis, the UNDP seeks to merge its m any goals under the 
good governance category. W hether the UNDP uses the term “good governance” as it 
usually did in the early and mid 1990s, or “dem ocratic governance,” as it had more 
com m only since, the goals rem ain the same: prom oting equity, fairness, respect for all, 
and opportunity, as well as ensuring basic needs are m et and the environm ent is 
protected.
As stated, UNDP priorities in support o f  good governance and dem ocratic 
governance differ for each country, a significant fact in and o f  itself. Program  category 
titles also changed during the course o f  the 1990s. In the early 1990s, m ore program  areas 
existed. G ood governance and dem ocratic governance were separated program m atically. 
Some com m on good governance focal areas were “G overning Institutions: Legislature, 
Judiciary and Electoral Bodies,” “Public and Private Sector M anagem ent,” 
“D ecentralisation and Local Governance,” “Civil Society Organizations.” and
64U nited N ations Developm ent Prrogramm e, Hum an Development Report 2002 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).
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“Governance in Special Circum stances." By the end o f  the decade, a typical dem ocratic 
governance country program might have been “ Local Governance and Civic 
Participation,” “Capacity Development,” “Justice and Human R ights,'1 and “Peace and 
Security.”65 W ithin the governance framework, typical UNDP headings were 
“Governing Institutions,” “Public and Private Sector M anagem ent,” “ Decentralization," 
“Civil Society O rganizations,” and “Governance in Special C ircum stances.” Follow ing 
is a description o f  some o f  the U N DP’s m ajor work in each o f  these latter five areas.
Governing Institutions
From 1992-1996, the percentage o f  the U N D P 's governance aid budget dedicated to 
helping governing institutions was just 7 percent, allocated m ostly in Africa and Latin 
Am erica and the Caribbean. The concentration o f  work in Africa is unique, because m any 
other international developm ent institutions worked more diligently in m iddle-incom e 
countries and countries with abundant desirable resources. The U N D P’s budget may have 
been small for these endeavors, but many program s were enacted. The organization 's 
approach to governing institutions focused on and still works prim arily to foster free and 
fair elections, credible and effective legislatures that protect citizens and enforce property 
and contract rights, and strong, reliable judicial system s, all with an em phasis on hum an
65These categories o f good governance and dem ocracy prom otion are grouped in 
different ways in m any documents. Some key docum ents are as follows: United N ations 
Developm ent Program m e M anagem ent Developm ent and Governance Division, C apacity  
D evelopm ent: Technical Advisory Paper 2 (N ew  York: UNDP, 1997); United N ations 
Developm ent Program m e, Report on UNDP A ssisted  Governance Projects A pproved in 
1994-95 (N ew  York: UNDP, 1997); idem, Corruption and G ood Governance:
Discussion Paper 3 (N ew  York: UNDP, 1997); idem, Governance fo r  Sustainable  
H um an Development: Report o f  International Conference, New York, 29-30 July 1997 
(N ew  York: UNDP, 1997).
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rights prom otion 66 There is a lesser rhetorical desire obvious in the U N D P’s literature to 
transplant a certain type o f governm ent and system o f  governance and more a wish to 
nurture and advance the most democratic elem ents already present within com m unities. 
UNDP officials are urged to look to find and identify local leaders in governm ent, NGOs, 
and business and to work with them and help and direct them towards more dem ocratic 
societies. This is an ideal, o f  course, yet the UNDP has played an important and 
expanding role in its efforts.
The U N D P’s w ork has focused on supporting electoral processes at the request o f  
several countries, helping to ensure open registration procedures, secure ballots, access 
for all to voting sites, the independence o f  superv isory bodies, and freedom o f  expression 
and association. The UNDP, for instance, supported Bangladesh’s 1994 elections by 
conducting voter educations program s, training electoral officials, and coordinating 
international election observers. In M ozam bique, the UNDP organized international 
efforts to train more than sixty thousand local people in electoral system support. All 
relevant com ponents o f  the electoral process, including logistics, civic education, 
training, and legal and financial management, were explained. In several countries, 
including Vietnam , the organization has educated and trained female candidates for 
im portant offices.67 The institution’s legal and judicial reform program s have also 
attem pted to raise the value o f  women in various ways in the many poor societies. 
Beginning w ith its legal program s in Latin America, the organization has worked to open 
politica l spaces  for w om en and other marginalized groups through reserv ed places or
66U nited N ations Developm ent Programme, “ International Conference on 
Governance for Sustainable Developm ent, 28-30 July 1997” (New York: U nited N ations, 
1997), 98.
67United N ations Dev elopm ent Programme, "UNDP and Governance."
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quotas on party lists. Indigenous peoples and “A fro-descendants" in Latin Am erican 
countries were also encouraged to becom e involved in parliam ents to help alter the 
status-quo o f  elite local rulers. The UNDP asserts that legal reform  m ust be 
com prehensive and holistic, addressing areas o f  legal protection o f  property rights, 
contract rights, gender equality, hum an rights, and the environm ent. Program s address 
access, enforcem ent, efficiency, and corruption issues. The reform  process is evaluated 
in its entirety, to see how  one reform  affects other parts o f  the system . The UNDP 
acknowledges that judicial reform  is inherently political and that entrenched interests 
m ay w ork to subvert the process. Its program s go beyond fostering narrow  legal reforms 
conducive to business interests such as m erely creating faster, m ore credible legal 
processes and adopting efficient m odem  comm ercial codes. Program s aim  to increase 
access to courts, enforce crim inal codes, and provide police protection where necessary.
In M oldova in the m id-1990s, the UNDP helped educate citizens about the roles o f  
responsibilities o f  a parliam ent, the need for a valid constitution, and the im portance o f 
consistent, non-discrim inatory enforcem ent o f  regulatory and crim inal laws. In Gambia, 
local officials requested and received UNDP assistance with creating fair laws and a 
sound judicial system. The aid agency also helped set up a system  docum enting laws and 
judicial system inform ation.68
Public and Private Sector M anagem ent
Between 1992 and 1996, the greatest portion o f  UNDP governance funding, nearly 
80 percent, went towards public and private sector m anagem ent, w ith 55 percent
68Ibid., “U N D P’s Support for Dem ocratic G overnance" (no date). 
<'http://w w w .undp.org/dpa/publications/FFdem govl30503E.pdf-> [1 February, 2005],
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allocated for enhancem ent o f  econom ic and financial m anagem ent, 36 percent for public 
sector m anagem ent (civil service reform ), and the rest for aid delivery and coordination. 
For the period 1997-1999, w hile UNDP assistance for public sector m anagem ent 
program s still received the m ost funding, activities focusing on the private sector featured 
in around 55 percent o f  future program ming. These figures reveal a notew orthy shift.
The UNDP was slow er at incorporating the desire for a sm aller state than were the BW Is, 
and, arguably, never really em braced it. The UNDP warns against excessive fiscal 
austerity, prem ature capital account liberalization, and overly aggressive privatization 
initiatives.
In the 1980s, w hile the W orld Bank was devising its SAPs with privatization and 
deregulation as prom inent features, the UNDP’s public sector m anagem ent program s had 
been w orking to m ake governm ents m ore professional in their organizational 
fram eworks. This did not translate into shrinking the state, but m aking it more 
com petent. Som etim es public sectors actually grew with the help o f  UNDP officials. The 
organization supported review s o f  the functional distribution o f  governm ent sectors and 
institutions and helped countries to create new adm inistrative and organizational 
fram eworks. Instead o f  focusing prim arily on fighting inflation, public sectors were urged 
to concentrate on prom oting job  creation, including an em phasis on the im pedim ents to 
job  c rea tio n -lack  o f  credit and overvalued exchange rates. A ccording to UNDP 
docum ents, if  m acroeconom ic m anagem ent leads to overvalued exchange rates and high 
interest rates, there will not be jo b  creation. W ith UNDP guidance, countries devised 
recruitm ent strategies, jo b  descriptions, human resources plans, prom otion criteria, and 
career training program s. The UNDP continues this work, and since the early to mid 
1990s, has m oved to support m acroeconom ic m anagem ent projects and program s more,
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y e t not exactly  in line with traditional neoliberal economic efficiency concerns. Creating 
sound regulatory frameworks to im prove investm ent and trading opportunities has 
increasingly been on the organization 's agenda. A close look at the U N D P 's public and 
private sector m anagem ent program s and policies reveals, though, concerns w ith both 
m aking developing countries political and econom ic environm ents am enable for the 
m arket and with addressing social costs o f  such reforms. As the H um an D evelopm ent 
Report, 1996, states, free m arket capitalism  without regulation often leads to extreme 
social inequalities in the distribution o f  global resources and incom e, which is not only 
unfair but can be destabilizing to the global system  as a whole and to dem ocratic
■ 69regimes.
As will be discussed in a later chapter, whereas the W orld B ank’s program s view 
public sector inefficiency, waste, and corruption as problem s that stifle the m arket 
econom y, the U N D P’s public sector m anagem ent and anti-corruption program s focus on 
these issues as well as on equity concerns. W hen countries adopt m acroeconom ic 
m anagem ent m easures, the UNDP often analyzes how the adjustm ents will affect citizens 
in the short and long-term. In G uyana in the early 1990s, for exam ple, UNDP assistance 
led to the adoption o f  a com prehensive reform  program  which included alm ost US$20 
m illion in donor financing. The adjustm ent program , which included standard neoliberal 
reforms, was preceded by analysis on how  the speed and sequencing o f  reforms would 
affect citizens and was accom panied by  policy guidance to address social impact 
concerns and issues. In Uruguay, a U N D P-sponsored m acroeconom ic adjustm ent 
program  em phasized local input in the processes o f creating new  governm ent institutions, 
im proving coordination with extra-governm ental agencies, and increasing cooperation
69United Nations Developm ent Program me, "UNDP and G overnance," 1-2.
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betw een the executive branch, parliam ent, and the judiciary. In Yem en in 1995, UNDP 
pubic sector reform  program s helped local officials and citizens cope with problem s such 
as rising unem ploym ent, excessive reliance on bank loans to pay for the budget deficit, 
lack o f  savings, and a high debt to external creditors. The UNDP provided technical 
assistance for im provem ents in tax and custom s administration, budget m anagem ent,
70accounting and bank supervision, and national accounting figures.
Privatization is urged by  the UN DP, with m ethods and techniques differing for 
countries depending on their circum stances. In the 1990s, the organization w orked to 
educate locals about the potential value o f  privatization and how  to address its 
redistributive impacts. Civil service reform in general for the UNDP is attentive to both 
efficiency and distribution issues. In Jordan, for instance, in the late 1990s, civil service 
was not downsized but rather rightsized  to better serve citizens. G overnm ent service is 
seen as highly prestigious w ork in m any M iddle Eastern countries, so m any opt to jo in  
this field. Also, governm ent leaders tend to view having m any subordinates as 
respectable. In 1998, 60 percent o f  Jordan’s employed worked for the federal 
governm ent, so to help the new ly unem ployed and the rest o f  the population, retirem ent 
incentives were offered, and em ploym ent training programs were established. Program s 
were also created to teach civil service employees to better serve the “custom er,” or 
average citizen, including w om en and the otherwise disenfranchised.71
The U N D P’s work in Jordan included coordinating the work o f  various aid agencies,
70 Ibid., “C ountry Reports: D em ocratic Governance” (2002). 
<http://w w w .undp.org.gy/dem govem .htm l> [11 February 2005],
7lJordan Institute o f  Public Adm inistration, “Synopsis o f  the Ten Best Practices in 
Jordan’s Civil Service Reform  for Human Sustainable D evelopm ent" (no date). 
http://m agnet.undp.org/D ocs/psrefonn/jordan_ten best.htm> [10 February 2005].
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including the W orld Bank. The U N D P’s public and private sector reform  program s 
increasingly involved various donors in the 1990s. The UNDP has attem pted to help 
shape the w ay public and private sector reform  efforts are enacted. For the UNDP, anti­
corruption efforts are interwoven into these programs. This work attem pts to uphold the 
institu tion’s Program me for A ccountability and Transparency (PACT). The PACT 
stresses that corruption is part o f  poor governance. Good governance is 
“participatory, transparent and accountable -  its social, political and econom ic priorities 
are reached by  consensus [,] and the poorest and m ost vulnerable have their say in m atters 
affecting their well being and in the allocation o f  developm ent resources.” Bad 
governance, on the other hand, “rife with bribery, corruption and m aladm inistration, has
72the opposite effect.”
The U N DP acknowledges that anti-corruption program s often fail because there are 
w eak incentives for im plem entation that stem from both poor policy design and local 
institutional environments. Under PACT, the UNDP works w ith various donors, the 
private sector, and local and international NGOs to help countries im prove their systems 
o f  financial accountability and m anagem ent. The oversight that results from this 
collaborative effort to curb corruption helps provide incentives for local officials to act 
responsibly. Through this program , the UNDP has provided support in the area o f  debt 
m anagem ent that takes into account the need to provide pro-poor social services. O ther 
donors are encouraged to consider such elements.
Tow ards the end o f  the decade, the UNDP was heavily engaged with other donor 
initiatives, m ost notably in the areas o f  public and private sector reform. In 1999,
M alloch Brown was praising the good governance approach and the W orld B ank’s efforts
72United Nations Developm ent Program me, “Support,” 2.
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in this direction. M alloch Brown said publicly: “ I share Jim W olfensohn’s view  that this 
[anti-corruption and good governance generally] is the key to the developm ent frontier," 
he said, shortly after Jam es W olfensohn appealed to the World B ank’s Board o f 
G overnors for further support in such efforts. UN Deputy Secretary-General Louise 
Frechette jo ined the chorus supporting a more collaborative effort betw een the UNDP 
and the W orld Bank to promote good governance. In previous years, she said, the W orld 
Bank and the UNDP worked towards developm ent in separate ways, with the Bank 
focusing on econom ic fundam entals and the UNDP focusing on “adjustm ent w ith a 
hum an face.” Now, she said, more convergence o f  ideas exists. “The argum ent you hear 
in the UN General Assem bly and in the boards o f  the World Bank and the IM F are now 
so often so m uch alike that, if  you closed your eyes, you could not alw ays be sure 
w hether you were in N ew  York or W ashington.”73 That was not really the case, but the 
U N D P was increasingly becom ing more m ainstream  with some o f  its ideas and projects, 
or at least allying itself with powerful Northern IDIs as well as smaller, more localized 
good governance efforts. Many o f  UNDP public and private sector m anagem ent 
program s are often not greatly different than those o f  some o f  the o ther IDIs. They are. 
however, often different in that they traditionally include a more hum anistic focus. The 
U N D P’s m acroeconom ic m anagement program s take into account how' the speed and 
severity o f  reform s affect social program s, citizens’ senses o f  w ell-being, and public 
support for the governm ent. The U NDP financial administration reform program s
73Ibid., “Public Sector M anagem ent, Governance, and Sustainable Hum an 
D evelopm ent - D iscussion Paper 1” (no date). <http://m agnet.undp.org/D ocs/lU N 98- 
21.PD F/Psm .htm > [8 February 2005]; idem, “Small and M edium Enterprise 
D evelopm ent” (no date), <http://m irror.undp.org/m ongolia/ public 
ations/essentials/docum ent/english/ EssentialsSM El .pdf> [8 February 2005].
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em phasize integration o f  public needs w ith other state expenses, so that debts are serv iced 
w ithout drastically cutting social spending. UNDP program s designed to increase private 
investm ent in developing countries sim ultaneously work to attract foreign investors and 
to increase the clout o f  local small and m edium -sized businesses.
W hile early 1990s program s concentrated on m eeting isolated goals in sectoral 
m inistries, late 1990s program s addressed a m ore com prehensive fram ework. Public 
sector reform  efforts eventually concentrated on im proving access to international 
m arkets through both  the reorientation and restructuring o f civil services and public 
sector institutions. In concert with these efforts, social im pacts were addressed.
The UNDP also increased efforts to draw  the private sector into its developm ent 
efforts in the 1990s, including inviting international and local businesspeople to 
roundtable discussions with representatives from governm ent and CSOs. Issues such as 
equitable incom e distribution and w om en’s rights figured largely in these discussions, as 
did concerns such as taxes and contract rights. The UNDP also began initiatives to 
support and train local business people to identify opportunities, write business plans, 
follow laws, register their businesses, and serve their clients. Local governm ent officials 
and public relations specialists were taught how to court investment. Partnerships w ere 
forged to encourage investment and business growth, w ith UNDP assistance. The 
challenges o f  creating a level playing field for private businesses, especially regarding 
access to land and credit, were addressed. Also, a greater ratio o f  local to foreign private
74sector developm ent was encouraged.
74United N ations Developm ent Program m e, “ Partnerships with Business” (no 
date). <http ://64 .233.161.104/search?q’cache:O liW cd4k_N Y J:ww w.undp.org. 
m y/cm s_undp/docum ent/un information/bus.pdf+undp+private-t-sector+developm ent& hl 
’en& lr'lang_enJ> [10 February 2005]; J. Loup, “The UNDP Roundtables and the Private
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In the rural sector, governm ents were encouraged to adopt land reform  program s 
that did not concentrate on commercial land m arkets, but rather, on land redistribution. 
M eaningful land reform  for the UNDP entails institutional provisions for land 
redistribution with the provision o f  credit and access to technology. Land registration is 
im portant, but it has to be seen as only one com ponent o f  a broader program . Land 
registration enhances the use o f  land as collateral, but would only be considered effective 
where there were w ell-functioning land markets.
Decentralization
D ecentralization received a relatively small 6 percent o f  the U N D P’s governance 
funding in the m id-1990s. For the UNDP, decentralization as part o f  good local 
governance is seen as fostering greater accountability to people at a local level and 
greater opportunities for the interface betw een civil society and local governm ent in 
developm ent decision-m aking at that level. UNDP decentralization program s at the 
country level are broadly construed, like m ost UNDP programs. Program activities under 
this category focus on technical assistance in developing legal and policy fram ew orks for 
decentralized authority and m anagement, im provem ent o f  financial and hum ^n resources 
m obilization in support o f  decentralized governance, as well as improved planning and 
local service delivery initiatives. They include dow nsizing state control and increasing 
citizen control over financial, adm inistrative, and legal processes. M uch em phasis is 
placed on m aking inform ation available to all people in comm unities and encouraging the 
entire population, especially the poor, women, youth, and ethnic m inorities, to m obilize 
and participate. NG Os, and what the UNDP term s “Com m unity-Based O rganisations" or 
CBOs and private firms and donors are encouraged to rem ain or becom e active. UNDP 
Sector” (no date). <rhttp://w w w .eldis.org/static/D O C10348.htm > [8 February 2005].
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provides both technical and financial support for decentralization processes in 90 
developing countries.75 Beginning in the 1990s, program s aim  to foster m ore legitim ate, 
transparent, and accountable local authorities and an active and inclusive local political 
process; institutional m echanism s for citizens' access to information; consultation and 
participation o f  citizens in all stages o f  the local public resources m anagem ent cycle; 
efficiency gains in local services delivery also through a greater involvem ent o f  
com m unities and private firms in their provision and production; and greater security for 
citizens.
Policy docum ents are careful not to construe certain elem ents o f  good governance, 
such as decentralization, as inherently good. Decentralization, docum ents state, is 
inadequate i f  it m erely signifies deconcentration o f  power; pow er has to be usefully 
devolved and channeled through m ulti-layered new venues. Importantly, for the UNDP 
decentralization involves balancing state pow er with m ultiple branches o f  governm ent as 
well as shifting state pow er to civil society groups and the private sector; it does not, 
however, entail lowering existing taxes or resisting im posing taxes in countries w'here 
they did not exist previously. The U N D P’s program s, unlike those o f  m any other IDIs 
including the W orld Bank, do not urge neutrality in taxation. In fact, taxes are som etim es 
raised. In Brazil, for example, the U N D P’s decentralization program s included the
In the year 2002, a m ore careful study than previous ones was carried out on 
UNDP decentralization programs for 2001. A total o f  253 decentralization-related 
program  activities were carried out in 95 countries. The greatest num ber o f  program  
activities, 85, was being carried out in Africa, followed by Asia and the Pacific (59), 
Latin A m erica (44), Europe (39) and the Arab States including Palestine (26). O f  the 
activities, 38 percent fell under “Decentralisation Policies,” 24 percent were categorized 
under “Participation at the Sub-National Level, 26 percent as “Partnerships betw een 
Local A uthorities and CSO s,” and 10 percent were “Alliances by the Poor.” United 
N ations D evelopm ent Programme, “ A Global A nalysis o f UNDP Support to 
D ecentralisation and Local Governance Program m es 2001” (New York: UNDP, 2002).
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establishm ent o f  the Tobin tax. which funds program s for m others to help children stay in 
school. This pilot program  is now being replicated in many other countries under UNDP 
auspices. In m ost developing countries w orking w'ith the UNDP, tax systems are based 
upon needed social expenditures. The UNDP holds workshops on how to create tax 
adm inistration system s that support countries’ social needs.76
Civil Society Organizations
Civil society participation for the UNDP was heavily stressed in the 1990s,
although by m id-decade, only one percent o f  UN DP governance funding was allocated to
civil society organizations, largely in Latin A m erica and the Caribbean. The UNDP had
been involving NG Os in programs and projects for years and established the NGO
Liaison Unit in 1986 to encourage this involvem ent. In the early 1990s, the UNDP
enlarged its conception o f  NGOs and CSOs, and wrote o f  civil society,
together with state and m arket,[it is] one o f  the three ’spheres’ that interface in the 
m aking o f  dem ocratic societies. Civil society is the sphere in which social 
m ovem ents becom e organized. The organizations o f  civil society, which represent 
m any diverse and sometimes contradictory social interests, are shaped to fit their 
social base, constituency, them atic orientations (e.g. environm ent, gender, hum an 
rights) and types o f  activity. They include church-related groups, trade unions, 
cooperatives, service organizations, com m unity groups and youth organizations, 
as well as academ ic institutions and others.77
The expansion o f civil society, for the UNDP m ost em phatically grassroots-level civil
society, is seen as the expansion o f  the space for moral action. But the UNDP does not
see civil society developm ent necessarily an inclusive process. “Civil passivity" is often a
76United N ations Development Program m e, “ATM  Cards Help N early 10 
M illion Brazilian Children Stay in School” (N ew  York: UNDP, 2002); United N ations 
Developm ent Program m e, “Financing Social Expenditure” (New York: UNDP, 2002).
77United Nations Development Program , Human D evelopm ent Report 1993 (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1993).
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result o f  m arginalization, documents note, and can be addressed with interventions o f  
education and support. Som etim es societies suffer from the lack o f a legal and 
adm inistrative environm ent in which local initiatives can emerge and effectively netw ork 
on social, econom ic, and other concerns faced by the society. UNDP programs attem pt to 
help alleviate these obstacles. The UNDP is also conscious o f  the potential m isdirection 
o f  some CSOs, w arning in docum ents o f  the dangers o f  misdirected or less than stable 
ones that m ay have destructive agendas and fail to respect hum an rights.78
The UNDP stresses the value o f  civil society because the formal 
institutionalization o f  dem ocracy—routine elections and m ultipartyism —does not 
necessary equal dem ocracy in its fullest sense. Too m uch emphasis on the formal 
elem ents m ight lead one to argue that the Philippines and Zaire, with their m ulti-party 
systems and parliam ents, would be am ong the m ost dem ocratic in the world. A ccording 
to UNDP docum ents, in the 1990s, the rapid dem ocratizations o f  much o f  Latin Am erica 
and Eastern Europe had m uted legitim ate questioning about the w ays in which even 
existing as well as transitional dem ocracies were flawed. It w as thus that some o f  the 
U N D P’s focus in the 1990s was to broaden the goals somewhat to foster a good 
governance basket o f  attributes: form ally dem ocratic and efficient practices, in addition 
to the extensive program s aimed at fostering hum an rights and relief for the poor and the 
m arginalized.79
78 United N ations Developm ent Program me, ‘‘The Role o f  Civil Society in Local 
Governance and Poverty Alleviation: Concepts, Realities and Experiences’’ (M ay 2002). 
<http://w w w .undp.org/m ainundp/ propoor/docscivilsociety/roleofcivilsociety.doc> [ 12 
February 2005]; U nited Nations Developm ent Program m e, “UNDP and Civil Society 
Organisations: B uilding Alliances for D evelopm ent’’ (1998). 
<http://w w w .undp.orgm ainundp.htm l> [12 February 2005],
'^United Nations Developm ent Program me, Human Development Report 2000
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
137
UNDP docum ents state that lack o f finances can often m ake CSO agendas 
reflective o f  donor agendas. That is one o f the m ain reasons the organization does not 
heavily fund CSOs. Also, UNDP sta ff is trained to foster trust betw een CSOs and local 
governments. CSOs are trained to m eet with local and international business leaders at 
various stages o f  the business design and im plem entation process, as well as for regular 
“check ups.” In the 1990s, the UNDP even discussed the issue o f  not neglecting CSOs 
with which it d id  not have a history o f  collaborating, such as trade unions and religious 
groups. “W hat can they perhaps bring to the table?” a UNDP docum ent asked.
The U N DP has relied heavily on input from CSO s to help establish and institute 
m any o f  its job  creation, job training, and educational program s. In the late 1990s, the 
UNDP used civil society input to help determine how  to create a program  that truly 
em powered the m ost m arginalized in society. The “ Beautiful B ulgaria” job  creation 
program led by  the UNDP incorporated input and efforts from m ore than 800 CSOs. The 
greatest focus was placed on a region, Veliko Tam ovo, where the unem ploym ent 
percentage was the highest. A total o f  3,922 unem ployed participated in the programme, 
achieving qualification and skills in planting and grassing, paving, and dyeing. The 
UNDP sees job  training and creation and education as vital for m aking good governance 
more participatory: those w ithout knowledge and skills are less able and less apt to jo in  
the political process. CSOs help m ake this happen by  lobbying for local citizens. A great 
deal o f  the lobbying has focused on the content o f  the training and education. Teaching 
citizens to start their own small businesses using local resources has been an important
(New York: O xford University Press, 2000).
80United N ations Development Programme, “The Role o f  Civil Society,” 2.
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com ponent o f  UNDP program s, as has ensuring that educational m aterials are high 
quality, even in the poorest regions.
In som e developing countries, m icro-credit schem es have proved to be an 
im portant instrum ent for social m obilization. Through a partnership o f  public and private 
interests, UNDP m icrocredit program s began to gain m om entum  in the m id-1970s, and 
took on m om entum  in the early 1990s. By the end o f  2001, m icrocredit financing was 
provided to 26.8 m illion poor people. A ccording to the UNDP, while m uch o f  the 
discussion o f  m icro-credit has emphasized the econom ic aspects, the provision o f  credit 
to poor households that otherw ise would not have access, m uch m ore was at stake, 
including overturning pow er structures in local villages and ensuring m ore econom ic 
pow er to poor people. In both the rural and the urban sectors, the UNDP stresses that 
program s to prom ote savings need to exist. Ways o f  providing credible governm ent 
guarantees for small savers are devised.
G overnance in Special Circum stances
As UN w ork w ith CSOs increased, UN security and peace-keeping also rose 
m arkedly w ith the fading o f  the Cold War. By 1993, m ore than 70,000 people were 
serving in U nited N ations peacekeeping operations, at a cost o f  US$3.5 billion for that 
year, dram atically up from  U S$1.4 billion in 1992.81 The UNDP also began increasingly 
prom oting dem ocracy assistance in war-torn, crisis, and transitional countries and 
regions. This was a m atter o f  practicality: the U N D P’s field staffs, small grant 
operations, and extensive CSO relations were well suited to prom ote the m eeting o f  basic
---------- OT--
United Nations, United Nations Peacekeeping  (New York: United Nations, 
1993), 3, 1 1-12.
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needs, dem ocratic assistance, conflict prevention, and em ergency and peace building 
assistance. The U N D P’s G overnance in Special C ircum stances program s, concentrated in 
Africa and Latin A m erica and the Caribbean, received 6 percent o f  governance funding 
between 1992 and 1996. Through its netw ork o f  country offices, the UNDP had access to 
play an important crisis m anagem ent role, including efforts involving the w ider donor 
comm unity. The UNDP was charged with helping put into place dem ocratic features to 
help stabilize countries. This was done with recognition o f  the fact that these were 
initially cosm etic dem ocracies, but the intent was to help bring som e m easure o f 
tem porary stability so that genuine reform  could later occur. UN peace keepers would 
attempt to restore som e sense o f  order and set up elections. Instead o f  then leaving, as 
had been the policy in earlier years, the peacekeepers and the UNDP would work to help 
consolidate these new or fragile dem ocracies in order to prevent the return to a crisis 
situation. The UNDP becam e an im portant link in the U N ’s new peace-building role, and 
in the process it was given new relevance. Som etim es the UNDP served as the 
coordinator o f  other aid program s in these situations, which gave it a new sense o f  
importance, as well as som e influence over countries’ governance structures and how 
they functioned.82
The UN was establishing itse lf as both a peacem aker and a peace keeper in the 
1990s, and its developm ental arm helped facilitate these roles. During the Cold W ar, the 
UN generally refrained from  becom ing involved in ongoing conflicts. If  it did intervene 
at all, it was to help m onitor a cease-fire that had already been negotiated. Yet as the 
Cold W ar was fading and in the years follow ing its end, from 1988 to 1994, the UN
---------- R7—United N ations Developm ent Program me, “UNDP and G overnance in Special 
Circum stances” (7 M ay 1997). •"http://w w w .undp.org/bcpr/archives/govem an.htm > [12 
February 2005].
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intervened in ongoing conflicts around the globe in a visible and forthright m anner. UN 
developm ent agencies, including the UNDP, increasingly entered into these conflict and 
post-conflict zones and w orked alongside m ilitary officers. These developm ent 
practitioners attem pted to provide relief, protect m arginalized individuals and groups, 
and, at less vulnerable stages, to set up regimes and institutions designed to help ward o ff  
future unrest and conflict. A id practitioners, particularly those from  the UN DP, advised 
m ilitary officers and local leaders about how to set up and m onitor elections, educate 
voters, and support civil reconstruction. It was an entirely new dom ain and a new  role for 
the UN and the UNDP that had to be pursued carefully and thoughtfully. It was also a 
notable entrance into a significant field o f  work. In post-G ulf W ar Northern Iraq, for 
example, UNDP assistance also served to help ensure that the Kurds were protected in 
the short-term  and, through the installation and consolidation o f  dem ocratic features, in 
the long-term. In m any A frican civil wars, the UNDP intervened to provide basic needs 
assistance and later good governance aid.83
It m ust also be noted that not only in Special C ircum stances, but in all five areas o f  
its good governance prom otion, the UNDP in the 1990s becam e unprecedentedly 
collaborative. The num ber o f  partnerships, jo int initiatives, m ulti-donor projects, 
workshops, conferences, forum s, and the like it sponsored or took part in was so great 
that it is nearly im possible to track. UNDP officials met and often worked with 
representatives from the private sector, local and international pubic sectors, local and 
international CSOs, and bilateral and multilateral donors. An Internet search for 
keywords “U N D P’’ and “partnership” resulted in more than h a lf  a m illion results. A 
search for “ UN D P,” “governance,” and “partnership” resulted in nearly a quarter m illion
83Ibid.
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results. C learly for the UNDP, prom oting good governance requires deep and broad 
involvement.
Institution-Specific Features 
The preponderance o f  developing countries in the U N D P 's m em bership with its 
non-weighted voting and voluntary contributions has made debates distinct from IDIs 
such as the W orld Bank, where weighting privileges wealthy donors. The U N D P’s good 
governance promotion, with its emphasis on human rights protection, environmental 
protection, issues o f  equitable distribution, special attention to the needs o f  the poorest 
countries and people, and fair access to a country’s resources, reflects its noticeably non- 
Northem  dom inated pow er structure. Also, since developing countries receiving UNDP 
assistance share the costs o f  reform s, there is added incentive to help the poorest.
UNDP good governance program s are unique in that from  the very beginning, in 
the early 1990s, they reflected concerns for equity and local participation that only came 
later in m any o f  other institu tions’ programs. Right from the start o f  initiating such 
program s, the UNDP was careful not to lim it or com partm entalize its conceptions o f 
good governance. UNDP docum ents called governance “system ic governance,” used 
terms such as “holistic,” and generally postulated that “success” in one aspect o f 
governance was contingent upon m any other factors, including success in other aspects o f 
governance. This conscientious lack o f  technicality made UNDP program s
much different than those o f  the IFIs, as well as m any o f  bilateral aid program s.
The U N D P’s m ore nuanced, holistic program s reflect its pow er structure’s 
inherent disdain for the quick fix o f  earlier versions o f  m odernization theory', as well as 
some degree o f  resistance to Northern imposition. The organization’s good governance
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prom otion programs and policies are noticeably m ore country-specific than other ID Is \ 
and, as stated, greater attention is given to the effects o f  reform s on those m arginalized 
w ithin societies. The U N D P’s emphasis on fostering a vibrant hom e-grown civil society 
and local business ventures is also reflective o f  pro-poor, Southern values as a rem edy for 
chronic structural inequalities. W hile other aid agencies in the later 1990s and beyond 
have generally shown concern with issues such as ownership o f  the developm ent process 
and fostering local initiatives, the UNDP has done so, or at least relatively m ore o f  this, 
from the early 1990s on. UNDP program s recognize and attem pt to take into account the 
w ay inequalities are often em bedded in societies. Hum an rights prom otion program s, for 
exam ple, are based on the fact that im plem entation challenges exist.84 The official 
recognition o f  rights is not helpful without the dedication to or ability to enforce them  
fairly and consistently. For example, the m ove towards gender equality tends to occur 
faster de ju re  that de facto; though legally protected against discrim ination, in practice 
little m ay be done to enforce this. The UNDP urges follow-up m eetings be held to 
evaluate such factors.
The U N D P’s good governance and dem ocracy assistance program s in the 1990s 
also served to help the larger UN with its pro-poor agenda rem ain relevant in the post- 
Cold W ar W orld. W ith aid weariness palpable, especially w'ith m any client countries 
paying partly for program s, good governance incorporated with anti-poverty program s 
sold well to donors and recipients. The UNDP worked to converge its good governance 
and antipoverty agendas so that the poorest countries and regions were not overlooked. 
This pleased stakeholders and suited UNDP ideals.
84United Nations Developm ent Programme. "C ountry Reports: Democratic 
G overnance.”
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M any poor countries could be described as lacking the will to develop in the wake 
o f  m any failed BW Is’ SAPs and sim ply in general in the early 1990s. A sense o f  
pow erlessness was present, as the N orthern countries appeared to be in charge o f  the 
global economy. The N orthern-led BW Is and the new W TO were perceived as 
dom inating the global econom y, and rich countries no longer had the Soviet challenge or 
potential challenge to their unity and dom inant neoliberal ideology. If  poor countries did 
develop, they were doing so because the North needed them to and they w ere doing so by 
Northern-im posed or inspired m ethods, m any believed. Dependency theory had lost its 
m agnetism , but many o f  its underlying sentim ents, mainly that the South w as chronically 
m arginalized by the North, persisted. G ood governance prom otion appealed to m any 
countries in the South because it prom ised a change, always w elcom e during dire times, 
and perhaps some new independence to developing countries. Term s such as 
“em pow erm ent” and “ local ow nership” w ere attractive to countries accustom ed to 
ow ning little power and having little sense o f  ownership them selves. Good governance 
prom otion gave poverty-stricken U nited Nations countries a goal around w hich political 
w ill, scattered in recent years, and could once again be mobilized. The U N D P’s 
increased em phasis on good governance can be construed as at least partly a 
counteroffensive against the W ashington consensus.
There was also a sense o f  division among the developing countries them selves in 
the early 1990s that perhaps good governance promotion could help assuage. The United 
N ations’ financial crisis in the 1990s was em blem atic o f  a political crisis am ong m em ber 
countries with their own varying agendas. The United Nations in general had increasingly 
becom e a forum for disgruntled leaders o f  the developing countries, leaders who resented 
the United States and O rganisation for Econom ic C'ooperation and D evelopm ent nations
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for their superior global influence but who also resented each other for various reasons. 
Countries, and their United N ations representatives, competed for what little aid was 
available, and som e developing countries did not appreciate the recent successes o f  a 
handful o f  once very poor countries. In the 1990s, the Asian New ly Industrializing 
Countries were receiving new attention and m ore foreign investment, and they still 
com peted with the poorest African countries for aid. Also, regional com petitiveness and 
long-term  resentm ents still persisted. Focusing on good governance could to som e 
m easure possibly help assuage these larger problem s. It took the focus aw ay from  inter- 
organizational disagreem ents and provided a new m ission around which countries could 
rally.
In the 1990s, the UNDP was not only concerned about internal challenges, but 
w as also in m any respects looking for ways to ensure its future role. As other 
international organizations grew in num ber and in influence, the United N ations in 
general was beginning to seem a bit like an artifact o f  the Cold-W ar world. Its role as a 
symbol o f  unity seem ed less necessary without the previous East-W est rivalry, and its 
role, never particularly clear, seem ed unprecedentedly ill-defined. The United N ations 
generally and its specialized agencies were under new scrutiny. M uch o f  this was directed 
towards the developm ental role o f  the UN. The United N ations’ developm ent activities 
were receiving m ore public attention in the 1990s partly because o f  the renew'ed attention 
to the United Nations. The United Nations developm ent system had com e to com prise as 
m any as 125 legally independent agencies, organizations, and funds. The m ore o f  these 
entities that were created, the m ore bodies that wrere needed to help coordinate them. 
Critics claimed that without the Cold W ar’s bipolarity, the United N ations’ sym bolism  
was losing validity, that the developm ent arena was increasingly dom inated by other
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IDIs, and that the UNDP was increasingly m arginalized in practice. They also asserted 
that the Cold W ar divide was no longer an excuse for UNDP failures or paralysis, that the 
U N D P’s prom ises were often em pty, and that while other forms o f  m ultilateral 
cooperation were increasing their vitality, the UNDP was losing what little it ever had. 
O thers contended that the United N ations financial crisis reflected a deeper political crisis
8 5w ithin the organization that interfered with its agencies' competencies. The UNDP had 
too m any discordant voices, too m uch internal dissent, and too little true power, m any 
claim ed. This was particularly frustrating for the UNDP, as it was having great difficulty 
raising funds. Conflict in transition countries was on the rise, causing increased needs for 
short-term  funds, as well as the extant need for short- and long-term  funds for chronically 
poor countries. The UNDP suffered from a sense o f  disillusionm ent in the early 1990s. 
The global oil crisis o f  1973 had revealed the im portance o f  developing countries to the 
international economy, creating a sense o f  possibility that those previously m arginalized 
could find a new voice and new strength under the aegis o f  the UNDP. Hopes for a New 
International Econom ic Order (NIEO) proposed in 1974, however, had been long lost.
The turn towards laissez-faire econom ics o f  the 1980s had uneven results, and the Bretton 
W oods institutions’ SAPs and conditionalities had left little room  for UNDP influence, as 
well as no clear sign o f  being largely effective in and o f  themselves. The UN DP seemed 
to have becom e project-laden, yet m ission-less, even though dem ands for its funds
continued to grow. Some hoped that a renewal o f  the entire United N ations system  could
86be achieved “within the context o f  the econom ic and social functions.” The UNDP 
likely saw a broader collaborative effort tow ards good governance prom otion with the
^ a k o b s e n , 136-38.
86A ssaf and others, 27.
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other leading IDIs as a m eans o f  enhancing its, and the larger U N ’s, credibility and 
power. The UNDP had begun calling for a closer collaborative effort w ith the other 
leading IDIs in the 1980s, but to little avail.87
Perhaps this was the U N D P’s opportunity. Perhaps then, also, the UNDP could 
advance its other goals, such as “human developm ent’’ and equity w ithin and betw een 
nations, with larger support. In October, 1994, then Secretary General Boutros Boutros- 
Ghali went so far as to call for the establishm ent o f  a centralized United Nations 
D evelopm ent Council to coordinate policies for the BW Is (including the W orld Bank and 
the Fund). He argued that current lack o f  coordination between the United Nations, the 
W orld Bank, and the IMF “can hardly continue for the next fifty years except to the 
detrim ent o f  the cause o f  developm ent.”88
UNDP m em bers representing a w ide array o f  developing countries realized that 
other goals long valued by the UN system generally and the UNDP specifically such as 
equitable access to a country’s resources and opportunities and fair treatm ent o f  those 
m ost often m arginalized in society could be forwarded under the good governance rubric. 
For the UNDP, good governance prom otion as was beginning to be prom oted through 
increased international discourse, by non-state actors and the IFIs alike, was an 
opportunity. Joining in the dialogue, the U N DP could broaden and widen the m ore 
lim ited conceptualizations starting to em erge from the IFIs to include its own specific 
concerns. For the UNDP after all, the prim ary function o f  the governm ent is to em pow er 
its citizens. A 1996 UNDP document from a U N DP workshop on “Good G overnance for
l i g h t e r ,  167.
88Ibid.
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Sustainable Developm ent,” for example, listed 18 characteristics o f  good governance.S9 
Tw elve o f  these traits emphasized the prom otion o f  equity. For the UNDP, the chance to 
help define the international understanding and prom otion o f good governance would 
m ake the institution more relevant and advance its own agenda o f  helping create to some 
degree a m ore equitable world system.
Because o f  the relatively stronger pow er o f  the W orld Bank and the Fund, it is not 
surprising that the UNDP has looked for w ays to work in closer collaboration w ith these 
institutions. W hen the W orld B ank’s 1989 report Sub-Saharan Africa: From  Crisis to 
Sustainable Growth  was published, this “broke new ground for the United N ations by 
addressing A frica’s ills squarely, ending the taboo on m entioning internal politics that
'  90had m ade official discussion o f  developm ent. . . so artificial.” In a sense, the report was 
a step by the W orld Bank towards acknow ledging what had been obvious all along, yet 
unspeakable by the W orld Bank—that politics matters. The UNDP had never had a 
problem  acknow ledging this. And it benefitted from the tem porary affirm ation o f  its 
views. As is evidenced by increased collaboration, the organization realized the potential 
benefits to its own agenda o f  increased association with the relatively m ore powerful 
IFIs.
Em bracing the good governance rhetoric that was becom ing widespread in the 
1990s was a w ay for the UNDP to help shape developm ent policies often largely 
influenced by  the Northern-based IFIs. The UNDP worked to widen the good governance 
concept o f  the IFIs to address concerns particularly important to its own m andate. By
89United Nation Developm ent Program m e, “UNDP W orkshop on Good 
G overnance for Sustainable D evelopm ent” (New York: UNDP, 1996).
90Righter, 206.
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cooperating with the IFIs and bilateral donors and sponsoring conferences and joint 
initiatives, the UNDP had the chance to introduce and reiterate its interest in prom oting 
equitable and human rights-oriented developm ent. UNDP developm ent practitioners were 
urged to encourage other donors to consider these facets in their design and 
im plem entation o f  programs. At the U N D P 's October, 2000 second G lobal Forum on 
W orld D evelopm ent in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, for example. Harvard scholar and human 
rights advocate Stephen P. Marks urged UNDP field s ta ff to "acquire a solid background 
in the hum an rights approach to convince the partners that it is legitim ate and even 
helpful to developm ent planning to bring in such considerations." M arks continued to 
state that other
agencies m ay be slower than [the] UNDP in integrating hum an rights into 
developm ent, especially the international financial institutions and the specialized 
agencies. W orking within those agencies to provide such m onitoring is m ore 
difficult, but eff ective application o f  the human rights fram ework includes 
working with them to develop progressively the habits that both reflect and 
generate a common com m itm ent to the official policy, which com es with 
experience with integrating hum an rig h ts ....91
Similarly, by em barking with the IFIs and bilateral donors on initiatives such as 
the U N D P 's PACT, the UNDP was able to help broaden and inform  other institutions' 
good governance concepts and practices. Som etim es the effect o f  this influence, though, 
m ay have been difficult to see.
Criticism  o f  the United Nations in general was intensifying in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s. Adam Roberts and Benedict K ingsbury echo the sentim ent o f  m any that 
after the Cold W ar, the United Nations could no longer use the East-W est divide as an
9lStephen P. Marks, "The Human Rights Framework for D evelopm ent: Five 
Approaches," expanded and updated version o f  speech delivered at the United Nations 
Developm ent Program m e’s Second Global Forum on World Development. Rio de 
Janeiro. Brazil. 9-10 October 2000 (Boston: Harvard University Press. 2001). 21.
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“all-purpose exculpation for its num erous failures to take collective action."92 Faith in the 
U N D P’s technical cooperation program s had sunk so low by 1990 that some 
governm ents w ere considering ceasing their aid contributions altogether.93 B ritain’s 
overseas developm ent m inister Lynda Chalker went so far as to speak before the U N D P’s 
governing council on the issue. She m ade continued British contributions contingent 
upon the U N D P’s addressing several proposals (less interagency bickering and better 
planning and follow -through o f  developm ent projects, am ong them). Chalker was not 
alone: attention was generally increasingly focused on the U N D P’s shortcom ings.94 Part 
o f  the problem  was that the United N ations from the beginning attempted to insulate itse lf 
from inter-state bickering by not tying its power to state power; its charter recognized 
each state’s sovereignty equally, w ithout giving m ore powerful states more pow er w ithin 
the United Nations. The result was that the more powerful and richer states, not given 
their perceived fair share o f  influence, retreated. The United Nations, many argued, had 
increasingly becom e a forum  for m any Third W orld voices, but with little actual pow er to 
influence events or world conditions.
97 Kingsbury Roberts, 76.
93The UN DP and the agencies it funds has always received its share o f  criticism . 
The Food and A griculture Organization (FAO) and the W orld Health Organization 
(W HO), both funded by the UNDP, have been singled out on m any occasions for their 
perceived shortcom ings. The FAO has been accused o f  consistently overstating the 
severity o f  the w orld food shortage to alarm donors. N icholas Eberstadt, The Tyranny o f  
Numbers: M easurem ent a n d M isn d e  (W ashington, D.C.: AEI Press, 1995). The W HO , 
generally considered successful in its early years, particularly in the fight against various 
disease epidem ics like sm allpox, has lately been accused o f  having too broad and 
unspecified a m andate to be effective. Javed Siddiqi, World Health and W orld Politics: 
The World H ealth Organization and  the UN System  (Columbia: University o f  South 
Carolina Press, 1995).
94R ighter, 267-68.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
150
The UNDP in particular also was facing a host o f  new criticism  in the m id-to-late 
1980s and 1990s. Intense interagency com petition for its scarce funds consum ed much o f 
its agenda, and the funds it did disperse were oftentim es used to build too many 
“cathedrals in the desert."95 The publication o f  the 1986 report “Does Aid W ork?’’ by a 
W orld Bank/Fund intergovernm ental task force, w hile not specifically focused on the 
UN DP, highlighted the negligible impact that technical assistance was m aking in the 
fight against poverty. A lso damaging was the publication o f  the O rganisation for 
Econom ic Cooperation and D evelopm ent’s 1986 report on developm ent aid, which 
accused the UNDP o f  m ostly funding “m ini-projects w orking on m ini-objectives.”96 The 
influential first Nordic U nited Nations Reform Project, published in 1991, also brought 
attention to a host o f  United Nations problem s and specifically criticized the U N D P’s 
lack o f  sound analytical capabilities in its developm ent policy prescriptions.97 The 
N ordic Project, which was particularly resonant due to the N ordic countries’ reputations 
as generous aid donors, recom m ended that the UNDP im prove its conceptual basis for 
developm ent aid to provide a stronger rationale for its endeavors. Y et another reform 
proposal cam e from the South Center, an independent w orking group that included some 
very elite scholars. Its working report identifying the U N ’s dim inished role in supporting 
econom ic developm ent had been well-circulated by 1995. The report, published in 1996, 
argued that the advanced industrialized countries had in essence divested the United 
N ations o f  its developm ent role, deferring instead to the BW Is.98 In the 1990s, the UNDP
95fbid., 61.
96Ibid, 59.
97A ssaf and others, 29-30.
9SIbid., 31-2.
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was ostensibly trying to overcom e such w ide-ranging and m ounting criticism , or at least 
trying to shift the focus away from it with a new or reconceived endeavor. As m entioned, 
in the early 1990s, the United Nations in general was w itnessing a steady decrease in the 
already relatively fewer funds it received from  the w ealthy and powerful United States. 
By m id -1999, the United States’ debt to the United Nations had reached $1.6 billion, all 
unpaid d u es ."  It had becom e increasingly evident that the w orld’s wealthy, 
industrialized powers were interested in little m ore than offering lip service to an 
organization in which their pow er was not truly reflected. The UNDP in particular, to 
which contributions were voluntary, was struggling financially .100 As Rosem ary Righter 
contends, from the beginning, there was intense interagency com petition for the U N D P’s 
m oney. By 1985, for exam ple, thirty-seven United N ations agencies were spending the 
U N D P’s funds, which never am ounted to m ore than 3 percent o f  official developm ent 
assistance. The num ber o f  projects the UNDP funded had increased exponentially since 
its creation, yet its budget had hardly grown. Between 1970 and 1993, the UNDP budget 
had witnessed no real growth at all. Additionally, the U N D P’s share o f  United Nations 
spending on technical assistance, 65 percent in 1968, had steadily declined, falling to 38 
percent by 1980.101 Increasingly working collaboratively with the W orld Bank 
(particularly after its capital funding increase o f  $75 billion in 1988) and with the
"R o b ert L. Borosage, “M oney Talks: The Im plications o f  U.S. Budget Priorities” 
(W ashington, D.C.: A m erica’s Future, Septem ber, 1999), 5.
l00Jakobsen, 173-74; Righter, 232-35; and Klaus Hufner, “The N ature and the 
Role o f  M ultilateral A ssistance o f  the United N ations System ,” in The Future Role o f  the 
United Nations in an Interdependent World, ed. John P. Renninger (Boston: M artinus 
N ijhoff Publishers for UN ITAR, 1989), 172-90.
101 R ighter, 58-9, 167.
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O rganisation for Econom ic Cooperation and Development could help allay this situation, 
as it m ight help convince richer m em bers to at the least pay their dues.
Even if  countries did pay their dues, the U N D P’s needs were greater than ever in 
the 1990s.102 W hen the Cold W ar ended, Soviet aid to some developing countries, 
greatly dim inished since the m id-1980s, ended altogether. At the sam e time, the form er 
Soviet countries now needed aid them selves and comm anded a great deal o f  international 
attention, m aking the com petition for aid funds and the struggle to raise awareness for 
developm ent all the m ore intense. These increased dem ands on international 
developm ent assistance and international hum anitarian efforts m ade it difficult for the 
UNDP to work towards its goal o f  prom oting human developm ent in all poor countries. 
Adding to this diversion aw ay from business-as-usual developm ent goals were the 
growing num bers o f  “com plex em ergencies” such as ethnic conflicts, collapsed states, 
and refugee problem s occurring around this time. These were not all the result o f  the 
Cold W ar’s end, but m any w ere related to it, and others gained m ore international 
attention since the collapse o f  the Soviet Union shifted international priorities. It was 
easy for the UNDP to be overlooked as the international system underw ent its post-Cold- 
W ar reorientation.
Also with the fading o f  the Cold W ar, many o f  the poorer United Nations 
countries becam e less strategically im portant to donors. This gave them less bargaining 
pow er with the richer countries, and less pow er generally in the international system. The 
nature o f bilateral aid is often indicative o f  individual countries’ true sentiments about 
where and how m ultilateral aid should be spent. M ost bilateral developm ent aid since the 
end o f  the Cold W ar has focused on United States econom ic interests (such as Egypt and
l02lbid., 58-60.
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Israel), Japan’s trading partners, France and Great B ritain’s form er colonies, m iddle- 
incom e countries with large foreign debts, and former Soviet bloc transition countries. 
Hence, to obtain m em ber donations from the richer countries for general developm ent 
goals, including for re lief o f  poverty in the poorest and most overlooked countries, the 
UNDP depended increasingly on the “political good w ill” o f w ealthy nations, notably the 
U nited States, W estern European countries, and Japan. The U N D P had to earn this good 
will. Em bracing good governance prom otion, as the Bretton W oods institutions were, 
was a w ay to earn points for the poorer countries, and hence for the U N D P ’s m ission.
Even the UNDP itself adm itted in its 1992 Human D evelopm ent Report that w ithout the 
Cold W ar struggle, developing countries had little impact upon the affairs o f  the richer 
countries. The econom ic im pact was certainly negligible.
This put the U N DP in the precarious position o f  having to raise international 
public opinion about developing countries, even ones with problem atic political 
situations and histories. The end o f  the Cold W ar ushered in a period w here countries’ 
international reputations becam e increasingly important. The UN DP, if  it w anted to 
m ake a difference in influencing the volum e and direction o f  developm ent aid, had to 
convince the leaders o f  the international aid com m unity that the poorest countries were 
worth such investm ent. The UNDP also had an interest in this cause due to the 
discussions that were underw ay in the richer countries about potentially  forgiving 
increasing num bers o f  international debts. During the course o f  the 1980s, the long-term  
debt o f  the poorest countries had m ore than tripled, and m any o f  these countries had to 
divert m oney away from  citizens’ basic needs in order to service their debts. These were 
the countries that could afford to do even that. The UNDP had reason to w ant to attain the 
am ity o f  the rich countries.
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It was also a propitious time for the UNDP to attempt to accom plish th is .103 
A fter the Cold W ar ended, the rich, developed countries were tem porarily reconsidering 
their foreign policy goals and strategic alignm ents.104 Also, the era o f  conservatism  
epitom ized by Ronald Reagan and M argaret Thatcher had come to a close, ushering in 
the potential for more welfare-oriented strategies on a global scale. This would be a good 
tim e for the UNDP to effectively argue its cause or at least gam er som e positive attention 
for the plight o f  the w orld’s m ost destitute. As Stokke contends, the W orld Bank “took 
the lead in the initial period” in prom oting good governance.105 Intervention was 
extended from the economic to the political environm ents o f  developing countries. By 
show ing that it was am enable to this intervention and even jo in ing  in the cause, the 
UNDP hoped to raise its profile. This, in turn, could raise the profile o f  the m ost highly- 
indebted countries in the post-CoId-W ar world. M ore developm ent assistance, it was 
hoped, would follow.
The fading o f  the Cold W ar offered a period o f  renew ed hopes for a m ore viable 
and effective United N ations.106 The G u lf W ar in 1991 was an unprecedented instance o f
103Richard Grant and Jan Nijman, “Foreign Aid at the End o f  the Century: The 
Em erging Transnational Order and the Crisis o f  M odernity” in The G lobal Crisis in 
Foreign Aid, eds. Richard Grant and Jan N ijm an (New York: Syracuse U niversity Press, 
1998), 3.
104Bruce D. Berkowitz, “Handicapping the George K ennan Sw eepstakes,” Orbis 
42:3 (sum m er 1998): 465-73.
,05Ibid.
106Som e developing countries did not have high hopes for a revitalized United 
Nations, fearing that the organization could becom e a tool o f  developed countries’ 
national interests. Some worried m ore particularly that the renew ed em phasis on United 
N ations security and peacekeeping roles would distract the organization from helping 
developing countries not in the midst o f  well-publicized conflict. See. for exam ple. 
Robert M atthews, “United Nations Reform in the 1990s: North-South D im ensions" in
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great pow er cooperation that raised expectations for the role o f  the chronically 
m arginalized to become a potent force in the post-Cold W ar world. Som e even feared 
that the UN m ight becom e too pow erful.107 The election o f Boutros-Ghali in 1992 
brought new hopes, as did the seem ing renew ed cooperation o f  the Security C ouncil.I0S A 
sense o f  anticipation accom panied the first Security Council m eeting in New York in 
January, 1992. The United N ations had not only a new highly visible Secretary-General, 
but also new m em ber and prospective m em ber states, m aking m em bership in the 
organization alm ost universal.109
The UNDP also saw a potential space growing for more cooperation w ith the
Bretton W oods institutions, which could potentially lend it credibility and perhaps lead to
increased funding from the m ajor developed countries. The UNDP also saw an opening
for m ore unity with United States sentim ent via good governance prom otion. The United
States had lost its early enthusiasm  for developm ental aid due to various factors, such as
general aid fatigue and the lack o f  progress in m any developing countries. The explosive
growth o f  the W orld Bank under Robert M cN am ara’s leadership had m ade some
Am erican leaders wary, and the grow ing budgets w ithin the United N ations generally did
not add to their sense o f  confidence in aid organizations. This lack o f  confidence was
The State o f  the United Nations, 1993: North-South Perspectives, ed. Gerald Dirks and 
others (Providence: The Academ ic Council on the United Nations, 1993), 28-37.
l07Haq, 44.
l0SGwin and W illiams, 111-12.
l09Not everyone felt so hopeful. Li Luye writes that various factors have “tipped 
the balance o f  the existing world pattern,” and dom inating powers “stress that the United 
Nations should be given a ‘central ro le,’ [but] they in fact are placing them selves above 
the United N ations.” Li Luye, “UN Role in Establishing a New W orld O rder,” in The 
U N ’s Role in World Affairs, ed. Donald A ltschiller (New York: The H.W . W ilson 
Company, 1993), 144.
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evident in the United States’ half-billion dollar debt from unpaid dues to the United 
Nations in the early 1990s, its adoption o f  a policy o f  zero growth in UN contributions in 
1977, and its departure from UN ESCO in 1984. In the early 1980s, United States 
President Ronald Reagan com m itted to reducing all official developm ent assistance. This 
sentim ent endured throughout the decade, rightly worrying UNDP officials about any 
future com m itm ents from the United States. Yet all this began to change in the early 
1990s. As the Cold W ar faded, the G eorge Bush adm inistration was clearly reassessing 
A m erica’s position on m any issues. In m any respects, the adm inistration helped fuel 
great m om entum  in favor o f  cooperation and international law. The G u lf W ar was an 
exam ple o f  such inclination, raising hopes for a “New W orld O rder" w ith m ore 
consensus and solidarity. The United N ations in general saw this as a hopeful sign. Also, 
the broader organization w'as receiving m ore Am erican attention as it increased its 
peacekeeping activities. The organization was attem pting to m ake itse lf m ore attractive to 
the United States in m any small ways. In 1991, for example, the United Nations 
appealed its 26-year-old resolution equating Zionism  with racism, which the United 
States had always opposed. M any appointm ents o f  Americans to prestigious posts were 
also made. Boutros-Ghali appointed A m erica’s ’ Governor Richard Thornburgh as 
U nder-Secretary General (later to be replaced by A m erica’s M elissa W ells) and selected 
Joseph V em er Reed, another Am erican, to m anage the organization’s fifty-year 
anniversary celebration. Additionally, Am erican Burton Pines was selected (by Reed) to 
serve on the Executive Board o f  a new  NGO, the Institute o f  East-W est Dynam ics, which 
received an initial $250,000 UNDP grant to help Eastern European countries establish 
free m arket economies. Am erican Pedro Sanjuan, considered a conservative, would 
serve as its president. W illiam Draper, the UNDP Adm inistrator at the tim e (1986-1993),
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was know n as a conservative and as a friend o f  Am erican President Bush. In the early 
1990s it was clear that that an unlikely friendship was form ing betw een the United 
N ations generally and American Republican leaders, usually som e o f  the United N ations' 
harshest critics. This improvement in relations helped create a space for m ore 
cooperation betw een the United States and the United Nations, including the UNDP.
The UNDP also saw the potential for a possible carry-over effect by em bracing 
som e o f  the rhetoric o f  the W orld Bank-led good governance prom otion. W orking in 
conjunction w ith the W orld Bank in particular m ight boost the U N D P 's stature. Also, as 
noted, the W orld B ank’s notion o f  good governance tended to be m ore narrow  and 
adm inistrative than that o f  the United Nations, the latter o f  which stressed hum an 
freedom  m uch m ore em phatically as a goal. M aybe by adopting sim ilar term inology, the 
UNDP could influence this institution to adopt som e o f  the U N ’s w ider hum an 
developm ent goals. The U N D P’s Human D evelopm ent Report o f  1990 is evidence o f  the 
its em bracing sim ilar rhetoric: its wording cam e uncannily close to resem bling the W orld 
B ank’s World Developm ent Report o f  1990.
Synopsis
In the 1990s, the UNDP concentrated on the hum an aspects o f  developm ent, 
prom oting program s that focused on people’s choices and capabilities. The strategy 
recognized the lim itations o f  a sole reliance upon m arket forces, and sought to prom ote 
values such as equity, environmental quality, and the em pow erm ent o f  the poor. The 
institution operates with a very broad definition o f  good governance. This conception 
o f  good governance has been linked to U N D P’s core m ission since the m id 1990s, the 
prom otion o f  sustainable human developm ent. Good governance is considered to be the
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prim ary means for achieving sustainable hum an development. The UNDP encourages 
developing countries to develop their own views o f  good governance.
Yet as the UNDP revealed in the 1990s, this IDI was not averse to increasingly 
courting the favor o f  the richest countries. Som etim es this m eant co-opting some o f  the 
language and practices o f  dom inant countries and institutions, yet with a persistent 
underlying resolve to rem ain com m itted to shifting the Northern-led status-quo.
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CH APTER IV 
THE W ORLD BA NK
The W orld Bank, a lasting inheritance o f  the post-W orld-W ar-11 econom ic order, 
is today’s leading IDI. Headquartered in W ashington, D.C. and with about one hundred 
country offices, it serves as a prim ary liaison betw een developed and developing 
countries. The W orld Bank Group is currently com prised o f  five separate entities: the 
original International Bank for Reconstruction and Developm ent (IBRD), the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC, established in 1956), the International 
Developm ent A ssociation (IDA, 1960), the International Centre for the Settlem ent o f  
Investm ent Disputes (ICSID, 1966), and the M ultilateral Investment Guarantee A gency 
(M IGA, 1988). From here on, the term “W orld Bank" refers to the IBRD and the IDA 
together, the group’s m ain developm ent arm s.1
The IBRD has 184 members, and the IDA 164. Each m em ber governm ent is a 
Bank shareholder, and the num ber o f  shares a country owns is based on the size o f  its 
economy. The United States is the largest single shareholder, with 16.41 percent o f  votes, 
followed by Japan (7.87 percent), Germ any (4.49 percent), the United Kingdom  (4.31
’The IBRD and IDA, separate but integrated institutions, provide funds to 
governm ents. They em ploy the same staff, are located at the sam e headquarters, report to 
the sam e president, and follow equivalent loan standards for appraisal and approval. The 
IBRD lends m ainly to m iddle-incom e countries at near market rates, while the IDA is 
focused on the poorest countries, offering low-cost loans and grants. W hile the IBRD and 
IDA are "specialized agencies" o f  the United Nations, the W orld Bank functions as an 
independent institution comprised o f  m em ber countries that are the Bank's shareholders. 
The m em ber countries “own" the Bank and determ ine its strategies, policies, lending, and 
m em bership. A country m ust be a m em ber o f  the International M onetary Fund (IM F) 
before jo in ing  the IBRD. M embership in the IBRD is also required for m em bership in 
IDA and other Bank institutions. World Bank, “The W orld Bank Group: O rganization" 
(2002). <http://w w w .W orld Bank.org [10 January 2005].
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percent), and France (4.31 percent). The rem aining shares are divided am ong the other 
m em ber countries.
Staffed by  about 9,500 and with a $28 billion annual lending budget, the W orld 
Bank is the m ost abundant source for long-term  developm ent lending and credit. Since 
its beginnings, it has lent m ore than $500 billion to m iddle and low-incom e countries. By 
constantly redefining itself, resurrecting its image, and continuing to supply know ledge 
and funds, it has come to serve as a prim ary source o f  the w orld’s prevailing developm ent 
ideas and practice standards. In addition to its capital and financial leverage and its 
developm ent expertise, the W orld Bank has attempted to rest its influence upon its 
“apolitical im age’’ as form alized in its Articles o f  Agreement:
The W orld Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs o f  any 
m em ber; nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political 
character o f  the m em bers concerned. Only econom ic considerations shall be 
relevant to their decisions.3
By stressing technocratic resolutions to a m yriad o f  developm ent problem s, the W orld
Bank endeavors to present itse lf as benign, non-political, and concerned principally with
creating conditions conducive to growth and with raising standards o f living in
developing countries. Because o f  its interventionist nature, however, the W orld Bank has
to work ceaselessly to prove its credibility to m any o f  its own m em ber countries as well
as critics o f  capitalism  and o f  the N orth’s rendering o f  and treatm ent o f  the South.
Because the very issue o f  developm ent is controversial and because the W orld Bank is
Paul J. Nelson, The World Bank and Non-G overnm ental Organizations: The 
Lim its o f  A po litica l D evelopm ent (New York: St. M artin’s Press, 1995), 35, 122.
3The W orld B ank’s apolitical legal requirem ents are reiterated in A rticle 111, 
section 5b, w hich requires that the W orld Bank not consider political or other non­
econom ic factors in m aking its decisions. Cited in Franz von Benda-Beckm ann, "Good 
Governance, Law, and Social Reality: Problem atic Relationships,” Knowledge and  Policy  
7:3 (fall 1994): 55-68.
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quite prom inent, this institution has becom e a perpetual target o f  sorts for those with 
various resentm ents. The fact that the Bank is still in business and that it is still a 
significant actor on the international stage is a tribute to the resourcefulness and ingenuity 
o f  its leadership over the years. The W orld Bank is not harm less or blam eless, though. It 
is highly political, as is the nature o f  any large m ultilateral institution. It has increasingly 
come to stand for economic liberalism  and developm ent via Northern conceptions, but 
this does not m ean to imply that it is devoid o f  hum anism .
The W orld Bank has, though, m ade a profit every year since its creation, totaling 
about 3 billion in 2004 dollars. The IBRD only lends directly to governm ents or for 
projects that they guarantee. The IBRD has lent to 129 countries, yet over 60 percent o f  
these loans have been m ade to ten countries (in order o f  total sum borrowed): M exico, 
Brazil, India, Indonesia, China, Turkey, Argentina, Korea, the Russian Federation, and 
the Philippines. IDA lends to governm ents that have been assigned such poor credit 
ratings they are unable to borrow from comm ercial banks. IDA loans are a significant 
credit source for these countries. M ore than 20 percent o f  all IDA funds have gone to 
India. IDA's top ten borrow ers are as follows (in descending order): India, Bangladesh, 
China, Pakistan, Ghana, Ethiopia, Tanzania, V ietnam , Uganda, and Kenya. The Bank has 
twenty-seven “vice-presidential” units around which it organizes its functions. Six o f  
these units are regional and focus on Africa, East Asia and the Pacific, Europe and 
Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, the M iddle East and North Africa, and 
South Asia. O ther units focus on issue areas such as the environm ent, the financial sector, 
private sector developm ent, developm ent econom ics, legal affairs, and hum an resources. 
The Bank president, chosen by the United States, leads all five arms o f  the institution.
The president's term , which is renewable, lasts five years. Bank operations are also run
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and overseen by  a complex system o f  Boards o f  governors, directors, and executive 
directors, as well as a developm ent committee. The B ank’s Board o f  Governors, to which 
each m em ber country elects a representative, m eets annually in the fall. It m akes 
im portant decisions on the institu tion 's strategic course, membership, capital stock, 
budgets, and incom e distribution. Tw enty-four Executive Directors com prise the B ank’s 
Board o f  Directors. The five largest shareholders appoint their own representatives, as do 
the Peoples Republic o f  China, the Russian Federation, and Saudi Arabia. The rem aining 
sixteen Board chairs are divided. The Board o f  Executive Directors oversees daily Bank 
operations and approves all lending decisions. The twenty-four m em ber Developm ent 
Com m ittee (DC) advises the B ank’s Boards o f  G overnors and the International M onetary 
Fund on issues o f  developm ent and finance.4
Growth o f  Policies and Program s
The W orld Bank has evolved greatly since it was created at the post-W orld-W ar 
11 Bretton W oods conference in 1946. Its initial prim ary task was to help w ith the post­
war reconstruction o f  Europe, though it ended up dispersing only four reconstruction 
loans, totaling $497 m illion. The M arshall Plan eclipsed its lending by dispersing $41.3 
billion in 1953.5 As had been planned, the W orld Bank soon began investing in the 
infrastructure o f  developing countries. Still, though, even ten years after its beginning, 
m ore than ha lf o f  the B ank’s financing went towards loans to the industrialized countries. 
W hen the W orld Bank began focusing more on the developing world (due to the grow ing
4See W orld Bank, ‘‘O rganization.”
5Bruce Rich, “W orld Bank/IM F: 50 Years is Enough” in Fifty Years is Enough: 
The Case Against the World Bank and the International M onetary Fund , ed. Kevin 
Danaher (Boston: South End Press. 1994), 6.
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asym m etric Cold W ar strategies o f  the United States and its allies), it proceeded 
cautiously, neither wanting to be accused o f  disturbing the sovereignty o f  other countries 
nor wanting to risk its reputation by m aking bad loans.
By design, however, the institution was in a position to take some risks. Its 
founders had believed that national governm ents could not depend only on private 
sources for adequate and fair international loans. The W orld Bank, with its considerable 
access to funds and its ow n status, would reduce the risk involved in foreign lending 
during a tim e when global capital m arkets were volatile, after the financial tumult o f  the 
inter-war years. The Bank w ould help establish a new  standard for m aking credible loans 
and provide reliable inform ation about investment prospects.6
In the B ank’s beginning years, the institution had a rather lim ited focus that 
would only expand with time. After its early reconstructive lending, the W orld Bank 
came to view itself prim arily as a lender for projects, particularly for infrastructure. 
M odernization theory, popular at the time, influenced the institu tion’s view that with the 
proper infrastructure in place, poor countries would develop as European ones and the 
United States had previously. The W orld Bank responded to grow ing developing country 
requests for loans, and m ost o f  these loans went to finance the building o f  roads, 
railways, pow er plants, port installations, and com m unication system s. M uch focus was 
placed upon public sector planning and investm ent for these projects, while the private 
market was seen as the m ost viable sphere o f  developm ent for industry, agriculture, 
commerce, and financial services.7 In the 1960s, though, the W orld Bank broadened its
6See Bakker, 46-9.
7See Ed Brown, Giles M ohan, and Alfred B. Zack-W illiam s, ‘"The Long Road to
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scope and began m aking loans for agricultural and industrial developm ent. W orld Bank 
lending was becom ing increasingly politicized, as the decolonization process intensified 
and the United States and the Soviet Union sought to gain influence in strategic Third
o
W orld locations. Europe and Japan rose in strength to challenge United States 
dom inance o f  the global economy, and Third W orld influence added to a country’s 
international stature.9
The follow ing decade, the 1970s, was m arked by crisis in the global economy. It 
was also a decade o f  growth for W orld Bank operations. Under the leadership o f  
President Robert M cNam ara, the W orld Bank and its pow er expanded considerably. The 
Bank form ally espoused poverty alleviation as its principal goal, and also rhetorically 
paid increased attention to hum anistic problem s such as inequality and lack o f  access to 
education. Investing in hum an capital took precedence over infrastructure loans. The 
W orld Bank co-opted som e o f  the term inology from the grow ing dependency theory 
m ovem ent originating in Latin America. New Bank doctrines such as “redistribution 
with growth” and the satisfaction o f  “basic needs” emerged, partly in attem pt to quell 
criticism  that the poor were intentionally subjugated or at least overlooked.10 At the same 
time, the Bank intensified its lending for rural developm ent and began investing 
specifically in areas like nutrition, health, water, and sanitation. M cN am ara asserted that 
alleviating poverty was essential not just for its own sake but also for global political
Structural A djustm ent,” in Structural Adjustment: Theory, Practice, and  Impacts, eds.




IOJoanna M acrae, Aiding R ecovery9 The Crisis o f  A id  in Chronic Political 
Em ergencies (London: Zed Books, 2001), 14.
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stability. Hence, he acknowledged in a sense that the Bank was serving the wider 
political purposes o f  the N orth .11 As its mission grew, the num ber o f  W orld Bank staff 
rose from 1,500 to 5,200, and the dollar value o f  loans rose sixfold. Lending increased 
from $953 m illion in 1968 to $12.4 billion in 1981.12
The second global oil crisis o f  1979-80 and the subsequent debt crises, along with 
the policies o f  the neoliberal governm ents in the United States and W estern Europe, 
helped lead to neoliberalism ’s rise and entrenchment at the W orld Bank in the early 
1980s. Som e contend that these phenomena helped trigger a m arked change in world 
view  at the W orld Bank. Bank officials came to believe that the real value o f  aid could 
com e only from supporting structural adjustm ent.13 N eoliberalism ’s influence at the 
W orld Bank and m ore broadly among the developed countries stem m ed from the overall 
character o f  the international political economy at the time. Particularly after heavy 
borrow ing following the second oil crisis, m any indebted developing countries needed 
balance o f  payments assistance that project finance could not provide.14 The developed 
countries realized they could not control the world econom y to the extent they once had 
thought possible, and they saw in neoliberalism  an answ er to this dilemm a. The state,
" ib id ., 15.
I2Sheldon Annis, “The Shifting Grounds o f Poverty Lending at the W orld W orld 
B ank” in Between Two W orld's: The World Bank's N ext Decade, eds. Richard Feinberg 
and others (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1986), 89.
I3J. Harrigan, P. M osely, and J. Toye, A id  and  Power: The World Bank and  
Policy-Based Lending, vol. 1, 2d ed. (London: Routledge, 1995), 1, 21-61.
"C hristopher Gilbert and David Vines, “The W orld Bank: An Overview o f  Some 
M ajor Issues” in The W orld Bank: Structure and Policies, eds. Christopher Gilbert and 
David Vines (Cambridge: Cam bridge University Press, 2000), 12; Ravi Kanbur and 
David Vines, “The W orld Bank and Poverty Reduction: Past, Present, and Future” in The 
World Bank: Structure and  Policies, eds. Christopher G ilbert and David Vines 
(Cambridge: Cam bridge University Press, 2000), 87.
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m any believed, skewed the natural workings o f  the m arket and lim ited its ability to bring 
absolute gains to all and relative gains to the North. Structural adjustm ent and other 
forms o f  econom ic conditionality came to dom inate the W orld B ank’s lending concerns 
and policies, eventually accounting for about 25 percent o f  new  lending.15
T he early W orld Bank adjustm ent view revealed the neoclassical perspective that 
shrinking the size and reducing the activities o f  the state, enhancing the state’s ability to 
carry out its lim ited econom ic role, and correcting dom estic policies that im peded the 
m arket’s efficiency would spur developm ent. The beginning o f  A lden W. C lausen’s 
Bank presidency reinforced this view. The publication o f  the B erg Report in 1981 
dem onstrated some o f  the basic values present within the institution at the time. The 
report, form ally called A ccelerated D evelopm ent in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda fo r  
A ction , w ritten by Eliot Berg, prescribed less state intervention and greater reliance on 
m arket forces.16 W orld Bank policies followed from this perspective. The Bank 
increasingly focused on rolling back the state and m inim izing interference with the 
functioning o f  the market. Its prescriptions opposed the nature and policies o f  state-led 
econom ies, in the Soviet bloc and in the South generally. M any developing countries 
w ere told to abandon infant industry protection and establish vital com m odity export 
m arkets. Fiscal discipline was urged, as were inflation controls, state expenditure 
reductions, and balanced state budget deficits. Privatization and com petitive exchange 
rates and trade policies w ere advocated.17
15Colin Leys, The R ise and  F all o f  Development Theory (Bloom ington: Indiana 
U niversity Press, 1996), 19-20.
16 W orld Bank, A ccelerated Development in Sub-Saharan A frica: An Agenda fo r
Action  (W ashington, D.C.: The W orld Bank, 1981).
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Despite its reputation for im posing stringent conditions to loans, Bank 
conditionality did not actually begin until 1979. Bank loan dispersem ent has always been
accom panied by a degree o f  conditionality, which is naturally inherent in lending
18decisions. Yet SAPs took conditionality to a m uch higher sphere. Initially, m ost SAPs 
focused on the basic policy prescriptions from m ainstream  classical econom ic theory.19 
As Christopher G ilbert and others contended in 2000, though, since the 1980s, the 
“policies have becom e the projects'’ o f  the W orld Bank.20 Adjustm ent lending increased 
from the W orld B ank’s issuance o f  its first SAP loan in 1979 in all regions until 1987, 
when it began to level o ff  and then slow ly decrease. Latin Am erican and Caribbean 
countries received about a third o f  all o f  the B ank’s adjustm ent loans during this period, 
followed by Asia, Africa, Europe, and the M iddle East. In all, the Bank dispersed loans 
equaling about US$20 billion during the 1980s. Structural adjustm ent loans w'ere m ost 
widely used early in the decade, while the m ore specifically-focused SecALs, sectoral 
adjustment loans, grew in prom inence in the m iddle o f  the decade, eventually surpassing 
SALS in their volume and amounts. SecALs becam e m ore widespread because they
i
were easier to implem ent and to m onitor due to their m ore narrow  foci.'
W illiamson, “W hat W ashington M eans,’’ 16.
l8Christopher Gilbert and others, “The W orld Bank, Conditionality and the 
Com prehensive Development Fram ew ork’’in The World Bank: Structure and  Policies, 
eds. Gilbert and Vines (Cambridge: Cam bridge U niversity Press, 2000), 291.
19Francisco H.G. Ferreira and Louise C. Keely, “The W orld Bank and Structural 
Adjustment: Lessons for the 1980s”in The W orld Bank: Structure and Policies, . 
Christopher Gilbert and David Vines (Cam bridge: Cam bridge U niversity Press, 2000), 
159-95.
20Gilbert and others, 290.
21 Ferreira and Keely, 170-71.
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In the early 1980s, W orld D evelopm ent Reports initially used the term s “adjustm ent'’ 
and “stabilization” indiscrim inately and interchangeably. Later, though, stabilization 
policies cam e to be known as those meant to achieve m acroeconom ic balance, such as 
inflation reduction m easures and account deficit reductions. Structural adjustm ent was 
more specifically articulated to m ean supply-side policies attem pting to increase
efficiency. Som e exam ples include trade, price, tax, and financial reform; privatization;
22and labor m arket reform. W orld Bank loan requirem ents focused on the econom ic 
sphere, and political reform  was not considered a dom ain for Bank interference, due to 
the institu tion’s charter lim itations and its stance that it was an apolitical institution. The 
Bank did initiate “public sector assistance reform ” projects as early as 1983, as described 
in its 1989 World D evelopm ent Report, but the reforms were circum scribed to a very 
narrow, technical domain. The Bank set up program s to assist developing country 
governm ents create and im plem ent better financial m anagem ent policies, reduce the size 
o f  civil service, set appropriate salaries, and “help” in other fairly non-controversial 
ways. Projects were carefully devised to avoid the appearance o f  political intrusiveness, 
and they were not the focal point o f  W orld Bank activities.23 They were, how ever, a 
precursor to policies to com e, foreshadow ing the Bank’s imm inent concern with political 
environm ents conducive to efficient m arket economies.
The volum e o f the B ank’s conditional lending grew dram atically in the m id- 
1980s. Neoliberal beliefs had becom e entrenched in much o f  the North, and structural 
adjustm ent proponents believed that the econom ic problem s o f  the 1970s largely resulted
^ Ib id ., 160-61, 166-67.
23Richard Sandbrook, “Bringing Politics W orld Bank In? The W orld Bank and 
A djustm ent in Africa,” Canadian Journal o f  African Studies 29 (1995): 279; W orld 
Bank, World D evelopm ent Report 19S3 (New York: Oxford U niversity Press, 1983).
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from faulty state policies adopted after the first oil crisis o f  the decade." W orld Bank 
policy prescriptions were intended to rem edy these perceived deficiencies. They 
increasingly included liberalizing financial m arkets, ending subsidies and quotas, curbing 
state m onopolies and price controls, floating exchange rates, and accelerating 
privatization. Export-based growth and balanced state budgets (including tim ely 
servicing o f  debts) were prom oted. In the early 1980s, a large num ber o f  developing 
countries were experiencing severe reductions in already low econom ic indicators, as 
well as serious m acroeconom ic problem s. M any countries were unable to either service 
their debts or feed their citizens. This gave the Bank leverage to intervene in their 
economies. Critics assert that SA Ps were a sym ptom  o f  the Bank’s, and m ore broadly the 
N orth’s, desire to control and dom inate the South. Others argue that the typical SAP 
package was overly generic and not form ulated to help a specific country with its own 
unique characteristics and issues. Still others contend that SAPs were detrim ental to the 
social w elfare o f  citizens, particularly the poorest who tended to depend upon the state
9 <
for basic services. All o f  these allegations have m erit, yet W orld Bank officials asserted
that by getting their econom ic policies right, the plight o f  developing countries would
26improve. It is true that som e pro-poor policies were introduced in developing countries 
following the first debt crisis, but these com prised a small percentage o f  o verall Bank-
24Giles Mohan, “Preface and Prospectus” in Structural Adjustm ent: Theory, 
Practice and  Impacts, eds. Giles M ohan, Ed Brown, Bob M ilward, and Alfred B. Zack- 
W illiam s (London: Routledge, 2000), xv.
25Abrahamsen, 9-13; Robert Cox, “ M ultilateralism  and W orld O rder,” Review  o f  
In ternational Studies 18 (1992): 161-80.
26Bob M ilward, “W hat is Structural A djustm ent?” in Structural Adjustm ent: 
Theory, Practice and Impacts, eds. Giles M ohan, Ed Brown, Bob M ilward, and Alfred B. 
Zack-W illiam s (London: Routledge, 2000), 24.
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initiated reforms. W orld Bank SAP lending, though, expanded steadily. Between 1980 
and 1982, it amounted to $190 m illion. Between 1986 and 1988, it was $1,241 million. 
During the decade o f  the 1980s, it rose to $10, 025 m illion.27
Criticism  o f the W orld Bank had reached new heights by the end o f  the 1980s,~s 
and the Bank responded partly by co-opting som e o f  its critics’ concerns, as it had done 
in the 1970s. The Bank responded to claims that it was overly focused on conditions 
needed for an efficient m arket econom y and re-claim ed its dedication to poverty 
alleviation. Concern about the effects o f  developm ent program s on poverty surfaced in 
W orld B ank’s rhetoric and docum ents decades ago, yet poverty reduction as an 
independent objective was a fairly new phenom enon. Such a focus had been largely 
m issing or stifled during the 1980s. The Bank, accused o f  ignoring the social costs o f 
adjustm ent, would devote its 1990 World D evelopm ent Report to addressing the problem
29o f  poverty. The strategy em phasized how the institutional environm ents o f  recipient 
countries needed be structured or restructured so that the poorest w ere not further 
m arginalized. The report was published in the year following the IM F’s statem ent that it 
w ould be  unacceptable to “wait for resum ed growth alone to reduce poverty .”30 Further, 
in 1993, a vice-presidency with a special poverty reduction m andate was created at the 
Bank. Critics would contend that these m easures did not change the fact that the Bank
27Ibid„ 25.
28Ibid.
29W orld Bank, World D evelopm ent Report 1989/1990 (N ew  York: O xford 
U niveristy Press, 1990).
30W orld Bank, Poverty Reduction Operational D irective  (W ashington. D.C.: The 
W orld Bank, 1992).
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worked to buttress the position o f  the North via the South, but m ost would at least 
concede that the renewed attention to poverty alleviation was a welcomed sign.
The num ber o f  projects reflecting the W orld B ank’s renew ed concern with 
protecting the environm ent also expanded in the 1990s, often falling under the label 
“sustainable developm ent.” Efforts w ere m ade to consider the long-term  effects o f  
projects and policies on the air, land, and waterways. Topics like conserving 
biodiversity, reducing greenhouse em issions and pollution, reducing chem ical use, and 
addressing global warm ing becam e popular.31 As the 1990s progressed, particularly 
during Jam es W olfensohn’s tenure, the W orld Bank increasingly added to its num ber o f  
concerns and program s. In addition to its environm ental programs, the W orld Bank also 
initiated program s focusing on the im portance o f  civil society, women in developm ent, 
ethnodevelopm ent, and hum an freedom  as com ponents o f  development. The Bank also 
began to show m ore concern with the quality, not just the quantity, o f  state capacity.
The Bank opened the way for focusing on good governance prom otion as early  as 
1989 with its publication o f  Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth. 
This report “contained all the ingredients for subsequent good governance discussions.”32 
The next year, an internal Bank dispatch explained that “internal or external political
3'G iles M ohan, “The Environm ental Aspects o f  Adjustm ent” in Structural 
Adjustm ent: Theory, Practice and Impacts, eds. Giles M ohan, Ed Brown, Bob M ilward, 
and A. Zack-W illiam s (London: Routledge, 2000), 95-116.
•> -y
‘M uch o f  the B ank’s early 1990s’discussion about good governance emanated 
from this IDI’s work in Africa. This is m ost likely because o f  the m ore active role the 
Bank took in Sub-Saharan Africa; the large num ber o f  dictators in this region; increased 
calls for dem ocracy among African people; a traditionally strong role for the state in 
m any countries; and the failure o f  SA Ps to entice private investment and foster increased 
econom ic growth to the region. R. Sm ith and P.J. Lipperman, “The W orld B ank’s New 
Focus on the Quality o f  ‘G overnance’ in Borrowing Countries and the Linkage Between 
‘Good G overnance’ and Internationally-Recognized Human Rights” (W ashington, D.C.: 
Lawyers Com m ittee for Human Rights, 1992), 21.
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events m ay have significant direct econom ic effects, which, due to their econom ic nature,
m ay properly be taken into consideration in the W orld Bank’s decisions."33 In the
following year, 1991, the W orld Bank further confirmed its new position on the necessity
o f  the state intervention in some ways. Its World Development Report stated that the,
proper econom ic role o f  governm ent is larger than m erely standing in for m arkets 
if  they fail to work well. In defining and protecting property rights; providing 
effective legal, judicial, and regulatory systems; im proving efficiency o f  the 
civil service, and probably the environm ent, the state forms the very core o f  
developm ent. Political and civil liberties are not, contrary to a once popular view, 
inconsistent with econom ic grow th.34
M any bilateral aid donors were openly encouraging dem ocracy at the tim e, and other
m ultilateral aid donors were beginning to do the same. As Leftwich contends, however,
the W orld Bank was m ore cautious in its stance. Instead o f  advocating dem ocracy or
even good governm ent, it adopted the m ore neutral term inology o f  “Good governance."
Instead o f  being accused o f having too lim ited a focus, critics accused the W orld Bank o f
suffering from “m ission-creep."35 The Bank also began creating its influential Poverty
Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). The W orld B ank’s experience in public sector had
also prom oted a fuller understanding that public sector m anagement m ust be understood
w ithin a broader context o f  governance. The role o f  governing institutions w as indeed
critical to the perform ance o f  the public sector, and there were connections betw een good
public sector m anagem ent and decentralization to local governments, to the private
sector, and to civil society. A m ore holistic, system ic approach to developm ent was
33Ibid.
34W orld Bank, World D evelopm ent Report 1991 (New York: O xford U niversity 
Press, 1991), 4.
35Jessica Einhom , “The W orld B ank’s M ission Creep,’’ Foreign A ffa irs  80:5 
(Septem ber/O ctober 2001): 22-35 and Stephen Fidler, “W ho’s M inding the W orld 
Bank?" Foreign Policy  (Septem ber/O ctober 2001), 40-50.
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obviously needed to better take account o f  all these factors. The basic idea was that aid 
recipients would devise, through a process o f  lengthy consultation including national civil 
society and international donors, their own long-term  developm ent strategies. The Bank 
would then work with each developing country to help it achieve its objectives. The Bank 
explicitly  stated that this partnership would take different forms depending on the 
situation with each country. Countries could only have a partnership with the Bank if  
they pursued sound m acroeconom ic policies and adhered to certain standards o f  good 
governance, as defined by the Bank. Increased em phasis was placed on the 
m ultidim ensionality o f  poverty, yet even the PRSPs, were overly focused on 
m acroeconom ic environm ents, public expenditure m anagement, and decentralization. As 
will be discussed, avoiding the issue o f  political participation lim ited the institu tion’s 
intended venture beyond traditional Bank public sector m anagem ent work.
It m ay be true that since the end o f  the Cold W ar, the Bank has been struggling to 
find its niche and has thus becom e a bit diffuse in goals. This is, however, a sign that the 
W orld Bank is w illing to change and grow and that it wants to be useful as well as 
prosperous. If  the past offers insight, the Bank will likely continue to be im portant well 
into the future for its knowledge as much as for its funds. Yet as poverty rem ains a 
severe problem  in much o f  the world, the W orld Bank clearly still has m uch to learn.
Good Governance Promotion 
Far-reaching change was begun in W orld Bank developm ent policy in the 1990s. 
Ravi K anbur and David Vines contend that there was a “com plete flip around’’ in the 
W orld B ank’s developm ent assum ptions.36 This exaggerates the shift som ew hat, yet it
36Kanbur and Vines, 95.
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was nonetheless significant. Part o f  this change was evident in the W orld B ank 's new 
prom otion o f  good governance, which gradually began appearing in W orld Bank 
publications and policies in 1989 and into the 1990s. The Bank acknowledged that 
econom ic liberalization program s had been largely unsuccessful due to poor m anagem ent 
o f  the program s by recipients, and suggested that political liberalization would help 
create an enabling environm ent for econom ic growth. The very idea continues to be 
articulated and better defined and prescribed into the new m illennium , as W orld Bank 
scholars and policy m akers continue to experim ent, study, and learn from experience. 
Stiglitz notes, for instance, on the subject o f  good governance, that while “ it is easy to 
identify  the outcom es o f  good institutions, and to cite exam ples o f  institutions which 
work well and those that do not, it rem ains far from  clear how to go about creating these 
‘good’ institutions.”37 As a result o f  the W orld B ank’s gradual em bracing, acceptance, 
and understanding o f  the concept o f  good governance, tracing its em ergence and 
evolution requires a bit o f  scrutiny.
At first, the W orld Bank focused on prom oting sound institutions, providing 
various, evolving definitions o f  what this entailed. Later, the Bank heightened its focus 
on equity and social concerns, highlighting the need to protect the poorest and least 
advantaged groups from the possible harsh effects o f  transition. Then, particularly after 
W olfensohn becam e the B ank’s president in 1995, the issue o f  corruption am ong leaders
3 8o f  poor countries came to the forefront. The latest developm ent in the B ank 's concern
37Joseph Stiglitz. “Introduction” in The World Bank: Structure and  Policies, eds. 
Christopher Gilbert and David Vines (Cam bridge: Cam bridge U niversity Press, 2000), 3.
38Recent years have seen a succession o f  trials o f  political leaders and m inisterial 
resignations in the wake o f  corruption scandals in Belgium, Italy, India, South Korea, 
Germ any, France, the United States, and elsew here. These examples m ake it clear that
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with good governance has been potentially the most controversial o f all: discussions o f  
the political will o f  a nation’s leadership and its comm itm ent to pro-developm ent 
priorities beyond any particular policy. To this end, the W orld Bank has even recently 
created a Capacity-Building and Im plem entation Division at its W ashington base, as well 
as developing an Africa Capacity-Building Initiative w ith the UNDP, located in Harare. 
Certainly concern with a state’s capacity and will is far beyond the basic m acroeconom ic 
policies the W orld Bank was urging in the 1980s. Despite the technocratic language 
used, these W orld Bank efforts clearly have m oved into the political realm; yet as W orld 
Bank officials see it, such efforts are not political interventions in and o f  them selves, but, 
rather, m easures taken to prom ote the conditions deem ed necessary for sustainable 
economic developm ent.39
The W orld Bank has becom e increasingly involved in m odernizing and 
decentralizing the state, strengthening public institutions, reform ing judiciaries, 
im proving legislatures, w orking to fight corruption, and prom oting participation in 
political processes. The Bank has set som e lim its on the degree o f  its interventions, 
though. In 2000, it stated that it would not becom e involved w ith prescribing police,
corruption is not confined to developing countries. M orris Szeftel, "M isunderstanding 
African Politics: Corruption and the G overnance Agenda,” R eview  o f  A frican Political 
Economy  25:76 (June 1998): 221-40.
39Paralleling what has been occurring within the W orld Bank, outside o f  the 
W orld Bank scholars such as Leftwich, Larry Diamond, Stephen Haggard, Seym our 
M artin Lipset, and others, have been at the forefront o f  articulating a m odem  
“developm ental” state in which leaders are comm itted to developm ent and w illing to 
tenaciously take risks and attempt changes, som etim es again and again, w ithout a clear 
blueprint for success. Som e o f  these scholars argue that a dem ocratic state provides the 
optimal environm ent for sustainable developm ent. Larry Diamond, “Econom ic 
D evelopm ent and D em ocracy Reconsidered,” Am erican Behavioral Scientist 35 (1992): 
453-72.
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prison, or crim inal justice  system reform, nor would it attempt to influence parliam entary 
processes, elections, or political party form ation and functioning.
O utside o f  the Bank, during the 1990s various other bilateral and m ultilateral aid 
donors began to increasingly advocate dem ocratic governance. The Bank, though, has 
not gone so far as to advocate democracy. The type o f  governm ent it recom m ends, 
though, is one that is participatory, transparent, and grounded in the rule o f  law. It has 
come to sound m uch like the Northern model o f  a liberal democracy.
As noted, the W orld B ank’s 1989 report on Africa was the first tim e it publicly 
acknowledged loan recipients’ governance problem s as im peding developm ent efforts. 
A ccording to the report, beneath the host o f  A frica’s developm ental problem s w as a 
“crisis o f  governance.” The W orld Bank som ewhat obliquely defined “governance” as 
“ .. .the exercise o f  political pow er to m anage a nation’s affairs.” It cited institutional, 
legal, and political conditions that Africa was lacking that were necessary for A frica’s 
developm ent. G ood governance was, as has been pointed out, defined in a narrow sense 
that avoided political ideology as much as possible. The W orld B ank’s definition 
included the follow ing features: non-corrupt and accountable leadership, a representative 
legislature, an independent legal system, sound legal rules and enforcem ent m echanism s 
to protect the legitim acy o f  contracts and property rights, and respect for hum an rights.40 
The W orld Bank did not use the term “ liberal dem ocracy,” but the conditions it described 
and prescribed w ere those valued by its proponents.
The A frica report was followed by further Bank pronouncem ents o f  its growing 
concern w ith good governance. As M alcolm Grieve contends, the W orld B ank 's World
40W orld Bank, Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth 
(W ashington, D.C.: The W orld Bank, 1989).
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D evelopm ent Report 1990 has a more “hum anistic tone” than previous reports. It
continues to advocate neoliberal reforms, but also attends m ore to the governm ent’s role
in helping protect the poor during these transitions. The report contends that the state’s
capability to help protect the poor during econom ic adjustm ent periods can help ease the
process. Labor-intensive projects are recom m ended to increase opportunities for poor,
and governm ents are urged to expand their allocation o f  basic social serv ices as well.
The report adm its that during structural adjustment, the W orld Bank, not generally
recognized for its hum ility or ability to admit its m istakes, overlooked the poor.41
In its 1991 W orld D evelopm ent Report, the W orld Bank further contributes to its
articulation o f  good governance policies:
The proper econom ic role o f  governm ent is larger than m erely 
standing in for m arkets if  they fail to w ork well. In defining and 
protecting property rights, providing effective legal, judicial, and 
regulatory system s, im proving the efficiency o f  the civil service, 
and probably the environm ent, the state forms the very core o f  
developm ent. Political and civil liberties are not, contrary to a once 
popular view, inconsistent with econom ic grow th.42
It argues that in developing countries, the state should not only protect the poor during
transitions periods, but also becom e m ore discrim inatory in the policies its sets generally.
The report contends that “governm ents need to do less in those areas w here m arkets
work” and “m ore in those areas where m arkets alone cannot be relied upon.” It further
argues that the
challenge to policy-m akers is to exploit the com plem entarities betw een state 
and market. They can transform  the outlook for econom ic developm ent by 
having the state intervene less where it m ay . . . and m ore w here it m ust....”43
4lM alcolm  G neve, “Book Reviews,” Perspectives in P olitical Science  21:1
(w inter 1992): 49-50.
4~ W orld Bank, Report 1991, 4.
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Such statements envisage an expanded role for the state in actually politically guiding the
developm ent process. They also im ply a sense o f  local ownership for the state, as states
them selves are urged to discrim inate and decide what political practices and qualities will
enhance the m arket’s ability to create opportunity and developm ental success.
The W orld Bank addressed the role o f  the state further in its 1992 publication,
Governance and  Development. A ccording to then president Preston in his foreword,
Good governance is an essential com plem ent to sound econom ic policies. 
Efficient and accountable m anagem ent by the public sector and a predictable and 
transparent policy fram ew ork are critical to the efficiency o f  m arkets and 
governm ents, and hence to econom ic developm ent.44
This publication defines “governance” as the “m anner in which power is exercised in the
m anagem ent o f  a country’s econom ic and social resources for developm ent.”45 Again,
instead o f  calling for a reduced state role, it envisages a state actively engaged in not
sim ply overseeing but actually guiding not only  econom ic policies but also the qualities
o f  the political environm ent. It clearly identifies four m ain areas o f  governance: public
sector m anagem ent, accountability, legal fram ew orks, and inform ation and transparency. 
The state is called on to devise the tim ing and nature o f  policy reform s to suit its
particular m arket functioning.
The W orld B ank’s publication o f  The East Asian M iracle: Economic Growth and
Pubic Policy  in 1993 also reflected the institu tion’s evolving posture towards the role o f
the state in developm ent. Preston in the preface asserts that some “selective [state]
^ i d . , 9 - 1 0 .
44W orld Bank, G overnance and D evelopm ent (W ashington, D.C.: The W orld 
Bank, 1992).
45Ibid.
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interventions contributed to grow th,” particularly in North-East Asia. The document 
does not, however, go as far as to clearly acknowledge the role o f  the state in the 
development o f  Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, and Japan.46 Som e scholars assert that 
it was in its interpretation o f  the reason for East A sia 's developm ental success that the 
W orld Bank was m ost reticent to adm it the problem s with its earlier classical economic 
orthodoxy.47 This neoliberal interpretation had been critical in legitim izing the W orld 
B ank’s SAPs in Latin Am erica and Sub-Saharan Africa and thus seeing these differently 
was a crucial adm ission o f  past m istakes. Hence, the Bank was conservative even in 
1993 o f  granting m ore credence to the role o f  the state or the political nature o f  the
4 0
developm ent process in these countries. In the 1993 report, though, the Bank 
acknowledged that East Asian reg ion’s success partly stemmed from  state guidance. It 
noted that in addition to encouraging free trade and suppressing interest rates, 
governments had built national support for growth, grounded partly  in evenhanded land 
reforms; directing local credit allocations towards growth; and focusing on developing 
prom ising m anufactured exports.49
46W orld Bank, The East Asian M iracle  (New York: Oxford University Press,
1993).
47Kanishka Jayasuriya, Kanishka and Andrew Rosser, ' ‘Econom ic Orthodoxy and 
the East Asian Crisis,” Third W orld Quarterly  22:3 (2001): 381-96.
48Ibid, 383. In m aking their argument, Jayasuriya and R osser also cite W. Baer, 
W .R. Miles, and A.B. M oran, “The End o f  the Asian Myth: W hy W ere the Experts 
Fooled?” World D evelopm ent 21 AW. 1735-47.
49Critics such as Sanjaya Lall, though, contend that the W orld Bank held back in 
this report, endorsing the “neoliberal consensus” more so than that the reg ion 's proactive 
policies. Sanjaya Lall, “The East Asian M iracle: Does the Bell Toll for Industrialization 
Strategy?’’ World D evelopm ent 22 (1994): 645-54.
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The W orld B ank’s Ghana 2000 and Beyond: Setting the Stage fo r  A ccelerated  
Growth and Poverty Redaction, also published in 1993, makes m ore allowances for the 
role o f  the state in East A sia’s success than the report specifically on East A sia’s 
developm ent.50 The report seeks to explain how Ghana might adopt some o f  the policies 
East Asian countries used to facilitate developm ent, and it comes closer to 
acknowledging the im portance o f  the sta te 's  role in facilitating and guiding 
developm ent.51 The report advocates a stronger role for the G hanaian state in prom oting 
the country’s developm ent, and even suggests that Ghana experim ent with 
industrialization strategies, as w ere used in parts o f  East Asia. Industrialization strategies 
are generally shunned by  the neoliberal view that less state involvem ent is the best 
lubricant for a vital m arket, and this adm ission is quite telling.
World D evelopm ent Reports and other publications did not break new ground in 
the next few years, instead repeating what had been pronounced in the early  1990s. The 
W orld B ank’s 1997 World D evelopm ent Report did, though, take the W orld B ank’s 
evolving shift further into new territory. It further asserted the institution’s view  about 
the need for good governance policies, and it went so far as to contend that ‘"social and 
institutional fundam entals are equally [as] im portant” for a country’s sustained 
developm ent as neoliberal m acroeconom ic policies. This was quite a change. The W orld 
Bank essentially conceded that without the right policy environm ents, the econom ic 
adjustm ents it advocated throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s m eant little. Econom ic
50W orld Bank, Ghana 2000 and Beyond: Setting the Stage fo r  Accelerated  
Growth and Poverty Reduction  (W ashington, D.C.: Africa Regional Office, 1993).
5lSandbrook contends that it “veers even closer to the revisionist [or pro-state] 
interpretation than the East Asia study.” Sandbrook, 281.
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policies, this report stated, are im portant only when supported by effective politics and 
countries “need m arkets to grow, but they need capable state institutions to grow 
m arkets.”52 This report urged what the W orld Bank publications w ould later judiciously 
term  “dem ocratic decentralization,” or the devolution o f  state pow er to various levels o f 
bodies and organs, all overseen by accountability m echanism s and responsible to a 
country’s citizenry.53 By 2002, the “apolitical” W orld Bank was not urging democracy 
outright, yet was in fact using the term “dem ocratic” to describe m any o f  its earlier and 
extant good governance policies. The report provides the results o f  a survey o f  m ore than 
3,600 private firms in 69 countries that confirm  the value o f  sound institutional 
fram ew orks and viable policy environm ents to potential and present foreign investors. It 
reiterates the need for states to protect the poor during tim es o f  transition and again 
contends that state institutions should be organized in such a way as to enhance and 
prom ote international coordination. The report concludes that good governance does not 
ju st help spur sustainable developm ent, but that it is essential for sustainable 
developm ent.
The B ank’s publication o f  Assessing Aid: What Works, What Docsn 't and Why in 
1998 served to further confirm  the B ank 's stance that aid only helps those countries with 
good policies in place. The Bank concedes that aid given to countries with poor policies 
m ay actually impede developm ent, causing aid dependence and reinforcing poor 
governance habits and tendencies. The authors contend that at the tim e o f  writing, 32 
very poor countries with fair or good policies would benefit from increased foreign aid.
52W orld Bank, World Developm ent Report 1997: The State in a Changing World 
(New York: Oxford U niversity Press, 1997), 38.
53Ibid.
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I f  aid was given to only countries with acceptable policies according to 1998 allocations, 
25 m illion peoples’ lives would be im proved, they contend.54
The following year, the W orld Bank went even further in its efforts to prom ote 
good governance by enlisting the help o f  m any o ther organizations and institutions.
W orld Bank President W olfensohn and O rganisation for Economic Cooperation and 
D evelopm ent Secretary-General Don Johnston signed a m em orandum  on June 21, 1999, 
agreeing to create a Global Corporate G overnance Forum comprised o f  the m ajor 
international institutions and sm aller intergovernm ental organizations and N G O s to 
coordinate efforts to im prove governance in developing countries. They agreed to pool 
resources, coordinate efforts, and help design a public-private partnership forum  to help 
developing countries im prove their governance policies and practices so that m ore private 
and public capital could be attracted. Also in 1999, the W orld B ank’s new 
Comprehensive Development Fram ew ork  was proposed. It seeks to coordinate donor 
activities with the input o f  the private sector, civil society, and the governm ents o f  
recipient countries.55 The Bank went from slow ly embracing good governance 
prom otion to seeking to lead a concerted international effort toward this end. Results 
were prom ising, particularly after UNDP A dm inistrator M alloch Brown announced that 
his institution and the W orld Bank had agreed to work more closely together prom oting 
good governance.56 The U N D P’s involvem ent enhanced the credibility o f  the W orld 
B ank’s effort and enlisted the support o f  m any new countries. Also in 1999, the W orld
34W orld Bank, Assessing Aid: What Works, What D oesn't, and Why (New York: 
Oxford U niversity Press, 1998).
55Jam es D. W olfensohn, A Proposal for a Comprehensive D evelopm ent 
Fram ew ork  (W ashington, D.C.: The W orld Bank, 1999).
56"UN DP to Join W orld Bank," 1.
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Bank further institutionalized its good governance promotion, this tim e at the 
international level. The W orld Bank assum ed responsibility for som e o f  the IM F’s 
“ Reports on the Observance o f  Standards and Codes (ROSCs),” a set o f  controversial 
standards designed to regulate m arket behavior in developing countries. The Bank, for 
exam ple, agreed to help oversee a corporate governance plan that would help ensure that 
investors in the global South were protected from corruption and state m ism anagem ent. 
RO SCs were partly a response to the East Asian crisis o f  1998-1998, in which regional 
financial problem s threatened the w ell-being o f  wealthy countries. They were largely an 
attem pt by G-20 countries to cooperate with the IFIs to ensure that m arkets would be less 
vulnerable to crises. The next year the W orld Bank published som e surprising statistical 
results supporting the value o f  its version o f  good governance. In Septem ber, 2000, the 
Bank issued a study entitled “The Q uality  o f  Grow th” that argued that countries could 
double their living standards by im proving their governance policies.57 W orld Bank ch ief 
econom ist Nicholas Stem announced publicly  that the W orld B ank’s past em phasis on 
countries adopting sound m acroeconom ic policies was still vital, but that this alone was 
not sufficient to prom ote sustainable developm ent. Good governance was indispensable 
as well. The W orld Bank continued to resist prom oting liberal dem ocracy by  name, yet 
others on occasion did this for it. Agence France Presse, for exam ple, interpreted S tem 's 
rem arks as acknowledging that “dem ocracy” as well as other factors was vital for 
developm ent.58 The W orld B ank 's good governance promotion had begun to take on a 
life o f  its own.
57W orld Bank, The Quality o f  Growth  (W ashington, D.C.: The W orld Bank,
2000).
^V eronica Smith, Agencc France Presse  (25 Septem ber 2000).
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The W orld Bank has continued to amend its operational guidelines to feature 
good governance m ore prom inently in its adjustment and investment lending 
operations.59 T he B ank’s Country A ssistance Strategies and PRSPs have increasingly 
used governance as a m easure and criterion. Further, since 1999, the Bank oversees 
Institutional G overnance and Reviews to assess a country 's progress in achieving 
designated good governance features. IDA resources are increasingly conditional upon 
good governance as well, and since 1998, the twelfth IDA replenishm ent initiated a 
perform ance-based allocation framework. The ID A ’s Country Policy and Institutional 
A ssessm ent (CIPA ) consider various governance factors, including the extent to w hich a 
country im plem ents accountable and effective institutions, transparent econom ic and 
social policies, a stable and reliable legal fram ework, an active civil society, and citizens’ 
ability to participate in the political process.60
In the 1990s, the W orld Bank defined governance as the “m anner in which pow er is 
exercised in the m anagem ent o f  a country’s econom ic and social resources for 
developm ent."61 The Bank targeted three facets o f  governance: the type o f  political 
regim e, the process the regim e uses to m anage econom ic and social resources for
<http://w w w .W orld Bank.org/w bi/govcm ance'other growth.htm > [ 22 January 2002],
59Santiso, “G overnance Conditionality," 19; Shahid Javed Burki and others, 
Beyond the W ashington Consensus: Institutions M atter (W ashington, D.C.: The W orld 
Bank, 1998).
60Pierre Landell-M ills, Governance: The Critical Factor: IDA. (W ashington,
D.C.: The W orld Bank, 2000); International Developm ent Association, Linking IDA  
Support to C ountry Performance: Recent Experience and  Emerging Issues  (W ashington. 
D.C.: IDA, 2001). 62W orld Bank, Governance: The W orld B a n k ’s Experience  
(W ashington, D.C.: Operations Policy Departm ent, 1993), xiv.
6,W orld Bank, Governance and Development, 3.
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developm ent, and the capacity o f  governm ents to achieve developm ental goals. “ Some 
critics claimed that although these conceptualizations bore some sim ilarities to those o f 
the UN DP, they were clearly less focused on citizens’ rights and governm ental 
responsiveness to those needs. Instead, som e rightly believed, the W orld B ank’s 
approaches to strengthening good governance in developing countries were rem arkably 
com parable to those used to foster econom ic reform .63 The m ain difference is that the 
W orld B ank’s aid conditionality has em braced not only the econom ic but also political 
dom ain. Form er W orld Bank C hief Econom ist Joseph Stiglitz contends that at the W orld 
Bank, “Views about developm ent have changed .... Today there is m ore concern about 
broader objectives, entailing m ore instrum ents, than was the case earlier.”64 Though the 
Bank uses m uch o f  the good governance term inology popular w ithin m any IDIs and the 
developm ent com m unity generally, its good governance program s and policies reveal 
interest in the efficiency o f  the state m ore so than with equity w ithin states. For the 
W orld Bank, concerns such as equity, freedom, opportunity, and em pow erm ent that 
figure so largely in the U N D P’s program s and statem ents often are m erely tag ons.65 The 
W orld B ank’s genuine concerns appear to have changed little in content from its earlier
“W orld Bank, Governance: The World B ank's Experience  (W ashington,
D .C .:O perations Policy Departm ent, 1993), xiv.
63Catherine Caulfield, M asters o f  Illusion: The World B ank and the Poverty o f  
N ations (New York: Henry Holt and Com pany, 1996.
64Joseph Stiglitz, “The W orld Bank at the M illennium ,” The Economic Journal 
109 (N ovem ber 1999): 587.
65The W orld Bank does in a few cases give equity concerns serious attention in its 
docum ents. Perhaps the m ost com prehensive exam ple to date is in its 1997 W orld 
D evelopm ent Report. In a chart labeled “Functions o f  the State,” the W orld Bank devotes 
one/fourth o f  this chart to “Addressing M arket Failure.” The rem aining fourth is devoted 
to "Im proving Equity.” W orld Bank, World D evelopm ent Report 1997.
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SAPs; they sim ply have been broadened and w idened to include aspects o f  the political 
realm  that the W orld Bank previously avoided. T hey also address some new concerns 
with obstacles to developm ent incurred by som e o f  their previous aid conditionalities.
The Bank has increm entally am ended its operational guidelines to include greater 
consideration o f  good governance in its adjustm ent and investment lending operations. 
The B ank’s Country A ssistance Strategies (CAS) and the PRSPs now have provisions 
gauging the quality o f  governance and, since 1999, the Bank conducts Institutional and 
G overnance Reviews. Similarly, in 1998, the tw elfth  IDA replenishm ent began a 
perform ance-based funding allocation fram ew ork. The Com prehensive Developm ent 
Fram ework (CDF) approach also integrates governance concerns.
M ost recently, the W orld Bank reports that its good governance program s have 
five goal areas or “dim ensions.” These reflect the W orld Bank’s goals to encourage in its 
client states (1) governm ental structures that separate the powers between independent 
executive, legislative, and judicial branches; (2) accountable and contestable leaders; (3) 
effective public sector management; (4) open entry and com petition in the private sector; 
and (5) w ide venues for participation and civil society m obilization and influence.66 By 
som e estim ates, the W orld Bank is currently lending about $5 billion yearly for 
institutional reform  to support such goals. In 1998, the W orld Bank docum ented that it 
was spending about 7 percent o f  its loan budget on “public sector m anagem ent." The 
W orld Bank itse lf admits that this amount is difficult to determine, though “because 
governance is a broad term that straddles the functional classifications the W orld Bank 
uses to classify  its lending operations.” By 2002, the Bank had undertaken m ore than 600
66W orld Bank, M iddle East and North A frica  Governance (W ashington D.C.: The 
W orld Bank, 2002).
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governance-related program s and initiatives in 95 countries in support o f  such efforts.67 
In 2002, it was im plem enting and encouraging what it termed good governance program s 
in 50 countries.68
Key dim ensions o f  governance identified by the W orld Bank are public sector 
m anagement, accountability, legal fram ework, and transparency and information. The 
W orld Bank also here identified four basic elem ents o f  good governance: (i) 
accountability, (ii) participation, (iii) predictability, and (iv) transparency. Main areas o f  
focus for B ank’s good governance prom otion in the late 1990s w ere as follows: public 
sector governance, decentralization, anti-corruption, legal institutions, and voice and 
accountability.
Public Sector Governance
In the early 1990s, the W orld B ank 's good governance program s and policies 
focused m ainly on public sector reform. The W orld Bank began to increasingly prom ote 
what it term ed as “Type 11” Reforms. “Type 1" reform s were generally m acroeconom ic 
reforms that could be imposed or at least advocated with a clear set o f directives, while 
Type 11 reform s were m ore nuanced and value-laden. They had to do with the nature o f  
the political environm ent: how it im plem ented its policies and enforced them. Type 11 
reform s w ere m ore intricate and m ore political, as well as more difficult to m onitor and 
enforce. Hence, the W orld Bank had long had a tendency o f avoiding them. Experience
67W orld Bank. “Poverty M atters” (W ashington, D.C.: The W orld Bank, 2002).
68W orld Bank Developm ent Com m ittee, Note fro m  the President o f  the World 
World Bank, 18 Septem ber, Prague. (W ashington, D.C.: The W orld Bank. 2002).
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revealed, though, that they were important, and the Bank began venturing into new 
domain, explaining this as econom ically m otivated.69
The W orld Bank urged m axim izing neutrality in taxation and addressing the 
distributive objective prim arily through expenditure policy. This ignored the revenue- 
raising aspect o f  progressive taxation. In some docum ents, the Bank urges m oderate 
taxes. On the basis o f  a sim ple model in which the tax revenue is used exclusively to 
finance transfers to the poor, the article shows that not only would it be optim al to finance 
the targeted transfers w ith progressive taxation, but the optimal progressivity increases 
unam biguously w ith grow ing incom e inequality. This conclusion holds up under different 
assum ptions about the efficiency cost o f  taxation and society 's aversion to inequality.
Decentralization
W orld Bank decentralization program s focus on political, adm inistrative, fiscal, 
and m arket decentralization projects that support reorganization o f  financial, 
adm inistrative, and service delivery systems. The decentralization program s are designed 
to bring about a m ore consistent and com prehensive approach. D ecentralization for the 
Bank helps alleviate the red tape in decision-m aking that may be caused by central 
governm ent p lanning and control o f  important econom ic and social activities. Program s 
determ ine the m ost “appropriate" forms o f  privatization. W here it is possible to structure 
com petition either in the delivery o f  a service, or for the right to deliver the service, the 
Bank indicates that the service will be delivered m ore efficiently. According to Bank 
documents, the central governm ent should be involved with overall policy, setting
69Jan Svejnar, “Transition Economies in Perspective" (2002). 
w w w .w orldbank.org 'oed/ transitioneconom ies/docs/Svejnar.pdf [20 February 2005].
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standards, and auditing; state governm ents should have an oversight function; and local 
governm ents should be involved with the provision o f  infrastructure and services. The 
internal com m on market will be purportedly be functioning efficiently if  all resources 
(labor, capital, goods, and services) are free to m ove from one region to another without 
im pedim ents or distortions imposed by policy.
In the 1990s and beyond, the W orld Bank has stressed the importance o f  the 
private sector in its operations and highlighted financial support for the private sector.
The Bank offers privatization tool kits and prom otes private sector developm ent through 
a whole panoply o f  policy reforms. One w ay is through structural adjustm ent lending that 
prom otes privatization, investm ent liberalization, and export-oriented growth. The Bank 
devotes notable resources to advise governm ents on how to privatize. Through its 
structural adjustm ent lending, the bank will often require a governm ent to cut domestic 
spending, open up m arkets for foreign investment, expand exports, and liberalize trade 
policies. All o f  these conditions prom ote a favorable business clim ate for the private 
sector. The W orld Bank often pushes for private sector involvem ent in infrastructure 
projects and the privatization o f  utilities and serv ices.
Recent Bank initiatives have included The Global Facilitation Partnership (GFP). 
which will coordinate efforts by public and private institutions and international 
organizations to build a constituency for trade liberalization and trade-related 
infrastructure. Another Bank project that supports the m arket is the Integrated Framework 
for the Least Developed Countries. This promotes the integration o f  the poorest countries 
into the international economy. Countries apply for resources from the Integrated 
Fram ework in order to obtain assistance in understanding and im plem enting trade rules, 
such as agriculture regulations, anti-dum ping rules, and the protection o f  trade-related
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infrastructure. A nother Bank project that supports the market is the Integrated Fram ework 
for the Least Developed Countries. This prom otes the integration o f  the poorest countries 
into the international economy. Countries apply for resources in order to obtain assistance 
in understanding and im plem enting trade rules. Projects that are incorporated into the 
Integrated Fram ework advance trade by stream lining the trading process. Indirect taxes 
levied on exporters are eliminated, as are technical barriers to trade. Frameworks for 
procurem ent are created, and adherence to “voluntary '’ international quality standards is 
required.70
Beyond establishing a good business clim ate through structural adjustm ent lending, 
the Bank encourages private sector developm ent by financing private enterprises. The 
IFC and M IGA fund and underwrite private com panies. The IFC provides project loans 
to companies, m akes equity investm ents in private projects, and mobilizes capital in the 
private financial m arkets. It functions as a catalyst for private investment because its 
participation im proves investor confidence and attracts more private sector financing. In 
1998, the IFC funded $2.7 billion in new investm ents— an unprecedented level o f  new 
com m itm ents— and mobilized another $2.4 billion from  other private banks. In the last 
few years, the IF C ’s lending has increased by an average o f  10 percent, while the B ank’s 
lending to central governm ents has not increased. M IGA helps developing countries 
attract foreign investm ent by providing risk insurance. Political risk insurance has been in 
increasing dem and for investment in new  and em erging m arkets. M ost IFC and M IGA 
loans finance projects in the financial services sector, infrastructure such as roads and 
power projects, and m ining/oil and gas developm ent.
70W orld Bank, “Global Facilitation Partnership for Transportation and Trade” 
(2003). <http://w w w .gfptt.org/Entities/PageSim pIe.aspx> [21 February 2005].
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Anti-Corruption
In the m id-1990s, when W olfensohn becam e president, anti-corruption becam e a 
clear focus. Under pressure from civil society groups, the Bank initiated transparency 
reforms from within, m aking m any m ore internal docum ents available on its website. The 
Bank also heightened efforts to control corruption in loan recipients. Its 1997 report, 
Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role o f  the World Bank, described the 
B ank’s strategy regarding anti-corruption. The B ank’s anti-corruption efforts reflect its 
apolitical stance on developm ent issues. For the Bank, addressing corruption does not 
take place as part o f  a dem ocratization agenda as it does with som e other IDIs. Instead, 
its function is to help insuring the m acroeconom ic stability conducive to the market 
economy. This IDI view s corruption as a sym ptom  o f  weak institutions and lack o f 
accountability, rule o f  law, and participation. U nlike other donors, the Bank does not 
suggest that dem ocratization is the rem edy. For the Bank, anti-corruption strategies can 
work as well in authoritarian states as in dem ocratic ones, and the B ank 's lending in this 
area reflects this. Therefore, the B ank's anti-corruption program  excludes political 
considerations from an area generally seen as prim arily a political phenomenon.
Between fiscal years 1997 and 2000, the Bank had undertaken more than 600 
specific anti-corruption program s and governance initiatives in 95 borrow er countries. In 
m any cases these activities include surveys o f  citizens, private firms, and/or policy 
makers, followed up by workshops. The W orld Business Environm ent Survey (W BES), 
for example, assessed the state o f  the “enabling environm ent" for private business 
activity in m ore than 100 countries, surveying at least 100 firms per country. Database 
results were m ade available. An updated version, the W orld Business Environment
^ V o rld  Bank, “ Integrated Fram ework" (19 N ovem ber 2004).- http. /www.int 
egiatedfram ew ork.org '>  [21 February 2005],
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Survey 2000 (W BES 2000), surveyed m ore than 10,000 firms in 80 countries, generating 
m easurem ents in such areas as corruption, legal system, investm ent climate, and the 
“quality” o f  the business environm ent. Business climate “constraints” reported included 
the need to lower tariffs and other barriers to international trade; unify exchange rates and 
interest rates with those in the global market; eliminate subsidies; m inim ize regulations, 
licensing requirem ents, and perm its for new firms and investors, including foreign ones; 
dem onopolize public sector activities and privatize state assets into com petitive m arkets; 
abolish m onopoly export m arketing boards; and reliably enforce banking regulations and
7?
auditing and accounting standards. In Guatemala, for instance, in order to decrease 
corruption, the Bank helped national officials reform the country’s financial m anagem ent 
system. Through two projects, the Bank helped with the im proving o f  service delivery by 
prom oting m ore transparent public sector financial operations. This included m odernizing 
the governm ent’s budgeting, accounting, cash management, and auditing sub-system s by 
m aking them m ore accountable. This work was integrated with updated laws and 
regulations concerning financial m anagem ent and the adoption o f  a single database 
informational system .73
Legal Institutions
The B ank’s work tow ards legal reform focuses on three com ponents o f  the legal 
process: rules, processes, and institutions. Legal reform does not address civil or criminal
72W orld Bank, “G overnance and Anti-corruption” (2005).<http:/7info.worldbank. 
org/govem ance/w bes/> [20 M ay 2005],
73Ian Bannon, “T he Fight against Corruption: A W orld Bank Perspective” (28 
M ay 1999). <http://w w w .iadb.org/regions/re2/consultative_group/groups/transparency 
workshop6.htm #2> [8 February 2005],
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concerns. Projects concentrate prim arily on ensuring the reliability and predictability  o f 
the legal fram ew ork, em phasizing private law to secure property rights, intellectual 
property rights, and reliable contracts. They also involve public finance m anagem ent.
The B ank’s 1990s’ good governance efforts included nearly 500 legal and judicial 
reform projects in 84 countries, at a cost o f  US$380 million. O ften these projects are 
accom panied by large structural adjustment loans applied in m ultiple sectors, with 
various conditionalities attached. The Bank has also been using Judicial Sector 
Assessm ents since 1994 and, since 1999, m ore detailed and com prehensive Institutional 
and G overnance Reviews.
The Bank has a Legal Vice President who advises countries. The largest judicial 
reform projects w ere undertaken in V enezuela (U S$60 m illion) and Russia (US$58 
million). The W orld Bank uses surveys to ascertain investor and business perceptions 
about the judicial system s in aid receiving countries and tries to m ake developing 
countries investor- and business-friendly. The Bank uses efficiency criteria to assess the 
efficacy o f  these projects.74
The Bank does assist countries w ith public expense m anagem ent and tax 
administration. Such efforts often focus on expenditures, by offering counsel to the 
president’s or prim e m in ister's  office, the finance ministry, or the central bank, or 
supporting taxation reform  by im proving the capacities o f  tax adm inistrators to fulfill 
their jobs.
Bank judicial reform  program s in the late 1990s in Africa and Latin Am erica 
concentrated on fostering judicial independence, reform ing pay scales, and providing
W orld Bank, “Helping Countries Com bat Corruption: The Role o f  the W orld 
Bank” (W ashington, D.C.: The W orld Bank, 1998).
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training in legal ethics. O ther program s worked to improve court adm inistration and case 
flow m anagem ent and procedural reform, including reducing ex parte com m unication 
betw een judges and litigants. Providing better access to justice (through small claims 
courts, alternative dispute resolution, and legal aid) and legal education w ere also 
stressed.
In the m id to late 1990s, the Bank increasingly began to pave the w ay for 
expanding trade in services. Program s have aimed to expand service exports, such as 
com puter program m ing services, and reform  regulations and barriers to foreign entry into 
services sectors. At the sam e tim e the Bank has been supporting efforts to develop an 
international framework for governm ent procurem ent.75
Voice and Accountability
The W orld Bank had been increasingly funding NGOs since 1981, and in the 
1990s began relying on them to help carry out its governance work. A ccording to Bank 
docum ents, the Bank has m ade extra efforts to include civil society organizations in its 
operations, due to their know ledge o f  the needs and interests o f  poor com m unities. The 
Bank has developed various program s to prom ote closer collaboration with NGOs, such 
as "social funds" to finance com m unity-based projects, direct contracts with NGOs to 
carry out portions o f loan projects, grant program s and initiatives including funding o f  
NGO participation in local and international conferences. The Bank has created an NGO 
Unit, which m aintains extensive data on NGOs, and the Bank's Econom ic Development 
Institute conducts training program s for NGO representatives. NG Os began receiving
7?W orld Bank Group, “Electronic Governm ent Procurement"' (no date). 
<http://w bln0018.w orldbank.org/O CS/egovfom m .nsf/m ain/hom e> [20 M ay 2005],
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hundreds o f  thousands o f  dollars in the early 1990s to help carry out Bank projects. This 
figure has since grown to include m illions o f  dollars.
In 1995, the W orld Bank adopted its “M ainstream ing Participatory Initiative," an 
agreement to cooperate m ore broadly and w idely with NGOs. In 1989, nearly 20 percent 
o f  W orld Bank funds were being channeled through NGOs; by 1999, this percentage had 
risen to 52 percent, and m any o f  these were involved in governance work. Over the 
course o f  the 1990s, the W orld B ank’s em phasis on civil society increased, and by the 
late 1990s, equity and other distributional concerns also featured prom inently. Early 
1990s program s focused on prom oting rule o f  law , such as the enforcem ent o f  contracts 
and property rights; elim inating corruption and other rent-seeking activities; fostering 
transparency in public services to ensure efficiency and effectiveness; reducing 
uncertainties and instability in the econom ic and political environment; and ensuring 
efficient public services for basic social services such as schools and healthcare centers. 
These priorities were essentially designed to increase economic efficiency and growth by 
setting up an environm ent conducive to private investm ents.76
In response to criticism , the Bank now m akes clear that it develops and institutes 
its policies in a participatory m anner. The intent is to create a sense o f  ow nership o f  the 
developm ent strategy, yet the B ank 's “consultation" process is dubious, since poor 
countries seeking loans begin “participating” from an obviously weak and dependent
76W orld Bank, Cooperation Between the World Bank and NGOs: F Y  1994 
Progress Report (W ashington, DC: W orld Bank, 1995).
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position. W ith Bank-trained officials with expensive educations and extensive training, it 
is likely often clear who truly “ow ns’' the developm ent process.77
Particular Program s Features 
W ith votes weighted to reflect their financial stakes, rich developed countries have 
an established m ajority on the B ank 's Executive Board. W ealthy donor m em ber states 
together have the m ost notable m eans o f  influencing the Bank’s activities through their 
capital subscriptions to the IBRD, tri-annual replenishm ents o f  funds o f  the IDA, and 
their weighted votes w ithin B ank’s Board o f  Executive Directors. W hen this IDI was first 
established, two types o f  votes w ere created. One was based on financial input, and the 
other, the "basic vote," was decreed as a benefit o f  m embership, to give the Bank a more 
representative international m andate. Since the B ank 's creation, the percentage o f  the 
basic vote has shrunk to less than 2 percent o f  the total. D eveloping countries have a 
relatively small voice in Bank m atters.78
Further weakening this voice is the fact that the United States-appointed W orld Bank 
president has always exerted m uch control over the direction o f  this IDEs strategic vision 
and organizational activity. H aving authority above the Board o f  Executive Directors, 
the president has much control over choosing which issues and loan decisions are 
considered and how and when they are considered. The president also m akes key 
decisions about budget allocations and about who occupies senior m anagem ent roles.
The B ank’s chain o f  representative accountability is long and imprecise. The
W orld Bank, The World Bank's Partnership with Nongovernm ental 
Organizations  (W ashington, DC: W orld Bank, M ay 1996).
78Aldo Caliari and Frank Schroeder, “Reform Proposals for the G overnance o f  the 
W orld Bank: A New Rules for Global Finance Briefing Paper” (no date).
<http ://64 .233.161.104/search?q=cache:6N 1 nPFym uuU J:www .new-rules.org/ Docs/ 
ifigovem ancereform .pdf+w orld+bank+and fbasic+vote& hU en> [20 M ay 2005].
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associations betw een m ost m em ber governm ents and the Bank are extrem ely weak. M ost 
m em ber governm ents (excluding the United States) are quite distant from the workings o f  
the Executive Board, which in turn exercises little oversight w ith the sta ff and 
m anagem ent. The Executive Boards, though, are the important link from countries to the 
W orld Bank. Y et only the largest m em ber countries— the United States, G erm any,
France, Japan, the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, Russia, and China— are directly 
represented by their own Executive Directors. All other countries are assem bled within 
constituencies represented collectively by ju st one Executive Director. M ost 
governm ents thus have only a weak connection to the B ank 's actual deliberations and 
decision-m aking. For example, 22 African countries, at least 11 o f  which are highly 
dependent upon W orld Bank loans, are represented by a single Executive Director and 
have a voting share o f  voting share o f  ju st 4.07 percent. This small share o f  votes reflects 
a rationale that w as more appropriate to this ID Es original m andate and m em bership. The 
Bank, at its inception, had far fewer m em ber states; m em bership has since m ore than 
tripled. Originally, each m em ber had a vote proportional to its stake. Now that the Bank 
m akes highly conditional developm ent loans only to developing and transition countries, 
the traditional voting structure is inappropriate and inadequate as a m echanism  o f
79accountability.
T he United States has a veto on constitutional decisions requiring either a three- 
fourths or tw o-thirds m ajority o f  regional m em bers, and although the percentage o f  its
79W orld Bank Group, “Boards o f  D irectors” (no date). <http://web. 
w orldbank.orgAV BSITE/EX TERN A L/EX TA BO U TU S/O RG A N IZA TIO N /BO D EX T 0.. 
pagePK :64020055~theSitePK :278036,00.htm l>[20 April 2005]; idem, "Executive 
D irectors” (no date). <f'http://w eb.w orldbank.org/W B SITE/EX TER N A L/EX TA BO U T 
U S/O RG A N IZA TIO N /BC )D EX T/0„contentM D K :50004945~m enuPK :64020014'pageP 
K:64020054~piPK:64020408'~theSitePK:278036,00.htm l> [20 April 2005].
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
198
contribution to funding the concessional w indow  has dropped to 8.22, the country still 
has its veto power. Even in the capital account o f  the IDB, where the United States does 
not have a blocking m inority vote, it has w orked out a procedure to delay loans that it 
does not endorse. The United States also has a m ore diffuse influence because the IDB is 
W ashington-based, with about one-fourth o f  its top m anagement positions occupied by 
native U nited States citizens.
B y design, the W orld Bank is accountable to its largest shareholders, with the 
U nited States leading this wealthy group. As stated, the United States was present at and 
instrum ental in the W orld B ank’s creation during a heady period o f  post-W orld W ar-II 
victory. The establishm ent o f  the IMF involved m any com prom ises between the United 
States and its European allies, the W orld Bank was m ostly an Am erican creation. The 
United States Treasury Departm ent had already m ade extensive plans for such a W orld 
Bank that w ould ensure that countries could borrow  foreign capital in order to build 
m odem  infrastructure and enter into global trade. Lessons had been realized from the 
experience o f  the 1930s, when borrow ers had defaulted on hundreds o f  m illions o f  dollars 
o f  loans and subsequently world banks and investm ent firms retreated. A global 
recession followed. W ith the United States leading in its creation, the W orld Bank was 
strategically located in W ashington D.C., ju st blocks from the W hite House. This 
occurred despite B ritain 's John M aynard Keynes plea that it be located outside o f  the 
United States, or at least further from its political capital. The W orld B ank’s W ashington, 
D.C. location and the United States’ ability to select the W orld B ank 's president have 
always parlayed a strong Am erican influence on and in the W orld Bank, which has only 
grown as A m erica has adopted a w ider world presence and influence relative to Britain 
and o ther W orld W ar II victors. Because the U nited States selects the institu tion 's
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president every five years, the country in essence sets the tone for what the W orld Bank 
will stand for and focus on in a renewable fashion. And this strong Am erican authority is 
m ore than symbolic: as stated, the W orld B ank’s voting structure is principally based on 
a system o f  one dollar, one vote. The politicization o f  W orld Bank lending decisions is 
created largely by this unbalanced voting structure, with its built-in convention that 
em pow ers the richest nations. America, along w ith other rich governm ents, controls 45
percent o f  the voting rights. M eanwhile, all the countries o f  sub-Saharan Africa
80com bined have less than seven percent o f  the vote. Fittingly, the W orld Bank has 
tended over the years to serve Am erican and w ealthy-nation interests. Providing
even m ore relative pow er to the United States and other rich nation W orld Bank m em bers 
is the fact that the W orld Bank’s equity is com prised o f  capital subscriptions, rather than 
actual m oney, from its m em ber countries. Only 10 percent o f each subscription (or even 
less in som e cases in recent years) must be paid in; the rest is “callable capital” for 
em ergencies that has not yet ever been needed. Hence, w ealthy countries do not even 
need to literally pay for their pow er positions w ithin the W orld Bank. They sim ply have 
to be in a position where they are in fact able to pay. This further deprives poor country 
m em bers, who m ight feasibly try to gain leverage w ithin the W orld Bank by raising 
m oney sim ply to pay in to the W orld Bank. C ertainly poor countries are in no position to 
com pete w ith rich countries’ abilities to pay. Further, the m ost significant source o f  the 
W orld B ank’s funds actually comes from the sale o f  securities to central world banks and 
private investors. The Group o f  Eight (G-8, now G-9) nations clearly have the m onopoly 
over these types o f  sophisticated transactions. O ver time, the W orld Bank has cultivated a
80W orld Bank Group, “Organization” (2005). <' http://w eb.worldbank.org/ 
W BSITE/EX TERN A L/EX TA BO U TU S/0,.contentM D K :20040580~m enuPK :34588-pag 
ePK :51123644~piPK :329829~theSitcPK :29708,00.htm I> [20 April 2005],
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variety o f  borrow ing and investment m ethods and tools and has become a vital and astute 
international capital m arket broker.81 Poor countries usually have little experience 
understanding or influencing such matters.
A dditionally boosting the G-8 countries’ hold over the W orld Bank is the m anner in 
which the institu tion’s 24-m em ber Board o f  Executive Directors is selected, meets, and 
operates. A lthough formally, the W orld B ank’s powers are conferred to a board o f  
governors, one from  each m em ber country, this group o f  m ostly national finance 
m inisters and central W orld Bank directors m eets only once annually. The 24-m em ber 
Board m eets in semi perm anent session at W orld Bank headquarters, every two weeks 
plus whenever the directors schedule sessions. These Executive Directors are W orld 
Bank em ployees appointed by and accountable to their home governm ents. They are 
hence direct channels for the use o f  national influence on the W orld Bank. They oversee 
financial and operational decisions, approve lending proposals and bond issues, create the 
annual budget, and initiate and track policy directives. The W orld B ank 's partiality to its 
richest m em bers is particularly evident in the m ake-up o f  this Executive Board. The 
W orld B ank’s five largest shareholders appoint their ow n Directors, which in essence 
occupy perm anent board seats. O ther m em bers’ votes are combined into caucuses that 
select the rem aining 19 Directors. The m ajority o f  the W orld B ank 's m em bership hence 
does not have representation in the W orld B ank 's forem ost decision-m aking body.
Further underm ining the pow er o f  the m ajority o f  m em bers is the fact that in the caucuses 
selecting the 19 m em bers, a Director representing several countries speaks for this group 
as a whole. This perm its not only the rich countries to control the W orld Bank, but also 
allows current world events or reigning econom ic and political trends to influence 
srBakker, 46-9.
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lending decisions alm ost immediately. Additionally, m any o f  the W orld B ank’s m ost 
significant judgm ents, such as amendm ents to its Articles o f  Agreement, require a 
m ajority o f  the vote that less-developed nations are largely powerless to influence.
In recent years, the United States’ voting pow er w ithin the International W orld 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) has decreased, but its control over the 
W orld Bank as a whole has not been largely affected. The United States initially 
controlled 35 percent o f  the IBRD vote, yet this percentage has decreased by alm ost half, 
and a sim ilar trend has occurred in IDA voting privileges. These declines are m ostly  the 
result o f  other states’ lobbying for increased control. As noted, the United States, though, 
still possesses the pow er o f  veto, due to its insistence that 85, rather than 80, percent 
m ajority is needed to exercise this power.82 Also, the reigning coalition o f  the powerful 
nation m em bers is still intact, and in the IBRD, the United States, the United Kingdom, 
Germany, France, and Japan, control about 40 percent o f  the vote. Northern countries as 
a group control about 60 percent o f  the IBRD vote. For the IDA, 'T a rt I” countries, or 
the W orld B ank’s richest members, still direct and control the vote. Generally, a small 
group o f  w ealthy nations control the W orld B ank 's agenda.
This fact rem ains, despite the growing pains experienced by key Bank stakeholders 
in the early 1990s. No longer united by the desire to m aintain a comm on alliance against 
comm unism , the norm ative division between the United Stares and Europe and Japan on 
the purpose o f  Bank lending becam e apparent. The state-led, w elfare-oriented 
orientations o f  European countries and Japan stood in m arked contrast with the United 
States’ desire for neoliberal, laissez-faire policies seen as critical for opening up
82 Environm ental M edia Services, World Bank Basics (W ashington, D.C.: EMS,
2000), 2 .
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em erging m arkets to Am erican exports and foreign investment. The thirteenth IDA 
replenishm ent negotiations brought to light a strong difference betw een the B ank’s m ajor 
donor states about the extent to which IDA funds should be disbursed in the form o f  
grants instead o f  interest-free loans. The United States largely won this battle, and most 
scholars on the W orld Bank agree that the United States still leads the W orld Bank in all 
im portant areas. The United States, for exam ple, determ ines which issues are worthy o f  
the W orld B ank’s consideration and what choices are feasible.
The current Bank policy orthodoxy continues to be comprised o f  liberaliza tion- 
opening up econom ies to international trade, privatization—reducing the role o f  the state; 
and deregulation—increasing the space for foreign capital to operate in developing 
countries. In the 1990s and beyond, m any Bank loans have supported exchange rate and 
trade policy reform s that continue to serve rich country interests. Trade-related activities, 
such as telecom m unications, ports, export corridors, custom s reforms, and private 
enterprise developm ent open the w ay for rich countries to profit from Bank program s and 
initiatives. The B ank’s support for a global intellectual property protection regim e based 
on the trade-related intellectual property rights (TRIPS) agreem ent is likely to serve rich 
country interests, as it prom otes the exports o f  developed countries which The current 
Bank policy orthodoxy continues to be com prised o f  liberalization—opening up 
econom ies to international trade, privatization—reducing the role o f  the state; and 
deregulation—increasing the space for foreign capital to operate in developing countries. 
In the 1990s and beyond, m any Bank loans have supported exchange rate and trade 
policy reform s that continue to serve rich country interests. Trade-related activities, such 
as telecom m unications, ports, export corridors, custom s reforms, and private enterprise 
developm ent open the w ay for rich countries to profit from Bank program s and
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initiatives. The Bank’s support for a global intellectual property protection regim e based 
on the trade-related intellectual property rights (TRIPS) agreem ent is likely to serve rich 
country interests, as it prom otes the exports o f  developed countries which create new 
technologies. It actually m ay harm  developing countries, whose industries, i f  in place at 
all, rely on the im itation o f  technologies. W hereas the U N D P’s good governance 
program s are m ore concerned w ith social equity and equity generally (with emphasis, for 
example, on hum an rights, hum an developm ent, w om en’s rights, equal opportunities, and 
fair distribution o f  wealth), the W orld B ank’s reveal concern w ith fostering conditions 
conducive to capitalist expansion. Equity and responsive governance are included in the 
W orld B ank’s agenda because they indirectly support this neoliberal goal. The W orld 
B ank’s G-8-dom inated voting structure allows the North to use the W orld Bank to 
forward rich countries’ political and econom ic goals. The prim ary emphasis o f  the W orld 
B ank’s good governance program s and policies has been on the effectiveness o f  the state 
in m anaging econom ic affairs, rather than on the equity o f  a sta te’s policies. The W orld 
Bank’s governance program s focus prim arily on public sector m anagem ent, financial 
m anagement, public adm inistration m odernization, and privatization. The W orld Bank, 
for example, im plem ented 169 civil service reform  program s in 80 countries between 
1987 and 1998. The m ajority  o f  its governance program s since the early 1990s have 
promoted legal and judicial reform, decentralization, and anti-corruption (through 
strengthening accountability institutions such as om budsm en and parliam entary oversight 
bodies).83 These types o f  program s help ensure that governm ental policies are aimed at 
facilitating the growth o f  m arket econom ies (with reliable institutions, laws, and law
---------- S3—W orld Bank, Reform ing Public Institutions and Strengthening Governance: A 
World B ank Strategy  (W ashington, D.C.: W orld Bank Public Sector Group, 2000).
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enforcem ent), that discretionary market interventions will not occur, and that wasteful 
spending and rent-seeking do not proliferate. They, like SAPs, facilitate the repaym ent o f  
W orld Bank loans, the availability o f  inexpensive resources and labor to developed 
countries, and open, reliable m arkets for rich countries' products. In the 1990s, these 
program s did com e to evidence increasing concern with sufficient social spending, 
appropriate and equitable welfare program s, and legitim ate leaderships. Som e W orld 
Bank researchers advocated that more attention be paid to equity concerns as early as 
1987, yet program s addressing them did not becom e popular until the 1990s.
Coalitions o f  N G O s critical o f  the Bank have succeeded w ith their lobbying o f  
national parliam ents, especially the United States Congress during IDA replenishm ents, 
to affect Bank guidelines and policies. Today new informational disclosure rules require 
the Bank to m ake public m any o f  the docum ents it formerly kept private, and an 
independent Inspections Panel established in 1993 reviews social and environm ental 
concerns about the B ank’s policies. Though it contains some elem ents o f  variety and 
focus o f  the needs o f  the poor, the W orld B ank’s good governance agenda largely 
continues to reflect an em phasis on a narrow group o f  interests— those conducive to 
m aking the m arket econom y work for TNCs and rich countries. M uch focus is directed 
towards state accountability to business interests.
Though som e have accused the Bank o f  incorporating equity and responsive 
governance concerns as “ tag-ons-’ to its programs simply to satisfy critics, the Bank has 
been m ore open about its rationale for including these elements in its good governance 
program s. The Bank has recognized that prom oting peoples' em pow erm ent relates 
directly to and defends participation in the market. Countries with high degrees o f  
inequality tend to be less stable and their efforts to reform m ore difficult.
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Considering that 49 percent o f  the w orld 's top TN Cs are based in the United States 
and that 86 percent are based in OECD countries,84 countries that own and run the W orld 
Bank, this m akes sense. The W orld B ank’s institutional reform program s support 
liberalizing m arkets, prices, and trade and exchange regim es and are m arkedly sim ilar to 
the W orld B ank’s earlier SAP conditionalities. The W orld B ank’s public sector reform 
program s aim to privatize state-owned enterprises so that client countries can becom e 
m ore m arket-oriented. Infrastructural and service-delivery reform  program s also attempt 
to decentralize governm ents so that the market becom es m ore free and fluid.
All o f  this enables N orthern-based TN Cs greater access to em erging and potential 
m arkets and works to prevent Third W orld leaders from taking actions that could 
jeopardize the free flow o f  econom ic globalization. This econom ic globalization, o f  
course, benefits the wealthy countries that are stakeholders in the Bank. Program s 
addressing corruption, a feature strongly emphasized in W orld Bank rhetoric, policies, 
and program s since 1997, also work to serv e m arket expansion and hence Northern 
interests. Additionally, with less corruption, there is greater chance that Bank loans will 
be repaid. For the W orld Bank, im proving good governance in client countries has 
becom e not only a goal for but also a requirem ent for developm ent aid. The B ank’s 1998
X Spublication Assessing Aid: Wh at Works, What D o e sn ’t, and  Why, for instance, 
recom m ends a m ore deliberate targeting o f  assistance to client countries with “effective" 
institutions and policies, or pro-capitalist, dem ocratic countries. Increasing 
conditionalities on assistance is possible using the veneer o f  political neutrality that good
84 Petras and Veltem eyer, 9.
85W orld Bank, Assessing Aid, 1.
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governance promotion attempts to provide. The norm ative aspect o f  good governance is 
suppressed or ignored, as is the fact that in prom oting its version o f  good governance, the 
W orld Bank increases its conditionalities and the instruments it uses to encourage, 
m onitor, and enforce them. The W orld B ank’s view o f  good governance continues to 
reveal a concern with the effectiveness o f  the state in promoting capitalist expansion and 
econom ic openness, rather than w ith the equity o f  a client countries’ econom ic/political 
system  and the viability o f  its pow er structure. The prim ary aims o f  the B ank’s good 
governance program s have been public sector m anagement, financial m anagem ent, 
privatization, and m odernization. The B ank’s good governance agenda is operationalized 
in term s that further provide a sense o f  political neutrality or at least political benignity.
Good governance program s allow the W orld Bank to achieve its political 
objectives while conveying the appearance o f  apoliticality. The erudition o f  the W orld 
B ank’s good governance design attem pts to hide the W orld B ank’s em phasis on the 
neoliberal economic policy m odel. The W orld B ank’s own barom eter for assessing the 
“soundness” o f  countries’ econom ic policies is its own Country Policy and Institutional 
A ssessm ent (CIPA), w ith its tw enty criteria focusing on m acroeconom ic policies, 
structural conditions, public sector m anagem ent, and social inclusion. The latter category 
em phasizes participation rather than social equity and comes close to approxim ating 
conditions conducive to dem ocratic policy-m aking. The W orld Bank reports, for 
exam ple, that participation “derives from an acceptance that people are at the heart o f  
developm ent.... Since developm ent is both for and by people, they need to have access to 
the institutions that prom ote it (e.g., representative bureaucracies)” The Bank further 
notes that the “ interface between public agencies and the private sector is conducive to 
the latter’s participation in the econom y, national economic perform ance (com prising the
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v 8 6combined contributions o f  the public and private sectors) will be enhanced." It is not so 
m uch that the W ashington consensus had fundam entally changed; rather, the W orld 
B ank’s new good governance prom otion is a deeper, more political version. Stiglitz, 
form er ch ief econom ist at the W orld Bank, contends: “Views about developm ent have 
changed in the W orld Bank....Today there is concern about broader objectives, entailing 
m ore instrum ents, than was the case earlier.”87 N ew  W orld Bank docum ents, 
publications, policies, and program s addressing the subject o f  good governance, 
prescribing plans to im plem ent them , and assessing this im plem entation have 
proliferated. The W orld Bank has not disregarded its earlier neoliberal econom ic model 
o f  its controversial SAP, but deepened and broadened it.
The W orld Bank has revised its own operational guidelines to take into account and 
em phasize good governance promotion. The Country Assistance Strategies the W orld 
Bank uses to determ ine aid allocation have been substantially revised, and the W orld 
Bank Poverty Reduction Strategy Program s have been amended to include good 
governance promotion. Further, beginning in 1999, the W orld Bank began form ally 
reviewing what it deemed countries’ good governance progress with “ Institutional and 
Governance Review s.” M aking W orld Bank aid even m ore selective and conditional is 
the twelfth IDA replenishm ent guidelines that good governance prom otion be used as 
criteria for aid allocation to the poorest countries. Performance-based review s are now 
used to determ ine which countries receive this aid and how much they receive. Debt 
relief, too, in the form o f  the W orld Bank Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) status
86Ibid.
S7Stiglitz, “M illennium ," 587.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2 0 8
88now  m akes debt re lie f  conditional upon good governance policy reform.
D onor governm ents have been given increased influence over the W orld B ank’s 
developm ent assistance policies through these increased criteria. The IDA funding has 
been especially used as a vehicle for aid selectivity, as donor grants are optional and 
flexible. The use o f  conditionality expanded over the course o f  the 1990s, giving donor 
governm ents greater pow er and control over developm ent aid via the W orld Bank and 
over client countries policies and prerogatives.
The W orld Bank has even less tolerance for dissent from within, som e claim. The 
"resignations" o f  ch ief econom ist Joseph Stiglitz and W orld Developm ent Report team 
leader Ravi K anbur, both astute econom ists who challenged the W orld B ank’s '‘party 
line,” reveal that the W orld Bank does not like challenges to its neoliberal ideology. This 
ideology sustains W orld Bank policies and program  and is enforced by the voting pow er 
and influence o f  the W orld Bank’s m ajor shareholders. The W orld Bank has essentially 
allow ed itse lf to have a liberal interpretation o f  its m andate to justify  its intervention in 
political affairs o f  developing countries, and doing so supports its pro-m arket agenda. 
T he W orld Bank, on the other hand, has a very restrictive approach to such interventions 
w hen they do not relate directly to pro-m arket reform s, such as in the area o f  hum an 
rights prom otion.
A careful study o f  the W orld B ank 's anti-corruption policies and program s reveals 
a W orld Bank be lie f that corruption subverts m arket institutions and interferes with a 
country’s ability to repay loans. The W orld Bank proposes that accountable and
88W orld Bank, World D evelopm ent Report 2002: Building Institutions for  
M arkets  (New York: Oxford U niversity Press, 2002); idem. Beyond the Center: 
D ecentralizing the State  (W ashington, D.C.: The W orld Bank Latin A m erican and 
C aribbean Studies, 1999).
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transparent public institutions can help limit corruption’s interference with the m arket 
econom y. Since public institutions are m ore transparent and reliable and because 
political and econom ic sanctions are m ore easily im posed on corrupt leaders, the W orld 
Bank works diligently to teach client country populations to deplore corrupt officials.
For the W orld Bank, prom oting anti-corruption strategies is also a new way to encourage 
deregulation, or less state interference in the m arket, albeit under a m ore benign cover. 
The W orld B ank’s SAPs received so m uch criticism  for their perceived neoliberal, 
N orthern-dom inated agenda that new rhetoric was needed to soften criticism  so that this 
agenda could continue. The anti-corruption language was different; the neoliberal 
agenda, however, was the same. The W orld Bank defined corruption as the capacity to 
seek rents, or as a 1998 study proposes that the “dynam ics o f  corruption in the public 
sector can be depicted in a simple m odel.” It further states that the “opportunity for 
corruption is a function o f  the size o f  the rents under a public official's  control, the 
discretion that official has in allocating those rents, and the accountability that official 
faces for his or her decisions.”89
State control is explicitly linked to corruption, and rent-seeking, by  legal or illegal 
m eans, is portrayed as dam aging to a coun try 's  econom y. The W orld B ank 's 1997 World 
D evelopm ent Report asserts that the s ta te 's  “m onopoly on coercion, which gives it the 
pow er to intervene effectively in econom ic activity, also gives it the powrer to intervene 
arbitrarily.” To m ake this power appear particularly egregious, the Report further 
contends that this “power, coupled with access to inform ation not available to the general 
public, creates opportunities for public officials to prom ote their own interests, or those
89W orld Bank, “ Helping Countries," 4.
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o f  friends or allies, at the expense o f  general in te res t/’90 W olfensohn further em phasizes 
the issue in a w ay that rouses public support and diverts attention from the contrived link 
between corruption and inequity: “ In country after country, people are dem anding action 
on this issu e .. ..corruption diverts resources from  the poor to the rich,” he states. “ [W ]e 
all know that corruption is a m ajor barrier to sound and equitable developm ent. Solutions 
can only be hom e-grown. National leaders need to take a stand. Civil society plays a key 
role as w ell.”91 Areas w ith a potential im pact on corruption that fall into the B ank’s 
m andate include civil service reform , legal reform , accountability for public funds, 
budget discipline and popular participation “ in the design and im plem entation o f  a 
specific developm ent project or program ” (as opposed to popular participation in 
general).
This project proposes that the W orld B ank’s good governance prom otion reflects its 
power structure with its inherent neoliberal bias. The W orld B ank's new em phasis on 
good governance, with its concern with transparency, accountability, and openness to 
trade and other financial transactions, reflects its desire to (1) foster the sm ooth 
functioning o f  the global economy; (2) open up new  regions and sites in the South to 
capitalism  and a global m arket economy; and (3) shift the focus away from past W orld 
Bank criticism  and accusations that the North is not concerned with the general quality o f  
life in the South.
As to the W orld B ank’s internal pow er structure, its policies have generally served 
the econom ic and political interests o f  its richest m em bers, as the W orld B ank 's  votes are
90W orld Bank, W orld Developm ent Report 1997, 98.
91 Ibid., “Corruption” (1997). <http://w w w .w orldW orld Bank.org/html, 1997> [7 
April 2005],
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weighted according to m em ber contributions. M ore specifically, W orld Bank aid, or 
loans, largely reflects econom ic and foreign policy goals o f its m ost powerful m em bers, 
the G-8 countries, and m ost particularly the U nited States. Som e are less beholden to this 
view, yet clearly the G-8 countries and the United States in particular used preferential 
lending to support allies throughout the Cold W ar. The United States, for example, 
supported allies such as the Philippines, Guatem ala, Zaire, M orocco, and Pakistan 
through bilateral and m ultilateral, specifically W orld Bank, aid.
The W orld B ank 's good governance program s reveal the W orld B ank 's Northern- 
dom inated pow er structure in that they aim to foster the smooth functioning o f  the global 
economy. These program s aid a power structure concerned with the viability o f  W orld 
Bank loans and the prevention o f  trade and financial disruptions that could hinder the 
well-being o f  Northern econom ies. They also reflect the W orld B ank 's belief that the 
m arket provides political stability conducive to the m aintenance o f  the Northern-led 
status-quo. Due to the som etim es m assive defaults on prior W orld Bank loans which 
often required bail-out packages and the deteriorating status o f  African econom ies in 
particular, the W orld Bank began perm itting som e African nations to repay high-interest 
loans w ith low-interest loans in the late 1980s and early 1990s. This coincided w ith the 
em ergence o f  good governance prom otion evident in W orld Bank literature and 
program s. This tim e period was also one o f  econom ic stress for several o f  the G-8 
countries.92 Additionally, during the 1980s, long-term  developing country debt m ore 
than tripled, before reaching its peak in the m id -1990s.93 The long-tem  debt o f  the forty-
92In 1990 and 1991, for example, the United States suffered an eight-m onth rec.
93M.A. Thom as, "G etting Debt Relief R ight," Foreign A ffairs 80:5 
(Septem ber/O ctober 2001): 37.
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one poorest countries had grown from $47 billion in 1980 to $159 billion in 1990 and 
clearly w as becom ing a looming problem .94 Private commercial W orld Banks that had 
issued considerable loans to poor countries in the 1970s and 1980s had retrenched on 
their lending by the m id-to-late 1980s, leaving the problem  o f  poverty alleviation 
increasingly to bilateral and multilateral institutions. Kapur, Lewis, and W ebb argue that 
at this tim e, there had been a “gradual erosion o f  activity through a retreat o f  both 
creditors and b o rro w ers/’95 If the United States wanted the W orld Bank to be repaid and 
to sim ultaneously reduce its post-Cold-W ar role in supplying international public goods, 
private investm ent in developing countries would have to not only continue, but also 
increase and be spread m ore evenly throughout developing countries. In the m id-1990s, 
nearly 3/4 o f  private flows went to only twelve countries. Good governance prom otion 
was m eant to help prom ote foreign investm ent so that some o f  the W orld B ank’s burden 
m ight be lifted.96 Such developm ents intensified the pressure on the W orld Bank, the 
w orld’s forem ost developm ent lending institution, to step in and w ork to help stop this 
trend. If  the W orld B ank’s loans were not repaid, its functioning would be threatened.
A lso, due to the intensification o f  econom ic globalization in recent years, in the 
early 1990s the W orld Bank had come to realize that the spill-over effects from regional 
trade disruptions could be costly to the North. It increasingly m ade sense that a free 
market could not m uch benefit from an antiquated, distorted, poorly established, or
94W illiam  Easterly, "Debt Relief.’’ Foreign Policy  (N ovem ber/D ecem ber 
2001 ): 2 2 .
95Devesh Kapur, John Lewis, and Richard W ebb, The World Bank: Its F irst H a lf  
Century, vol. 1, H istory  (W ashington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1997). 47.
96S m i l l i e ,  17.
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undeveloped state system o f  governance. National leaders needed not only the will to 
prom ote developm ent in their countries, but also the capacity, and that depended on the 
nature o f  the extant policy environm ent and state institutions. In the 1980s, neoliberalism  
had held out the prom ise that all countries, rich or poor, could rise in wealth sim ply by 
reducing state interference in the econom y and adopting certain m acroeconom ic policies. 
The invisible hand o f  the market would eventually help raise everyone’s standard o f  
living. Judging by  the im poverished conditions that persisted into the 1990s in m any 
countries, this theory no longer seem ed universally viable. Poor countries without certain 
types o f  leadership and policy environm ents could not easily adapt the way W estern 
Europe had after W orld W ar 11. Adrian Leftwich, for exam ple, argues that the W orld 
Bank could see the significance o f  good governance just by review ing the results o f  its 
SA Ps97 (which had grown to account for about 30 percent o f  all W orld Bank loans) and 
other loans over the 1980s. States with m ore “capable and effective” institutions and
98with leaders who were com m itted to developm ent priorities fared better overall. The 
Bank learned that the unfettered market could im prove lives, but that it had certain 
requirem ents beyond basic m acroeconom ic policies.99
As m any developm ent and economic theories lose credibility over time, so did the
97As is fairly comm on practice, this project uses the term s “SAPs" to also refer to 
the m ore specifically-targeted Sectoral Adjustm ent loans (SecA Ls) and hybrid loans— 
com bination o f  SAPs and SecALs.
98 Leftwich, “Governance," 605-10.
"H arrigan , M osely, and Toye write that the W orld Bank learned from experience 
that its SAP reform s o f  the 1980s had “m ore relevance to Thailand and Turkey, say, than 
to M alawi or Guyana. A policy o f  trade liberalisation works better if  industry is already 
com petitive in export m arkets; private incentives to com m ercial farmers work better if  
those farmers have access to credit, fertilizer, and good roads; privatisation works better 
if  there exists a private sector able and w illing to take over the public sector's assets.” 
Harrigan, M osely, and Toye, 309-10.
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100W orld B ank’s faith in the ability o f  neolibcral econom ic policies alone to cure poverty. 
During Japan’s high-growth period, for instance, governments intervened when they 
believed it would be beneficial, with credit allocation, subsides, trade restrictions, public 
enterprises, and other m easures to prom ote certain industries and to protect o thers.101 As 
Dani Rodrik describes, governm ent intervention in these economies was so deliberate and 
goal-oriented that some leaders even subsidized investment when they perceived that this 
m ight produce the desired results. It was not that such state intervention was positive in 
and o f  itself, in the W orld B ank’s view. It was, rather, as the W orld Bank adm itted, that 
the state could play a constructive role in helping its economy adapt to the grow ing forces 
o f  globalization. The sta te’s leadership, institutions, and policies did matter. 102 The 
W orld Bank also conceded at least partially that Africa, on the other hand, was a case in 
point o f  its failures in outlook and policy prescriptions, though it transferred m uch o f  this 
blam e to African leaders and their policy environm ents.103 The few African states that 
did m ake progress took longer than expected .104 Ed Brown adds that “to a certain
100 In 1993, the W orld Bank for the first tim e admitted that state interv ention, its 
1980s scapegoat, had played a role in the success in m ost o f East Asia. W orld Bank, The 
East Asian M iracle  (New York: O xford U niversity Press, 1993).
101Stiglitz, “ Introduction,” 1.
102Dani Rodrik, The N ew  G lobal Econom y and Developing Countries: M aking  
Openness Work (W ashington, D.C.: The Overseas Development Council, 1999).
103Frances Stewart, “Education and Adjustm ent: The Experience o f  the 1980s and 
Lessons for the 1990s,” in M arket Forces and  World Development, eds. Frances Stewart 
and R. Prendergast (Basingstoke: M acM illan, 1994), 128-29
104The W orld B ank’s Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth, a 
review o f  A frica’s developm ent issues published in 1989, conceded that a “crisis in 
governance” had contributed to this reg ion’s lack o f  success. Illegitim ate leadership, 
corruption, poor institutions, and other factors were cited as part o f  the crisis. Sec W orld
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degree, this new  focus on ‘good governance’ represents a recognition o f  the im portance 
o f  political context to econom ic policy and a partial acceptance o f  som e o f  the argum ents 
concerning how SAPs in them selves have actually sometimes hindered the ability o f  the 
state to adm inister any sort o f  econom ic reform .” 105 SAPs, o f  course, intended to reduce 
the state’s role in the econom y on the neoliberal prem ise that state intervention impedes 
econom ic grow th.106 Good governance, on the other hand, sees a role for the state in 
prom oting sm ooth and equitable m arket activity. It sees not so m uch a reduced role for 
the state, but a different role in helping shape the forces o f  globalization in general and in 
regards to its particular constituency.
It also helped the W orld Bank substantiate its claims that particular countries were 
prom ising sites for investm ent. By the m id-to-late 1990s, private investm ent in a handful 
o f  m ore stable and m arket-oriented developing countries had begun to su rge .107 In 1996, 
for exam ple, net private capital flows into developing countries increased by 30 percent, 
to reach $243.8 billion. This was a five-fold increase since 1990.108 Good governance 
prom otion was a way for the W orld Bank to attem pt to broaden the narrow  range o f  
recipient countries.
The W orld Bank also prom oted good governance in the 1990s in attem pt to shift
Bank, Sub-Saharan Africa: From  Crisis to Sustainable Growth (W ashington, D.C.: The 
W orld Bank), 1-15.
105Ed Brown, “Tinkering with the System: Adjusting A djustm ent” in Structural 
Adjustm ent: Theory, Practice, and  Impacts, eds. Ed Brown, Bob M ilward, G iles M ohan, 
and Alfred B. Zack-W illiam s (New York: Routledge, 2000), 138.
106Ibid.
l07W orld Bank, Report on Adjustm ent Lending 11: Adjustm ent Lending Policies 
fo r  Sustainable Growth (W ashington, D.C.: The W orld Bank Country Econom ics 
Departm ent, 1990).
,08Ibid.
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the focus away from  past W orld Bank criticism  and accusations that the N orth is not 
concerned with the w elfare o f  the South. The W orld Bank wanted to stay in business and 
to continue its w ork o f  creating a liberal capitalist economic environm ent. Yet due to 
ram pant criticism  o f  the institution that ironically occurred right as capitalism 's rival 
system was com ing apart, the W orld Bank had to repackage its agenda to rem ain viable. 
As a pow erful institution, the W orld Bank has always received its share, perhaps more 
than its share, o f  external criticism . Yet critical voices were particularly  prevalent, 
energetic, and m obilized in the early 1990s.109 Some surm ise that the opening o f  another 
m ultilateral developm ent W orld Bank, the European W orld Bank for Reconstruction and 
Developm ent added som e fervor to the invective.110 M any outside o f  the Bank expressed 
concern that despite its pow er, it had not achieved helped countries m ove forward and 
im prove the lives o f  those living in poverty. The perceived failure o f  the B ank 's SAPs 
did not help: the W ashington consensus o f  the 1980s had becom e W ashington confusion 
by the early 1990s. Theorists had been w rong about m any things, m ost im portantly about 
how to help ease poverty. O thers criticized the Bank o f  creating w ider gaps betw een the 
rich and the poor betw een and within nations through policies favoring corrupt leaders in 
developing countries.111 Som e critics continued to disparage the Bank for being
109This w as partly due to globalization, a trend the W orld Bank itse lf had worked 
to promote. Increased com m unication, travel, and other exchanges had been m aking the 
world smaller, narrow ing the space between people and ideas. The Internet in particular 
had been a useful tool for uniting and galvanizing such criticism , w hich was decidedly 
strong as the W orld B ank’s fiftieth birthday approached in 1994. Kapur, Lewis, and 
W ebb, 1161-1216.
ll0Caulfield, 305-6.
m Harrigan, M osely, and Toye, 12.
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subservient to a “dispersem ent im perative."11'  The Bank was also accused o f being elitist and 
disconnected from  the true nature o f  the plight o f  the poor.113 Others blam ed the Bank for 
neglecting environm ental concerns in favor o f  business interests.114
Also, as previously m entioned, the popularity o f  laissez-faire ideas o f  the 1980s helped 
contribute to a challenge to the authority, legitim acy, and usefulness o f  the state. This in turn led 
to increased disillusionm ent with m ultilateral institutions such as the W orld Bank. M ore 
em phasis was put on system -level phenom ena like globalization. Kapur, Lewis, and W ebb 
contend that “ . . . central governm ents were faced with difficult tim es, and disillusionm ent with 
them , alm ost inevitably, spilled over to their international creations: m ultilateral institutions."115 
T he United S tates’ C ongress’ taking aw ay o f  the president’s fast-track trading authority in 1994, 
in p lace and little disputed since 1974, as evidence o f  this sentim ent.116 James Cypher argues 
that com m ercial W orld Banks were also pressuring the Bank. Its SAPs and other
112Gustav Ranis, “On Fast-D ispersing Policy-Based Loans,’’ Task Force on the United 
States and M ultilateral Developm ent W orld Banks background paper (W ashington, D.C.: Center 
for Strategic and International Studies, 1996), 6; Vasquez, 275-86.
I13L. Taylor, “The Revival o f  the Liberal Creed: The IMF and the W orld Bank in a 
G lobalised Econom y,” W orld D evelopm ent 25:2: 145-52.
114W ith the rise o f  several Green parties in Europe and o f  the environm ental movement 
w orldw ide, new  pressure was exerted on the W orld Bank to pay m ore attention to the results o f 
its actions and the im plications and ram ifications o f  its soft power, as it did help shape the 
international developm ent regime. News o f  global warming, deforestation, and other 
environm ental hazards was becom ing m ore widespread, as Cold W ar concerns no longer 
dom inated the m edia and the public m ind-set and as people com m unicated m ore extensively. In 
the developed countries, the environm ental lobby was exerting intensified pow er on politicians 
to heed such concerns, and some o f  this pressure was then directed toward the W orld Bank.
Rich, 11-12.
115Kapur, Lewis, and W ebb, 46.
116Easterly, 20.
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conditionalities had not m ade the poorer developing countries any m ore secure for private 
investment, and the Bank was a convenient if  not deserved scapegoat.117
The W orld B ank’s new  focus on good governance, part o f  its “post-W ashington 
consensus,” was w ithout doubt partly m otivated by external criticism  and pressures, yet 
scholars differ on w hether this focus indeed reflected a change, or whether it was m erely 
cosmetic. Preston in 1993 spoke o f  the W orld B ank 's "increasingly negative external 
im age” and called for a “proactive approach” to im proving it.118 W here Kapur, Lewis, 
and W ebb see a genuine and substantive shift resulting ,119 Brown and others see an 
attempt to shift the focus.120 They cite Fine, for example, who argues that the W orld
»-> i
Bank was insincere in its rhetorical prom ises to reform its priorities. " N. Hildyard and 
A. W ilks, too, are circum spect, calling the new focus an act o f  “astute political 
m aneuvering.” 122 Kiely, too, had doubts, asserting that the W orld Bank did not change
---------- 1 17Jam es Cypher, “The Debt Crisis as ‘O pportunity’: Strategy to Revive United 
States H egem ony,” Latin Am erican Perspectives 16:1 (w inter 1989): 61. Som e scholars 
also assert that all o f  this external criticism influenced W orld Bank policies in the early 
1990s, leading it to assum e new responsibilities and priorities, from environm entalism  to 
good governance prom otion. Even as an independent institution, the W orld Bank was to 
an extent beholden to its m em ber countries and to m aintaining its reputation as a useful 
institution. K apur and others w rite that it was rather ingenious o f  W orld Bank leaders to 
take the m ounting criticism  o f  its neoliberal policies and SAPs and use it to help 
transform  its ow n identity. Instead shirking from the criticism , leaders saw an 






i22N. Hildyard and A. W ilks, “An Effective State? But Effective for W hom ?" 
ID S Bulletin 29:2 : 50.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
219
1 9  ^
its goals, but sim ply its rhetoric. In any case, good governance prom otion was 
appealing to investors countries because it seem ed to firm up the N orth’s ideological win 
against Com m unism  and to m ake the world safer and m ore rule-based. By prom oting 
good governance, the W orld Bank was taking a cue from the norm ative values o f  the 
W orld B ank’s w ealthy shareholders at the time. The international environm ent was 
conducive to dem ocracy and dem ocracy prom otion as the 1990s began. This gave the 
W orld Bank latitude in prom oting good governance, though the W orld Bank did not 
rhetorically equate this democracy. Insisting on political conditions such as rule-based 
institutions, representative government, accountability, and transparency, as the W orld 
Bank did, was seen as appealing in a world where dem ocratic values were flourishing and 
spreading. It suggested broad convergence, cooperation, and even peace and security to 
many. In addition to the fall o f  Com m unism  in Eastern Europe, other factors helped 
m ake the global environm ent ripe for dem ocracy and good governance prom otion. The 
bandwagon effect o f  countries embracing dem ocratic values, Northern attention to hum an 
rights, and the spread o f  liberal ideals favored dem ocratization and sim ilar values such as 
those under the W orld Bank good governance rubric .124
The global m ove toward dem ocracy that peaked with the fall o f  Com m unism  in 
Eastern Europe had begun in the m id-1970s and continued through the 1980s. The 
advance towards dem ocracy with the demise o f  W estern Europe's final three 
dictatorships, in Spain, Portugal, and Greece, continued through Latin Am erica. The 
dem ocracy and hum an rights impulses were given som e impetus by the Carter
^ K ie ly , 68.
l24Bruce Parrott, “Perspectives on Postcom m unist D em ocratization" in Politics. 
Power, and  the Struggle fo r  D em ocracy in South-East Europe, cds. Karen D aw isha and 
Bruce Parrott (Cam bridge: Cam bridge University Press, 1997), 8
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adm inistration’s focus on human rights, but also took on a life o f  their own. M ost o f 
Latin A m erica’s dictatorships fell or withdrew by the late 1980s, and C hina’s democratic 
m ovem ent gained international attention with the Tiananm en Square massacre. In other 
parts o f  Asia evolution towards dem ocracy was increasingly conspicuous in countries 
such as Taiwan and Thailand. South Korea and the Philippines w itnessed clear 
dem ocratic transitions, and democratic progress was m ade in Pakistan. India continued 
to struggle to im plem ent democracy. In parts o f  Africa as well, as apartheid was 
weakened and then dism antled, democracies and dem ocratic m ovem ents were 
increasingly evident. In the North, political liberalization could be seen in Tunisia and 
Algeria, and Egypt’s governm ent system continued to be partially liberalized, with m ulti­
party elections and som e quasi-democratic institutions. In the South, people continued to 
struggle to achieve non-racial dem ocracy through nonviolent action, which included its 
newly em pow ered trade union movement. As Laurence W hitehead contends, 
“ liberalizing m easures tended to gather their own m om entum  as increased freedom o f  
expression and organization led to the emergence o f  new ly perm itted organizations and 
dem ands” and soon “ [libera liza tion  passed into dem ocratization....” 125 These trends 
bestow ed an unprecedented legitimacy on the viability o f  dem ocracy and its values, 
providing the W orld Bank with new license to prom ote m ore value-laden reforms such as 
those involved in its good governance promotion.
Not only was the world experimenting with dem ocracy in unprecedented ways, 
but the nature o f  and nuances o f  this experiment were w idely know n, due to the increased
l25Laurence W hitehead, “ Democratic Transitions” in The Oxford Companion to 
Politics o f  the World, 2d ed., ed. Krieger (New York: Oxford U niversity Press, 2001). 
195.208-9.
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socializing aspects o f  globalization, such as the technological revolution and m ore
frequent international travel and other exchanges. This helped raise awareness about
governm ent repression and other sorts o f  hum an rights abuses. The W orld B ank 's good
governance prom otion likely also stemmed from grow ing international sentim ent about
the need to protect hum an rights. The 1980s brought a rem arkable growth in global
concern for hum an rights. This included, notably, the right to choose political leaders
and to voice one’s political ideas and beliefs, but also a perhaps even darker side o f  such
abuses. This served to reinforce some o f  the elem ents o f  democratic governance. As
Larry Diamond, Juan Linz, and Seym our M artin Lipset contend, as
torture, disappearances, and other grave hum an rights violations becam e m ore 
widespread but also m ore system atically exposed and denounced around the 
world, there developed a renewed and deeper appreciation for dem ocratic 
institutions, which, with all their procedural m essiness and sluggishness, 
nevertheless protect the integrity o f  the person and the freedom o f  conscience.126
As Stephen Haggard contends, this increased international normative concern with
dem ocracy and hum an rights only furthered the dissem ination o f  Northern policy norms
that structural adjustm ent was providing for, thus enabling institutions such as the Bank
to impose their w ills even more intently .127 The B ank’s good governance
prom otion in the 1990s also was bolstered by the increasing governance-related
conditionalities levied by bilateral aid donors and other IDIs. The Bank would be
less likely to be accused o f  political interference in sovereign nations i f  sim ilar
conditionalities were seen as comm onplace. Trends in the academic world also helped
encourage the B ank 's shift. As Kanbur and Vines assert, the W orld Bank "is not
1 ̂ 6“ Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, 2.
p?
‘ Stephen Haggard. Developing Nations and the Politics o f  Global Integration  
(W ashington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution. 1995), 21.
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independent o f  either the intellectual world or the political world in which it operates.
The W orld B ank’s thinking on poverty thus closely parallels academ ic concerns with
poverty, and its actions with regard to policy re lief reflect the political priority afforded to
1 ̂ 8poverty in the world at large.” " Changes in view point and em phasis in economics, 
developm ent studies, dem ocratization studies, sociology, and other liberal arts studies, 
prim arily in the developed countries, impacted the W orld Bank’s conceptualization o f  its 
role.
In the field o f  econom ics, studies were increasingly pointing to the need for the state 
to take an active role in developm ent. As M adhusudan Bhattarai contends, in the 1990s 
economics scholars were increasingly interested in new developm ents in "new 
institutional econom ics” and “new growth theory” that pointed to the need for the state to 
furnish and m aintain sound institutions. Such institutions, it was believed, would help 
strengthen the m arket and help protect citizens from the potentially painful effects o f  
liberalization. Additionally, this branch o f  economics paid attention to the view that 
dom estic compensation, or som e form o f  welfare state, can be an im portant component o f  
increasing international openness. New empirical studies showed a positive relationship 
betw een trade openness and grow th o f governm ent.129 Also, the value o f  the protection 
o f  private property and contract rights becam e a popular topic in growth studies.
Bhattarai contends that institutionalists in the field o f  econom ics have long argued about 
the value o f  state in developm ent, but the renewed interest in the 1990s stemmed from
128Kanbur and Vines, 87.
u9Higgott, 27.
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new  data supporting and strengthening such ideas.130 Richer empirical studies in 
econom ics also evidenced that there is a positive correlation between the level o f  equality 
in society and the level o f  GDP, reinforcing the need for some social w elfare protection 
by the state.131 As the W orld Bank is staffed with 800 or so econom ists w ith elite 
backgrounds, such academ ic and scholarly trends surely had impact.
In the field o f  developm ent studies, new emphasis on alternatives to neoliberalism
that considered the needs o f  the poor, women, and other m arginalized groups emerged.
Additionally, scholars studied the way cultural histories and norms m ade certain regions
less prone to develop via Northern standards. As Christine Sylvester asserts,
Alternative and post developm ent tendencies have tried to push 
developm ent studies in less distanced, abstract, and m acroeconom ic 
directions; and they have succeeded to the degree that the structural 
adjustm ent wing has enabled alternative thinking to be spoken in the 
corridors o f  the W orld B ank.132
Yet the m ost impactful trend in developm ent has been the view popular in
thel990s that political and economic liberalization not only can be endeavored at the
sam e time, but that they can support one another. In 1993, Thom as C allaghy described
this as the pervasive developm ent viewpoint o f  the decade, reinforced by countless new
studies.133 Hence, the W orld Bank had little difficulty buttressing its claim s o f  the
indispensability o f  good governance when the academic w orld, w ith its rich supply o f
^ B h a tta ra i M adhusudan, “Book Reviews," Journal o f  Economic Issues  33:1 
(M arch, 1999): 204-8.
131Kanbur and Vines, 95
132Sylvester, 715.
133Thom as Callaghy, “Vision and Politics in the Transform ation o f  the Global 
Political Econom y” in G lobal Transformation in the Third World, ed. Robert Slater 
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993).
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independent scholars and resources, was m aking sim ilar claims. D evelopm ents in the 
grow ing field o f  dem ocracy studies also supported the W orld B ank’s shift toward good 
governance prom otion. In the early 1990s scholars began to m ake the argum ent that 
dem ocracy is a prerequisite for economic developm ent or at least m ust be in place 
concom itant w ith econom ic developm ent efforts. Previously it had been largely assumed 
that dem ocratic conditions were an outcom e o f  developm ent, but scholars had 
increasingly com e to see the usefulness o f  dem ocratic conditions to facilitating econom ic 
reforms. Such conditions frequently cited included governm ental accountability and 
transparency, the rule o f  law, open policy debates, and reliably enforced state 
institutions.134 These included m any o f  the same conditions the W orld Bank was 
advocating, lending additional backing to the W orld B ank’s revised agenda.
In the 1990s, other trends in academ ia also reinforced the W orld B ank’s shift. In 
the field o f  sociology, post-colonial studies built further barriers to casual acceptance o f  
neoliberalism ’s tenets, with its attention to uneven structural relationships and the local 
and the specific rather than the general and universally applicable. In the field o f  literary 
theory, postm odernism  called into question the nature o f  truth and reality, urging scholars 
to see the ideological underpinnings o f  comm on entrenched beliefs, like neoliberalism . 
M ichel Foucault’s work on the construction o f  uneven pow er relationships becam e an 
academ ic mainstay. In political science, the rise o f  constructivist theory and the debate 
about the new world order also tilted towards openness to new paradigm s and the 
questioning o f  old ones. M any o f  these developm ents, o f  course, coincided with the
l34John Healey and M. Robinson, Democracy, Governance, and  Economic  
Policy: Sub-Saharan Africa in Comparative Perspective (London: O verseas 
Developm ent Institute, 1992).
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fading o f  the Cold War. Nevertheless, the W orld Bank benefitted from the academ ic 
clim ate in the 1990s in many ways.
The W orld Bank also prom oted good governance in the 1990s because this 
because the international political clim ate at the tim e was amenable to this. As Ngaire 
W oods writes, what is “significant about the W orld B ank’s strong advocacy o f  the 
W ashington consensus in the 1980s. . . is that it highlights the extent to which the 
institution is liable to sway towards the m ind set and priorities prevailing in the US 
governm ent in any period o f  tim e.” 135 In the early 1980s neoconservative governm ents 
cam e to pow er in the United States, Great Britain, Germany, and beyond. T he early and 
m id-1990s witnessed a sweep to pow er o f  social democratic, or “Third W ay” 
governm ents in the leading developed countries. Bill Clinton, Tony Blair, G erhard 
Schroeder, and others brought with them  a fresh idealism  and a hope o f  finding a new 
m ethod o f  balancing the international political econom y so that the m arket could flourish 
and citizens’ needs, the rich and the poor, could be m et.136 Third W ay values are 
surprisingly sim ilar to the B ank’s new developm ent agenda: creating a state that 
com plem ents market functions, building strong state institutions, increasing 
governm ental transparency, ending corruption, granting a significant role to civil society, 
striving tow ards m ore social equality, connecting social and econom ic policy, reform ing 
the welfare state, protecting the environm ent, and coordinating the efforts o f  governm ents
135 N gaire W oods, “M ultilateralism  and Governance,” in The W orld Bank: 
Structure and  Policies , eds. Christopher Gilbert and David Vines (Cam bridge: 
Cam bridge U niversity Press, 2000), 142-43.
136Anthony Giddens, The Third Way: The Renewal o f  SocialD cm ocracy  (M alden: 
Polity Press, 1998) and the essays in G iddens, ed., The Cllobal Third Way D ebate  
(M alden: Polity Press, 2001).
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and international institutions.137 It is not surprising that the W orld Bank, controlled or at 
least influenced, by its richest m em bers, revealed a sim ilar change in its political world 
view. O f course, because the W orld Bank shares the same world with wealthy developed 
nations, it would naturally see sim ilar trends and learn sim ilar lessons, but still, popular 
political ideas have a strongly-felt presence. As Catherine Gwin argues, the W orld Bank
1 - jo
has always in particular been influenced by the political climate o f  the United States.
The fact that the United States and m uch o f  W estern Europe had converged politically 
undoubtedly had a powerful im pact on W orld Bank priorities.
Adding to its ability to enter into m ore political interventions in developing 
countries was the strengthening o f  the GATT, now the WTO. Clearly, the leaders o f  the 
new global environm ent were attem pting to \im pose a new supranational rule-based order 
that w ould protect the status-quo and lim it crises as experienced in the past. This search 
for a w ider m andate gave institutions like the W orld Bank m ore latitude in declaring
*• 1 I Q
policies that interfered with its liberal capitalist agenda as distortions.” W here there 
were rules and norms, there could be infractions and deviations. Developing countries 
were also increasingly at the m ercy o f  W orld Bank decisions to intrude in their policy 
environm ents because o f  the leverage N orthern states was gaining by imposing 
“conditional” m em ber status on states, such as China, in the W TO. Conditional status
l37Description o f  Third W ay values sum m arized from Giddens, "Introduction,” 
The G lobal Third Way Debate, 1-21.
l38Catherine Gw'in, US Relations with the World Bank, 1945-92. W ashington, 
D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1994.
l39Osvaldo Sunkel, “C ontem porary Econom ic Reform in H istorical\Perspective" 
in Rebuilding Capitalism: A lternative Roads A fter Socialism and  Dirigism, eds. Mario I. 
Bljer, Andres Solimano, and O svaldo Sunkel (Ann Arbor: University o f  M ichigan Press, 
1994), 320; see also M. Agosin and D. Tussie, “ Globalization, Regionalization, and New 
Dilem m as in Trade Policy for D evelopm ent,” World Competition (June 1992).
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w as used to im pose policy guidelines on states favorable to open m arket interests as well 
as to establish global expectations and norms conducive to this interest. The W orld Bank 
took advantage o f  such growing expectations and norms, becom ing part o f  a larger effort 
to im pose order and maintain extant pow er structures. Additionally, the rise o f  regional 
trading blocs was m aking Third W orld countries in a sense m ore em pow ered, but also 
m ore vulnerable. The North American Free T rade Area (NAFTA) and the EU, for 
instance, prom ised great rewards for its developing country m em bers, though requiring a 
stricter adherence to Northern policy guidelines. O f  course, the grow ing accessibility o f  
ideas and inform ation due to the technological revolution only served to reinforce this 
trend toward m ore policy standards and convergence.
The precedent o f  SAPs and other conditionalities, negotiated by both the W orld Bank 
and the IMF, also provided the W orld Bank with an increased awareness o f  the need to 
change its past methods. With many countries, the W orld Bank learned that state leaders 
could not fully im plem ent the W orld B ank’s reform  package proposals if  they  so desired. 
Firstly, m any countries lacked the supportive panoply o f  political, m anagerial, legal, and 
econom ic institutions needed for such reform s, and secondly, state leaders w ere not 
alw ays or even often in a political position to im pose such sweeping reform s as were 
m andated.140 Developmental problems had deeper roots and success encountered m ore 
obstacles than the W orld Bank had envisioned. Even when countries attem pted to m ake 
the prescribed reform s, success was not always forthcoming. The W orld Bank also later 
learned that even in the cases o f  M exico and East Asia, seem ing success can be fragile 
w ithout a certain type o f  political policy environm ent and the right institutions. A 
learning curve does exist, and the W orld Bank w as m oving further along it in its good
^ S a n d b ro o k , 27S.
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governance promotion, at least in so far as prom oting its goal o f  integrating the 
developing countries m ore fully into the global economy. Richard Sandbrook writes that 
the W orld B ank’s preoccupation with good governance "does represent an advance in 
adjustm ent thinking.” Further, he contends, “ Implicit in this notion is the idea that 
‘getting politics right’ for capitalist developm ent is as essential as getting prices right.” 141 
N ot only had the W orld Bank learned from experience, but it had also gradually 
increased its ability to intervene m ore in developing economies. Scholar David 
G oldsw orthy contends that previously, the W orld Bank had avoided politics because its 
presence was a potential obstacle to rapid and effective loan disbursem ent and to being 
able to influence developing countries.142 But once SAPs, originally intended for short­
term  crisis m anagem ent, became standard, it was easier to attach m ore and m ore political 
conditions to them (clothed in technical language). M atching other institutions such as 
the U N ’s rhetorical prom otion o f good governance gave it an easy way to extend the 
intervention it had begun into developing countries in the early 1980s, to a deeper and 
even m ore political intervention. As John W. Newark writes, before the 1990s, good 
governance prom otion pronouncem ents would “surely not have been made, or they 
w ould w idely have been condemned as acts o f political interference or im perialism  on the 
part o f  the developed nations.” 143 The W orld Bank, as well as the policies o f  o ther aid 
donors, had eased the world gradually into more acceptance o f  deeper intervention. The
rrrIbid., 280.
142David Goldsworthy, “Thinking Politically About Developm ent,” D evelopm ent 
and Change 19 (1988): 505-30.
143John W. Newark, “Foreign Aid in the 1990s: The New Reality” in The 
Changing Political Economy o f  the Third World, cd. M anochehr Dorraj (Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner, 1995), 223-44.
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W orld B ank’s always sterile term inology for what were clearly political reform s also 
helped in this respect.
It was also increasingly clear that the W orld B ank’s SAPs, originally so 
auspicious in the eyes o f  their designers, were not the solution in and o f  them selves. As 
has been stated here and well-studied generally, SA Ps brought at best uneven results and 
at worst, poor overall results. M onitoring for SAPs also gave the W orld Bank a closer 
view o f  governance deficiencies in m any developing countries. One o f  the lessons o f  the 
1980s was that laissez-faire policies alone are insufficient to prom ote and sustain 
developm ent in developing countries in the m odem  world. Rem oving the state from  an 
un- or underdeveloped m arket brings little developm ental success. The W orld Bank 
came to increasingly see that m arkets have requirem ents, institutions to support them , 
liberal progressive cultural values, trustw orthy leaders, enforceable laws and contracts. 
They also saw  that speedy, sweeping reform s are not always effective. The 
conditionalities o f  m ultilateral institutions that m andated sweeping econom ic 
liberalization and privatization as in Eastern European countries in the 1990s m ade it 
painfully obvious that policy environm ents needed both reform and developm ent. Private 
incentive, it was evidenced, requires a reliable policy  environm ent with laws and rules. 
Yet deciding on w hat these laws and rules should be has proven to defy sim ple 
technocratic analysis. As Stiglitz writes, for exam ple, “different policies affect different 
groups differently. . . O utside advisors can clearly take strong positions against Pareto- 
inferior policies, but. . . [w]hat appears to be a Pareto-dom inant policy in a static context 
may not be in a m ore dynam ic one, and conversely.” 144
^ S tig l i tz ,  “ Introduction,” 4
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The process o f  dem ocratization itse lf called attention to the nature o f  political
14 5
interactions and the characteristics o f  policy environm ents. Scholars such as M ancur 
Olson describe how it was easy for W estern European countries and the United States to 
inadvertently overlook certain features that make a country’s policy environm ent 
conducive to developm ent such as property rights protection.146 Certain such features 
developed gradually and naturally in these regions and were largely taken for granted 
instead o f  being seen as intrinsic to a country’s developm ent. The W orld Bank learned 
from experience that such features matter.
Another factor leading the W orld Bank to revise its ow n sense o f  its role was its 
reinterpretation o f  the success o f  the East Asian tiger economies. In the early 1990s 
debate over the reasons behind East A sia’s rapid developm ent over the past three decades 
intensified as the region increasingly exemplified successful developm ent. In the m id-to- 
late 1980s W orld Bank scholars and economists genetically em phasized the basic 
neoliberal m acroeconom ic policies pursued by countries in the region: fiscal and 
m onetary discipline, little regulation o f  the dom estic econom y, and a w illingness to 
em brace international trade. Y et these policies had been pursued in other countries and 
regions w ith m arkedly less success. Upon closer view , the W orld Bank had to admit that 
other factors w ere in p lace that helped contribute to East Asian countries’ success. As the 
W orld Bank acknow ledged in its $ 1.2 m illion East Asian M iracle  study, not only did 
many o f  these countries pursue m acroeconom ic stability with stable and competitive 
exchange rates, low inflation, careful m anagem ent o f  their state budgets, and export
l45Stephen Haggard and Robert Kaufman, The P olitical Economy o f  D em ocratic  
Transitions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).
14601son, 6.
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prom otion. They also invested heartily in education and social serv ices.14' The W orld 
Bank also acknow ledged that in some o f  these countries, notably N ortheast Asian states 
such as Japan and Korea, state industrialization policies were successful, partly because 
these states intervened when results were positive and w ithdrew when they w'ere not.
The W orld Bank did not grant a blanket acceptance to industrialization policy, noting that 
in Southeast East countries such as Hong Kong, it was in fact not successful. But the 
W orld Bank did acknowledge a role for the developm ental or activist state. In a 1998 
speech, Stiglitz acknowledged that despite East A sia’s crisis beginning in 1997, this 
cluster o f  countries. . . had not closely follow'ed the W ashington consensus prescriptions
148but had som ehow  m anaged the most successful developm ent in history.”
Ironically, yet another phase o f  W ashington’s reinterpretation o f  the East Asian 
story influenced its prom otion o f  good governance. A fter the severe financial crisis in 
the region, w ith its global ripple effects, the Bank adopted the view  that poor governance 
had allowed for this. The W orld Bank did not discount the region’s successes, but in the 
wake o f  the crisis it blam ed poor institutional infrastructure for the sudden trouble. In its 
1999 R oad to Recovery  publication, the W orld Bank contends that the crisis was “best 
seen as a story o f  rapid growth built on incom plete foundations, which was left exposed 
to the winds o f  the international financial m arkets.” It further noted that the region “will 
have to rebuild its success on new foundations in its trade com petitiveness, in the 
financial sector, and in the governance o f  and financing o f  its corporate sector.” 149 The
l47W orld Bank, Miracle.
l48Stiglitz, “M ore Instruments and B roader Goals: M oving Tow ards the Post- 
W ashington C onsensus,” WIDER Annual Lectures , 2 January 1998.
l49W orld Bank, East Asia: The Road to R c c o v o y  (W ashington, D.C.: The W orld
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W orld Bank was in essence arguing that though some aspects o f  good governance had 
helped the region succeed, other aspects o f  poor governance had prevented this success 
from being sustainable. Though its language is technical and dry, the W orld Bank is 
acknow ledging that political factors, not sim ply econom ic ones, were at play in both the 
successes and failure in the East Asia. Thus in both its success and in its failure, the East 
Asian crisis highlighted the need for good governance for developm ental success.
The W orld Bank realized in the early 1990s that in order to stay in business, it 
needed to transform  itse lf and its role to some degree. It needed to show that it would 
m ake good use o f  1988 $75 billion funding increase. It also needed to prove its worth in 
the w ake o f the Cold W ar, as distinct from the IMF, in light o f  past failures, and in light 
o f  increased private capital flows to developing world. A t the sam e time, the W orld 
Bank had to somehow discover a w ay to satisfy its growing num ber o f  critics. Satisfying 
shareholders and external critics would not be simple. The U nited States’ new post-Cold 
W ar world position threatened m any, and claims o f  W orld Bank elitism, its self-serving 
predisposition, that it was a tool to advance Am erican interests, and that it was staffed 
with “ idiot specialists” only continued to increase.150 The growth o f  the NG O m ovem ent 
and m obilized environm ental and hum anitarian criticism  increased the W orld Bank’s 
need to transform its reputation and its role. I f  all o f  this criticism  was not enough, the 
W orld Bank also faced increased United States Congressional and Treasury Department 
criticism  with the new incom ing adm inistration in 1992.151 The W apanhans report 
opened the door to m ore internally-generated criticism on top o f  this, which was followed
Bank, 1999), 16.
l50W oods, 143; see also L. Taylor, 145- 52.
l5lGlobal Poverty Research Group, “The W orld Bank’" (April 2005). 
<http://ww w.gprg.org/news-com m s/com m -001 ,htm> [20 June2005],
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by increased criticism  from academ ics and from the media. These critics accused the 
W orld Bank o f  being better at take-offs than landings, o f  offering carrots but “no sticks” 
in efforts to prom ote reform, and o f  being subserv ient to its ow n dispersem ent 
imperative.
One significant w ay in which the W orld Bank attem pted to m ake itse lf m ore 
relevant and deflect criticism  was to prioritize its role as a know ledge W orld Bank. Its 
use o f  econom ic conditionality o f  the 1980s had afforded it a closer view  o f  challenges 
developing countries faced as they attem pted to becom e m ore com petitive in the world 
economy. Its general experience, expertise, and elite reputation gave it credibility  to 
m ake broader suggestions, beyond econom ics into the political realm and it also m ake it a 
source o f  inform ation for private investors looking for lucrative new m arkets or assessing 
the viability o f  existing m arkets. By supplying its knowledge function, the W orld Bank 
could capitalize on what it knew already, decreasing the pressure to m ake loans and raise 
funds and also diffusing criticism  about its own acquisitiveness. The W orld B ank’s 
increased reliance on its Know ledge W orld Bank functions also stems from  the 
increasing need or social capital to attract investm ent in today’s world. The W orld Bank 
clearly needs to help poor, strife-ridden countries im prove their reputations. This helps 
them becom e m ore attractive to public and, even m ore importantly, private investors. As 
capital continues to becom e increasingly m obile and m arkets m ore vital, it is m ore and 
m ore evident that almost nothing m atters m ore than prom ising returns. Prom oting good 
governance has becom e a significant way for the W orld Bank to help countries market 
themselves.
W ith both the fading o f the Cold W ar’s tem porary sim plification o f  m any political 
and econom ic issues and the w orld’s growing interdependence and com plex web o f
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relations, it becam e increasingly obvious during the 1980s and 1990s that the W orld 
Bank needed to consider as broadly  as possible the ram ifications o f  its stances and 
policies. As globalization intensified interconnectedness and shared social space, the 
efficacy o f  W orld Bank policies and practices was increasingly contingent upon factors 
beyond its control and w orldw ide perceptions o f  its legitimacy. One way the W orld 
Bank could take back som e o f  this control and perhaps increase its reputation involved 
working to better coordinate its actions in regard to what other aid donors and IFIs were 
doing.
Initially, good governance prom otion seemed like a feasible way to deflect 
criticism  and shift the focus, as well as to excuse past failures. M orton Halperin, David 
Scheffer, and Patricia Small, w arn, however, that the United States in particular “needs to 
recognize that some countries view  the new U.S. interest in dem ocracy . . .  as yet another 
pretext for U.S. intervention in the internal affairs o f  other states in support o f  U.S. 
security and econom ic interests.” 152 W hen the UNDP began rhetorically em phasizing 
good governance and dem ocracy prom otion, it becam e clear that w orking m ore broadly 
with the UN in this effort could enhance the W orld B ank’s credibility and power. This 
heightened the W orld B ank’s good governance promotion m om entum . W hen the 
Organisation for Econom ic Cooperation and Development jo ined in the chorus o f  good 
governance promotion, this strengthened this im pulse even more.
Various changes in the international econom ic environm ent helped m otivate the 
W orld Bank to reassess its m ission in the late 1980s and early 1990s. D eveloping 
countries had come to possess m ore wealth, m ore consumers, and m ore people than ever
152M orton Halperin, D avid Scheffer, and Patricia Small, Self-D eterm ination in the 
New World Order (W ashington, D.C.: C'amcgie Endowment for International Peace, 
1992).
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before as the 1990s began. M any also had natural resources upon which the North 
increasingly depended.153 These countries’ abilities to affect the rest o f  the world were 
surprising. East Asian economies, for instance, helped fuel the growth o f  the rest o f  the 
world. Developed countries increasingly needed these m arkets. For the United States, 
exports to developing countries accounted for one-sixth o f  the nation’s GDP between 
1990 and 1996. This says nothing o f  the jobs provided to Am ericans w orking 
som ew here w ithin this process. China, while still considered a developing country, could 
soon becom e the w orld’s second largest econom y.154 This gave the W orld Bank 
increased stake in the success and in the stability o f  m any developing countries, despite 
som e claim s that the Third W orld would be forgotten after its Cold W ar relevance ended.
W orld Bank m em bers had growing corporate interests in acquiring exports and 
pursuing investm ent opportunities.155 M em bers’ trade policies w ere beginning to 
increasingly reflect the desire to further open foreign m arkets and to ensure that they 
would rem ain open and predictable. Econom ic liberalism  had changed the world, and it 
had certain requirem ents that could not be assum ed to be in place. Even smaller, weaker 
countries played im portant roles, and local politicians in the developed countries felt new 
pressures. In W ashington, for instance, lobbying by financial service providers for m ore 
and better access to foreign financial m arkets had been grow ing since the 1980s, as
l53Jam es W. Joseph, "Stasis and Change in the IMF and the W orld 
Bank:International Context and Institutional Dynam ics,’’ Social Science Journal 37:1 
(2000): 43-66.
154Stiglitz, “Agenda,” 342.
155Barbara Stallings, “ International Influence on Econom ic Policy: Debt, 
Stabilization, and Structural Reform ” in The Politics o f  Adjustment, eds. Stephen 
Haggard and Robert Kaufman (Princeton: Princeton U niversity Press, 1992), 87-8.
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financial services provided an increasingly large share o f  American GNP and needed 
international operating scales to control costs.156
Joseph James notes that som ew hat ironically, some o f the increased influence o f  
developing countries on the industrialized countries stem s from some o f  the form er's debt 
burdens. These burdens have “ forced changes in the ways m ajor actors deal w ith them ." 
The debt relief programs that the Bank has participated in in recent years have used good 
governance conditions as criteria for selecting countries and designating debt relief.157
• • * 1 5 8Citing prior work by W. Cline ' , Joseph notes that on separate occasions, Poland, 
M exico, Peru, and Brazil have put their creditors at risk and eventually influenced the 
way they carry out business.159 The W orld Bank was increasingly seeing the 
im possibility o f  turning a blind eye to any country.
The tightest conditions already being circum scribed were for the poorest 
countries,160 and as Stephen Haggard describes, the num ber o f  poor countries and the 
severity o f  poverty in those already poor was growing. Osvaldo Sunkel contends that the 
“dem ise o f  the Second W orld has pulled the rug out from under the N orth-South 
confrontation, with the form er Third W orld countries. . . being reabsorbed” into the new
156Alice Am sden, The Rise o f  ‘the R e s tC h a lle n g e s  to the West fro m  Late- 
Industrializing Economies (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 252.
157Nancy Birdsall, Stijn Claessens, and Ishac Diwan, “W ill Highly Indebted Poor 
C ountry (HIPC) Status M atter? The Debt Gam e and Donor Behavior in A frica.'’ 
D iscussion Paper 3. W ashington, D.C.: The Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, 2001.
1 58' W. Cline, International D ebt Reexamined. W ashington, D.C.: Institute 
forlntem ational Economics, 1995.
159Joseph, 43-66.
160Harrigan, Mosely, and Toye, 131.
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international system, or simply being left in poverty and political disarray .161 The early 
1990s were sim ilar to the early 1980s, in that slow and unpredictable growth in the 
developed countries, leading to severe fluctuations in import demand, added to 
developing countries’ economic problem s. Term s o f  trade for the developing countries 
were dismal in each o f  these tim e periods.162 Countries form erly accustom ed to receiving 
Soviet aid, though it had been declining throughout the 1980s, were left with none. This 
gave institutions such as the W orld Bank, with its keen interest in prom oting an open 
world econom y, more latitude in term s o f  forw arding its own agenda. This is sim ilar to 
the conditions that m ake the introduction o f  SAPs possible in the late 1970s and early 
1980s: developing countries had little choice but to accept new dem ands in return for 
financial support. The World B ank’s good governance promotion was possible because 
developing countries were generally in a weakened state and could not object.
Further adding to the W orld B ank’s capacity to intervene were the concessions it 
was increasingly m aking to developing countries. Debt forgiveness in particular, given a 
boost by the M arch, 1989, approval o f  the Brady Plan, gave the W orld Bank new 
authority to dictate its wishes in regard to developing countries. If  it was to m ake 
concessions, surely it could require concession to match. As M iles K ahler contends, a 
bargain was stuck: “stringent adjustm ent for a m odest amount o f  financing."163 There 
were also potential incentives in the form o f  eased barriers to imports that som e o f  the
161Sunkel, 319.
162Haggard, 48.
163M iles Kahler, “Orthodoxy and its Alternatives: Explaining A pproaches to 
Stabilization and Adjustment,” in Econom ic Crises and Policy Choice: The Politics o f  
Adjustm ent in the Third World, ed. Joan Nelson (Princeton: Princeton U niversity Press, 
1990), 47.
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Northern countries were considering. Additionally, it was the W orld B ank’s richest 
m em bers that tended to have the m ost im pact upon whether developing countries were 
admitted to the im portant global institutions like the W TO, which prom ised its own 
rewards. Developing countries were in a position where they could not defy the W orld 
B ank’s dictates without losing the few advantages and benefits they enjoyed.
The fact that private investors, m ost notably comm ercial W orld Banks, were 
increasingly pulling out o f  developing countries added to the W orld B ank’s potential to 
intervene m ore in the 1990s. Haggard writes that the “combination o f  increased 
m ultilateral lending and the evaporation o f  com m ercial credit placed the IM F and the 
W orld Bank in a strategic position to define the policy reform agenda.” 164 A com m on 
criticism  levied against the W orld Bank has been that in recent years, the bulk o f  its 
lending (often cited as 70 percent) goes to only a handful (eleven) o f  em erging m arket 
countries.165 W hile it is true that this statistic is somewhat m isleading because these 
eleven countries are hom e to m ore than h a lf  o f  the w orld’s population (and alm ost 80 
percent o f  the people who live in poor countries that are W orld Bank m em bers), 166 it is 
still true that developing countries m ust increasingly compete for public and private 
funds.
164Haggard, 22.
165Adam  Lerrick, “Has the W orld Bank Lost its W ay?” Eurom oney  368 
(D ecem ber 1999): 34-37.
l66Joanne Salop, “Has the W orld Bank Lost its Way? Au C ontraheT 'Eurom oney  
371 (M arch 2000): 98-101.
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Heightened post-Cold-W ar ethnic conflict created both an exigency for political 
stability and an opportunity for IDIs such as the W orld Bank to intervene and begin to lay 
the groundw ork for stable, market econom ies.167 As Joanna M acrae asserts,
The end o f  the Cold W ar added further im petus to this ‘reunification’
o f  aid and politics. There were increasing appeals to utilise the end o f  the
superpow er confrontation to harness political will to achieve peaceful 
168resolution to conflict.
The connection between commerce, aid, and foreign policy was increasingly 
m ade in the post-Cold W ar world, and as M acrae further contends, a presum ption that the 
w orld’s developed countries, notably the United States and W estern Europe, wanted both 
peace and an open trading system existed.169 This gave the W orld Bank new license to 
take on a m ore active role in conflict resolution via its aid polic ies.170
A general shift in the W orld B ank’s leadership began in 1986. As has been noted, 
the W orld B ank’s new president, Conable, was notably less conservative than had been 
his predecessor, Clausen. Conable began the im portant precedent o f  categorizing non­
econom ic issues as directly relevant to econom ics with his statem ents and views on the 
environm ent.171 This helped open the way for later W orld Bank argum ents that political 
factors w ere w ithin the purview o f  economic m anagem ent. C onable’s 1987 W orld Bank 
restructuring allowed for some fresh ideas to surface, and this trend continued into the
167David M oore, “ Leveling the Playing Fields and Em bedding Illusions: ‘Post- 
C onflict’ D iscourse and Neoliberal Developm ent in W ar-Torn A frica,” Review  o f  African  
P olitical Econom y  27:83 (M arch 2000): 11-28.
168M acrae, 30.
,69Ibid.
170G. Perkovich, “The Plutonium G enie,” Foreign Affairs 72: 153-65.
171Von Benda-Beckman. 56-7.
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next decade. T he election o f Preston in 1991 as the W orld B ank’s new president 
furthered its new  openness. The W orld Bank began allowing m ore internal anti-elitist 
sentim ent to be vocalized, partly out o f a genuine desire for change and partly to enhance 
its credibility in light o f  growing external criticism . During Preston’s tenure, the W orld 
Bank’s Operations Evaluation Department (O ED ) presented new evidence that weakened 
the prevailing W ashington consensus. In the O E D 's  1992 analysis o f  industrialization in 
industrialization strategies were ineffective; the report did, however, acknowledge that in 
Korea, such governm ent interventions in the workings o f  the m arket were by and large 
highly effective and even instrumental in K orea’s developm ental success. For the era, 
the OED study m ade the unprecedented adm ission that state intervention can help direct a 
country towards developm ental success. 172 This study also paved the way for the 
subsequent publication o f  the W orld Bank’s study The East Asian Miracle: Economic  
Growth and Public Policy, which acknowledged the extent o f  the state interventions in 
this region and ascribed to m any o f  them va lue .173
Yet it w as the appointm ent o f  W olfensohn as W orld Bank president in 1995 that 
clearly revealed the allowance for and the degree o f  the W orld B ank’s shift. W olfensohn 
from the start set about changing the W orld B ank’s reputation and its role. He proposed 
unprecedented debt reductions for highly indebted countries, launched initiatives 
to involve m ore voices in policy m aking and im plem entation, including those o f  
the private sectors, NGOs, other aid donors, and leaders o f  developing countries.
He launched new  initiatives in diverse areas such as institutional reform and
l72W orld Bank, World Bank Support f o r  Industrialization in Korea, India, and  
Indonesia  (W ashington, D.C.: The W orld Bank, 1992).
l73Lall, 645.
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reducing corruption. The appointm ent o f  Stiglitz as the W orld B ank’s chief econom ist in 
1997 reinforced its openness to good governance prom otion, as Stiglitz was 
increasingly known for his be lie f in a stronger role for the state in m axim izing the 
benefits and decreasing the potential problem s associated with liberalization and 
m arketization.
In m any ways, the W orld Bank o f  the late 1990s hardly resem bled the W orld 
Bank o f  earlier decades. The W orld B ank’s goals were purportedly the same, to fight 
poverty and help poor countries grow, yet the m eans had changed. It was alm ost as if  the 
W orld Bank was attem pting to absolve itse lf o f  past failure and overconfidence by 
changing its im age and style. And this approach has worked at least to some degree.
Findings
Though som e observ ers view this expansion o f  the B ank 's governance prom otion 
m erely as “m ission creep” or the tagging on o f  popular ideas and program s to a lim ited 
and static agenda, this was not the case. The expansion o f  the W orld Bank’s agenda to 
include governance concerns and then the W orld B ank’s subsequent w idening and 
broadening o f  its governance program s and policies reveal inform ed reiterations o f  
Northern pow er concerns. W ith the W orld B ank’s allegiance to the interests o f  a small 
group o f  rich countries and to a comm on agenda o f  trade liberalization, deregulation and 
stringent intellectual property rights protection, there is very little room  in its good 
governance prom otion for prioritizing equity and help for the m ost marginalized. 
Increased protection o f  intellectual property rights serv es to consolidate the technological 
m onopoly o f  TNCs. It imposes the private rights o f  m ultinational com panies over 
national constitutions, since TNCs and investors arc able to take legal action against
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national governm ents. International arbitration panels, controlled by w ealthy countries, 
are not likely to favor the interests o f  poor, technologically backward com panies.
The W orld B ank’s governance concerns arose initially because its previous SAPs 
were not generally effective. Rent-seeking predatory states were reversing or m eddling 
with the SAP econom ic reform  process because o f  vested power interests and elites’ 
strong desires to m aintain the status-quo. The W orld Bank realized this at an opportune 
tim e for its increased political intervention, with the fading o f  the Cold W ar and 
increased international acceptance and even support for dem ocracy prom otion and 
political intervention. To its public sector reform program s, it added rhetoric and 
program s designed to em pow er civil society as a positive counterbalance to a (negative) 
state. This was som ew hat effective, yet the W orld Bank came to understand that w ithout 
certain broad social support for the reform  process, it could not m ove forward and 
consolidate. Including equity and distributional concerns and program s built broader 
bases o f  support for good governance that facilitated its success. The W orld Bank never 
changed its goals o f  w anting to open m arkets, have its loans repaid, and rem ain in 
business; it sim ply changed its means. The fact that the resultant program s and policies 
appeared m ore socially conscious and m ore pro-Southem  interests was a pleasant side 
effect for the often-m aligned W orld Bank, as well as for m any disem pow ered in the 
Third W orld. But the W orld B ank’s N orthem -country-dom inated pow er structure 
rem ained intact.
In sum, while it is difficult to assess the workings o f  a large and complex 
organization such as the W orld Bank, a close reading o f  prim ary docum ents reveals that 
despite its claim s to support pro-poor developm ent, the Bank’s good governance 
programs take the form o f  forging a capital-friendly agenda. By helping to construct a
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positive relationship between the state, the m arket, and civil society in recipient 
countries, the Bank attem pts to create a state that m anages and regulates the m arket in a 
supportive way with its institutions. The focus o f  program s is to establish o f  a smooth 
functioning m arket econom y w'ith protected property rights, reliable contracts, high 
degrees transparency, and a low m easure o f  corruption. This agenda represents the 
desires o f  international large corporate interests and o f  w ealthy countries, notably the 
United States.
Though the Bank likely truly desires to im prove the livelihoods o f  the poor, this is 
secondary to its allegiance to the market. To genuinely help em pow er the poor, the 
B ank’s good governance agenda would be less focused on m aking poor countries m arket- 
ready. M ost o f  the B ank’s good governance policies and program s w'ork to m ake the state 
amenable to international business transactions
W hile the W orld B ank’s good governance prom otion is clearly political, this ID1 
is careful not to recognize the resulting outcom es in political term s, thus falsely 
depoliticizing its own developm ent agenda. The W orld B ank’s good governance policies 
largely reflect the interests o f  its m ost powerful country m em bers and TNCs; they avoid 
entertaining inquiries about the politics o f  developm ent and carry  forth the dom inant 
econom ic growth paradigm  that serves the institution’s stakeholders. Unlike other IDIs, 
the W orld B ank’s definition o f  good governance does not em brace political dim ensions 
o f  the concept. Because o f  its non-political m andate and culture, prom oting good 
governance without crossing a certain line has been challenging for the Bank.
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CHAPTER V
TH E EU ROPEAN UNION
It is not surprising that EU developm ent assistance has been widely criticized and 
controversial. B ritain’s developm ent m inister even went so far as to call the EU program 
the “ worst developm ent agency in the w orld.” 1 Perhaps this w as a bit unforgiving, but 
not w holly without warrant. The w ay developm ent aid is allocated reflects an institution’s 
core values and goals, and the EU is still in the difficult process o f  forming its identity. 
The sam e stresses that plague the union, such as w hether to becom e m ore supranational 
or m ore inter-govem m ental and how to handle com m on security policies, com plicate EU 
aid decisions.
Also, not only is EU foreign aid a continental issue, but it is highly sym bolic o f 
the ID Es larger world role. Hence, different countries and EU bodies have m arkedly 
divergent visions for aid that are not easy to reconcile, let alone cogently assess. The 
outcom e has been aid policies that are often ad hoc, risk-averse, or at odds. This was 
particularly true before the EU notably reform ed its aid program s, as will be discussed. 
Further m aking EU aid decisions com plicated is the fact that assistance is apportioned 
along geographic lines, and each region has its own rules, procedures, program s, and set 
o f agreements. Additionally, today the aid apparatus that is designed to further the 
developm ent interests o f  tw enty-five countries is divided betw een three Directorate 
Generals and one im plem enting agency within the ambit o f the Com m ission. The 
Com m ission, in turn, is partially answ erable to the Council and the Parliament.
'C lare Short, “Aid That D oesn’t H elp,” Financial Times (June 2000). Other 
critical reviews include S. Dcardcn, “The Reform o f  the European U nion 's Development 
Policy,” Journal o f  European Affairs 2:2 (M ay 2004).
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As noted, EU foreign aid in the 1990s was not only structurally com plex, but also 
had a m yriad o f  goals. O ver the decade, the EU funded an increasingly com plex m ix o f  
pro-m arket, security-m otivated, and hum an rights-oriented program s and policies that 
reflected the EU ’s struggle to define itse lf and protect and prom ote its changing interests. 
The need to comply w ith W TO regulations as well as the desire to raise living standards 
in its own m em ber countries challenged the EU ’s generosity, and worries about potential 
security threats increasingly conditioned aid policies, especially in proxim ate regions.
Yet the EU continued to show its concerns with hum an rights, poverty alleviation, and 
the environm ent in its program s and policies. These m ultiple aim s, backed by  differing 
levels o f  prioritization in different regions, made EU foreign assistance disjointed and 
unconnected.
Despite this lack o f  focus, over the past fifteen years, European countries have 
slow ly and begrudgingly agreed to channel m ore o f  their developm ent assistance through 
the EU rather than their own bilateral aid program s. Nevertheless, EU aid, $6.8 billion in 
2004, still constitutes only about one-fifth o f  total aid given by EU countries. M uch o f  
EU aid is, in turn, channeled through NGOs. A study o f  EU activities found that by 1999, 
for instance, in most areas over 90 percent o f  dem ocracy and hum an rights expenditure 
went to advocacy NGOs. M ost o f  these NGOs w ork w ithin an um brella organization that 
is not w holly independent o f  the E U ’s political influence and thus are not truly 
“independent” forces.2 This heavy use o f  NGOs is reflective o f  the E U 's  lim ited in-house 
staff to introduce and help im plem ent reforms. Using “non-partisan” NG Os is also a way
2 . . .
Richard Youngs, “ Dem ocracy Promotion: The Case of European Union
Strategy.” Centre for European Policy Studies, W orking D ocum ent No. 167 (no date). 15
April 2005].
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o f  avoiding prickly issues such as the lack o f  consensus about a long-term  strategic vision 
for EU aid.
Differences in vision are partially rooted in the EU’s institutional dynamics. The 
m ore supranationally-oriented European Com m ission tends to want to use developm ent 
aid to pursue European foreign policy and econom ic prerogatives, w hile the more 
intergovernm ental Council o f  M inisters often prefers the use o f  funds for m ore distinctly 
hum anitarian purposes. Y et w ithin each o f  these bodies, disagreem ents persist. Currently 
EU aid reveals disparate aims. On the one hand, m any aid program s and policies reflect a 
desire for bottom -up, locally owned developm ent that truly represents European ideals 
about hum an rights, gender and racial equality, and hum anitarian assistance. On the 
other hand, the w ay the new EuropeAid allocates developm ent assistance reveals an 
increased em phasis on aligning aid goals with comm on security and foreign policy 
concerns, as well as with econom ic prerogatives. M uch o f  EU ’s recent developm ent 
assistance rem ains focused on the new ly independent Eastern European countries, for 
example, and on m iddle-incom e countries, despite m ost m em ber states requests that it be 
spent prim arily to help the poorest and m ost marginalized. It is difficult to conciliate 
these uses o f  aid, but until there is m ore unity o f  purpose, EU aid will continue to serve 
its m ultiple purposes only fairly  well. This helps explain why m ost EU m em bers still 
prefer to allocate their developm ent aid bilaterally, regardless o f  the heightened impact 
m ultilateral aid could potentially have i f  conscientiously directed.
B efore further review ing the history o f  EU developm ent aid, it is useful to briefly 
track the history o f  the EU itself. The twenty-five-m em bcr EU, expected to grow with 
two new  m em bers in 2007, is an association o f  sovereign dem ocratic states that 
voluntarily cede part o f  their independence in order to reap com m on benefits. Since the
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latest wave o f eastward expansion in May, 2004, Brussels has wielded an ever greater 
influence over another ten countries in Central, Eastern, and Southern Europe. Promoting 
trade was at the heart o f the creation in the 1950s o f  what is now the econom ic and 
political union. That dedication continues, and the EU has also becom e an em erging 
political and economic force. The EU stands for dem ocratic decision-m aking and 
cooperation, yet faces m any o f  its own challenges, as will be examined.
The title o f  the European Com m unity (EC) was changed to the EU when the 
m em ber states’ parliam ents ratified the M aastricht T reaty in Novem ber, 1993, revealing 
m em ber countries’ desires to further strengthen econom ic and political ties.3 The EC 
began as three separate organizations, the European Coal and Steel Com m unity, the 
European Atom ic Energy Com m unity, and the European Econom ic Com m unity, which 
becam e m ore and more united and cooperative as their aspirations and roles increasingly 
overlapped. The movem ent toward closer European integration had begun decades earlier 
during W orld W ar II and its afterm ath, when cooperation between m ostly  the W estern 
European countries was seen as vital to the continent’s reconstruction. In the post-war 
years, the United States supported such efforts as it sought to strengthen its realm  o f  
influence in its growing struggle to contain the Soviet Union and com m unism  generally. 
Early integration efforts derived im petus from John M onnet’s Schum ann plan and 
conviction that war between France and G erm any m ust be prohibited at all costs to 
ensure the future well-being o f  the continent. Italy, Belgium, the N etherlands, and 
Luxem bourg joined in negotiations, resulting in the form ation o f  the European Coal and 
Steel Com m unity (ECSC) in 1951, which consolidated the industrial sectors m ost often
^Successive treaties signaling desires for closer unification were subsequently 
signed in Amsterdam and Nice.
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used to m anufacture w ar m aterials, to help ensure that these six countries would never 
again go to w ar against one another. Great Britain opted not to join. The econom ic 
success o f  the ECSC helped m otivate the six m em ber countries to devise the Treaty o f  
Rome in 1957, which established the European Atom ic Energy Com m unity (Euratom ) 
and the European Econom ic Com m unity (EEC). A common assem bly and court for all 
three com m unities and a Com m ission and Council o f  M inisters for the two new est were 
created. The Com m ission would propose rules and laws that would require ratification 
by  the Council o f  M inisters. The treaty was vague in areas where m em ber countries had 
difficulty reaching agreement, yet it signified m em bers’ wishes to continue m oving closer 
together in various realms.
Soon thereafter, the Brussels-based EEC becam e the prim ary engine for further 
European integration efforts. Soon a custom s union, common tariff, and com m on trade 
policy were proposed and developed. At the insistence o f  the French, a Com m on 
Agricultural Policy (CAP), an im pactful and expensive agreement designed to help 
m odernize agricultural m ethods and support W estern Europe’s agricultural sector, was 
institutionalized.4 The EU also developed a role in external affairs. M ost EU countries
4The antecedents o f  the h ighly protectionist CAP can be traced back to the first 
era o f  globalization (1860-1913), w hen European governments wanted to protect their 
farmers from new com petition with the United States. The current incarnation o f  the 
CAP also gained impetus from the post-W orld-W ar-11 settlements, in which Russia was 
provided with large allocations o f  food aid and G erm any was not. In the 1990s, the CAP 
consum ed roughly h a lf  o f  the E U ’s budget. The m ajor EU countries (except for Great 
Britain) have a m uch larger agricultural sector than the United States'. In France, for 
example, about 10 percent the work force is devoted to agriculture, as opposed to 2 
percent in the United States. In recent years, due m ainly to W TO obligations, the CAP 
has becom e slightly less protectionist. The econom ic policies o f  the G eorge W . Bush 
adm inistration have, conversely, recently  made Am erican agricultural policy m ore 
protectionist than in years past. David Feldman, “Food and Trade Policy.’’ lecture 
delivered to the W orld Affairs Council o f  Greater Hampton Roads, V irginia W esleyan 
College, V irginia Beach, Virginia, 8 February 2003.
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continued to channel m ost o f their foreign aid budgets bilaterally, but EU m ultilateral aid 
did fund some program s and projects. EU m ultilateral aid focused prim arily  on 
hum anitarian assistance and relief projects and concessional trade and financial 
agreem ents with form er m em bers' colonies. The Yaounde accords o f  1963 were replaced 
in 1975 by the first Lome Convention, and later succeeded by the C ontonou Convention.5
The three European com m unities becam e increasingly intertwined over tim e. The E U 's 
m em bership also was growing with the jo in ing  o f  the United K ingdom , Ireland, and 
D enm ark in 1963, G reece in 1981, Spain and Portugal in 1986, Sweden, A ustria, and 
Finland in 1994, and Poland, Malta, Latvia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia,
Estonia, Lithuania, Slovenia, and Cyprus in 2004.6
In the past quarter century the m anner in which the EU functions has m arkedly 
evolved. Integration has long been associated with m arket unification, yet there has also 
been a significant expansion in the nature o f  additional EU activities. The EU has m oved 
beyond the area o f  econom ic regulation into areas such as environm ental and consum er 
protection and health and safety issues. A lthough this expansion process w as initially
sThe successor to the Yaounde Conventions (1963 and 1969), five conventions at 
Lome, Togo (1975, 1979, 1984, 1989, and 1998) have reinforced political and econom ic 
ties betw een EU countries and 71 African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) states. The 
Lom e Convention discrim inates in favor o f  these form er colonies. D esm ond Dinan, Ever 
C loser Union, 2d ed. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1999); J. H. H. W eiler, The Constitution  
o f  Europe  (Cambridge: Cam bridge University Press, 1999).
6French President Charles de G aulle initially vetoed the United K ingdom ’s
application to jo in  in 1963 and again in 1966, view ing the British as too closely aligned
w ith the United States. He hoped for a “ third force” to be created during the Cold W ar 
w hich w ould be largely an extension o f  French power. He also resisted efforts to m ake 
the EC supranational, fearing that the French would have insufficient influence in the 
organization. It was only when de Gaulle resigned in 1969 that the EC regained its early 
m om entum .
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founded on a rather fragile official legal base, the organization 's constitution has been 
refined by  successive treaties. The Single European Act and the M aastricht, Am sterdam , 
and N ice treaties helped consolidate European integration.7 They explicitly recognized 
the com petence o f  the European Com m unity to deal w ith various issues, and they brought 
about a gradual shift to qualified m ajority voting that sim plified decision-m aking. The 
Europeanization o f  economic, social, and political regulatory policies has been gradual, 
yet the EU has m ade significant progress at pivotal crossroads. This was particularly 
apparent during 1989-1991 with the fall o f  the Soviet Union and G erm any's 
reunification, which stim ulated the E U ’s resolve to both deepen and widen.8 W ith the 
w idening that continued in the next several years, the EU now covers the full geographic 
range o f  the continent, up to Russia’s borders. The expected addition o f  Rom ania and 
Bulgaria in 2007, provided they m ake requested reform s, will further solidify the E U ’s 
dom inance o f  the continent.9 The com pletion o f  the single m arket program  and the 
introduction o f  the Euro in 2002 were significant developm ents in the consolidation o f
  ---
The division o f  responsibility delineated in the Treaty o f  Rom eresulted in 
deregulatory pressures as the EC set out to rem ove non-tariff trade barriers. It becam e 
increasingly obvious that the only w ay to conciliate m arket integration with social 
regulation program s, and to thus avoid trade distortions, was to create such program s at 
the European level. Com bined with the fact that European firms often prefer to com ply 
w ith a single European ruler than fifteen (now  tw enty-five) different rules, this generated 
grow ing pressures in favor o f  deeper Europeanization. The transfer o f  powers from  the 
state to the European level has helped bring about a transfiguration o f  European policies. 
G eorge Ross, “European Union” in The O xford Companion to Politics o f  the World, 2d 
ed., eds. Joel Krieger and others (New York: Oxford U niversity Press, 2001), 268-70.
8Ronald Tiersky, “Europe: State o f  the U nion,” Great Decisions, 2003 Edition  
(N ew  York: Foreign Policy Association, 2003): 81-91.
9If  Turkey were admitted, not only w ould the EU have a M uslim m em ber, but the 
new Europe would border Syria, Iran, and Iraq, countries far different in many 
controversial ways from traditional EU m em bers.
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the EU. Since then, though, the volum e o f  new  prim ary EU legislation has decreased.10 
This reveals the delicacy o f  the road the EU is attem pting to chart, with new pressures 
and new  opportunities in abundance. Som e w orry that the E U ’s deepening will be stalled 
with w idening, as intergovernmental discrepancies increase and the E U ’s dem ands grow. 
The EU, for example, cannot afford to apply its CAP to its m any new m em bers. 
Nonetheless, few would disagree that the EU is one o f  the m ost significant developm ents 
in the international sphere over the past half-century and that opportunities for an even 
m ore unified and strong union exist.
Currently, the EU is a form idable econom ic power, yet its political strength is 
som ew hat less impressive. This is largely due to the uncertain nature o f  future political 
integration, as some m em bers (notably G erm any and m any o f  the sm aller countries) 
desire a m ore federalist union and others (particularly France, Britain, and Italy) fear such 
a com m itm ent would weaken their pow er and desire a m ore intergovernm ental structure. 
The issue o f  the size and character o f  a potential future EU m ilitary force has not been 
resolved, and dem ands on the union 's budget continue to grow with the addition o f  new 
m em bers. Also, m any are concerned that the EU, considered by  some an elitist project by 
design, has a growing dem ocratic deficit that threatens its political legitim acy. M any 
claim  the institution has lost touch with citizens, yet it is difficult for EU bodies to have 
any sort o f  m om entum  without some degree o f  insulation. Also, the nature o f  the un ion’s 
future relationship with the w orld 's reigning hegem on, the United States, is uncertain .11
l0European Com m ission, Com mission Launches EU P reparatio tis fo r  the W orld 
Sum m it on Sustainable Development in 2002  (Luxem bourg: Office for Official 
Publications o f  the European Com m unities, 2001)
11 For an insightful discussion o f  the relationship challenges betw een the EU and 
the U nited States, see Henry Kissinger, Does Am erica N eed a Foreign Policy?: Toward a
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America was instrum ental in helping rebuild continental Europe after W orld W ar II and 
in providing it w ith security during the Cold War. Since the fall o f  com m unism , though, 
Europe and the United States have often behaved m ore like rivals than friends, as has 
been conspicuous in the new m illennium 's w ar on terror. As the world is increasingly 
globalized and interconnected on m any levels, the EU is still determ ining its desired roles 
and its political identity. The EU has come further than m any would have predicted from  
its hum ble post-w ar beginnings, but clearly has m any obstacles to overcom e i f  it is to 
better m eet its citizens’ needs and assum e a greater w orld role.
As m entioned, one such obstacle is the issue o f  governance w ithin the EU itself. 
O f relevance is how to best guarantee that people throughout Europe are well represented 
in EU governm ental bodies and institutions which m ore and m ore influence their daily 
lives. The subject o f  representation has been called into question particularly by large 
EU states that see the E U ’s efforts at granting equality to all states, no m atter what 
geographical o r population size, and equal jurisdiction in m ost voting m atters as unfair. 
Proposals have been put forth to re-weight votes or to introduce a double-qualified 
m ajority vote, requiring a preponderant vote to reflect a m ajority o f  the E U ’s population. 
Studies are currently being undertaken to further explore these and other options that 
might increase the E U ’s real and perceived legitim acy. Another relevant issue facing the 
EU is the lack o f  direct representation and accountability in the organization generally. 
Some have accused the institution o f  lack o f  transparency and accountability. As the EU 
prescribes good governance and dem ocracy in its developm ent program s, it continues to 
struggle with these issues w ithin its own leadership m echanism s.
D iplom acy fo r  the 21st Century  (New York: Simon & Schuster, 200 U, 32-82.
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A nother large question about the future o f  the EU is how it will handle security concerns. 
The post-Septem ber 11, 2001 war on terror has forced the issues o f  the E U ’s security and 
m ilitary options to the forefront. Even earlier, the successive foreign policy crises o f  the 
1990s called for som e m aturing o f  the EU in term s o f  foreign and security policy. There 
w ere lessons in realism  to be learned from Y ugoslavia, Som alia, and Rwanda. Gradually 
the EU has com e to believe that its external policies need attention. This revelation was 
enhanced by a host o f  NGOs lobbying (for exam ple, with the 1997 A m sterdam  appeal) 
for the EU to play a greater role in the securities field. The sam e year saw negotiations 
finalized to strengthen the EU’s m uch-debated Com m on Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) and also saw the developm ent o f  the European C om m ission’s Conflict 
Prevention Network, which sets up and works to help im plem ent political guidelines for 
addressing the root causes o f violence.
In 2004, a new EU Constitution, a new EU Com m ission, the recently elected new 
European Parliam ent, and these new security strategies all created the m om entum  to 
reflect on the goals and desires o f  a future EU. M ost would agree that w ithin the Union, 
the European institutions m ust be brought closer to citizens. Also, Europe needs to 
increasingly accept its responsibilities in the governance o f  globalization. It is poised to 
be a w eighty econom ic and political actor and a protector o f  hum an rights and freedoms 
if  it can continue to unify and serve its m em bers and strengthen not only its voice but also 
its world role.
History o f  Developm ent Policies
The E U ’s developm ent cooperation policy has a long tradition. Though the Treaty 
o f  R om e referred to the role o f  the EU in prom oting econom ic and social developm ent in
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countries w ith special ties to France, Belgium , and the Netherlands and identified m eans 
o f  pursuing these objectives, negotiated agreem ents between the EU and developing 
countries represented the core o f  European developm ent cooperation policy from the 
early 1960s onward. Y et other than the Lom e Conventions, EU development policies 
have largely been understudied until quite recently. This is m ost likely due to the 
com plexity and lack o f  centralized planning for the E U 's  policies with other areas besides 
its form er colonies. In 2000, for example, the EU had m ore than 60 different budget 
headings for its developm ent aid, not counting European Development Fund (EDF) 
resources, which lie outside o f  the principal budget allocations. Another likely reason for 
the lack o f  scholarly literature on EU developm ent policies is the fact that they are 
generally debated in private w ithin the European Com m ission and between the 
Com m ission and the European Council. In fact, the C om m ission’s tendency toward 
private decision-m aking was one o f  the factors in the Com m ission’s resignation en m asse
1 2
in 1999 am idst allegations o f  m ism anagem ent. Fortunately, since the year 2000, in the 
wake o f  heightened criticism  about the incoherence o f  m any EU development program s, 
more docum ents and details have been m ade available to the public.
Even this new accessibility does not m ake EU developm ent policies sim ple to 
decipher. The EU has over the years reached special developm ent agreements and 
com m itm ents w ith developing countries throughout the world in addition to the African, 
Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries, but it was not until the early 1990s that most o f  
these becam e form alized. It was not until the late 1990s that EU aid became centralized
12John Peterson, “The Santer Era: the European Com m ission in Normative, 
Historical and Theoretical Perspective,” Journal o f  European Public Policy 6:1 (1999): 
46-65; Christopher Lord, D em ocracy in the European Union (Sheffield: Sheffield 
Academic Press, 1998).
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and coordinated m ostly under the auspices o f  the new ly created EuropeAid, served by 
five D irectorate Generals and reporting to the Com m ission. In response to several calls 
for reform, the EU assistance program s were stream lined and decentralized, with 
increased roles for EU developm ent practitioners in the field. EuropeAid is organized 
into five geographic regions and five operational directorates which focus on them atic 
and adm inistrative issues and provide hum an resources, finance, and m anagem ent 
support for aid im plem entation, in close collaboration with country delegations. 
Organizationally, EuropeAid im plem ents the assistance cycle, while the Directorate- 
General for D evelopm ent (DG DEV) handles aid for the ACP countries and the 
D irectorate-General for External Relations (DG RELEX) for other regions. Country 
Strategy Papers have in recent years been initiated to be created in a discussion process 
with recipient countries and other donors. Rolling program m ing has been instituted, 
along with greater pow er and responsibility sharing w ith local delegations. By 2004, 
deconcentration o f  EU sta ff to 61 delegations had been com pleted, and alm ost 1,600 
additional s ta ff transferred. Also, greater em phasis was put on achieving tangible results 
for assistance efforts. It was hoped that the E U ’s emphasis on dispersem ent would be 
replaced w ith a focus on the impact o f  policies and program s.13 It is still too soon to tell 
how effective all o f  the recent reform s will be, but there are som e prom ising signs, such 
as m ore data available to the public, m ore involvem ent o f  locals in recipient countries, 
fewer uncoordinated program s, and fewer coordination problem s betw een program s.
EU aid in the 1990s certainly could have benefited from m ore organization and a 
clearer m ethodology. In that decade, the four m ain areas receiving EU aid were the ACP,
l3European Com m ission, Com munication fro m  the Com mission to the Council 
and the European Parliament: The European C om m unity’s D evelopm ent Policy  
(Brussels: European Com m ission, 2000), 31; S. Dearden, “Reform .”
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Asia and Latin Am erica (ALA), the M editerranean (MED), and East and Central Europe 
and the Com m onwealth o f  Independent States (CIS), yet within these “areas,” fourteen 
“regions” were targeted to receive EU aid flows. W ithin the regions them selves, often a 
confusing range o f  partnerships for different recipient countries existed. EU assistance 
was not only spread w ider geographically over the course o f  the 1990s; it also increased 
substantially. Because EU aid budgets are convoluted and some disagree about precisely 
what constitutes aid, a surprising degree o f  contention persists about how m uch the EU 
actually spends on foreign assistance. Som e contend that EU aid tripled over the 1990s, 
from U nited States $3.3 billion in 1990 to $10 billion in 2000. Others m ore accurately 
assess m ore recent figures to be m uch lower— about $5 billion in 2000 and about $6.8 
billion in 2004. Even though even these latter figures sound relatively high as they do not 
include bilateral aid from European countries (about $25 billion altogether in 2000 and 
$32 billion in 2004), the proportion o f  EU developm ent aid to the overall EU econom y 
fell by  about one-third during the 1990s. Over the 1990s, the EU decreased the 
percentage o f  its developm ent assistance to the countries in the ACP region (from  55 to 
44 percent), A sia (12 to 9 percent), and Latin A m erica (8 to 7 percent). It increased the 
percentage o f  its aid to countries in the M editerranean (14 to 20 percent) and Central and 
Eastern Europe (4 to 9 percent) and countries from  the former Soviet Union (0 to 4 
percent). These trends have continued into the new m illennium .14 The E U 's 
developm ent cooperation policy has focused m ore attention on wealthier or m iddle- 
incom e developing countries and the near-abroad. The EU has also m ore actively
l4“ E urope’s W asted A id,” Econom ist 355:8171 (20 M ay 2000) :60; Carlos 
Santiso, “ Im proving the G overnance o f  European Foreign Aid: Development 
Cooperation as an Elem ent o f  Foreign Policy.” W orking Paper (Brussels: C enter for 
European Policy Studies, October, 2002); Youngs, “Dem ocracy Prom otion.”
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prom oted neoliberal approaches to developm ent, and subordinated som e o f  its 
developm ent objectives to foreign and security policy considerations. These trends in 
developm ent policy have drawn attention aw ay from the w orld 's poorest countries and 
people and have reduced—but not elim inated—the poverty eradication and hum an rights 
orientations that have long dom inated EU rhetoric about its policies.
Splinters in the EU ’s developm ent aid interests can be traced back to the original 
m em ber countries’ differences. In the late 1950s through the first enlargem ent in 1973, 
divergence existed in the views o f  m em ber countries. France and Belgium  were intent 
upon the creation o f  a developm ent policy concentrated on form er colonies in Africa that 
em phasized aid, and G erm any and the N etherlands desired a m ore global policy that 
em phasized trade. The latter two countries saw special concessions as unilateral attempts 
to increase countries’, particularly France’s, international power and view ed free trade as 
a m ore equalizing endeavor. Italy favored aid rather than pushing for m ore open markets, 
yet did not have the ties to Africa that France and Belgium had. Since the late 1950s, 
European relations w ith developing countries have faced two m arkedly different 
pressures: regionalism  and globalization. A com prom ise between these two view s 
represented by  France and Germany increm entally  emerged: the EU w ould com e to have 
a w orld-w ide developm ent policy organized around regional program s, w hich would 
receive differentiated weighting. F rance 's form er colonies in the ACP region would 
receive m ore grants and privileges, and other regions would receive their aid w ith more 
conditions attached, often with more em phasis on trade. This division can be seen in the 
E U ’s developm ent budget allocations and in the w orking arrangem ents o f  the European 
Com m ission and the Council o f  M inisters. The original privileges granted to the ACP 
countries m ade them  the top priority. These privileges provided a fram ew ork for political
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and econom ic cooperation between Europe and the ACP countries that promoted 
developm ent through a com bination o f  preferential m arket access, com m odity price 
stabilization schem es, and developm ent aid. O ther countries and regions were granted aid 
on a m ore im prom ptu basis.
W ith the E U ’s first enlargem ent, there was a dram atic m assive extension o f  the 
geographical scope o f  EU developm ent cooperation (which the United Kingdom  heartily 
endorsed), and G erm any’s position on prom oting trade and globalization becam e 
stronger. Ireland and Denm ark, less influential countries, wanted the EU to be m ore 
generous and less political with its aid allocations. Still though, the area that received the 
m ost focused attention by EU countries was the ACP region. The five-year-long Lom e 
Conventions, succeeding the 1966-1975 Y aounde Conventions, were the first overt 
evidence o f  the w ay the EU viewed foreign aid. As colonialism  progressed, EU m em bers 
sought to continue their special relationships w ith form er colonies through preferential 
econom ic relationships. It was agreed that the form er colonies o f  the original six EU 
m em bers, m ostly  France’s former A frican colonies, and later form er British colonies, 
would have special trading and econom ic relationships with the Community. This 
allowed the EU to retain a sense o f  control in form er colonies and added to the EU ’s view  
o f  itse lf as a “ third force” in the Cold W ar international environm ent.15 The Lome 
C onvention’s m ost significant aspect was its granting the seventy-one ACP states non­
reciprocity in trading relationships, allowing these states to impose tariffs against 
European products while excluding them from European tariffs. Lome also afforded the 
ACP states o ther benefits in the technical, financial, comm ercial, cultural, and political
l5Trevor Parfitt, “The Decline o f  EurAfrica? Lom e’s M id-Term Review ,”
Review o f  A frican Political Economy 23:67 (M arch 1996): 53-4.
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realm s.16 Lome aid had little conditionality attached. Linder the framework o f  the first 
Lome accords, the EU sim ultaneously dispersed aid to right-w ing and com m unist 
governm ents, w ithout dem anding or even suggesting political changes. The EU did not 
attach econom ic conditions later, all the way up through the m id-1990s, for this region, 
even as the W orld Bank and the IMF introduced and came to depend m ore and m ore on 
their SAPs.
France in particular was insistent that Lom e rem ain as it was. despite persistent 
pleas from G erm any and the Netherlands to m ake EU aid less A frica-focused.17 During 
the Cold W ar, as the United States and the Soviet Union competed for pow er and 
influence throughout the world, including in the ACP region, holding onto its sphere o f  
influence there rem ained important to France. Som e EU m em bers did com plain that the 
C om m unity 's developm ent funds were being m isspent, as countries in the ACP region 
failed to develop by any m easurable standard, corruption in m any ACP countries 
persisted, and civil conflicts intensified. Lome policies changed little throughout m ost o f  
the Cold W ar, though, until towards the end. From the late 1970s on. however, the EU 
began gradually decreasing the benefits it accorded ACP countries. This was largely the 
result o f  G A TT rules, which required generalized tariff reductions for all countries. Trade 
figures from EU data reveal that Lome preferenees eroded very slowly. The E U 's 
Com m on External T ariff (CET) was nevertheless reduced from 10-12 percent in the 
1970s to 3-4 percent by the early 1990s. m aking duty-free trade with ACP countries
u’European Union. European Union s D evelopm ent Policy  (16 February 
2005).<http://homepages.uel.ac.uk/ben241 7s/EU A idlb .h tm  ’ [22 March 2002],
r Grilli. 335.
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relatively less significant.,x O ther non-Lome developing countries received LU funding, 
but usually only in crisis situations. The LU rem ained comm itted to humanitarian 
assistance, yet did not express a particular interest in Asia. Latin America, the M iddle 
East, or Eastern Europe. The EU did. though, begin trading more with countries w ithin its 
own sphere and beyond as globalization intensified on many levels.
A long w ith other IDIs at the time, in the 1970s and 1980s, EU developm ent 
programs em phasized fostering rural developm ent and infrastructures. Yet poverty 
alleviation had been at the center o f  ACP-region developm ent policies from the 
beginning, as had concerns about equity, hum an developm ent, and strategies adapted to 
the local context. Even early on, the C om m ission 's policy favored a horizontal approach 
and often blurred dim ensions such as hum an developm ent, democratization, m inority and 
gender rights, and access to health care and education.
W ith the E U 's southern expansions in 1981 and 1986, the integration o f  Greece and 
Spain increased EU interests in prom oting developm ent assistance policies in the 
M editerranean. Spain and Portugal promoted the E U 's developm ent cooperation with 
Latin Am erica, and Portugal increased interest in Portugese-speaking South Africa. 
Portugal also insisted that East T im or’s hum an rights abuses hindered the E U 's 
relationships with Indonesia and ASEAN and sought to enlist EU developm ent policies 
that m ight ease this dilem m a. Also, the E U 's new southern members were protectionist 
countries with traditional exports com peting with those o f  developing countries. These 
new m em bers did not desire more trade with com petitors. The EU remained Lome-
l!iIn m any sectors relative advantages accorded to ACP countries have decreased. 
European Com m ission, Cuidelines fo r  the Negotiations of the New Cooperation 
Agreements with the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) Countries (Luxembourg: 
Office for Official Publications o f the European Com m unities. 1997).
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focused in the 19<S0s. hut this would soon change. The dynamics o f  E ll developm ent 
cooperation would shift with the fading o f  the Cold W ar and the signing o f  the M aastricht 
Treaty. It was not until this treaty was signed in 1993 that developm ent cooperation was 
formally observed as a shared responsibility betw een the m em ber states and the EU. The 
treaty declared that EU developm ent policy should com plem ent the policies pursued by 
the m em ber states. The shift towards a more global, less preferential developm ent policy 
had begun in even the most reluctant m em ber states such as France, and EU policies 
began to slow ly m irror this trend. The E U 's Hum anitarian Aid instrument (ECHO), 
traditionally used to help countries in crisis, becam e m ore selective, and the EU began 
increasingly using its Macro Financial A ssistance instrum ent to prom ote public sector 
reforms in line with traditional m arket-oriented SAPs. Also, since 2000, the EU has 
created a Rapid Reaction Facility, enabling it to allocate assistance funds quickly in crisis 
situation for up to 9 months and up to 12 m illion Euros. This facility was designed to 
improve the E U ’s reaction time in politically volatile situations; it is adm inistered by DG 
RELEX.
Policies were shifting, too, towards the ACP countries. The goals o f  the EU 's 
developm ent policies towards the ACP region had been revealed increm entally in the 
successive AC'P-EU Lome Conventions -  poverty reduction (Lom e III), gender equality 
(Lome IV), hum an rights, good governance, and the rule o f  law (Lom e IV). As special 
preferences for ACP states eroded, fewer carrots were granted to these countries and 
more sticks were held out. The EU began insisting that ACP countries respect human 
rights and im prove their governm ent institutions. The EU, though, was inconsistent in its 
w ithholding o f  aid and special concessions, and thus ACP states changed their habits and 
practices m inim ally and for show.
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In the years preceding and since the signing o f  the M aastricht Treaty, the TU also 
increasingly form alized relationships with other regions o f  the developing world. This 
expansion o f  the E U 's developm ent policies often built upon previous relationships, and 
it is difficult to track, as these relationships and the policy dialogue that accom panied 
them were not alw ays clearly documented. Since the late 1980s and early 1990s. though, 
these new policies and program s have been and continue to be enacted to varying degrees 
throughout the world. One such program . PHARE (now being phased out), was created in 
1989 to help Poland and Hungary with developm ental needs, and it increasingly (and 
since 1997, officially) becam e a vehicle for helping new and prospective EU countries 
prepare for m em bership. PHARE program s focused on market reforms, institution- 
building, and dem ocracy assistance, in the Central and Eastern European countries o f 
Hungary, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic. Slovakia, Slovenia. 
Romania, and B ulgaria .14 The countries o f  the W estern Balkans were once included in 
the program , but were later aided by the CARDS (Com m unity Assistance to 
Reconstruction, D evelopm ent, and Stability in the Balkans) program. O ther accession 
candidates such as Cyprus, Malta, and Turkey received and continue to receive EU aid, 
but also through different program s. Through a process called “ tw inning," EU 
representatives visit prospective EU countries and help install and reform  governance 
institutions and foster desired policies deemed com patible w ith EU functioning. About 
200 representatives w'ere assisting in PHARE countries in 2002. The EU pledged to 
spend $11 billion on PHARE between 2000 and 2006, when the program  ends.""
'^European Com m ission, The European Union and Developm ent Policy 
(Brussels: European Com m ission, 1997). videocassette.
""European C om m iss ion  "W ha t  is PI1ARE7" (Luxembourg:  Off ice for Official
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Under another agreem ent reached in 1991. the TACIS program  (also now being 
phased out), the HU began providing grant assistance to newly independent states that 
were once part of the Soviet Union. The recipient countries in this region included 
Armenia, Azerbaijan. Belarus. Georgia, Kazakhstan. Kyrgyzstan. M o ld o v a .  R uss ia .  
Tajikistan, Turkm enistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. M ongolia was also covered by the 
TACIS program  from 1991 to 2003, and then by the ALA program . Between 1991 and 
2002, S2.3 billion Euro was distributed through TACIS. The program  has prim arily 
aspired to help with the transition process in these countries and has been largely 
conditional upon dem ocratic and m arket reforms. Additionally, in Novem ber. 1995. the 
EU signed the M EDA program  agreem ent with 27 countries from both sides o f  the 
M editerranean. It was agreed that EU resources would be allocated to these countries 
specifically to help them  open up their econom ies to free trade. Part o f  this funding 
supported social program s to help m ake this transition less painful in the short-term.
Most o f  this aid thus far has gone to nine countries: Algeria, Egypt, Jordan. Lebanon, 
M orocco, Tunisia, Turkey, and Palestine. Latin Am erica also began receiving EU 
conditional aid, though program s in this region began and are still m ostly adm inistered on 
a case-by-case basis. Program s between the EU and the ASEAN countries are still less 
form alized than in other regions, yet the EU has been w orking to foster trade there.21 
These newer developm ent cooperation agreem ents w ith newr regions have generally 
received less concessional aid and m ore conditional assistance. The E U 's growdng
Publications o f  the European Com m unities. 2002).
i  j
European Com m ission, "TACIS Program m e— O verview ” (Luxem bourg:
Office for Official Publications o f  the European Com m unities, 2002); idem. "W hat is 
TA CIS?" (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications o f  the European Com m unities. 
2002); European Union. A (iuide to European Union Relations with Third Countries 
(Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications o f  the European Com m unities. 1998).
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interest in wealthier developing countries such as the em erging market econom ies o f 
Latin Am erica and East Asia and the desire to link developm ent cooperation policy with 
the E U 's  foreign and security policy and econom ic agendas have further contributed to 
the E U 's drift in attention away from m any o f  the w orld 's poorest countries and sub- 
Saharan Africa in particular.
Clearly in the 1980s and 1990s, EU developm ent assistance grew in various 
directions. As m entioned, since 1999, the EU has also been instituting national Poverty 
Reduction Strategies. As w ith the W orld Banks PRSPs, the E U 's new strategies m andate 
that countries devise and draw up their own developm ent plans in consultation with 
representatives from the EU and civil society. The EU modeled these strategies after the 
B ank 's and began using them  with som e o f  the poorest countries to which it dispenses 
aid. It is still too soon to ascertain how successful they will be, as most strategy papers 
take several years to devise, and even m ore tim e to put into action.
It is apparent that EU aid is a com plex subject, and critics have been quick to point 
out that com plexity often breeds confusion. Part o f  the rationale for creating the 
EuropeAid office was not only to consolidate aid program s but also to m ake EU aid more 
distinguishable. W ith all o f  its different program  names and uses for aid, onlookers and 
aid recipients tended to forget its source. In early 2001, the EU began channeling about 
80 percent o f  its aid budget through its new ly created EuropeAid agency in Brussels. The 
20 percent o f  rem aining aid was earm arked for helping countries prepare for EU 
m em bership and also for ECHO program s, particularly those designed to help refugees. 
EuropeA id's m anaging board o f  five Com m ission members have been tasked with 
ensuring that EU aid flows reflect and support broader EU policies and goals through 
m ulti-annual program m ing requirem ents. Also, a further devolution o f authority has
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occurred as EuropeAid representatives in 128 offices around the world have gained new 
pow er and intluence over their regional efforts. The new agency also has sent hundreds 
o f  its new sta ff o f  1.200 to these offices abroad.“
The E U 's recent 2004 enlargem ent will likely affect this IDEs developm ent 
policies, as all previous enlargem ents have. New m em bers include relatively poorer 
countries with less sophisticated governm ent institutions and political practices. A lready 
there are signs that the enlargem ent will strengthen the imperative w ithin the EU for 
linking aid to issues o f  regional security and stability. Limiting or preventing further 
im m igration from the East and strengthening existing im m igration and trans-border- 
related legislation are also likely to be future issues as the new states arc brought in closer 
to the union. Due to security concerns, the EU is expected to continue to expand its 
program s in the former Soviet Union states. South-East Europe, and Central Asia. This 
m ay further weaken the E U 's emphasis on helping the poorest countries. W hile many 
countries in these regions have areas o f  severe poverty, econom ic ties or concerns about 
security and imm igration could shift the E U 's focus further from some poor regions 
previously receiving a relatively large percentage o f  EU aid.
One such region is the ACP. W hile using increasing hum anitarian rhetoric, 
somewhat paradoxically, the once-privileged trade status o f  the Lom e states has been 
effectively downgraded. In the 1990s, the E U 's preferential aid and trading relationships 
targeted m ostly at the ACP region underwent new scrutiny, as did its overall developm ent 
policies and programs. M any EU m em bers increasingly saw Lome preferences as more
“'C arlos Santiso, "Im proving." 1-6; European Com m ission Hum anitarian Office. 
EC H O  Strategy 1997: Working Paper (Brussels: European Com m ission Hum anitarian 
Office. 1997).
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o f  a hindrance than an asset. Nearly all o f  the form er colonial powers except for France 
came to view Africa as m arginal to their own well-being. Even France was pressured to 
rethink its com m itm ent to the region due to its potential and then actual participation in 
the European M onetary Union and President Jacques C hirac 's efforts to reduce the size 
o f  F rance 's army. ACP countries, initially enthusiastic about Lome, also gradually lost 
faith in the accords as their econom ies continued to lag behind and Lome assistance 
lessened relative to the E U 's other econom ic relationships. The EU had long been 
reevaluating its policies on aid and trade with the developing world when the Cold W ar 
ended. The European Com m unity developm ent policy declares "integration o f  
developing countries into the global econom y" as one o f  its objectives, yet one o f  the 
notable inconsistencies in EU policy is that its current trade agenda notably underm ines a 
sustainable or equitable basis for that integration. The EU's trade policy forum , the 
Article 133 comm ittee, is com prised o f  trade and industry specialists with no seat to 
represent developm ent interests. Not surprisingly, in m any instances the balance o f  
decision-m aking power places the export potential o f  EU domiciled corporations over 
developm ent policy.
European developm ent cooperation has undergone notable other changes since the 
late 1990s as well, and m ore significant readjustm ents are both underw ay and 
forthcoming. In early 2004. the European Com m ission chose to replace its w ide range o f  
geographical and them atic instrum ents w ith a new' framew ork comprised o f  six 
instrum ents only, four o f  them new. This is being gradually implem ented and is expected 
to be fully operational by 2007, to continue until at least 2013. The four new instrum ents 
are known as Pre-Accession A ssistance, the European Neighbourhood and Partnership, 
Developm ent Cooperation and Econom ic Cooperation, and the Instrument for Stability.
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Two existing instruments, tor Hum anitarian Aid, and for Macro Financial Assistance, 
have been continued. Pre-Accession A ssistance is for the candidate countries Turkey and 
Croatia and the potential candidate countries in the W estern Balkans. It replaces PHARE, 
and CA RD S, as well as a num ber o f  other instruments and regulations. The European 
Neighbourhood and Partnership pertains to the countries o f  the south and eastern 
M editerranean, Ukraine, M oldova, and Belarus, and the countries o f  the southern 
Caucasus, replacing M EDA and part o f  TACIS. This partnership also supports the E U 's 
partnership with Russia. A specific and innovative feature o f  the instrum ent is its cross- 
border cooperation component, that brings together regions o f  the EU M em ber States 
with neighboring countries sharing a com m on border. Development Cooperation and 
Econom ic Cooperation is used for all countries territories and regions that are not eligible 
for assistance under either the pre-accession instrum ent or the European Neighbourhood 
and Partnership instrument, replacing ALA and other countries. The Instrum ent for 
Stability is designed to address crises and instability in recipient countries and help 
relieve transborder issues including crim e, nuclear safety and non-proliferation, the fight 
against trafficking, and terrorism. The Hum anitarian Aid instrument and M acro Financial 
Assistance will change little, except that food aid will be included under Hum anitarian 
A id.23
Even with all o f  these institutional transitions at hand, there are other key issues
“3M ichael Dauderstadt. "EU Eastern Enlargem ent and Developm ent Policy" 
(Novem ber. 2002). <http://64.233.161.104/search?q=cache:IroJggnJV JM J: 
w w w .bond.org.uk/pubs/eu/euenlargem cnt.pdf+m ichael+D auderstadt+% 22EU +Eastem +e 
nlargem ent+and+developm ent+policy% 22& hl=en > [4 March 2005]; European 
Com m ission. Communication from  the Commission to the Council and Furopean  
Parliam ent on the Instruments for External Assistance under the f  uture Financial 
Perspective 2007-2013 (21 October 2004). • http: /europa.eu.int eur- 
lex en com cnc en cnc month 2004 00.html [1 May 2005].
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facing EU developm ent policy practitioners. These range from determ ining the desired 
relationship between EU foreign policy and developm ent to handling the impact o f  
enlargem ent and deciding whether to further shift developm ent goals for ACP countries. 
Also, loom ing questions persist about the role o f  EU Com m issioners and the structure o f  
the Com m ission.
It is evident that the regional distribution o f  EU aid has changed. The EU now gives 
priority to the stability and developm ent o f  neighboring countries and to aid for countries 
in crisis in the regions nearest to the EU. This is reflected in the rising share o f  aid to the 
M editerranean region, Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the Newly Independent 
States (NIS). W hile these regions together accounted for only 18.5 percent o f  total EC aid 
in 1990, this share had increased to nearly 40 percent in 2004.24 Despite criticism  from 
all directions, EU developm ent cooperation is increasingly becom ing a vehicle for the 
foreign policy o f  the Union. On 21-22 June 2002 the European Council in Seville decided 
to incorporate developm ent and hum anitarian issues into a new General Affairs and 
External Relations Council. The m erger was justified  as a technical solution to increase 
policy coherence, but the underlying trend is for developm ent to be subordinated to other 
political agendas. As the union 's integration process becomes more politicized, such 
considerations com e into play m ore in determ ining F.U external actions, including 
developm ent policies. Those perplexed by EU developm ent policy have plenty o f  reason 
to be. It is a confusing tangle o f  program s representing European ideals, practicalities, 
concerns, and fears. Hopefully out o f  this m uddle, experience is being gained, lessons 
learned, and priorities sharpened. And optim istically, helping poor countries and people
"'4 European Union/Less Developed Countries Network. "European Union 
Developm ent Cooperation Policy" (no date), - http: w-ww.eu-ldc.org them es 
developm entcooperution devcoop policy cu.php [17 April 2005],
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throughout the developing world will remain the prim ary goal once policies becom e more 
integrated and cohesive.
Focus on Good G overnance 
The E U 's work to prom ote good governance and dem ocracy in its own 
prospective and new m em bers has had a can y-over effect into its developm ent 
cooperation policies, and, as is often the case with the EU, program s and policies have 
blended in m any cases. The allure o f  EU m em bership did not start transitions from 
authoritarian rule in the Southern or Eastern Europe, but after initial dem ocratic 
breakthroughs, the EU played a notable role in fostering and establishing dem ocracy in 
Portugal, Spain, and Greece.
Thus, from the early 1980s—and arguably earlier—on, the EU has been working to 
prom ote good governance and democracy amenable to its values and desires. Decades 
later, the enticem ent o f  EU m em bership helped to encourage the process o f  democratic 
consolidation in eastern central Europe and provided m otivation for the dem ocratic 
laggards in the region, Bulgaria and Romania, to expedite the processes o f  political 
reform. At the sam e tim e as it was courting friendly new m em bers, this IDI was also 
increasingly institutionalizing and im plem enting its good governance and dem ocracy 
agenda in its developm ent cooperation programs.
Through treaties such as the European Initiative for Developm ent and Human in 
Rights in 1999 and the European Neighborhood Policy in 2003, the EU has m ade the 
prom otion o f  dem ocratic values a prim ary policy objective o f  its internal and external 
relations. It is not reticent about m aking this known, either. In fact, the E U 's website
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claims that access to dem ocracy is a universal hum an right and even a "moral 
im perative ." ''
The M aastricht treaty heralded the first tim e the promotion o f  good governance, 
democracy, and hum an rights were form ally categorized as falling within the goals o f  EU 
developm ent policy for all regions. Interestingly, the EU makes little attempt to separate 
these three categories, using the terms alm ost interchangeably. Unlike other IDIs. the EU 
perspective o f  good governance involves the need to continue im proving policy 
coherence in all relevant areas. Despite a lack o f  conceptual clarity in its dem ocracy 
prom otion strategies, the EU has often stated that the goal o f  supporting dem ocracy 
throughout the world m ust be understood within the general framework o f also protecting 
social and econom ic developm ent, referring to the indivisibility o f  human rights 
promoted and protected in the 1993 Vienna convention. This m erging together o f  
concepts occurs repeatedly in EU good governance and dem ocracy assistance docum ents, 
policies, and program s.
In the year before M aastricht, in 1992, the General Affairs Council o f  foreign 
m inisters created a funding provision for dem ocracy assistance, with a focus on 
strengthening the involvem ent o f  civil society, especially that o f  both an um brella o f  
NGOs the EU has long been associated with and grassroots NGOs. The Council declared 
that all new cooperation and association agreem ents would include a clause allow ing for 
aid suspension if  dem ocracy and hum an rights, as well as principles o f  an open m arket 
economy, were not respected. Interestingly, the E U 's notion o f good governance and 
dem ocracy were broadly construed enough to include respect for human rights and
' ^European Union,  External I ’olicy  (no date).  - http: curopa.cu.int  com m  
/external relat ions h u m an  rights eu election ass uhserv  (17 April  2005 J.
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faithfulness to m arket econom y principals w ithin the same purview. Rarely in other 1D1 
docum ents are term s and concepts so nimbly m ingled and casually linked and even at 
times synthesized. The UNDP som etim es blends ideas, but not to the extent that the EU 
does. The W orld Bank and USAID, on the other end, carefully separate their concepts 
relating to good governance, almost in rigid ways. For the EU, good governance is a 
particularly expansive and roomy concept.
In the years after the M aastricht Treaty was signed, evidence o f  future 
conditionality, including good governance specifications, began to increasingly surface. 
The Treaty itse lf noted that EU developm ent policy would be changed to focus more on 
the “general objectives o f  developing and consolidating dem ocracy and the rule o f  law. 
and to that o f  hum an rights and fundamental freedom s." Another document, com m only 
known as the Horizon Report, asserted that in the future, the client state “m ust not neglect 
its role in creating the physical and regulatory environm ent which business needs in order 
to invest."26 Such changes were occurring at the sam e tim e that the EU was considering 
shifting its whole developm ent framework from past preferential agreem ents to a new 
more m odem  strategic focus.
Even before M aastricht and the Horizon report, small signs indicating recognition 
o f  the desire for a shift towards good governance prom otion had emerged. In the early to 
m id-1980s, the C om m ission 's Directorate General for Developm ent (responsible for 
adm inistering the EDF) initiated a call for “policy dialogue" with client states. It was an 
attempt to urge states to use aid for certain sectors o f  their econom ies, most often the 
agricultural sectors, usually to improve export rates to the EU countries. The EU also 
proposed a hum an rights protection clause to be attached to future aid. By 1990, the EU
2,’Parfitt. 54.
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was also beginning to propose economic reform packages sim ilar to those o f the Bretton 
W oods institutions, yet with the added conditions that human rights and the environm ent 
be protected. Under Lome IV, a new structural adjustm ent com ponent was incorporated 
and blended with existing human rights and environm ental clauses, with S I. 15 billion to 
be allocated towards this ends. Additionally, a varying portion o f  each ACP recipient's 
individual National Indicative Program m e (NIP) would be directed by the EU, in 
consultation with the country, towards specific good governance goals, usually dealing 
w'ith the reform o f  im port and sectoral programs. Significantly, the EU also formally 
introduced Article 5 into Lome IV, stipulating that ACP countries prom ote hum an rights. 
The EU was not given the ability to use sanctions to enforce this Article, though.27 The 
EU began its habit early on o f proposing m ultiple ideals and stipulations, but not always 
reinforcing them with legal or other binding regulations.
Beginning in 1993, the EU began prom oting good governance even more 
emphatically. M ore guidelines were proposed, yet enforcem ent m echanism s were rarely 
utilized, if  created at all. An EU Council o f M inisters resolution stipulated that EU aid 
would be only given to states with sensible econom ic and social policies, democratic 
decision-m aking, adequate governm ental transparency and financial accountability, the 
creation o f  a m arket-friendly environm ent, m easures to com bat corruption, as well as 
respect for the rule o f  law, human rights, and the freedom o f  the press and expression. 
The level o f  rhetoric was not reinforced, though.
'  European Com m ission. L'rom Lome III to Lom e II': Review o f A id  from  the 
Lome Conventions at the End o f  1990 (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications o f 
the European Com m unities. 1992).
‘^European Com m ission. Communication from the Commission on Challenges of 
the Partnership Retween the European Union and the AC P States on Demoeratisation, 
the Rule o f Law, Respect for Human Rights and (load  (lovernance  (Brussels: European 
Com m ission. 12 M arch 199S).
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Nevertheless, m otions to institutionalize good governance and dem ocracy 
promotion in the m id-1990s had unprecedented m omentum . Furthering these early 
efforts, in 1994, proposals on new funds for dem ocracy and hum an rights by the 
European Parliam ent were brought together under a new Initiative for the Promotion o f 
Dem ocracy and H um an Rights. The Com m ission would m anage this effort. In M ay o f 
1995, the EU deem ed that all new country agreements would contain a standardized 
clause allow ing for aid suspension if  dem ocratic practices were not utilized. This clause, 
though, did not state that aid would autom atically and necessarily be withheld, and it did 
not include a clear description o f  im plem entation procedures. Despite these sometim e 
instances o f  lack o f  clarity, developm ents did not stop there. A seperate agency for work 
on hum an rights and dem ocracy assistance was created in June o f  1999 after the Cologne 
Summit. This new Com m ission departm ent assumed all responsibilities for coordinating 
dem ocracy assistance efforts previously falling under the task o f  different geographical 
departments. The establishm ent o f  the EuropeAid Office in 2001 put dem ocracy 
assistance efforts under the auspices o f  one central department.
Throughout this tim e, the EU began fine-tuning and form alizing its working
definition o f  good governance. By the new m illennium , this 1D1 had its definition fairly
well articulated. A ccording to the EU, governance “concerns the state’s ability to serve
the citizens....[It] refers to the rules, processes, and behaviour by which interests are
articulated, resources are m anaged, and power is exercised in society." Further. EU
docum ents contend that governance is
a m eaningful and practical concept relating to the very basic aspects o f  the 
functioning o f  any society and political and social system s. It can be described 
as a basic m easure o f  stability and perform ance o f  a soc ie ty .... good governance 
is the transparent and accountable m anagem ent o f hum an, natural, economic, 
and financial resources for the purposes o f  equitable and sustainable 
developm ent.
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Hence, the EU was clearly allowing lor good governance to include political
dim ensions o f  society, as well as economic dimensions. The EU additionally noted that
D em ocratisation is a gradual and continuous process which needs to take into 
account the country 's  socio-econom ic and cultural context. This process 
consists o f  a series o f  principles which include civil control, political equality, a 
pluralist system  and the existence o f  collectively binding decisions which 
form alise the establishm ent o f  a non-violent dialectic betw een the aspirations o f  
the m ajority and those o f  m inorities according to a body o f  rules accepted by all 
and based on respect for hum an rights and fundamental freedoms.
Dem ocracy, for the EU. was idealized as being country-specific and inclusive. The EU
backed up these very broad statem ents with its fair share o f  funding. In 2002, $EUR 104
million was spent on this line on human rights, democracy, and conflict prevention.30 As
stated, the E U 's support for hum an rights, democracy, and the rule o f  law is established
in the treaties. Article 6 o f  the Treaty on European Union states that the principles o f
liberty, dem ocracy, respect for hum an rights, and the rule o f  law are basic European
values. Hum an rights field m issions and election m issions are accepted as part o f  the
m andate o f  the EU whose treaty considers the protection and prom otion o f  human rights
as well as support for dem ocratization as com ponents o f  EU foreign policy and EU
developm ent programs. Regulations 975/99 and 976/99 o f  29 April 1999 provide the
legal basis for EU activities designed to further and consolidate dem ocracy, the rule o f
law, and respect for hum an rights. A com plem entary legal basis exists in the Tome
Convention.
The E U 's overall developm ent programs and policies prioritize four main principles
29European Com m ission, Communication from the Com mission o f  the European  
Communities, the European Parliament, and the European Econom ic and Social Council 
(Brussels: European Com m ission. 2003).
’"European Centre for Development Policy M anagem ent. "InfoContonou 5: 
Building Social Capital" (M aastricht: ECDPM. 2004).
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that all pertain to some degree to good governance promotion: developing and 
consolidating dem ocracy, prom oting econom ic and social developm ent, fostering 
integration into the world econom y, and alleviating poverty. Protecting hum an rights and 
the environm ent are subsum ed within each o f these categories. M any o f  the E U 's 
program s are strongly oriented to the continental European values o f  em phasizing human 
rights and social dem ocracies. A strong focus is placed on civic education, to improve 
understanding o f  the political process, political choices, and ways the m arginalized can 
increase their influence in societies.
A long with its statem ents and policy directives about the ideal governance 
conditions in societies, the EU continues to consider countries eligible for aid on a case- 
by-case manner. This ID1 has in severe cases suspended aid to the countries it has 
deemed most errant, and in 1994. it was w ithholding aid from eight states: Gambia. 
Equatorial Guinea. Liberia, N igeria. Somalia. Sudan, Togo, and Zaire. Aid to Burundi 
and Rw anda was also being suspended tem porarily due to crisis situations in these 
countries. EU aid was becom ing increasingly conditional, at least discursively, upon good 
governance, and by 1994, conditionality clauses were at least considered in about one- 
fourth o f  all aid decisions.31
In the mid to late-1990s, new' pressure was placed upon EU aid officials to align 
assistance with larger EU goals. In 1996. the European Com m ission sent a directive to 
the Council and Parliament urging a closer linkage o f  European aid. trade, and security 
policy. This document asserted that dem ocracy and good governance prom otion were 
increasingly vital as they affected Europe's econom ic health and security. Good
’'European Com m ission. E I)E  Operations in 1994 (Luxembourg: Office for the 
Official Publications o f  the European Union. 1995).
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governance prom otion was presented as a means to help case extant and potential 
regional, ethnic, and religious rivalries w ithin and between states. A year later, in 1997, 
the EU issued the statement that the "U nion must redesign its aid policy towards the ACP 
countries from scratch....the colonial and post-colonial era is over."32 EU com m issioner 
Joao de Deus O inheiro asserted that future EU-ACP developm ent aid m ust have three 
concerns: to help ACP countries becom e capable o f  integrating into the world economy, 
to build the necessary institutions and governance conditions for a m arket econom y in 
these countries, and to continue providing a safety net for those countries unable to do so. 
It was not until 1997, though, that good governance conditions were officially described 
in a Green Paper on the relationship betw een the EU and ACP. In this paper, the 
Com m ission stressed that future policies would emphasize m acroeconom ic stability, the 
removal o f  trade barriers, realistic exchange rates, governmental transparency and 
accountability, and lawful behavior generally. This was a notew orthy move. The 
Com m ission explained its disengagem ent from past trading preferences and new 
emphasis on good governance in terms o f  pure economics. The value o f  Lome 
preferences to ACP states had gradually declined, due to various EU m easures. Further, 
this value was expected to be reduced further still, the Com m ission contended. O ne o f 
the m ost impactful Lome preferences, for instance, was the exem ption o f  ACP states 
from the M ultifibre Agreem ent governing the export o f  textiles. This agreem ent would
“European Com m ission, Communication fro m  the Commission to the Council 
and the European Parliam ent on Linking Relief, Rehabilitation, and  Developm ent 
(Brussels: European Com m ission, 1996): idem. Communication fro m  the Commission to 
the Council: The European Union and  the Issue o f  Conflicts in A frica: Peace-Building. 
Conflict Prevention, and Beyond  (Brussels: European Com m ission. 1996).
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be phased out according to Uruguay Round stipulations. '3 Additionally and perhaps most 
significantly, the Com m ission asserted that it m ust be faithful to W TO rules that Lome 
preferences be ended altogether in com ing years. A subsequent Com m ission dispatch 
m ade it clear that ACP aid would be conditional upon the fulfillment o f  good governance 
requirem ents, such as respect for hum an rights and adherence to "dem ocratic principals." 
These principals were defined in "term s o f  three fundamental characteristics: legitimacy, 
legality, and effective application" o f  the rule o f  law and good governance practices.34 
The Contonou Convention currently being phased in replaces the four previous Lome 
Conventions. Its new five-year, $13.5 billion developm ent resource endowm ent, the 
EDF, is designed to be used to achieve m ore balanced m acroeconom ic fundam entals, 
along with increased private entrepreneur incentives and social service delivery. Since the 
early 1990s, the trade preferences that had stood out as a prominent feature o f  EU 
developm ent policies have been gradually replaced by free trade agreem ents between the 
EU and its partners in the developing world. New non-preferential ACP-EU partnerships 
are being forged. These new arrangem ents are rem oving tariff barriers reciprocally and 
progressively, and good governance stipulations are being included with the stated aim o f 
helping the ACP countries attract m ore private investment. W hile som e o f  the Lome 
arrangem ents are being m aintained during a preparatory period lasting until 2008, formal 
negotiations began in Septem ber 2002 on new econom ic partnership agreem ents. The 
Contonou Agreement does enable the EU to em ploy a more "flexible response" in terms
33 European Com m ission, Follow-up to the Rio Summit: Com munication to the 
Council and the European Parliam ent (Brussels: European Com m ission. 2000); 
European Com m ission. Fram ew ork Partnership Contract. (Brussels: European 
Com m unity. 1998).
4European Com m ission. Dcmocratisation. 2. 6.
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o f  crisis m anagement, and hum anitarian assistance is still granted. Special treatm ent o f 
the region, though, is no longer custom ary .’'-'
The EU lobbied successfully for good governance to be an essential elem ent o f 
the new Contonou accord, the violation o f  which could result in the application o f 
sanctions from Brussels. This was som ething which a large num ber o f  ACP states 
view ed as an intrusion on their sovereignty and were reluctant to accept. Political 
dialogue betw een the EU and each o f  the ACP partner states or regions will play a key 
role in determ ining the nature and objectives o f  the assistance provided, according to the 
Com m ission, which noted the agreem ent also establishes special consultation procedures 
and appropriate sanctions for dealing with hum an rights violations and serious corruption. 
Several ACP states have been outspoken against what they see as the developed nations' 
interference in internal matters o f  developing countries. Privately. ACP delegates 
com plain about political conditionalities imposed by the EU upon countries w ishing to 
sign on to the Contonou Agreement, through which the EU will disburse som e 13.5 
billion euros (US$12.7 billion) to the ACP states through its EDF in the next few years. 
The Contonou Convention adopted in June o f  2000 convention now m anages EU 
developm ent cooperation with ACP countries. This cooperation with ACP countries 
com prises the largest aid program m anaged by the Com m ission: aid allocations reached 
€3.8 billion in 2001, which was 37 percent o f  overall EC developm ent assistance.16 Under 
the new Contonou partnership agreem ent, the system o f  trade preferences previously 
granted the ACP states will gradually be replaced by a series o f  new econom ic 
partnerships based on the progressive and reciprocal removal o f  trade barriers. Partly in
^E uropean Union. Union s D evelopm ent Policy.
•"’Ib id .
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order to com ply with W TO regulations, preferential access to the HU m arkets for bananas 
and other com m odities produced by the ACP states may be dism antled as part o f  a 
broader strategy to im prove the ACP states' ability to attract private sector investm ent.'''
The late 1990s witnessed the rapid proliferation o f  EU docum ents defining, 
describing, and analyzing the topic o f  good governance and ways o f  prom oting it.3s 
M any w orkshops and forums on good governance and dem ocracy were held .34 The 
definitions o f  good governance becam e m ore and m ore broad and inclusive, and by 2000, 
included “a state o f  m ind," “a moral concept," respect for human rights, sound 
institutions, reliable and fair laws and legal processes, participatory regim es, regim es that 
valued civil society 's input, free presses, open access to information, equitable regim es, 
peaceful societies, non-corrupt adm inistrations, pro-women conditions, pro-education 
adm inistrations, and strong and accountable leaders. Com m ission President Romano 
Prodi stated in early 2000 that the E U 's good governance policies were intended to help 
the EU “ .. .project its model o f  society into the w ider world."40
In preparation for this, in the 1990s the E U 's dem ocracy and good governance 
prom otion program s and policies had five m ajor emphases. These were public 
adm inistration, legal and judiciary reform , local and national elections, civil society and 
citizen em pow erm ent, and peace and security.
37Ibid.
3sEuropean Union, Good G overnance for Sustainable D evelopm ent (16 February 
2005). <http://hom epages. uel.ac.uk/bcn2417s/E U A idlb .h tn t> [22 March 2002],
34EU-sponsored good governance and dem ocracy promotion workshops have 
thousands o f  links on the internet from the late 1990s. perhaps m ore than any other IDE
4°Europcan Union. ( nion 's Developm ent Policy, 12.
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Public Adm inistration
M any o f  the E U 's public adm inistration reform  programs and projects have 
supported neoliberal values, yet usually with social needs and rights clauses incorporated 
years before most other IDls did this. M ost every m ention o f  adm inistrative reform  o f  the 
state includes a lengthy discussion o f  how' social needs should be prioritized and equity 
concerns taken into account, and this was not a reaction to criticism , as has been alleged 
with the W orld B ank 's proliferation o f  social clauses in the late 1990s and beyond. The 
EU has been prescribing attention to social needs in its developm ent policies since its 
good governance agenda began em erging in the early 1990s. Also, the E U 's good 
governance program s have been less inclined to prom ote smaller states, em phasizing 
better organization and balance, as w'ell as m ore accountability. Little attention is given 
to dowmsizing the state, except for the purposes o f  decentralization program s that aim to 
spread state pow'er m ore broadly.41 For m any other IDIs. downsizing is considered 
alm ost a prerequisite for good governance; this is not the case for the F.U. Nonetheless, 
like o ther IDls, the EU in the 1990s increasingly blam ed poor fiscal m anagem ent, 
excessive protectionism , and a restrictive investm ent regim e for contributing to poverty. 
EU -supported NGOs provided technical and adm inistrative advice, training, and support 
for building m arket institutions. M ajor aims o f  EU reform program s have included 
reliability o f  governm ent administrations, sustainable reduction o f  budget deficits, the 
elim ination o f  discretionary tax and tariff exem ptions, and stabilizing the banking sector 
by curbing the practice o f  political loans. The EU has and continues to support various 
initiatives for trade liberalization, custom s procedures, the removal o f technical barriers 
to trade and investment promotion, and the developm ent o f regional capital m arkets and
41 Ibid.
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instrum ents for cross-border payments. Program goals have also aimed at im proving the 
efficiency and com petitiveness o f national econom ies through deregulation o f financial 
and labor m arkets, price liberalization, trade and exchange-rate reforms, the privatization 
o f  public enterprises, tax reforms, and transparency in fiscal or resource allocation. The 
EU has helped m any countries prepare for open m arket local, regional, continental, and 
international trade negotiations. Most o f  the E U 's  anti-corruption program s support an 
enabling environm ent for business and the m arket econom y, but without the view that 
this necessarily translates into sm aller states. A ccording to EU docum ents, in order to 
attract FDI, countries m ust build an institutional environm ent characterized by 
predictability, accountability, and transparency. The consistent application o f  sound (or 
neoliberal) econom ic policies and the prom otion o f  a stable m acroeconom ic fram ework 
has been and still is prescribed. The E U 's anti-corruption programs focus on banning the 
tax deductibility o f  bribes, rules on public procurem ent procedures, the introduction o f  
accounting and auditing standards, and the blacklisting o f  corrupt companies. In addition 
to balancc-of-paym ents support, the EU provides investm ent capital to advance m arket 
transitions through the European Investment Bank and the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).42
M ost program s have also worked to m ake social spending more transparent and 
accountable. There has been an increasing use o f  tracking surveys that follow social 
sector expenditure to see to what extent central governm ent funds meet citizens' needs. 
The EU sponsors m any program s to help ensure that public funds go towards pressing
4“ European Com m ission. Digest o f Com munity Resources Available for
Financing the Activities o f  NGOs and Other G overnm ental and or D ecentralised Bodies
Representing Civil Society in the Fields of D evelopm ent Cooperation and H um anitarian
A id (Brussels: European Com m ission. April 1WX).
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social needs and uses consultation processes with NGOs. local officials, and local citizens 
to determ ine what these are. In Burkina Faso, for example, the EU, in consultation with 
citizens and civil society, helped devise plans for public money to fund teachers' salaries, 
school books, and medicine. The EU has also provided humanitarian aid o f  food and 
m edicines to a num ber o f  countries to help ease the shock o f  econom ic adjustment.
There has been an em phasis on participation and ownership o f EU-sponsored reform  
program s. The EU funds program s, for exam ple, to increase inter-m unicipal cooperation 
to help im prove dialogue between the city and federal levels through strengthening the 
adm inistrative and resource capacity o f  city governm ents. The EU, for instance, has 
created decentralization training program s for m ore than 1000 district officials and 8,800 
District A ssem bly m em bers and local leaders in G hana 's 110 districts.43 The EU helps 
local officials design and amend constitutions, with citizen input. The EU funds NG Os to 
increase citizen awareness and participation program s that are inclusive and that instruct 
people about their political rights and how they can influence policy. W omen, the 
poorest in society, and other m arginalized groups are encouraged to learn about 
governm ent practices and to m ake their desires know n.44 In sum, the E U 's public 
adm inistration program s in the 1990s attempted to both foster open market econom ies 
and increase states' responsibilities and openness to m eeting citizen needs.
Legal and Judiciary Reform
EU legal reform program s in the 1990s were also expansively construed. Som e 
concentrated on fostering reliable open market econom ies with private law to secure
—  —  4 3JEuropean Union. Guide.
44 I b i d .
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property rights, including intellectual property rights, and reliable contracts. They 
involved public finance m anagement and com m ercial property rights protection.4" Others 
emphasized m ore hum anistic elements o f  the legal system, such as fair and responsible 
criminal justice  systems. PHARH TACTS projects, for instance, both helped to establish a 
legal inform ation program  in Hungary for better m onitoring o f  contract rights and 
supported NG O efforts to improve prison conditions in Ukraine. Estonia, and Lithuania.
EU legal reform  program s also had a strong anti-crim e component. For Russia 
and the W estern NIS, special attention was given to initiatives addressing m ajor cross- 
border problem s including crim e and corruption. The EU supported several initiatives to 
strengthen ju risd ictions' capacities to combat organized crim e in eastern European 
countries. To address the challenge o f  international crim e, the EU is also m oving toward 
a single area o f  justice for its own m em ber countries with norms and guidelines for its 
developm ent policies and program s as well. Since the adoption o f  the Amsterdam Treaty, 
which states that the creation o f  a common area o f  freedom, security, and justice  is a goal 
o f  the EU, steps have been taken to mainstream  crim inal justice procedures w ithin the EU 
which have had a carry-over effect. Definitions and descriptions o f  particular crim es and 
their proposed punishm ents have been form alized for EU countries, and the EU has 
transferred these to som e o f  its aid recipients. This has been particularly true for crim es 
with transnational repercussions. Intense efforts are being put into the developm ent o f  
integrated border m anagem ent. M igration and asylum  are also key foci. In some countries 
such as Bangladesh, the EU has established a com prehensive criminal justice reform 
program , including im proving policing services and separating the judiciary from the
^ E u r o p e a n  Union."Final  Comprehensive  Evaluation o f  Par l iamentary Support  
Programme:  1996-2002."  (no date). • http: w w u  .eupsp.org.za - [ 1 7  April 2005],
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executive. In the field o f  security, the EU has supported the institutional developm ent o f 
the South African Police Service (SAPS), the Departm ent o f Safety and Security (DSS). 
and assisted police forces in Eastern Cape.4,1 O ther EU legal and judicial reform 
program s have concentrated on enhancing the capacity o f  particular institutions. The EU 
has program s that train the elected m em bers and professional staffs o f  parliam ents, 
focusing on such functions as budgetary m anagem ent, press relations, and research and 
library support. PHARE and TACIS dem ocracy assistance projects have been w orking to 
establish a legal inform ation and assistance program  in Hungary. Other projects support a 
vast array o f  training program s for lawyers. In South Africa, the EU sponsored a justice 
system reform program  (E-justice) to address the shortages o f  the legal system by 
ensuring training for public officials and by m onitoring the respect o f  fundamental rights 
(such as rights to a legal defense, rights o f  detainees, and rights enshrined in the country 's 
constitution).47
Local and National Elections
Despite progress in other areas like legal and judicial reform, electoral assistance 
constituted the m ost conspicuous form o f  EU dem ocracy assistance in the 1990s. 
Responding to the growth in transitional democracies, the electoral assistance role the EU 
has played has served as a key entry point for undertaking a new generation o f 
governance projects. W ithout imposing its own political agenda and allowing for a 
diversity o f  political m odels, the EU began observing elections in 1993 in Russia and in
4<’Europcan Union, Common Position on Human Rights, Democratic Principles, the 
Rule of Law  and ( food (iovernanee in Africa (Brussels: European Union. 199S). 1.
Deve lopm ent  Gateway.  ' 'M om entum  for Legal Aid Reform Builds Across 
Europe"(22 March 2005).  ■ http: topics.de\  elopmentgatew as .o rg  gosernance  re 
ItemDetail .  do -1033N9S [22 April 2 0 0 5 1.
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1994 in South Africa and followed a case-by-case approach throughout the 1990s. Over 
the rest o f  the 1990s. the EU funded m any electoral observation m issions throughout its 
aid-receiving regions. It was not until 1998. though, that the EU established criteria for 
evaluating the fairness and regularity o f  elections it observed. Also in 1998. the EU 
developed formal guidelines for electoral observation, and in 1999. it instituted criteria 
for the selection o f  electoral observers. The EU also has supported dom estic elections 
m onitoring and helped countries design and im plem ent new electoral systems.
Unlike USAID, EU funding o f  political parties has been limited. W hereas USAID 
supports United States State Departm ent calls for "regim e change" and "new  leadership," 
the EU uses softer language and a softer approach towards encouraging political reform 
in recipient countries. EU docum ents frame their efforts with descriptions such as "social 
m odernisation" and "the transform ation o f  society." and em phasize the im portance o f  
"partnerships" and “consensus." EU developm ent officials have com m only argued that 
encouraging dem ocracy requires building widespread and strongly em bedded consent for 
dem ocratic norm s and that political liberalization adopted as a result o f  external pressure, 
reluctantly and in the absence o f  positive consent, is rarely sustained for a long period o f  
time. A key focus has been to fund NGOs to help begin dialogues with state officials on 
“social developm ent." W hereas USAID program s attempt to replace authoritarian 
regim es, the EU is m ore am enable to trying to dem ocratize such leaderships. D em ocracy 
budgets have been used, however, to support local level social and environm ental
4Xgroups.
The absence o f  uniform ity and the rich diversity in institutions and procedures was
---------- 38' European Com m ission, Commission Communication on E C  Election Assistance  
and O bscn  ation-l-'ava Report (14 March 2001). http://europa.eu.int 
com m /extem al relations/new s patten speech 01 125.htm -[22 April 2005].
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and still is an im portant EU com ponent in its dem ocracy assistance program s. For the 
EU, variety in social and political organization m atters in furthering democracy. A 
European approach is therefore distinctive in sharing a range o f  experiences and by being 
relatively inclusive.
The EU has also been instrum ental in developing various projects to raise support 
for democratic elections. Representatives helped create a Russian radio series to show the 
im portance o f  local governm ent and NGOs. O ther EU projects have supported a vast 
array o f  program s educating lawyers, journalists, public opinion analysts, trade union 
representatives, w om en's rights activists, local adm inistrators, em ployer association 
m anagers, civilian specialists in defense and security issues, and m any others about the 
influence they m ight have in dem ocratic politics.
The EU w as particularly active in increasing awareness about and participation in 
local and national elections in A frica in the 1990s. Unlike the UN and other IDls, in the 
early 1990s, the EU did not have a specific unit responsible for election involvem ent 
there. The EU Electoral U nit in South Africa (EUN ELSA ) was established on 24 January 
1994 and a total o f  307 officials w ere then deployed. Further assistance was granted 
across a range o f  sectors: additional European police officers were assigned to assist in 
security; and personnel w ere dispensed for m ediation tasks, logistics, election 
adm inistration and, most notably, voter education. Overall, the EU provided 12 m illion 
EC U  specifically for the electoral process. The 307 observers were, on average, deployed 
for a considerably longer period (between one to three months) than the m ore num erous 
1,800 or so UN observers, the bulk o f  whom  were present for just one week. In term s o f  
days spent in South Africa helping prepare for and carry out dem ocratic elections, the EU
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was the m ajor player.4* The support tor elections forms an integral part o f  the political 
dialogue between the European Union, the governm ent, opposition, and civil society 
representatives/" The HU has financed a wider range o f  civic and voter-edueation 
program s and journalist training program s than most other developm ent agencies. Much 
attention is given to the dem ocratic p ro c e s s /1
Civil Society and Citizen Em powerment
Both a strong orientation towards involving civil society in its developm ent 
cooperation, including its good governance and dem ocracy prom otion program s, and a 
notable desire to protect and em power citizens, especially m arginalized ones, during and 
after dem ocratic reform s characterized F.U good governance prom otion in the 1990s and 
beyond. M uch like the UNDP, the EU sees civil society 's potential to hum anize and 
localize developm ent decisions. Also, the EU needs to em ploy NGOS to carry forth its 
agenda, because the union does not have the in-house sta ff available to do so. As much as 
working with and through NGOs has becom e a necessity, prioritizing citizen 
em pow erm ent has becom e a compulsion. The E U 's program s in this area are often 
em bedded in or subsum ed under good governance projects and policies.
The EU has long prom oted the value o f  w orking in close collaboration with civil 
society and in the 1990s and beyond relied heavily upon NGOs to foster and implement
4> i d .
5"lbid.
51 European Com m ission. The K l r s Human Rights and Dcm ocratisation Policy  
(no date), http:--europa.eu.int’comm external relations hum an rights eu election, 
ass observ ■ j 1 1 June 2005].
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its good governance and dem ocracy prom otion policies and program s. By 1994. the h i 1 
was allocating $US 1 billion annually to NGOs.
During the decade, the EU began to rely heavily on a small group o f well- 
organized NGOs that understood its goals. The selection o f this group stemmed from 
previous working relationships. The E U 's cooperation with the NGO com m unity goes 
back to 1976, with the establishm ent o f  Clong, a liaison com m ittee o f  NGOs. Since then, 
the EU has involved this organization in all aspects o f  its dem ocracy assistance. Clong by 
itse lf represents about 880 NGOs with at least 15 platforms. The EU has continued to 
work w'ith and through Clong, as well as other networks o f  NGOs. These relationships 
evolved over tim e to becom e a strong linkage with organized consultation and 
com m unication on im portant developm ent policy issues. The EU has NGOs it is 
com fortable working w'ith meet with developm ent officials in Brussels to devise 
program s and then sends these groups into com m unities to teach locals about the value o f 
dem ocracy and good governance and how to move tow'ard these goals. NGO 
representatives then report back to Brussels on their progress.5*
The EU ’s program s are characterized by a particularly strong focus on human 
rights, which these N G O s prom ote. These groups are also instructed to meet with locals 
and find out w'hat needs in society are being neglected, so that these problem s can be 
addressed. There is a focus on the dem and-side perspective, which NGOs are presumably- 
poised to discover. The EU tasks NGOs with developing strategies, im plem enting 
sustainable programs, and creating operational channels with local governm ent that aim
5:European Com m ission. Digest o f  Community Resources Available for Financing  
the Activities o f  NG Os and Other Governmental and o r  D ecentralised Bodies 
Representing Civil Society in the Fields o f  D evelopm ent Cooperation and Humanitarian  
A id  (Brussels: European Com m ission. April 1998).
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to improve the situations o f  citizens through dem ocracy and good governance support. 
The EU has typically funded less overtly political N G O s than the United States and has 
tried to rely less and less upon its larger, m ore networked NGOs and m ore on local, 
grassroots NGOs. EU-funded NGOs are also decidedly more environm entally focused 
than U SA ID ’s or the W orld Bank’s. Countless N G O and EU docum ents discuss the 
effects o f  E U ’s projects on the environm ent.53 The EU has always been a vigorous 
advocate o f  not only protecting the environm ent but also o f  hum an rights and citizen 
empowerm ent, and this was evident in its dem ocracy assistance and good governance 
prom otion policies in the 1990s. Long before the W orld Bank and m ost other IDls 
m entioned gender equality or the rights o f  indigenous people, the EU has enshrined such 
values in its developm ent policy documents. The introduction o f  Council Regulation 
975/199913 provides the EU ’s m ost detailed description o f  its hum an rights views and 
policies. This regulation includes a long list o f  EU-sponsored hum an rights activities, 
including program s to promote civil and political, as well as econom ic, social, and 
cultural, rights. It also furnishes a m andate to fund program s which support m inorities, 
ethnic groups, and indigenous peoples; reinforce hum an rights institutions including 
N G Os; provide resources for victim s o f  torture; foster human rights education; facilitate 
hum an rights m onitoring missions; and support equality and non-discrim ination and 
m easures aim ed at protecting specific civil and political rights, including freedom  o f  
opinion, expression, and religious belief. G ender issues are also m ainstream ed in the 
EU’s developm ent cooperation policy as a whole, as described in the Council Resolution
53See the m any links on the EPHA Environm ent N etw ork’s website. EPHA 
Environm ent N etw ork (no date). <http://w w w .env-health.org/a/l 586>f 1 M ay 2005],
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on the integration o f  equality between men and women o f  1995. G ender equality and 
w om en's rights form another key part o f  the hum an rights dialogues betw een the EU and 
developing countries. Quite distinct from what one might find in USAID or m any other 
developm ent agency policies, the EU also sponsors programs to help protect the rights o f  
lesbians and gays EU poverty reduction program s have focused on helping m eet the 
needs o f  the m ost vulnerable in societies. The EU supports projects oriented towards skill 
developm ent at the grass-roots level, including carpentry, sewing, baking, animal 
husbandry, and agroforestry. The EU has been particularly attentive to the rights o f  
indigenous people and other m arginalized groups. One o f  m any sim ilar EU resolutions 
calls for the “ full participation o f  indigenous peoples in the dem ocratic processes o f  their 
country," and states that “ [Ijndigenous cultures constitute a heritage o f  diverse 
knowledge and ideas, which is a potential resource to the entire planet." A wide range o f  
projects supporting the rights o f  indigenous people have been carried out, including 
dem arcation o f  indigenous territories, com m unity-based conserv ation and m anagem ent o f  
resources, capacity-building, workshops, studies, and seminars. Both PHARE and TACIS 
projects created a system  to m onitor and reduce racist acts and speech in Albania, 
Bulgaria, and Romania. EU dem ocracy projects have also provide support for a variety o f 
NGOs w orking for the reduction o f  interethnic and dom estic v iolence and for the 
prom otion o f  the rights o f  m inorities and the disabled.54
Along with having the prom otion o f  human rights as a key elem ent o f  partnership. 
EU developm ent cooperation also allows for the m ainstream ing o f  fundam ental social 
rights in the area o f  trade and labor standards. The EU uses the v ersion o f  labor rights
>4European Commiss ion.  Report from the Commission on the Implementation of  
Measures Intended to Promote the O hscnancc  of Human Rights and Demoeratie  
Principles (Brussels:  European Commiss ion.  1996).
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described in the conventions o f  the International Labour Organization, which includes the 
freedom o f  association, the right to collective bargaining, the abolition o f  forced labor, 
the elim ination o f  child labor, and non-discrim ination with respect to em ploym ent. Some 
EU projects have helped create a network o f  trade union education centers in Russia, 
organizations to prom ote consum ers' rights in Rom ania and Slovenia, and a new Russian 
radio series to showcase the im portance o f  local governm ent and NGOs. Further, a new 
"m icro-projects" facility for Central and Eastern Europe makes available very small 
grants (o f about $3,000 to $10,000) to stim ulate activity more deeply at the grass roots 
and to enhance the developm ent o f  a w ider range o f  NG Os.55
Strengthening N G O s’ representation o f  econom ic and social rights has been a key 
emphasis. EU program s have also shown helped countries incorporate EU social policy 
standards and legislation; social m obilization around job training; funding for cultural 
NGOs; and a com m unity level focus built upon support for com m unity leaders, youth 
councils, parents' associations, and links between citizens and local councils. In some 
countries, such as Russia, the EU has helped establish networks o f  trade union education 
centers. The EU has supported w orker's unions by funding training for better em ployees' 
rights and bargaining techniques. The EU has also helped create organizations to prom ote 
consum ers' rights; supported NGO efforts to m onitor and improve prison conditions in 
Ukraine, Estonia, and Lithuania; and instituted a system to m onitor violent racist acts and 
speech in Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania. Targeting the high rate o f  school non- 
attendance and drop-out am ong Rom a'Sinti children in Hungary, the EU allocated EUR
“ European Com m ission. The European Union s Role in Prom oting Human  
Rights and D cm ocratisation in Third Countries (Brussels: European Com m ission, 2001); 
idem. The European Union and the External Dimension o f  Human Rights Policy: from  
Rome to M aastricht and Beyond  (Brussels: European Com m ission and European 
Parliament. Novem ber 1005).
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9.6 m illion, co-financed by the H ungarian governm ent, to support these childrens' 
inclusion in the educational system. In Slovakia, a m inority tolerance program , co­
financed by the Slovak governm ent and totaling EUR 2.3 million, trained 450 local 
Slovak public administration representatives and opinion-m akers on m inority issues and 
conflict resolution.56 Clearly, the E U 's  work with civil society and citizens' rights and 
em pow ennent has been and continues to be substantial.
Peace and Stability
It was a natural extension o f  EU policy to apply the good governance 
conditionalities it had been im posing on its own m em bers to its neighbors. In the 1990s. 
E U 's new purposeful blending o f  aid and security was particularly notable. Com m ission 
developm ent docum ents em phasizing the connections between good governance and 
peace and security proliferated throughout the decade. The EU states that. "Security and 
developm ent are com plem entary agendas; there can be no sustainable developm ent 
w ithout peace and security and developm ent is an essential condition for security." For 
2007-2013, the Com m ission has even proposed a coherent framework which includes a 
new separate instrum ent for “stability." The EU, though, began im plem enting policies o f 
this nature years earlier.57
An illustration o f  the E U 's new concern with geopolitics can be seen in the 
changes in its aid allocations to ACP states during the 1990s. Aid provided through the 
Lome m echanism  amounted to 52 percent o f  the E U 's total external aid in 1990. The 
ACP only received one-quarter o f  EU aid in the year 2000. For the EU. assistance
5,’European Com m ission. Prom oting Human Rights.2.
" Ib id .
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
increasingly started close to home. The political foreign policy elem ent in EU 
developm ent policies increased over the 1990s with more aid and focus going to Central 
and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and the M editerranean countries, and with greater 
em phasis on governance concerns in these regions. The rise over the 1990s o f  amounts 
o f  EU aid to m iddle-incom e countries in Central Eastern Europe, and South Eastern 
Europe and the M editerranean at the expense o f  the poorest countries is reflective o f  the 
tendency. After the Cold W ar ended, EU countries faced newly destabilized countries to 
the East, just as the United States was w ithdraw ing m any o f  its troops from Europe and 
pulling out the security um brella it had held out over Europe throughout the Cold War. 
Central and Eastern European countries were largely im poverished, unstable, and filled 
with peoples desiring to m igrate to EU countries. The gradual elim ination o f  border 
control w ithin the EU had not only m arkedly facilitated the free m ovem ent o f  European 
citizens, but also made it easier for crim inals to carry 011 operations transnationally. The 
EU responded by establishing developm ent program s, such as TA CIS, PHARE, and 
CA RD S, in nearby regions with strong emphases on good governance, particularly rule 
o f  law program s with enforceable conditionalities.
EU good governance and dem ocracy promotion program s heavily  stressed peaceful 
resolution to conflicts. As a 1996 m em o from the com m ission stated that the E U ’s new 
developm ent policies should consider their potential for “balancing the interests and 
opportunities o f  different identity groups within a state, for encouraging dem ocratic 
governm ents that enjoy w idespread legitim acy among the population, for fostering 
consensus on key national issu es .. .and for building m echanism s for the peaceful 
conciliation o f  group interests.”58
^ Ib id .
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The EU in the 1990s began using conflict indicators that exam ine issues such as the 
balance o f  political and econom ic power, the control o f  the security forces, and the ethnic 
com position o f  the governm ent for ethnically-divided countries to try to assess areas o f  
potential conflict and respond to them. In conflict and post-conflict situations, the E U 's 
developm ent program s include peace-building initiatives and rehabilitation activities as 
well as dem obilization and disarm am ent. Peace building and conflict prevention and 
resolution policies were intended to address the root causes o f  conflicts, strengthen the 
dem ocratic legitim acy o f  governm ents, support the dem obilization and reintegration o f 
form er combatants, and tackle the proliferation o f  small arms and light weapons. 
Developm ent practitioners w ere urged to work towards balancing political, economic, 
social and cultural opportunities am ong all segm ents o f  society, strengthening the 
dem ocratic legitim acy and effectiveness o f  governance, establishing effective 
m echanism s for the peaceful conciliation o f  group interests, and bridging dividing lines 
am ong different segm ents o f  society. Activities have included support for mediation, 
negotiation and reconciliation efforts; effective regional m anagem ent o f  shared, scarce 
natural resources; and addressing the problem  o f  child soldiers, as well as for suitable 
action to set responsible lim its to m ilitary expenditures and the arm s trade, including 
through support for the prom otion and application o f  agreed standards and codes o f  
conduct. Additionally, em phasis is given to the fight against anti-personnel landm ines as 
well as to addressing an excessive and uncontrolled spread, illegal trafficking and 
accum ulation o f  small arm s and light weapons. In the 1990s, the Com m ission also began 
review ing its Country Strategy Papers from a conflict prevention angle. W hen such 
papers were prepared, risk factors began to be checked in a system atic m anner5y
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For the EU. good governance prom otes stability and order, especially in nearby 
regions. This has increasingly been the ease in the recent past.
Unique Program Features 
In the 1990s, the EU had an approach towards prom oting good governance and 
dem ocracy reflective o f  the un ion 's  inexperience with this endeavor, com peting desires 
and m otivations o f  m em ber states, and the fact that European developm ent aid rem ains 
strongly com partm entalized across geographic lines. Much was seriously debated and 
docum ented in Brussels, yet due to the EU ’s highly formal and institutionalized 
partnerships, focus has been placed on individual m issions, im plem entation issues, and 
funding decisions rather than on far-reaching strategic questions. Instead o f  targeting 
visible change when break-through opportunities presented them selves, as USAID often 
did, EU good governance and dem ocracy promotion programs in the 1990s revealed 
internal institutional prerogatives, with little overall coordination and attuneness to the 
overall im pact o f  internal dynam ics or to outside events.
The EU ’s good governance and dem ocracy promotion program s supply an apt 
display o f  how institutional realities affect the design o f  policies. The structure o f  
European developm ent cooperation is comprised o f  political leadership provided by the 
Council; the Com m ission in Brussels; the network o f  field offices usually occupied by an 
EU official or two and various NGO representatives; the supervision and decision­
m aking arrangem ents for m em ber states; and the European Parliament. As a rule. F.U 
policies are decided by the twenty-five m em ber states, each represented by politicians 
dependent upon the citizens o f  his or her own country for financial and political support.
"'Ibid.
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As stated, these m em ber countries have different values and political constituencies.
resulting in a divided array o f  independent goals. This helps explain why EU good
governance program s have been lacking in cohesiveness. The m isalignm ent o f  donor
incentives has resulted in contradictory and poorly leveraged aid. Pressure to achieve
select objectives is great, yet these objectives so far have failed to work together to
support a com m on strategic vision for the goals and purposes o f  dem ocracy and good
governance assistance.
The E U 's pow er structure is difficult to characterize, yet it clearly favors the
interests o f  its four largest members: Germ any, France, Italy, and Great Britain. Voting
is weighted based on population size in the Council o f  Ministers. For 1995, the weighting
was as follows:
10 votes (each)— France, Germ any, Italy. Great Bntain 
8 votes -Spain
5 votes— Netherlands, Belgium, Greece, Portugal 
4 votes— Austria. Sweden 
3 votes— Finland, Denmark, Ireland 
2 votes— Luxembourg
The Com m ission is represented by two m em bers from each o f  these four largest countries
rather than the custom ary single m em ber. Also, France in particular has tended to be
particularly influential in guiding and directing the EU. as the union was initially a
Franco-Germ an conception and project, with Germ any the more acquiescent o f  the two
due to its hum ble post-W orld W ar II position. France, which often has been assigned the
C om m ission 's presidency, agreed to enter into the European project in part to help
contain potential future German am bitions within the continent, and G erm any has
willingly conceded to com prom ise in order to regain its repute. Together France and
G erm any set out to reshape Europe, and other countries have been invited to participate
in the project.  Italy, with about the sam e populat ion size as France, has bec o m e  an
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increasingly influential member, and Great Britain, even as a late joiner, also holds clout 
due to its size. France in particular but also Germ any and Italy have never allowed Great 
Britain to steer the E U 's course, however, due to Great B ritain 's geographical distance 
from the continent and geopolitical distance from some o f  Europe's values. Great Britain, 
for exam ple, has tended to side with the United States more readily than have the m ajor 
continental countries.
M ost EU developm ent program mes are based on a financial agreem ent betw een the 
Com m ission and the recipient governm ent, which presum ably sets the objectives, rules, 
and conditions for aid implem entation. This im plem entation is carried out on a 
contractual basis. Som e funding vehicles such as that for em ergency aid are not subject to 
the norm al approval process. Proposals for aid decisions are exam ined by a m em ber 
sta tes' com m ission advisory committees. M em ber states’ votes are weighted based on the 
country’s population, and a certain percentage o f  votes, based on various factors, is 
required for approval. Since the latest N ice Treaty, votes for approval also need to 
represent at least 62 percent o f  the population o f  the EU Union as a whole.
Any influential institution tends to be subject to widespread criticism , and the E U 's 
governing bodies have received even m ore than most. The fact that the EU even exists is 
rem arkable given the com plexity and controversial nature o f  the European project. In 
order to have created such a union, its bureaucracy has had to override m any particular 
worries and concerns and set its sights on the larger picture o f  Europe in the present and 
future. Becom ing m ore integrated and unified has in m any ways m andated that the EU 
becom e more federal and less intergovernmental. In an ironic way, the EU has had to 
becom e less dem ocratic in order to gain the unity and authority to represent and prom ote 
dem ocratic ideals. From one perspective, the E U 's progress has been m asterfully  guided.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
29X
Few believed that the Euro would ever be launched, let alone reach parity with the 
Am erican dollar, as it did on July 15, 2002 for the first time. Yet as critics assert, in 
m any w ays the EU has become increasingly elitist in order to m ake the institution m ore 
powerful. It is difficult to track the locus o f  pow er within the EU. Some contend that the 
European Com m ission is the true seat o f  pow er, serving as the E U 's executive branch 
and largely as its legislative arm as well. The European Com m ission does initiate most 
policies, but is accountable to the European Council and the European Parliam ent, either 
o f  which can veto or otherwise interfere with its plans. M any point out. though, that the 
latter two bodies have only negative pow er and that they rarely use it to block m ajor 
initiatives. The m em ber states do select the com m issioners and the Com m ission 
president, who all must be approved by the Parliament. The Com m ission 's leverage has 
grown in the recent past, and com m issioners assum e much o f  the credit for the E U 's 
success thus far. A 2000. European Com m ission paper emphasized that this organ was
established to act im partially in the interests o f  the European 
Com m unity... notably by exercising its right o f  legislative initiative: 
controlling M ember states’ respect o f  Com m unity law: negotiating 
commercial agreem ents...im plem enting the common policies and ensuring 
that com petition in the Com m unity w'as not distorted.w>
The Com m ission then assumed credit for serving as the engine o f  ehange in the
transform ation from customs union to econom ic and then political union. The
Com m ission does have only about 2.500 em ployees with decision-m aking jurisdiction.
yet these 2.500 do hold much power over the approxim ately 450 million EU citizens. Up
until the present, elite representatives from the larger European countries and the EU
'’"European Com m ission. White P a p e r  on R eform ing  the E uropean  C o m m iss io n  
(Luxem bourg: Office for Official Publications o f  the European Com m unities. April 
2000 ) .
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founders in particular help detcm iine EU developm ent policy. This still does not fullv 
explain, however, how the E U 's power structure influences developm ent policy-m aking. 
Part o f  the dilem m a in providing this explanation stem s from larger EU rift between 
France and Germ any. As stated, both have their own visions for the EU, with G erm any 
favoring a m ore integrationist, federal structure and France preferring a more 
intergovernm ental model.
G erm any’s version has received increm ental validation since the fading o f  the 
Cold W ar, as G erm any becam e more powerful with unification and as the addition o f  
new Eastern European m em bers to the EU m ade the country m ore centralized in the EU 
structure. It is not surprising then that France’s developm ental priorities, such as special 
preferences accorded to ACP states, have becom e less prom inent since the beginning o f  
the 1990s.
But from the late 1980s onwards. France, Germ any, and the rest o f  the m ajor EU 
powers, though disagreeing on the power balance w ithin the EU, have m ore or less 
converged on a sim ilar vision for the F.U in world affairs. This vision is not surprising. 
The leaders o f  the EU want what they should be expected to want: greater prosperity and 
more security absolutely and relative to the larger international landscape. EU leaders 
have also converged on the belief that the EU countries need to participate m ore fully and 
m ore com petitively in the global economy. A com m on cliche that Am ericans “seek 
equal opportunity” while Europeans “preach equal outcom e” has become increasingly 
outdated, as European countries have decreased their welfare provisions and em braced 
the hallm arks o f  neoliberalism  such as economic deregulation and privatization.
EU m em ber countries in the 1990s disagreed about where foreign aid should be 
directed, however, and these disagreem ents persist. Country preferences can be seen by
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exam ining bilateral aid p rogram s/’1 France still favored liigh aid allocations for W est 
Africa, where m any o f  its former colonies including oil-rich countries such as Nigeria are 
located. Both France and Italy want m ore m oney to go to North Africa, to quell strife so 
close to their southern borders. Germ any wanted greater allocations for Eastern Europe 
and the form er Soviet Republics, to avert unrest to the east. Also, if  the EU successfully 
continues to expand eastward. G erm any will becom e a more centrally located and m ore 
powerful m em ber. Spain and Portugal preferred that m ore aid be distributed to Latin 
America, w here they have cultural tics. Britain wanted to spend less money altogether on 
EU aid, as its interests were often not param ount in EU decisions. Also, in the early and 
m id-1990s, Britain was increasingly losing faith in the value o f  foreign aid, as was 
evidenced by the reductions in its bilateral aid spend ing /'2 Overall, these varying 
priorities o f  EU countries created a fragm ented aid regim e, and this fragmentation 
affected the E U 's  good governance and dem ocracy promotion. The EU was slow er at 
imposing conditionalities on the recipient regions in the ACP favored by the E U 's m ost 
powerful m em ber country, France. G erm any 's favored recipient regions gained special 
attention as the 1990s progressed and new the prospect o f  new EU m em bers to the east 
heightened security concerns. Eastern European and NIS good governance and 
dem ocracy prom otion program s has a strong geopolitical element. Spain and Portugal's
61 For reviews o f  bilateral aid spending, see the annual country reports at 
Organisation for Econom ic Cooperation and Developm ent. "Country Reports" (no date). 
<http://w w w .oecd.org/dac> [12 February 2003].
62Britain also was highly criticized for som e o f  its aid allocation decision in the 
1980s and early to m id -1990s. Britain was accused o f  favoring corrupt leaders who were 
supportive o f  its policies in Kenya and M alawi and later blam ed for sending large 
amounts o f  aid to help build the Paraguay dam in M alaysia, after which M alaysia spent 
about $1 billion on British-m anufactured weapons. "A id for Brussels." Economist 338: 
7953 (17 February 1996): 52-3.
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chosen areas to receive assistance in I.atin America were much ignored: little aid was 
allocated there and good governance and dem ocracy prom otion program s were weakly 
conceived. Great Britain had little influence over EU aid decisions. By the end o f  the 
1990s, the two regions representing the developm ent interest o f  the E U 's two strongest 
m em bers, the ACP and eastern Europe, were receiving the most aid and the most good 
governance and dem ocracy assistance. Despite its efforts to support good governance 
and dem ocracy, though, the EU has been much less direct and forceful in its dem ocracy 
prom otion than USAID has been. This softer and gentler approach to dem ocracy 
prom otion m irrors in m any ways EU countries' and the EU ' foreign policy when 
compared to that o f  the United States. EU good governance policies reflect a distinctly 
European view about the role o f  the state. W estern European countries tend to allow for 
and even expect the state to take an active welfare role. The w ay political leaders o f  
recipient countries m ust define not only their econom ic but also their social goals in their 
CSPs is indicative o f  this, as is the E U 's practice o f  calling for not a sm aller state but a 
leaner, m ore responsive state. This is not surprising. A critique o f  capitalism  has 
historical as well as political roots in Europe. M any European countries had active and 
sizable Com m unist parties throughout the Cold War. M ost European countries have 
im portant Socialist or Social Dem ocratic parties, which tend to support governm ental 
intervention in the social and economic realm to m ore equitably distribute the costs and 
benefits o f  life w ithin a country.
As many neoconservative governm ents came to pow er in Europe in the early 
1980s, the early and m id-1990s also witnessed a sweep to pow er o f  like-m inded regimes. 
Social dem ocratic or "Third W ay" governm ents were elected in the leading EU m em ber 
countries. Gerhard Schroeder. Lionel Jospin. Tony Blair, and others brought with them
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hopes o f  discovering new ways balancing the international political econom y so that the 
market could flourish and citizens' needs, the rich and the poor, could he met. These 
Third W ay governm ents each expressed particular concerns with prom oting market 
reform s while at the sam e tim e m itigating the sharp social dislocations that sometimes 
accom panied econom ic reform  and globalization. Third W ay values can be seen in both 
countries' bilateral aid program s and in the EU 's  m ethods o f  prom oting dem ocracy and 
good governance. Third W ay goals tend to include fostering socially conscious states that 
are also econom ically com petitive with sound and reliable state institutions. These goals 
also include fostering transparent and responsive governm ents, inclusive and 
participatory civil societies, equitable states, states that connect social and economic 
policies, environm entally conscious societies, and states that embed their local values and 
goals in com m unity and international institutions.
Further, the E U 's  stress on variety in social and political organization in its 
developm ent policies reflects the diversity o f  its m em bership and western Europe's 
relatively liberal political ideology. As stated, the EU does not fund political parties and 
is willing to work with authoritarian regim es provided they show some level o f  
cooperation and respect for hum an rights. The surprising mix o f  rhetoric about citizen 
empowerm ent and hum an rights protection coupled with a lack o f punishm ent and even, 
in some cases, judgem ent reveals a European tendency towards idealism  yet lack o f 
exaction. The way the EU links dem ocracy with social justice  and tends to shy away from 
enforcing conditionality reveals these unique features. The E U 's good governance 
promotion evidences m any o f  the qualities o f  hum an developm ent that Sen and other 
humanist econom ists espouse. At the same time, though, the EU itself has increasingly 
needed to becom e realistic in terms o f  economics and m ake adjustm ents to comply with
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
W TO rules and regulations. The F.U values the opportunities afforded it by the global 
trading regim e and the design o f  its good governance program s affirm  this. The desire to 
prom ote trade and thus the economic well-being o f  m em ber countries has always been at 
the heart o f  the EU project, but has naturally increased in recent years. Losing 
im pedim ents to profitable economic globalization such as L om e's preferences and 
distortions reveals this pro-m arket EU power strueture in action. The E U 's developm ent 
cooperation agreem ents increasingly reflect the interests o f  European-based business, 
including transnational capitalists. The numbers, size, and influence o f  m em bers' 
intercontinental and TN Cs had grown rapidly and considerably by the early 1990s. The 
corporate lobby has always had a noteworthy impact w ithin the EU. This impact had 
grown considerably over the years, and the stakes were particularly high for corporate 
leaders as the ending o f  the Cold W ar shifted the previous stats-quo. New business 
relationships and trade agreem ents signaled the need for stable Third W orld 
environm ents that good governance could likely help provide.63 This was especially true 
to the new ly independent central and eastern European countries. Trade between EU 
countries and this region grew' exponentially after the Cold W ar, and these countries' 
econom ies and governance system s were generally in grave disorder. Trade liberalization 
opened up new relationships and dialogue between the EU and these countries, as w'ell as 
exposing the form er to the latter's governmental incapacities. Because the EU as a whole 
and individual EU countries on a bilateral basis im m ediately began new trading 
relationships after the Cold W ar and addressed problem s as they surfaced, econom ists 
generally agree that EU countries reshaped this reg ion 's trade reorientation to their
’"McCiiff in.  139-40.
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advantage.64 Yet becom ing the central and eastern Europeans m ost significant trading 
partner during the 1990s gave the EU the heavy burden o f  interacting with antiquated 
governance systems. In early 2000, Prodi described the EU 's continuing goal: "The 
challenge is to radically rethink the way we do Europe. To re-shape Europe." His first 
concern with this project was fostering strong dem ocratic institutions.65 Imposing 
prescriptions for institution-building conducive to the market econom y
o f  course was not relegated only to continental developm ent partners; the EU funded 
public adm inistration and legal and judicial reform program s that fostered pro-market 
conditions in regions throughout the developing world. W here there was more incentive 
to open markets, such as in oil-rich Northern Africa and rcsource-rich Southeast Asia, 
the EU did not shy aw ay from im posing conditionalities that reinforced its agenda, 
especially in the late 1990s. The influence o f  capitalism  on EU developm ent policy grew 
substantially during the decade. As the power o f  EU institutions expanded, and the 
length o f the policy chain increased, Brussels becam e the second largest lobbying capital 
in the world. An estim ated 10.000 to 40.000 lobbyists worked to influence the decision­
m aking process by the new m illennium . Approxim ately 70 percent represented corporate 
interests. 20 percent NG Os. and 10 percent regional interests. The Com m ission was and 
still is the most im portant target for lobbyists, and lobbyist can greatly influence policy. 
Since its 1992 report on special interest groups, it has argued that in order to maintain its 
openness to all forms o f  dialogue, it must not introduce any binding requirem ents for
<>4Jarko Fidrmuc, "R estructuring European Union Trade with Cental and Eastern 
European Countries," Atlantic Econom ic .Journal 28:1 (M arch 2000): 83-92.
'''R om ano Prodi. "Shaping the New Europe" (speech given to the European 
Parliament. Strasbourg) (13 January 2000). • http: europa.cu.int rapid start egi 
guesten.ksh [3 October 2002],
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lobbyists. Despite taking note o f  eases o f  overly aggressive lobbyists, the Com m ission 
proposed that public affairs professionals them selves create a voluntary set o f  guidelines 
for behavior. Since then, associations have been created, including the Society for 
European Affairs Professionals (SEAP) and Public Affairs Practitioners (PAP). M embers 
agree to voluntary codes o f  conduct.00 These groups have successfully helped m ake 
neoliberal values a shaping force for the E U 's development policies.
Another powerful facet o f  EU countries' increased im petus to form lucrative 
trading relationships with the South in the early 1990s concerned the E U 's vision o f  itself 
in the new ly com petitive, less clearly defined post-C'old-W ar world. EU m em ber 
countries had long spoken o f  the need to develop a European defense arm o f  the 
institution, and this issue had becom e particularly relevant as the Cold W ar faded and 
European cooperation increased. European protection from the United States w as 
presum ably less reliable w ithout the Cold W ar's bipolarity, and m any EU m em ber 
countries expressed new concerns. It was difficult, though, to convince m any EU 
country citizens to support a large, impactful European defense force, though, as many 
countries' debt, deficit, and inflation problem s had already induced high unem ploym ent 
levels and threatened further reductions social programs. Additionally, European 
integration was always haunted by the specter o f  another continental w'ar and was 
perceived as fragile already. One w'ay that EU countries opted to handle such disparities 
and the com plexity o f  this situation was to focus on economic strength as a solvent to 
defense worries. The weakness o f  EU Europe's ability to project force outside its borders 
in the early 1990s becam e increasingly apparent, particularly w hen juxtaposed w ith
°°European Com m ission. Lobbying in the European Union: Current Rules and  
Practices  (no date). ' http:' ww w.google.com  searclUhl cn& lr &q Society^ fo r ’ 
European+Affairs [2 May 2005]; Babarinde.
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A m erica 's  growing m ilitary preem inence. Yet instead o f opting to com pete in a 
Hobbesian sense, Europe in the early 1990s m ade a decision. Europe's new identity and 
pow er would come from its econom ic viability. Europe's new challenge would be 
econom ic rather than military.
It m ust be noted that w hile the European Com m unity developm ent policy clearly 
states that "integration o f  developing countries into the global econom y" is one o f  its 
objectives, one o f  the great incoherencies in EU policy is that its current trade agenda 
fundam entally underm ines a sustainable or equitable basis for that integration. The EU’s 
trade policy forum, the ‘A rticle 133' com m ittee, is comprised o f  trade and industry 
specialists with no seat at the table for developm ent. The balance o f  decision-m aking 
pow er places the export potential o f  EU dom iciled corporations firmly over developm ent 
policy. Hence. EU developm ent practitioners are charged with prescribing free trade, yet 
they have no intluence over the E U 's  own trading policies with developing countries.
EU developm ent officials did believe in the need for good governance prom otion in 
the 1990s, nevertheless. The processes o f  European integration inspired this. The E U 's 
institutional and bureaucratic expansion required the organization to have m ore contact 
with the developing countries. This increased exposure to the inner polities o f  developing 
countries likely m ade m ore pertinent the need for and more imm inent the desire for sound 
institutions, effective legal system s, and other elem ents o f  good governance. Due to this 
increased awareness, the EU was also becom ing increasingly cognizant o f  its inability to 
achieve its developm ent goals for poor countries due to its own handicaps. The E U 's 
developm ent program s in m any poor countries were short-staffed and in som e cases, 
notably inefficient. Also, if  the EU was to widen, certainly the nature o f governance in 
prospective new m em bers and neighbors was all the more significant to EU m em bers.
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W ith the European Union in its form ative stages, good governance was a priority on the 
m inds o f  m any in the 1990s. A general sense o f  agreement that liberal dem ocracy was 
conducive to prosperity and peace had emerged. Officially. EU dem ocracy and good 
governance program s were initiated in tandem with m ajor new developm ents in the E U 's 
aid program s and during the new political clim ate o f  the post-Cold W ar world. They 
were created at tim e when the EU was not only preparing to expand but also country 
m em bers were attem pting to reduce national budget deficits in preparation for the 
adoption o f  the single currency. Also, new potential threats and opportunities were 
em erging for EU m em ber countries. The future o f  Central and Eastern Europe was 
uncertain, as were the effects o f  the rise o f  Islamic fundam entalism  in parts o f  Northern 
Africa. Em erging m arkets in Asia and Latin America wrere promising. M any new 
challenges and possibilities faced the EU in the early 1990s. The dem ocratic m odel is 
designed to diffuse uncertainties by installing fam iliar rituals, procedures, and rules. 
C ertainly dem ocracy prom otion was hence a useful tactic for the post-Cold W ar world 
the EU faced.
Providing security to EU countries becam e a growing influence on EU 
developm ent policies during the 1990s. In just six months. Eastern E urope’s com m unist 
regim es collapsed, providing the W est w'ith an unforeseen, vast, and sudden victory in the 
extensive global contest against the Soviet Union. In the m onths betw een July and 
Septem ber o f  1989. Hungary, Poland. Czechoslovakia, East Germ any, Bulgaria, and 
Rom ania discharged Com m unist regim es. Their replacem ent leaderships pledged 
com m itm ent to dem ocratic policies and open, market economies, and Soviet troops began 
w ithdraw ing from Europe. W ithin m onths. Germany had unified, and before the 
im plications o f  this had begun to set in. the Soviet Union collapsed. The political
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significance was enormous. W estern Europe was increasing its encounters with the 
former Soviet countries and satellites, leading naturally to its desire for good governance 
throughout the continent.*’ One o f  the central tenets upon which the HU was based, that 
econom ic prosperity and cooperation lead to peace, was extended to the Third W orld, 
particularly with the fading o f  the Cold W ar. Dem ocracy and good governance 
prom otion, it was hoped, were m eans of spreading peaceful values, especially to Central 
Europe and new ly independent Eastern European states. The EU was well aware o f  the 
“danger . . . that these new frontiers will create a dem arcation line betw een ordered and 
stable Europe and an Eastern Europe characterized by instability and poverty. " (,x Good 
governance prom otion, it was hoped, would help prevent this from occurring and ease 
this transition along. The European Com m ission itse lf noted that the "E U 's  objective 
interests have led it to give priority to the stability and developm ent o f  neighboring 
countries and to aid for countries in crisis in regions nearest to the E U ." ''1
67The collapse o f  com m unism  in the early 1990s indicated not only the start ofan 
internal process o f  political and econom ic transform ation for the Central and Eastern 
European countries, but also the beginning o f  political ram ifications for w ider Europe. 
Between 1990 and 1996, the EU adopted ten new associate m em bers from Central and 
Eastern Europe: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania. 
Poland, Rom ania, the Slovak Republic, and Sloxenia. The EU was concerned that these 
countries had m any changes to m ake in order to successfully integrate into the structures 
o f  the EU. European Com m ission, White Paper: Preparation o f  the Associated Countries 
o f  Central an Eastern Europe fo r  Integration into the Internal M arket o f  the Union 
(Brussels: Com m ission o f  the European Com m unity. 1995).
^ Isabe lle  Bensidoun and Agnes Chevalier. "Indicators o f  Regionalisation in 
North Am erica, Asia, Central and Eastern Europe and the M editerranean Basin." in 
Globalisation, M igration, and Development, ed. the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (Paris: O rganisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development. 2000), 19.
’’ European Com m ission. ( (immunity s Dcvclo/imcnt Policy. 4.
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Also, addressing global problem s and potential problem s such as overpopulation, 
the spread o f  HIV/AIDS, and drug trafficking required Third W orld cooperation. It was 
increasingly clear that political/econom ic affairs and decisions in one country or region 
increasingly affected the global landscape. The fact that globalization had intensified 
international interconnectedness on m any levels m ade the stability o f  developing 
countries m ore pertinent to EU countries than ever before. This likely was part o f  the 
reason EU leaders began to increasingly prom ote good governance, in hopes o f  m aking 
the political and economic environm ents o f  developing countries m ore stable and m ore 
open to the W est and its ideals. Also, im m igration flows from Central and Eastern 
Europe to W estern Europe were increasing in the 1990s.™ In the Cold W ar's  afterm ath, 
m illions o f  imm igrants and refugees m igrated worldwide, increasingly to the EU 
countries. New imm igrants, who were needed as W estern Europe faced an aging 
population, would be m ore easily absorbed if  their host countries were m oving in a m ore 
dem ocratic or at least liberal and transparent direction.
Also fueling the E U 's security concerns in the 1990s was the fact that the United 
States was clearly the w orld 's predom inant m ilitary power, and the Cold W ar security 
um brella Am erica had provided for western Europe was no longer as steady. The United 
States was reducing its presence on the continent, and the EU had not yet com e forth with 
firm plans for its own defense policy and force. Further, EU m em ber countries could not 
m uster support for any increases in m ilitary spending in the years after the Cold W ar 
ended, w hether it be through their contributions to NATO or toward an EU independent 
force. D espite some warnings that Europe could potentially face various form s o f 
instability in the post-C'old-W ar environm ent, m ost EU m em ber countries allowed their
"ibid.
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defense spending to drop to below 2 percent o f  GDP and plans for a Com m on Security 
and Defense Force languished. Simon Serfaty describes the “m any pre-Cold W ar 
legacies o f  ethnic and territorial conflicts, overbidden after W orld W ar 11 by the 
com petition between the two superpowers, but resurrected in parts f  the Continent in the 
wake o f  the dem ise o f  one and the rise o f  the other" and the incapacity o f  EU countries to 
“attend to these conflicts by them selves...." In Bosnia in particular. Serfaty argues, the 
“clock stopped h a lf  before Europe, and the security debate switched from what the EU
said (but failed to do) to what NATO did (but occasionally failed to tell) "7I W ith the
ending o f  the Cold War, the EU began a new phase o f  developm ent policy separate from 
Lome, citing the need under changed to widen the U nion 's previous developm ent focus 
to include countries o f  Eastern Europe, as well as countries in Latin America and Asia.
Sum m ary
In contrast to the W orld Bank, the E U 's position on the governance issue has 
been m uch broader and political since the early 1990s. The EU has openly and 
unapologetically endorsed dem ocracy (neoliberal, social, and other types) and a version 
o f  good governance prom otion that em phasizes conditions for reliable markets, peaceful 
societies, and protected human rights. These trends in EU developm ent policy m anifest 
EU institutional prerogatives and reveal stakeholders' agendas.
The ELJ's dem ocracy and good governance prom otion in the 1990s revealed 
concerns with econom ics, security, and hum anitarianism . W ith viable trading partners.
'S im on Serfaty, “ European Com m on Foreign Security and Defense Policies: 
Implications for the United States and the Atlantic Alliance." House Com m ittee on 
International Relations Hearing. 10 Novem ber 1999. 1. 2.
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sound institutions and laws protecting the market were encouraged. In regions deemed 
threatening, clear renderings o f criminal law and punishm ent was stressed. In all regions 
but m ost particularly the ACT region, where France had special interests, human rights 
protection and citizen empowerm ent were em phasized. Human rights was conceived 
very broadly, to include indigenous people, m inorities, women, children, the disabled, 
and lesbians and gays, all groups that citizens o f  European Union m em ber states care 
about.
The E U 's program s were distinct in other ways as well. Conditions were often 
not enforced, to avoid controversy, and developm ent officials did not prescribe a “one- 
size-fits-all” m odel o f  democracy. Local civil society m em bers were invited to 
participate in the conception o f  desired political regim es and conditions, which is 
characteristic o f  European continental values and norms. The E U 's heavy use o f  NGOs 
to carry forth its developm ent work helped m ake this diversity and particularity o f 
political parties and regim es possible, as did the fact that the EU does not fund political 
parties.
The E U 's dem ocracy and good governance prom otion in the 1990s had m any 
prom ising qualities, such as its focus on local context and its stress on social and 
economic inclusiveness. The problem was that aid was poorly coordinated and 
conditionalities were so poorly enforced that they lost meaning.
In order to foster change, the EU needs a m uch m ore dynamic, cohesive, and 
unified approach to dem ocracy assistance. It has to m ove beyond periodic policy 
dialogue at the adm inistrative level and overseeing project funding within countries. It 
needs to im prove it partnership approaches and its flexibility in response to reform 
opportunities and at the same time be more inclusive and dem ocratic in its aid decisions
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and aid delivery. There is also a need for the establishm ent o f  structured links between 
the official policy levels and the civil society agencies and actors to obtain 
com plem entarities in efforts.
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C H A P T E R  VI
THE U N ITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELO PM ENT
Like m ost bilateral developm ent organizations, the goals o f  USAID have always 
been tied to the host country 's  strategic interests. Yet the agency also has its own separate 
institutional identity. This identity tends to be m ore concerned with developm ent for 
developm ent's sake or with the efficiency o f  developm ent program s in a less strategic 
sense.1 Because it operates under the auspices o f  the State Departm ent and the National 
Security Council, though, the agency must perform  a balancing act betw een serving 
national interest and its own institutional motives. At different tim es in history, it has 
tended to lean further in one direction or the other, based on different pressures.'
USAID adm inisters m ost foreign aid program s in Africa. Latin Am erica, Asia. 
Europe, and the M iddle East. Much o f  its m oney goes to m iddle-incom e countries like 
Egypt and Colum bia, with only about 40 percent allocated to poorer countries. Though 
President Bush pledged fairly substantial increases to U SA ID 's budget in 2002,3 in the 
late 1990s A m erican foreign assistance channeled through USAID averaged about $7 
billion annually out o f  the country 's roughly $10 billion overall foreign aid budget. At
'R uttan  discusses this insightfully on pages 12-13.
“Packenham . 2-3.
3Bush announced on 14 M arch 2002 that the United States would spend S5 billion 
m ore on assistance, raising the total from $10 to $15 billion, over the years 2004-2006. 
These figures describe bilateral and m ultilateral aid combined. “A Feast o f  Giving: 
Europe and Am erica are Suddenly Com peting to be Generous" Economist 362:8265 (23 
March 2002): 42.
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present, the activities o f  USAID account tor 0.5 percent o f  the federal budget.4 I 'SAID 
in the late 1990s had projects underw ay or completed in about one hundred countries, and 
this num ber has since grown. W hile such facts and figures m ay sound impressive, the 
United States is not am ong the most generous o f  the developed countries when it comes 
to developm ent assistance. Throughout the 1990s, the United States ranked twentieth in 
terms o f  aid as a percentage o f  GNP, the smallest percentage o f  any developed country. 
The United States, with its .1 percent official developm ent assistance (ODA). has not 
agreed to attem pt to reach the United Nations target o f  .7 percent. It does, however, 
support the Developm ent Assistance C om m ittee 's 1995 policy "D evelopm ent 
Partnerships in the New Global Context" which affirm s a com m itm ent to "generating 
substantial resources for developm ent cooperation to back the efforts o f  countries and 
people to help them selves.''5 Sen describes Am ericans lack o f  support for foreign aid 
aptly: "Am erican social ethics seem s to find it possible to be very non-supportive o f  the 
indigent and the im poverished, in a way that a typical W estern European, reared in a 
welfare state, finds hard to accept.''1’ This lack o f  public support is not without warrant.
United States A gency for International Developm ent. "USAID: About USAID" 
(7 January 2005). <http://w w w .usaid.gov/about_usaid/ United States Department o f Stated 
[1 April 2005]; “Natsios Confirm ed as USAID A dm inistrator" (4 M ay 2001). 
<http://www.usinfo.state.gOv/regional/af/usafr/a 1050201 > [19 M arch 2002]: United States 
General Accounting Office. "Foreign Assistance: USAID Relies Heavily on 
Nongovernmental O rganizations, but Better Data Needed to Evaluate Approaches" 
(W ashington. D.C.: GA O, April, 2002). 2.
5The United States as a single country ranked second behind Japan in the 1990s
for total aid given per year. G erm any and France each reached parity with Am erican aid 
levels in 1997. If  A m erica was as generous as Sweden with its foreign aid (as a percentage 
o f  GNP). it would give $76 billion a year. Borosage. 5.
(’Sen. D evelopm ent as Freedom. 95.
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though, as Am erican foreign assistance has unfortunately strengthened more than a 
handful o f  corrupt governm ents in developing countries over the past few decades.
Throughout its history USAID has had mixed reviews. Som e maintain that the 
agency has been useful in both serving A m erica's national interests and in forwarding the 
country 's  more hum anitarian goals.7 Others are more disapproving, asserting that 
USAID has lacked vision and the ability to articulate clear, m easurable goals, qualities 
needed to convince the Am erican people and governm ent o f  its m erit.8 The agency 's 
increasingly bureaucratic style and technocratic approach in the past two decades has also 
been criticized. The agency has always struggled for funding.'* This fact likely is partly 
due to A m ericans' lack o f  com m itm ent to dispensing foreign aid rather than the agency 's 
own record. Observers correctly predicted early on that USAID would suffer from a lack 
o f  credibility with the State Departm ent, which would m ake its work d ifficu lt.111 
Unquestionably, the agency has grappled to define its purpose and to gam er support ov er 
the years. In m any ways, its difficulties and trials have reflected both the United States' 
own am biguities about the country 's  desired international role and the N orth 's 
uncertainties about developm ent as a worthwhile or even feasible endeavor.
Uncertainties surrounding the "w ar on terror" in the wake o f  Septem ber 11, 2001. have 
revived interest in the agency, though, and for good reason. USAID, despite its 
bureaucratic tendencies, has a wealth o f  experience and insight into various dim ensions
M. Peter M cPherson. “ Advancing U.S. Interests with Foreign Assistance." 
Foreign Sen 'ice Journal (D ecem ber 1986): 22.
8John P. Birkelund, "D oing Good W hile Doing Well: The Unheralded Success o f 
Am erican Enterprise Funds." Foreign Affairs 80: 2001): 14.
4Ruttan. 474.
'"Packenham . 14.
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o f  developm ent that relate to security concerns as well as hum anitarian impulses. The 
agency would benefit from an im age reconstruction and more productive relationship 
with the State Department, top governm ent officials, and the public. This, o f  course, 
would require funding, for which USAID continues to struggle.
Policy Evolution
USAID was established in 1961 during the height o f  the Cold War. The United 
States Congress passed the Foreign Assistance Act on Septem ber 4, 1961, which 
reorganized Am erican aid program s. The stated intent was to unity  existing aid efforts, 
com bine economic and technical expertise and assistance, and separate strategic and non- 
strategic aid efforts. Essentially, Kennedy wanted the country 's aid program  to more 
clearly and effectively support A m erica 's foreign policy goal o f  containing comm unism . 
A ID 's three main responsibilities were to oversee three developm ental program s: the 
Economic Support Fund, which transfers funds directly into public sector budgets: 
Development Assistance, which grants m oney and concessional loans for specified 
projects; and Food Aid, which supplies surplus agricultural products at concessional 
rates. USAID would allocate about $400 billion in aid over the course o f  its first thirty- 
five years. A ccording to the agency, approxim ately $314 billion o f  this aid was used for 
econom ic assistance and the rem aining $165 went towards security and m ilitary-related 
goals.11 President John F. Kennedy declared that the new aid program  was a vital 
com ponent o f  United States foreign policy. Despite some obstacles and setbacks. United
"U nited  States A gency for International Development. "USAID: About U S A ID .' 
7 January 2005. - http:/ w w w .usaid.gov/about_usaid ' United States Departm ent o f  State. • 
[1 April 2005J: idem. "United States Overseas Loans and (irants and Assistance from 
International O rganizations'' (W ashington. D.C.: USAID. 1996). 4.
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States pow er and influence had grown steadily since the end o f  W orld W ar 11. as 
Am erica rose to meet the real and perceived Soviet challenge. W hen USAID was created, 
the country had never been stronger in terms o f  military, econom ic, and political strength. 
Kennedy pledged during his cam paign to “pay any price, bear any burden, meet any 
hardship, support any friend, and oppose any foe to assure the survival and success o f  
liberty." He also avowed to do so using a w ider variety o f  m eans than had his 
predecessor, Dwight Eisenhower. K ennedy 's flexible response strategy was designed to 
put less em phasis on nuclear w eapons and m ore on conventional warfare m ethods as well 
as political and econom ic strategies.12 A ttem pting to fulfill this prom ise after the 
election, Kennedy expanded non-traditional efforts to assert Am erican influence, most 
notably in developing countries. Kennedy extended the policies that had been limited 
prim arily to Europe throughout the w orld .13 In the process, foreign aid becam e a durable 
if  not always effective Cold W ar weapon.
To the frustration o f  European leaders w anting more security from the Soviets, 
Kennedy essentially viewed Europe as finished and turned his prim ary attention to the 
developing world. He and m any o f  his advisors saw liberal dem ocracy and socialism  as 
two com peting governmental and econom ic models. The more dem ocratic and capitalist 
the world could become, they thought, the safer and richer the United States would be. 
Kennedy justified the new aid program  on the prem ises that econom ic collapse in 
developing countries would harm Am erican interests and that the United States had the 
power, position, and obligation to help such countries move forward. For Kennedy,
'■Richard Reeves. President Kennedy: Profile o f  Power (New York: Sim on & 
Schuster, 1993).
l 3Donald White. The Am erican ( entury: The Rise and D ecline of the ( 'nitcd 
States as a World Power (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1997). 295-307.
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providing American support was a way to win friends and leverage in strategic Third 
W orld locations as well as to forward the nation 's  hum anitarian goals.
M odernization theory inform ed and directed m any o f U S A ID 's early efforts. The 
1961 Foreign Assistance Act actually included few restrictions on U SA ID 's funds or 
organization. Fowler Ham ilton, the agency 's first adm inistrator, put into effect various 
program s designed to help countries “take o f f ' and subsequently m ove through various 
stages o f  developm ent. USAID offered advice and resources to help countries m ake 
im provem ents in physical infrastructure, such as roads, water system s, and pow er plants. 
The agency also veered o ff  course from this focus at tim es in its early years, providing 
equipm ent and technical advisors to security forces in Latin Am erica and South East Asia 
in the 1960s and 1970s. Its rather loose early m andate provided it with a flexibility that it 
would later lose, as its W ashington bureaucracy grew in relation to its field s ta ff spread 
throughout the developing world.
In its first decade, USAID continued A m erica 's trend o f  allocating much o f  its 
foreign assistance to Asia, particularly South Korea, Taiwan, and later, South Vietnam. 
USAID hoped its assistance would help stop spread o f  com m unism , particularly in China. 
A large USAID effort grew in V ietnam , lasting until the last A m erican troops withdrew 
from the region in 1975. Another key USAID program in the 1960s was the A lliance for 
Progress, a plan to m odernize and dem ocratize Latin Am erican countries m uch like had 
been achieved with the M arshall Plan in post-w ar W estern Europe. It was hoped that 
such “progress” would help contain Fidel C astro’s growing influence in the region. The 
Alliance served as the cornerstone for U SA ID ’s m any program s in Latin Am erica 
throughout the 1960s. In Africa, m any USAID program s were designed to educate 
leaders o f  the ncwl v independent countries according to American standards and to help
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spur econom ic developm ent. In all o f  these regions, large cash and resource transfers 
were intended to build the infrastructure deem ed necessary for industrial and hence 
econom ic progress. The agency 's work attempted to spread Am erican values to disparate 
countries around the globe, w ithout m uch consideration paid to the countries them selves 
and their unique histories and challenges. Its m ethods were sym ptom atic o f  the United 
States' hubris and naivete at the tim e, as well as o f  the country 's good intentions.
In the early 1970s, support for USAID and foreign assistance in general m arkedly 
declined due to general aid fatigue plus disillusionm ent with the Vietnam W ar and the 
A m erican governm ent. The “basic hum an needs" approach then popular with other 
bilateral and m ultilateral aid organizations also began to inform and guide U SA ID 's 
efforts. This m ethod was partly an effort to redirect foreign aid to its m ore altruistic 
goals and also an attempt to m ake aid m ore effective at helping poor countries develop. 
Congress directed the replacem ent o f  U SA ID 's former aid categories o f  technical 
assistance grants and developm ent loans with functional categories such as agriculture, 
education, and fam ily planning. Instead o f  prim arily financing infrastructure projects and 
transferring goods and funds, USAID focused on sharing expertise in these new 
assistance categories. USAID offered program s on health care, nutrition, education, and 
fam ily p lanning.14 These new basic needs program s were not largely successful, as few 
developing countries m ade notable strides out o f  poverty.
Partly due to its inability to help m any countries rise out o f  poverty and to 
publicity about some o f  U SA ID 's failed projects and wasted resources, from the 1970s on 
each succeeding adm inistration had a m ore difficult time convincing Congress to allocate
l4Uni ted States Agency for International Development .  “ USAID:  His tory " (7 
January  2005).  '  http: www.usaid .gov about usaid usaidhist .html [12 April 2005).
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foreign aid funding. This can also he attributed to general public disillusionm ent with 
federal program s after the Vietnam War. public resistance to taxation, and congressional 
struggles to meet new federal budgetary pressures. The neoliberalism  that characterized 
much o f  the 1980s with its emphasis on leaner states greatly pressured efforts to fund 
USAID, considered by many to be m ore o f  a social program than a foreign policy too l.15 
Richard Nixon sought to generally reduce foreign com m itm ents when he becam e 
president in 1968. This included a new com pulsion to narrow and refocus Am erican 
bilateral aid. USAID responded with a series o f  reform s designed to stream line 
operations, im prove its efficacy, and gain support for its program s and polic ies.16 Around 
the tim e that Robert M cNamara was attem pting to shift the W orld B ank 's focus to 
poverty alleviation and “growth with equity." the United States Congress passed “New 
Directions" legislation. It was designed to reorient the work o f  USAID tow ards the needs 
o f  the poorest countries. The Foreign Assistance Act o f  1973 m andated that USAID 
devote m ost o f  its resources and energy toward helping the m ost im poverished 
countries.17 An effort was made to delink foreign assistance goals from A m erica 's 
foreign policy goals. The Carter adm inistration increased U SA ID 's budget and attempted 
to further raise U SA ID 's focus on hum anitarian concerns.18 In 1979. instead o f
l5Ibid.
1 C ongressional Research Service, “The New Directions M andate and the Agency 
for International Development" in Adm inistrative and  M anagement Problem s in 
Providing Foreign Economic Assistance, ed. United States Agency for International 
Developm ent (W ashington, D.C.: USGPO, 1981), 95-117; Donald R. M ickelwait, Elliott 
R. M orse, and Charles F. Sweet, New Directions in Development: A Study o f  USAID  
(Boulder: W estview Press, 1979).
1 T.airson and Skidmore,  279.
lsPaula Hoy. Players and Issues in International A id  (W est Hartford: Kumarian
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answ ering to the secretary o f  state, the agency began reporting to the director o f the 
new ly created International Development Coordinating Agency (IDC'A). U SA ID 's funds 
were still used for foreign policy purposes, though. The strategically located Israel and 
Egypt began receiving a large percentage o f  the agency 's funds after the signing o f  the 
Cam p David Accords in 1978.
Alongside these program m atic changes, USAID shifted its regional focus in the 
1970s from  Asia to the M iddle East. The am ount o f  aid given to Asian countries 
declined precipitously after 1975, after North V ietnam 's victory over South Vietnam. 
U SA ID ’s level o f  assistance to Taiwan and South Korea had already been steadily 
declining since the early 1970s. After the 1979 Cam p David peace accords betw een 
Israel and Egypt, USAID dram atically increased its aid to both o f  these countries, as well 
as to nearby Jordan, Tunisia, and M orocco. In the 1970s and early 1980s, USAID 
funding to Latin Am erica and Africa rem ained low, as did these regions" levels o f  
progress. In the 1980s, USAID to Central Am erica, particularly El Salvador, G uatem ala, 
and Honduras, rose as this region was perceived to be increasingly im portant from a 
strategic perspective.19
Studies conducted in the 1980s found that over the previous few decades, the 
pursuit o f  Am erican strategic objectives had in m any instances weakened the efficacy o f  
Am erican foreign assistance policies and program s. This in part led to the Reagan 
adm inistration 's announcem ent o f  its aim to be m ore conscientious o f  the interplay
Press. 1998). 25.
l4Israel and Egypt together received nearly half o f  all United States foreign 
assistance between 1978 and 1996. Steven W. Hook and Robert Zim m erm an. "The 
Assault on US Foreign Aid" in Foreign A id  Toward the M illennium, ed. Steven \V. Hook. 
57-74 (Boulder: Lynne Rienner. 1996). 62.
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between developm ent and security goals in its foreign economic assistance planning.Jl 
Reagan did not authorize s taff m em bers to the IDCA. which in essence became 
powerless. The pendulum  had swung back, and USAID was new ly pressured to serve 
A m erica's foreign interests.
In the early 1990s. various efforts were m ade to trim U SA ID 's bureaucratic 
procedures and to m ake the agency m ore effective. Great em phasis was placed on the role 
o f  the Inspector General within USAID. This person, nom inated by the president and 
confirmed by the Senate, is quite influential, and his office carries significant authority. 
Com ing from a quantitative, auditing perspective, the IG 's role has been to support close 
adherence to the agency 's m ission statem ents in various regions In the early 1990s. due to 
pressure from citizens, Congress had becom e increasingly involved in the IG 's and the 
overall agency 's affairs, and by 1990. was im posing 288 separate reporting stipulations. It 
also was directing m ore than 90 percent o f  assistance funds to specific countries and 
programs. Support for the agency, already low' when the Cold W ar ended, declined even 
further w'ith the new Republican m ajority in Congress, and then-President Clinton reduced 
U SA ID 's budget by 10 percent in 1994. The cuts were uneven, as funding for Israel,
Egypt, the form er Soviet Republics, and Russia rem ained constant, while aid to other 
regions w as reduced. Aid to Central Am erica, a region which was sym bolically im portant 
during the Cold W ar. w as m arkedly cut, as was aid to Cold W ar allies such as Pakistan 
and Turkey. O ther changes in 1994 included the decision to channel more o f  U SA ID 's 
funding through NGOs rather than through country governm ents and to take away som e o f
JIRuttan.  xviii-xix.
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Congress' previous ability to ear-mark aid for certain countries; instead, aid could only, 
for the m ost part, be ear-m arked for p rogram s.'1
The first C linton adm inistration understood the need to redefine and restructure 
USAID because o f  grow ing budgetary pressures and with the absence o f  Cold W ar 
rationale. A lthough various prom ising steps were taken— including the new em phasis on 
slow ing global environm ental degradation, elim ination o f  bureaucratic excess and 
unneeded country offices, and attempts to more deeply involve NG Os— the 
adm inistration failed to establish a new foundation for post-cold war foreign aid and thus 
support for USAID program s and projects. During Clinton's second term, though, USAID 
funding began to rise to com plem ent American m ilitary operations in Colom bia. Haiti. 
Bosnia, and Kosovo.
One positive long-term  feature o f  USAID over its history has been its use o f  overseas 
s taff living in the developing world to carry out most o f its field work, from initial design 
to im plem entation and later to appraisal. W hile this certainly has given and continues to 
give the institution certain advantages, such as fam iliarity with local com m unities and 
governm ental tendencies, USAID is still handicapped to the extent that it m ust docum ent 
its program s and practices to satisfy departmental guidelines and rules. Also, while 
USAID increasingly attem pts to instigate reform in a bottom s-up, grassroots-oriented 
m ethod, other A m erican institutions such as the State Departm ent use top-dow n m ethods 
such as v isitor program s, high-level diplomatic visits, and tem porary election observers 
which do not support, and in many cases work against. U SA ID 's reform efforts. W hile
2lClifton R. W harton, "USAID and Foreign Aid Reform ." United States 
D epartm ent o f  State Dispatch 4:30 (W ashington. D.C.: United States Governm ent 
Printing Office. 1093): 526-44: Henrik Bering-Jensen, "Foreign Aid: From W aste to 
Investm ent." Insight on the AVn.s 10:5 (31 January 1994): 6-10.
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there have been rare cases, such as in Bulgaria, where USAID and the State Department 
have worked well together, usually their m ethodologies are at odds. Further. USAID, 
which lacks the research capabilities o f  the W orld Bank, is attem pting to prove its 
sophistication, efficiency, and knowledge about developm ent while not having the 
institutional license to take on political obstacles in developing countries overtly. For 
reasons o f  survival, it m ust categorize, define, and describe its endeavors so that 
m ethodology som etim es trum ps genuine engagem ent. M aybe because o f  this, USAID 
has become an active outsourcer o f  reform, giving United States firms a large hand in 
designing and carrying out its agenda.
United States foreign aid declined rather precipitously in the 1990s. In the wake o f 
the Cold W ar, when the Third W orld lost some o f  its relevance to strategic American 
national interest, USAID A dm inistrator J. Brian Atwood announced in 1994 that the 
agency would be restructured, ending m issions in h a lf  o f  the agency 's m ore than one 
hundred countries, cutting 1,200 staff, and reducing the agency 's num ber o f  primary 
goals from thirty-three to four (prom oting dem ocracy, protecting the environment, 
prom oting sustainable developm ent, and controlling population growth). In spite o f  such 
reforms, in 1995, the Republican m ajority in Congress sought to further cut U SA ID 's 
funding substantially and to reduce its independence by m aking it part o f  the State 
Department. This was in lieu o f  suspending the agency all together. New hope arose for 
the agency in 2002, however. President G eorge W. Bush, besieged by the multiple threats 
o f  possible war with Iraq and international terrorism , vowed in M arch to increase 
A m erica's overall aid budget by $5 billion, from $10 billion to $15 billion, over the next 
four years. The m onetary increase itself was not staggering. The adm inistration 's pledge, 
though, was an endorsem ent for the perceived value o f  foreign aid. O f the total $7.3
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billion allocated to U SA ID 's 1999 budget, S3.8 went to Development Assistance. ESF. 
and Child Survival and Disease; SI .4 billion to aid East Europe and form er Soviet states; 
$867 m illion to Food for Peace; and $205 million to International D isaster Assistance, 
with the rem ainder to agency operating expenses."
The advent o f  the “war on terror" and associated Am erican foreign policy 
tendencies towards unilateralism  have again challenged United States foreign aid 
rationales and debates. Since G eorge W. Bush assumed the presidency and particularly 
after Septem ber 11, 2001, Am erican developm ent assistance has been increasingly viewed 
through the lens o f  national security interests, even more so than during R eagan 's 
leadership. As early as Septem ber, 2000, the adm inistration 's introduction o f  the National 
Security Strategy closely linked Am erican developm ent assistance with the country 's 
foreign policy goals. Probably the most important new foreign assistance initiative in 
decades —  the M illennium  Challenge Account— has been joined by m ore than twenty 
new presidential initiatives relating to or specifically pertaining to foreign aid. The M CA 
itself, which pledges billions in new development funding annually by 2006 to reward 
countries prom oting econom ic developm ent, good governance, and social investment, 
heralds a potential transform ation in how the country allocates and utilizes developm ent 
assistance. Congress provided nearly $1 billion in initial funding for 2004 and $1.5 billion 
for 2005. The president has requested $3 billion for 2006 and pledged to increase annual 
funding for the M CA to $5 billion in the future."
3  9
"L a irso n  and Skidm ore, 299; "Feast," 42; United States Agency for International 
Development, “Sum m ary o f  USAID Fiscal Year 1999 Budget Request" (W ashington. 
D.C.; USAID. 1999).
'  United States Departm ent o f  State. "M illennium  Challenge Corporation: A New
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C’lcarl v. since the beginning o f  the war on terrorism in the fall o f  2001. national 
security prerogatives have becom e an even stronger influence on U SA ID 's program m ing 
and activities in the developing world. As a result, the effort and resources o f  USAID 
have been directed toward reconstruction in Afghanistan and Iraq. This is illustrated by 
the fact that the $87 billion President Bush requested from Congress to rebuild Iraq is 
eight tim es the total yearly budget for all forms o f  Am erican international assistance, and 
m ore than one hundred tim es the annual spending o f  USAID on good governance and 
dem ocracy assistance.
In this increasingly pressurized foreign assistance arena, USAID is still searching 
for its role. The State D epartm ent and leading defense officials in the adm inistration have 
tended to discount U S A ID 's value or to m erely pay it lip service at opportune political 
times, but there are signs that this m ight be changing. One o f  U SA ID 's new, or perhaps 
renewed, m issions is to help fragile, failing, and failed states that are viewed as potential 
but not imm inent threats to the United States. Such states, including Nigeria, Zimbabwe, 
and Somalia, are often seen as m arginal to the war on terror, but are still considered 
important to regional and global security that, o f  course, affects the United States.
USAID is uniquely poised to do this im portant work. Successes in areas such as these 
provide the agency with opportunities to prove its value and secure a m ore prominent 
place in the minds o f  influential sectors o f  the political arena.
Dynam ic leadership w ithin USAID could go a long w ay towards granting the 
agency the validation it needs to be highly successful. Despite its tendencies to want to 
apolitical, USAID is indeed a political tool o f  the United States governm ent. To be a 
useful political tool, this needs to be an accepted fact.
Partnership for Poverty Reduction and Growth" (17 May 2005).
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Em phasis on Good Governance 
W hile prom oting dem ocracy has long been part o f  United States foreign policy, it 
has not always been a prim ary objective o f  the country’s foreign assistance policy. The 
governing legislation o f  the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act did not em phasize or even 
m ention dem ocracy as an objective o f  Am erican foreign assistance. Even with its foreign 
policy decisions, historically, the United S tates' dedication to dem ocracy prom otion has 
been m ore rhetorically strong, yet tangibly weak Prom oting dem ocracy and good 
governance w as often if  not always a stated goal, yet adm inistrations throughout the Cold 
W ar supported dem ocracies only when this coincided with other foreign policy interests. 
The Am erican dem ocracy assistance program s that did exist were usually ad hoc, covert, 
and run by the Central Intelligence Agency.
Though U SA ID ’s dem ocracy and good governance program s did not become 
widespread until the 1990s, during the “third w ave” o f  dem ocratization in the m id-1980s 
the agency began gradually im plem enting some com ponents o f  its current good 
governance agenda. The agency first began prom oting rule o f  law' program s, m ostly in 
Latin Am erica and the Caribbean m ainly to help reduce human rights abuses and 
strengthen criminal justice  systems.
Governm ents were encouraged to be accountable for hum an rights violations and 
to enact clear, enforceable laws that protected citizens’ basic rights and freedoms.
USAID officials were dispatched to help governm ents establish dem ocratic legal 
fram eworks. During the Carter Adm inistration, hum an rights em erged as a foreign policy 
goal. Section 116 was added to the Foreign Assistance Act, prohibiting any assistance for 
countries with egregious or persistent violations o f  internationally recognized hum an 
rights.
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W hen the Cold W ar ended. President B ush 's administration looked for ways to 
prom ote dem ocracy more system atically and effectively .'4 One o f  these ways was to tie 
foreign aid to democratic and good governance reforms. In February. 1990. the 
governm ent announced that Am erican aid would he used to promote dem ocracy and 
would favor countries pursuing the "interlinked and mutually reinforcing goals o f  
political liberalization and m arket-oriented refo rm s." '5 USAID was urged to take up the 
cause, and in 1989, the House Foreign Affairs Com m ittee issued a task force report 
recom m ending a new formal reorganization o f  agency priorities. New em phasis would 
be placed on four main objectives: econom ic growth, environmental sustainability, 
poverty alleviation, and dem ocracy assistance. The bill was not enacted into law. but 
reflected new thinking about Am erican foreign assistance and U SA ID 's purpose.
In 1990, USAID launched the Dem ocracy Initiative to help prom ote and consolidate 
dem ocracy in developing countries. The initiative established the prom otion o f  
dem ocracy as one o f  the agency's central goals and involved it extensively in programs 
for free and fair elections, constitutional drafting, legal and judicial reform, anti­
corruption efforts, regulatory reform , civic education, and the creation o f  independent 
organizations and m edia in civil society. USAID 's involvement in dem ocracy promotion 
was deepened further w'ith the inauguration o f  President Clinton, who had featured 
dem ocracy promotion as one o f  the few foreign policy themes in his 1992 campaign. The 
Clinton administration from the start put much emphasis on dem ocracy prom otion, 
proclaim ing that the country 's containm ent strategy o f  the past would be replaced with a
'  Elizabeth Cohn. "U.S. D em ocratization Assistance.” Foreign Policy in Focus 
4:20 (July 1999): 1-3.
"  M. Clough. Free at Last.' I S  Policy Toward Africa and the Fnd of the ( Old 
Hf// (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press. 1992). 57-9.
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strategy o f  enlargem ent, or o f enlarging the num ber and scope o f  the w orld 's  dem ocratic 
states. In Africa alone. USAID funding for dem ocratic assistance program s increased 
from  $5.3 m illion in 1990 to $119 m illion in fiscal year 1994. Fittingly, in 1992. USAID 
established dem ocracy promotion as a goal area.2'' The Office o f  Transition Initiatives 
was formed and would be jo in tly  m anaged by the State Departm ent and U SA ID .27 This 
was a sign o f  changes to come, as the State Departm ent was becom ing m ore overtly 
involved in Am erican developm ent prerogatives. USAID began expanding its m ission to 
include a greater focus on dem ocracy prom otion.2S OTI was designed to help countries 
rebuild after conflict situations and to cope with political transitions. It included 
provisions for good governance and dem ocracy promotion. OTI has helped with 
G uatem ala 's de-m ilitarization after its 1996 peace accords and reinforced com pliance 
w ith disinform ation cam paigns in Bosnia after the signing o f  the Dayton Accords.~9In 
M ay, 1994, the Office o f  D em ocracy and Governance was formed to help design USAID 
field m issions and guide its dem ocracy assistance programs. The office, which also 
reported to the National Security C o u n c il,30 was charged with coordinating the different
26At about the same time, the Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor 
was created at the State Department. Additionally. President Clinton attem pted to create 
the position o f  Assistant Secretary o f  Defense for Dem ocracy and Peacekeeping at the 
Defense Departm ent, but Congress vetoed the idea. A Special Assistant for Dem ocracy 
was selected in the National Security Council. Cohn, 1.
2'M acrae. 30-1.
28Ruttan. 115-46.
‘ J. Brian Atwood. “After the Conflict Has Ended."C //m r/o« Science  
A/ow7or89:126 (27 M ay 1997): IS.
3°United States Agency for International D evelopm ent/'O ffice o f  D em ocracy and 
G overnance" (no date), http: www.usaid.gov dem ocracy.office' index. [6 M arch 02].
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com ponents o f  the nation 's dem ocracy assistance program s and helping ensure that they 
supported the efforts o f  NGOs like the Asia Foundation. National Endowm ent for 
Dem ocracy, and Radio Free America. In the 1990s and beyond. USAID increasingly 
worked to prom ote dem ocracy by financing elections, training political parties, 
strengthening legislatures, encouraging jud iciary  reform, supporting independent media, 
and building civil society organizations involved in human rights and dem ocracy-related 
activities.
The agency has still not found a lim ited reliable set o f  indicators to m easure the 
processes o f  dem ocracy, yet the Office o f  Dem ocracy and Governance is attem pting to 
devise this. Currently, the office publishes a guide with approxim ately 300 dem ocracy 
indicators, grouped under the categories o f  rule o f  law', elections and political processes, 
civil society, and governance. By the turn o f  the twentieth century, U SA ID 's dem ocracy 
and good governance promotion activities took place in 72 country and regional 
program s. USAID concedes, though, that "capturing the complex and dynam ic process o f  
dem ocratization" is exceedingly d ifficult.31
By the end o f  the 1990s, the breadth and scope o f  the agency 's good governance 
program s had widened and increased, with program s spread throughout the developing 
world focusing on various aspects o f  good governance reform. Helping m ake 
governm ents institutions more transparent and accountable had becom e a key priority. 
The most com prehensive o f  these program s were implem ented in Europe and Eurasia. In 
Africa, the nature o f  these types o f  program s varied greatly, as countries differed w idely
31 Ibid., USAID Fiscal Year 2002 A nnual Perform ance Plan (W ashington. D.C.: 
United States Agency for International Developm ent Bureau for Policy and Program 
Coordination. February 2000). 58.
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in character and in their abilities to prom ote reforms. USAID program s in Asia and the 
Near East were generally o f  a more provisional and experimental nature.3'
In the late 1990s and beyond in particular, USAID has also focused on prom oting 
hum an rights, declaring that developm ent and even dem ocracy are basic hum an rights. 
USAID advisor Craig H. Baab, for exam ple, writes that the "m ission o f  USAID to foster 
long-term  developm ent is premised on functioning laws and dem ocratic institutions. But 
U SA ID 's work with NGOs and governm ents w orldw ide is guided not so m uch by laws as 
by the principles articulated in the Universal D eclaration o f  Human R ights."33
USAID has increasingly focused on what it calls "second-generation" 
dem ocratization activities, in addition to "first-generation" dem ocratization activities. 
W hile first-generation activities are carried out in countries transitioning from  w ar or 
civil strife to peace or from authoritarianism  to a more open system, second-generation 
activities take place where the basic com ponents o f  dem ocratic governance—elections, 
representation, civil society, property rights, and a functioning legal system —are m ore 
advanced but could benefit from additional expertise. Efforts are made to try to help 
countries consolidate existing dem ocracies, or m ake their dem ocracies m ore 
representative and responsive.
Also, as part o f  its em phasis on the link between developm ent and dem ocracy, 
USAID began publishing Dem ocracy D ialogue  in 1994. For its first four years, the 
publication included articles revealing the regional and sectoral com ponents o f  the 
agency 's dem ocracy and governance assistance programs. Subsequently, the focus has
^TJnited States Agency for International Development, Fiscal Year 2002, 59.
' V ra ig  H. Baab, "Hum an Rights: The Cornerstone o f USAID." D em ocracy  
Dialogue: Technical Xotes from  USAID 's (llohal Center for Democracy and  (iovcrnancc  
(Novem ber, 199S): 2.
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been narrowed to a particular technical topic for each issue. Recent issues have 
highlighted m edia law reform, anti-corruption, conflict prevention, and political party 
developm ent assistance.34
In the m id-1990s. USAID began increasingly designing and im plem enting 
dem ocracy assistance program s for countries throughout Asia, Africa, and the M iddle 
East. M ostly, however, these program s were largely isolated from U SA ID 's central 
developm ent efforts. The agency refrained from assum ing an explicit pro-dem ocracy 
agenda, believing such a political position would potentially jeopardize ongoing 
developm ent efforts. As much as possible, developm ent efforts were carried out in a 
technical, apolitical m anner, separated from the interests o f the State Departm ent and 
Am erican foreign policy goals. For instance, as U SA ID 's democracy assistance program  
was in its early stages in the 1990s. USAID resisted State Department pressure to use 
Developm ent Assistance funding and pushed for the less politically oriented Econom ic 
Support Funds account to be used to respond to increased demands for dem ocracy 
assistance from the continent.
U SA ID 's formal definition o f  good governance in the late 1990s wras the sam e as 
it is today; good governance refers to “a governm ent's ability to m aintain social peace, 
guarantee law and order, prom ote or create conditions necessary for econom ic growth, 
and ensure a m inim um  level o f  social secu rity ."35 Programs by the late 1990s fell under 
the categories o f  elections and political processes, civil society, rule o f  law. 
decentralization and institutional reform , and anti-corruption.
34United States A gency for International Development. Democracy Dialogue. 
“Office o f  Dem ocracy and G overnance" (no date). ' http: Vw w w .usaid. gov dem ocracy 
dialogue.htm l ■ [6 M arch 02],
'''ibid.
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Elections and Political Processes
In the 1980s and earlier, the C'lA had routinely provided funds and guidance for 
political parties, business councils, trade unions, and student and civic groups in the 
countries in which the United States intervened. In the later 1980s. a notable portion o f 
these program s was shifted from the CIA to USAID. USAID Elections and Political 
Processes program s from then on and throughout the 1900s grew to eventually include 
election planning and im plem entation, political party developm ent, voter education, and 
support for dom estic and international m onitoring groups. Civil society developm ent 
program s also supported the establishm ent o f  political infrastructure and fostered input 
into public policy dialogue. Largely through NG Os, the agency works to help countries 
install, develop, and m aintain “participatory, representative, and accountable" 
dem ocracies. USAID sponsors pre-election assessm ents; election com m issioner 
training; the training o f  elected officials, poll watchers and local and international 
observers; and even the purchase o f  election equipm ent. USAID work also includes 
sponsoring program s to help structure post-conflict elections, support political 
organizations, and facilitate m ediation betw een hostile ethnic com m unities. The 
agency 's website states that, "In recent years, elections have been a principal vehicle for 
dem ocratization, as authoritarian governm ents increasingly have fallen to dem ocratic 
forces. Electoral cam paigns also tend to foster political liberalization." USAID takes its 
elections work very seriously .36
USAID encourages developing countries to adopt pluralistic, m ulti-party
36United States Agency for International Developm ent Office o f  Dem ocracy and 
Governance: Elections and Political Processes" (18 M ay 2005). • http:' www. 
usuid.gov/our w ork/dem ocracy and governance technical areas dg office epp.html ■ 
[19 M ay 2005).
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dem ocratic regim es, using fair and open laws and elections. The agency conducts 
program s in strengthening political parties, political campaigns, and legislatures: 
election m onitoring: and voter education. O ther programs work to reform the candidate 
selection process as well as political party legal and regulatory frameworks. Candidates 
are encouraged to rem ain issue-oriented and citizens are taught to be aware whether 
candidates work to fulfill campaign promises. W om en are encouraged to vote and to run 
for offices. Rule o f  law consultants help create and implem ent judicial system s sim ilar 
to those in the United States, often with attorney general offices, suprem e courts, public 
m inistries, and low er court systems staffed with public defense attorneys, prosecutors, 
judges, and adm inistrators. These consultants w ork to keep judicial system s merit- 
based, with opportunities for women. Reform o f  crim inal justice system s is encouraged, 
with program s targeting the police, criminal investigation system, criminal procedures 
code, and public defense attorneys. Local civil society is encouraged to m onitor legal 
system s and to initiate and track legislation and its efficacy. National anti-corruption 
plans with local offices are established. O m budsm en and auditors are trained. A nti­
m oney laundering program s are held.
U S A ID 's Dem ocracy and G overnance O ffice additionally supports regional 
program s to prom ote the exchange o f  inform ation and experiences among countries. For 
example, it has sponsored the creation o f  regional associations o f  election officials in 
Asia, Eastern Europe, and the Caribbean. These associations are designed to prom ote the 
“professionalization," according to USAID criteria, o f  election adm inistrators and create 
networks betw een countries' electoral com m issions. USAID also helps finances projects 
that dissem inate information on “successful" dem ocratization strategies for donors and 
practitioners. An electronic publication containing 5000 pages o f  information has been
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m ade available to assist election adm inistrators conduct elections according to USAID 
standards.
Unlike the EU. which provides election support less strategically. USAID looks 
for ‘"political openings." or opportunities to enact change before it channels high levels 
o f  resources. USAID also funds and attempts to shape political parties. The agency 
began its work developing political parties in 1989 in Hungary and has perform ed this 
work in at least fifty countries since then. G enerally training seminars and conferences 
are held for candidates, political party leaders, and elected officials, but som etim es 
political parties are targeted individually. In the 1990s and beyond, alm ost all USAID 
funding has gone to two NED associates, the International Republican Institute and the 
National D em ocratic Institute for International Affairs. The NRI and the NDI are 
officially the foreign policy arms o f  the Am erican Republican and the Dem ocratic 
parties, respectively. These groups attempt to create political conditions amenable to 
United States interests in developing countries. This m ay involve supporting a particular 
political group or party over another. This was clearly the case in the early 1990s when 
the rubric o f  strengthening civil society was used to support conservative forces to 
confront the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. Often conservative, centrist, pro-A m erican, pro­
m arket parties and regim es are supported. Special attention has been given to areas o f  
strategic interest to the United States for security and econom ic reasons. In the 1990s, 
much o f  U SA ID 's Election and Political Processes support went to central and Eastern 
European countries. In the new m illennium , m uch focus has been placed on M iddle 
Eastern countries.37
United  States Agency for International Development .  "U S A ID  and Political
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Civil Society
U S A I D  contends that strong civil societies enable citizens to participate in policy 
formation and im plem entation, help ensure that governm ents are responsive to citizens' 
needs and desires, and safeguard citizens from unpredictable or arbitrary governmental 
recrim ination. Supporting civil society has becom e a significant com ponent o f  the 
agency 's dem ocracy and good governance prom otion programs. USAID states that. "As 
the nexus for participation in governance, civil society is essential in a dem ocracy for
3 8political expression and influencing governm ent policy choices." The agency allocates 
its dem ocracy assistance funding either directly or through NGOs or organizations such 
as the NED and its affiliates and various “private" Am erican groups that are closely 
linked to the United States' policym aking establishm ent and aligned with American 
foreign policy objectives. Between 1994 and 2000. U SA ID 's s ta ff was reduced by more 
than 30 percent, m aking the agency vulnerable to m anagem ent weaknesses. Partly in 
response to budget difficulties, in m id-20001. USAID adm inistrator Andrew Natsios 
announced plans for a new program , the Global Developm ent Alliance. The program 
allows USAID to develop m ore partnerships with NGOs, private foundations, 
corporations, universities, and individuals to leverage funds and other resources for 
international developm ent goals. The organizations that receive USAID and NED funds 
include, am ong others, the International Federation for Electoral System s (IFES); the 
Center for D em ocracy (CFD). the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE): and 
the Free Trade Union Institute.
Party D evelopm ent" (no date), <http://ww w.usaid.gov/ our worb'dem ocracv and 
governance/ publications/pdfs pnace500.pdf > [3 M arch 2005].
3SUnited States Agency for International Developm ent. "O ffice o f  Dem ocracy and
Governance: Civil Society" (17 March 2005). ■ h ttp :' www.usaid.gov our
work dem ocracy and governance technical areas dg office civ.html [19 May 2005].
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Support for civil society is seen by some to be a m easure o f  support for the 
privatization o f  the econom y, and much o f  U SA ID 's em phasis on civil society in the 
developing world approaches the debate from this angle. One USAID study openly notes 
that “the transition from statist to market-based econom ies can be m ore effectively 
consolidated with the growth o f  advocacy groups that cham pion such reform s."34 Also, 
U SA ID 's desire to support civil society has em phasized em pow ering societies that 
facilitate and foster Am erican values and Am erican-style dem ocratic regim es. The United 
States is able to help shape the politics o f  a country while appearing relatively benign.
U SA ID 's efforts to strengthen civil society are organized into five areas: creating an 
enabling legal environm ent to protect and prom ote civil society; increasing citizen 
participation; increasing the financial viability o f  civil society organizations; improving 
the flow o f  inform ation through support for independent media; and fostering a 
dem ocratic culture. USAID also supports trade and industry associations that desire good 
governance. The Dem ocracy and Governance Office has actively helped civil society 
prom ote econom ic reform  in developing countries. In Ghana, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, 
for instance, this office is exam ining whether national econom ic consultative bodies can 
help prom ote econom ic reform .40
U SA ID 's use o f  NG Os has certainly served Am erican strategic interests, and the 
agency relies heavily upon them. In 2000, USAID allocated about $4 billion o f  its $7.2
34Gary Hansen, Constituencies fo r  Reform: Strategic Approaches fo r  
D onor-Supported Civic Advocacy Programs (W ashington, D.C.: USAID, 1996), 2
40United States A gency for International Developm ent, “USAID: Policy" (4 
February 2005). 'TittpV/www.usaid.gov/policy/adsOOO/refindxb.htm > [2 April 
2005]:idcm. “ USAID: Dem ocracy and G overnance (April 2005). • w w w .usaid. gov our 
work dem ocracy and governance '  [4 April 2005].
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billion budget to NGOs.'11 Am erican NGOs are selected for projects that would appear 
intrusive if  im plem ented by the United states government. M any o f  these NGOs work in 
close consultation with the Am erican government. M any are overtly political. By EU 
standards, if  the Am erican governm ent was genuinely interested in prom oting 
democracy, it would be willing to support leaders, regimes, and institutions preferred by a 
country 's own citizens and not attempt to influence the political choices, so long as they 
were dem ocratically achieved.
USAID-sponsored civil society work has also provided direct assistance to 
em pow ering disadvantaged groups such as poor wom en and helping them becom e 
increasingly active in the political process. W omen, the poor, and others have been taught 
about how they m ight influence politics and have their needs better m et.4'
Rule o f  Law
Agency Rule o f  Law program s were am ong its first in the area good governance 
promotion. The earliest USAID involvement in political aid began in the early 1960s. 
when the agency and the Ford Foundation funded the developm ent o f  law faculties in a 
num ber o f  Latin Am erican, Asian, and African universities. This "Law  and 
Development" program  trained students o f  these countries in W estern law to prom ote 
political and econom ic m odernization. This program  was short-lived, but paved the way 
for a focus in the 1970s on m aking legal services available to the poor, as part o f 
USAID's new focus on poverty alleviation and basic needs. W om en's rights and human 
rights received newfound attention in the late 1970s, but it was not until the Reagan
4lUnited States General Accounting Office. "USA ID Relies Heavily. " 1.
"United States Agency lor International Development. "Civil Society."
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Adm inistration that an "A dm inistration o f  Justice" program was im plem ented, targeted at 
first at Central A m erican countries. The current "Rule o f  Law" program , much broader 
geographically and conceptually, represents a fourth generation o f  IJSA1D program s in 
this area.43
USAID 's efforts to strengthen legal system s focus on supporting legal reform, 
im proving the adm inistration o f  justice, and increasing citizens' access to justice.
USAID judicial reform  program s work to increase the independence and com petence o f 
legal system s through assistance to the country and the police and to strengthen 
dem ocracy by nurturing fair, efficient, and accessible legal systems. The agency trains 
judges and other court system  personnel, supports bar associations in recipient countries, 
and trains police in investigative techniques. Legal areas where USAID was most active 
in the 1990s included general comm ercial law, especially in countries undergoing 
substantial econom ic transform ation, as was the case with in the 1990s in Hungary, 
Russia, and Serbia. USAID -supported efforts included the revision o f  national 
constitutions, com m ercial codes, and contract law. Laws were created dealing with 
business entry and exit (com pany law and bankruptcy), accounting rules, corporate 
governance, em ploym ent (including labor and pension benefits), and taxation. M uch 
attention was given to laws supporting financial services, including legal protection for 
capital m arkets and business insurance. Laws protecting foreign direct investment, WTO 
accession and com pliance, custom s rules, public procurem ent, anti-trust laws and
43United States A gency for International Development, “USAID: Legal and 
Institutional Reform " (18 June 2003). '  http:' ww w.usaid.gov our work economic
growth and trade/eg lir.htm  - 1 13 Jun2003].
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consum er protection, and foreign exchange rules were also devised and m ade 
enforceable.44
Other areas that received much attention in the 1990s from USAID included 
m echanism s for comm ercial disputes and enforcem ent m echanism s, including judicial 
training, court adm inistration, docket control, arbitration, m ediation, and training for 
bailiffs and marshals. Laws were established that defined all forms o f  property and 
m andated the registration o f  property. Am ong the types o f  property encom passed were 
personal (or m oveable) property, business property, and intellectual property.45
Decentralization and Institutional Reform
Through U SA ID ’s D ecentralization and Institutional Support program s in the 
1990s, much emphasis was placed on preventing state capture and m isuse o f  public funds 
by local elites. Program s aimed to devolve cental authority, initiate privatization, and 
im plem ent institutions that prevented the abuse o f  state power. O ther related institutional 
support programs sought to create m arket-friendly state institutions in developing 
countries. In the initial stages, USAID would often docum ent the failings and 
shortcomings o f  the existing governm ental system s in areas o f  interest, provide support 
for a strategic intervention in the reform process, and m onitor the refo rm 's impact. 
U SA ID 's decentralization program s supported efforts to devolve authority to local levels
44United States Agency for International Developm ent, “Office o f  Dem ocracy 
and Governance: Rule o f  Law" (17 M arch 2005). <http://ww w.usaid.gov. our work/ 
dem ocracyandgovem ance/technical areas/dg office/ro l.h tm l> [19 M ay 2005],
45United States A gency for International Developm ent, “ USAID Prom otes the
Rule o f  Law in Latin Am erican and Caribbean D em ocracies" (no date). ■ http: :www. 
dec.org pdf docs PD A CA 630.pdf " (19 M ay 2005].
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through training, technical assistance, and visits to other countries where decentralization 
had occurred. They also sought to strengthen the participation o f  civil society in local 
governm ent decision-m aking and prom ote transparency in its financial operations. 
Budget codes were im plem ented in various countries. Many program s included the 
creation and distribution o f  citizens' guides to local governm ent structures including 
roles, responsibilities, and inform ation on how taxes are distributed.41’
USAID is very strategic about tim ing its privatization and institutional reform  programs 
that support open m arkets. USAID has developed three states o f  fostering privatization: 
pre-privatization (creating a facilitating, developing public aw areness campaigns, 
im plem enting a conducive legal and regulatory framework), privatization (the transfer o f  
assets), and post- privatization (restructuring corporate governance and encouraging 
com pliance with international accounting standards). U SA ID ’s privatization program s 
have grown beyond asset transfer to also privatizing services which have traditionally 
been m anaged by the public sector, such as telecom m unications, tourism, information 
technology, and transportation.4'
U SA ID 's econom ic portfolio has shifted from sim ply building dom estic enterprises 
to also assisting developing nations in jo in ing  and adhering to international trade pacts 
and collaborating with the W TO. U SA ID 's focus on restructuring the transitional states 
o f  the form er Soviet bloc, for instance, was intended to help pave the w ay for Am erican
4<,United States A gency for International Development, “ USAID: 
D ecentralization" (24 February 2005). <http://w w w .usaid. gov/our 
work/crosscutting program s/transition initiatives/focus/decentrl.htm U  [ 1 April 2005],
47United States A gency for International Development. "USAID: Econom ic 
Growth and Trade: Privatization" (12 M arch 2004). <http://w w w .usaid.gov 
/our work/econom ic growth and trade/eg privatization.htm  ' [  15 M arch 2004].
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corporate investors and traders. The agency in the 1990s also increasingly incorporated 
conflict prevention concerns in its institution-building efforts. USAID notes that. "The 
developm ent o f  key political and econom ic institutions serves as a panacea to combat the 
new set o f  post Cold W ar uncertainties." Efforts to build local capacity, engage multiple 
actors, and develop better m echanism s for coordination have been em phasized. 
M echanism s that are built into state institutions that are perceived as fair and inclusive 
have been a key focus.48
Anti-Corruption
USAID defines corruption as “ the use o f  entrusted authority for private gain." 
Throughout the 1990s. the agency continually worked to im prove its ability to help fight 
such activity in developing countries. As at the W orld Bank. USAID officials 
increasingly used the "c" word to help explain past developm ent efforts. Agency 
program s aimed to reduce hindrances to market econom ies and to develop leaner, more 
reliable states where investors could feel secure and citizens felt com pelled to oversee 
their governm ents' activities. The agency spent $184 m illion in fiscal year 2001 on anti­
corruption activities and $222 m illion in 2002 49
USAID-sponsored anti-corruption efforts in the 1990s worked to im prove the
United States A gency for International Development, "U SA ID  Conflict 
Prevention" (8 January 2001). ^httpi/Av-ww.usaid.gov/ pubs/confprev/ > [20 May 2005],
49United States A gency for International Development. "U S A ID 's Anti­
corruption Strategy” (January 2005). <http://64.233.161.104/search?q=cache:
dR lB W cb71K U J  :w w w .u s a i d . g o v / o u r w o r k / d e m o c r a c y  A n tL £ o v e m a n c e
publications/pdfs/ac_strategy_final.pdf+usaid+anti-corruption& hl=en> [2 M arch 2005]: 
idem ,“The Anti-corruption and Good G overnance Act" (11 N ovem ber 2001). 
http://64.233.161.104-seareh?=C ache:TrZy5P.\JH ZkJ: ww w.ignet.gov-randp 
lUlcOl .pd f'u sa id  + role toU  inspector ’ general&hl en [12 M ay 2005],
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capacity o f  NGOs to m onitor and publicize governm ent corruption and emphasized 
transparency and accountability in its support to financial m anagem ent system s and audit 
and accounting systems. USAID works with governm ents to create and support audit and 
investigative oversight. The agency 's program in Kazakhstan, for exam ple, helped 
facilitate the adoption o f  and com pliance with international accounting standards. 
Standardized accounting was established in the central and com m ercial banking system.
In Russia, with the Cham ber o f  Accounts (R ussia 's national accounting office), USAID 
has worked to achieve auditing and accounting reforms, with oversight from an educated 
public. Citizen groups in Russia and the former Soviet states have been taught about the 
im portance o f  oversight o f  budgets, expenditures, and procurement activities. In 
Honduras, USAID has helped the Controller General to develop auditing plans for 
governm ent program s by providing funds to train, and equip governm ent auditors. W ith 
agency assistance, the Honduran Controller General makes inspection and audit reports 
available to the public via the Internet.50
USAID has worked to open up the budget-m aking process to public scrutiny in 
various countries. In Sum atra, Indonesia, for example, its Office o f  Transition Initiatives 
(OTI) supported public hearings at the district level that opened the annual budget 
process to public scrutiny. In Peru, to prepare localities to take on responsibilities that 
previously belonged to national officials, OTI supported public hearings and information 
cam paigns to teach citizens about new budget and policy proposals and increase 
participation in the policy-m aking process. OTI engaged local businesses, municipal 
officials, and advocacy groups in form ulating strategies for resource m anagem ent, trade.
50Ibid., "The Office o f  Transition Initiatives" (17 May 2005). 
<http://w w w .usaid.gov/our_work/crosscutting program s transition initiatives/focus dece 
ntrl.h tm l> [19 April 2005].
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and regulatory reform. and tor attracting new businesses and industries. OTI also funded 
training workshops and policy sem inars to help build relationships and m echanism s for 
ongoing cooperation.51
USAID al so relied on its corruption assessment o f  certain leaders, governm ents, or 
institutions to witlihold funds or dem and changes. In essence, by using the corruption 
barom eter in m aking aid decisions, the agency assumed greater degrees o f  control and 
selectivity.
Distinctive Institution Features
USAID, usually forced to justify  its existence to the right wing o f  the Republican party as 
well as to a critical public, discovered its new rationale in the early 199Us. By em bracing 
good governance and dem ocracy prom otion, the agency adopted a cause im portant to the 
State Department, the Republican-controlled Congress, the Am erican governm ent 
generally, and the American people. As a former State Departm ent advisor contended, in 
the post-Cold-W ar world, a "US stance in favor o f  dem ocracy helps get the Congress, the 
bureaucracy, the media, the public, and elite opinion to back US policy. It helps 
am eliorate the dom estic agenda, disarm s c ritic s ...."52
USAID also discovered a dom ain it was well suited to occupy, m aking its position 
w ithin the Am erican governm ent m ore secure. President C lin ton 's trial-and-error foreign 
policy was not always popular, but his emphasis on dem ocracy prom otion and free 
m arkets was lauded by many. Clinton often reiterated the popular view that dem ocracies 
and free market economies are m utually supportive and that dem ocracies do not go to
--------------------------- ^ T ~
Ibid.. "Anti-corruption Strategy. ‘
'"Cited in W illiam Robinson. Promoting Polyarchy . (llohalizalinti. ( S 
Intervention, and Ilegcm onv  (Cambridge: Cam bridge University Press. 1996). 73.
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war against one another. USAID, its continued existence tentative in the early 1990s
without its Cold W ar rationale and with public sentiment tor aid at an all-tim e low.
adopted the popular cause o f  dem ocracy promotion. It depicted its program s as creating
new opportunities for wealth-creation and as imparting stability in a new ly uncertain
world. The agency 's program s accordingly em phasized neoliberal econom ic reform s and
stable regim es with fam iliar dem ocratic traits and friendly or at least not
unaccom m odating leaders.
U S A ID 's new em phasis on com bating corruption in recipient countries had
strategic im plications for the agency 's institutional survival. Over the course o f  the
1990s, blam ing corruption for U SA ID 's past developm ent failures and raising hopes that
such failures could be rem edied was increasingly used in attempt to raise support for the
agency. In a paper featured at the 1992 W ashington. D.C. conference on "L im iting
A dm inistrative Corruption in the D em ocratizing States o f  Africa," Robert C’harlick
em phasized how in the past, corruption had cost taxpayers. Charlick, senior advisor for
U S A ID 's Africa bureau, contended that
W ith the end o f the Cold W ar in Africa, international donor agencies have begun 
to openly say what they could previously only mutter—that corruption, rent- 
seeking, or other such euphem ism s, is a m ajor threat to the econom ic 
developm ent o f  m any African countries. Perhaps, just as im portant, it is a threat 
to donor program s as well. Not only are taxpayers and their representatives 
displaying an increasing im patience with the waste o f public resources which 
system atic adm inistrative corruption entails, private sector actors are 
decreasingly willing to tolerate the high cost o f  doing business in societies 
where the 'in form al' transaction costs are so steep.
USAID eould blam e its past failures on corruption, but it still had to advance a 
com pelling rationale for its continued existence. USAID had had to prove its merit many
' Robert C'harlick. "Corruption in Political Transition: A Governance 
Perspective." in Corruption and Reform , ed. Robert C'harlick (W ashington. D.C'.: United 
States Governm ent Printing ( )fficc. 1903). 1 77.
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times, hut before the early 1990s. it always had the Cold W ar as justification. After the 
Cold W ar. it was difficult to decipher how USAID could portray its relevance. American 
foreign policy unfolded as a wave o f  reactions against hum anitarian abuses, debt crises, 
and acting out by rogue states. It often seem ed that the locus o f  foreign policy was the 
Treasury Departm ent rather than the State Departm ent or the Pentagon. A m erica's 
interests in prom oting free m arkets was stronger than ever in the 1990s. Clinton 
negotiated NAFTA and then NAFTA enlargem ent. USAID had to transform  itself so that 
it could appear useful during this heady but largely undefined time. Dem ocracy 
prom otion provided a solution as it appealed to econom ic and security objectives, albeit 
in a som ew hat vague manner.
In the 1990s. particularly after 1997 when USAID was put under the State 
D epartm ent's command, U SA ID 's new good governance and dem ocracy assistance 
program s aimed at swift and dem onstrable econom ic and political liberalization that was 
am enable to A m erica's strategic political and econom ic interests. M any USAID 
program s fostered political structures and ideologies intended to legitim ate and more 
securely entrench m arket relations.
Bill C lin ton 's adm inistration, even m ore than R eagan 's or B ush 's, focused on 
establishing free m arkets around the globe. The Clinton adm inistration cared a great deal 
about free trade. Dubbed the "globalization" president by some. Clinton positioned the 
United States firmly towards increased integration in the global economy. He understood 
m ore profoundly than m any other leaders that free trade held out m any benefits for the 
United States. The Clinton adm inistration also asserted that there was a strong 
connection between free m arkets and dem ocracy, stating, in fact, that the form er were
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integral to the latter. This administration early on coined the term "m arket dem ocracies." 
em phasizing this relationship.
The first Bush and later the Clinton adm inistration had a sim ilar particular vision 
in mind with respect to prom oting free trade and open m arkets that dem ocracy assistance 
was useful towards. In order to create conditions conducive to increased relative and 
absolute prosperity for the United State, the Bush and most notably the Clinton 
adm inistration sought to secure open m arkets and free trading arrangem ents in 1990s that 
m axim ized the United States' position. They sought to do this by prom oting m ultilateral 
free trade, regional free trade that benefitted Am erica, and to hinder regionalism  that 
m ight im pede A m erica 's access to particular m arkets, especially regional arrangem ents in 
western Europe and in East Asia. M ultilaterally, the United States endorsed the 
form ation o f  the W ord Trade Organization as a m ultilateral econom ic referee and 
continued to play a if  not the key role in the G-8 summit meetings. It rem ained involved 
in the other Bretton W oods institutions. Regionally, the United States pursued and 
form alized NA FTA , with the goals o f  enlargem ent to include Canada on the horizon. But 
the United States also worked to underm ine any aspect o f  the EU trading bloc or o f  a 
loosely form ed East Asian trading bloc that lim ited A m erica's econom ic opportunities. 
This sort o f  calculated m ulti-tiered econom ic strategy required that the United States 
rem ain involved in the developing world and gave the United States high stakes in 
ensuring that it could secure lucrative econom ic opportunities with these countries. Good 
governance prom otion and dem ocracy assistance were ways for the United States to stay 
involved and help ensure that rules were in place to secure Am erican interests. U SA ID 's 
involvem ent in this work m ade the agency both pertinent and significant to the Am erican 
governm ent's agenda.
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The Am erican econom y was increasingly dependent upon the stability o f Third 
W orld political system s and economies, and as form er Secretary o f  State M adeline 
Albright asserts, dem ocracy is the “best political insurance" against conflict and the best 
way to ensure econom ic openness. It was only when Albright asserted that 
dem ocratization "gives people a stake in socie ty ''54 that one had to wonder to which 
people she is referring. The United Starts Com m erce Departm ent estim ated that in the 
late 1990s, Am erican foreign direct investm ent was m ore than $2 trillion, with about 
$500 billion going into developing countries. A pproxim ately 35 percent o f  Am erican 
exports in 1990 were to Third W orld countries, and in 1999, this figure had increased to 
about 41 percent. USAID had an increasing stake in ensuring that developing countries 
were viable sites for the business o f  Am erican TN Cs. M any contend that this concern 
dom inates all o thers.55 Their claims are not without merit.
USAID feels tacit pressure to cultivate transnationally-oriented elites who share 
W ashington 's interest in integrating states into the global capitalist system. During the 
1990s, USAID increasingly allocated its scarce foreign aid funds towards business and 
investm ent prom otion, favoring the interests o f  A m erican-based TNCs and influential
54M adeleine Albright, "A lbright Delivers Rem arks at 2000 U.S. Agency for 
International Developm ent, Dem ocracy, and G overnance Partners Conference" 
(W ashington, D.C.: F D C H  Political Transcripts, 30 N ovem ber 2000), 3.
55Sachs, ed., 192: Laurie Richardson, for exam ple, argues that feeding the hungry 
in Haiti with inexpensive food opens new m arkets for Am erican com m odities, undercuts 
local production, and creates dependency. USAID policies also build up the urban work 
force that can be em ployed in the industrial sector dom inated by American TNCs for low 
wages. D em ocracy prom otion ensures that Haiti is a relatively stable place for 
A m erican-based TN Cs to conduct such business. She focuses particularly on two 
Am erican NGOs, CARE and the Pan Am erican Developm ent Fund that receive m uch o f  
the m illions o f  dollars distributed for Haitian aid projects, claim ing that four-fifths o f  the 
m oney m eant to help Haitians ends up benefitting Am erican TN Cs and bureaucrats. See 
Laurie Richardson. Feeding Dependency. Starving Democracy: I SAID Policies in Haiti 
(Boston: Grassroots International. 1997).
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Am erican special interest groups favoring big business, rather than m eeting the Clinton 
adm inistration 's newly defined m ission for USAID o f  fostering sustainable developm ent. 
USAID good governance program s nurtured qualities necessary for reliable open 
markets. Privatization programs created openings for TNCs. as did lowered taxes and 
tariffs for trade and laws enforcing contracts and protecting business and intellectual 
property rights. Further, m aking governm ent officials in developing countries follow 
budget codes and transparency obligations m ade m ore funds available for investing in 
societies and m ade countries m ore attractive to investors and international business. 
Reducing crim e through enforceable, standardized crim inal codes m ade business 
environm ents m ore secure as well. Having credible legal system s protected business 
transactions and helped curtail domestic problem s that could interfere with peaceful 
com m unities that business seeks out. Additionally, tying the econom ies o f  developing 
countries to international standards such as W TO regulations gave the United States m ore 
control over developing countries under the m antle o f  legitim acy international rules 
provided. By fostering such conditions. USAID was able to serve United States 
governm ent interests and satisfy the desires o f  the strong Am erican business lobby that 
often helps underw rite governm ent programs. U SA ID 's increasing use o f  NGOs was 
seen by som e as a potentially transform ative force in prom oting m ore equal, 
participatory, and sustainable developm ent, yet the utilization o f  prim arily Am erican 
groups can be rightly viewed as a cooption by neo-liberalism .
Further, by linking developm ent assistance to national security objectives. USAID 
was able to m ake itse lf even more relevant through its good gov ernance and dem ocracy 
prom otion program s and policies. USAID did not hide these m otives, though it was
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careful not to sound over-reaching or im perialistic in its literature. Its statement on
"D em ocracy and the U.S. National Interest" declared that in the post-C'old W ar world.
No longer does the United States have one clearly defined adversary, and thus no 
one m easure to calibrate foreign policy worldwide. W hile they may be more 
diffuse, dangers and threats to peace, stability, and economic prosperity persist in
this new e ra  The challenge now is to recognize and understand m ultiple and
constantly-shifting sources o f  peril and to address complex and inter-linked 
causes o f  un rest.. .so that we m ay take advantage o f  new opportunities. One o f  
these opportunities is to prom ote principles o f  dem ocratic governance....56
There had been evidence in previous years that this position was indeed warranted.
Econom ic crises abroad had o f  course led to state failure throughout history. M ore
recently, though, the adverse consequences to the United States had been m ore strongly
felt due to increased globalization o f  the world econom y. Since 1960, most American
m ilitary interventions occurred in developing countries experiencing state failures, and
this trend had intensified by the early 1990s. By em bracing dem ocracy and good
governance prom otion, USAID was and still is attem pting to appeal to public sentiment
and hence to governm ental sentiment. A recent USAID Annual Perform ance Plan
contends that the agency believes a world o f  dem ocratic nations provides a more stable
arena in which to advance United States' values and interests. By equating dem ocracy
with stability, USAID was appealing to desires for a m ore secure world. Due to the need
to rem ain viable in an increasingly pressurized institutional setting, in the 1990s,
U SA ID 's dem ocracy assistance program s revealed a m ore emphatic geostrategic
component than any o f  the other IDIs studied here. USAID has been an arm o f  Am erican
governm ent policy that does not shy away from intervening in strongly authoritarian
contexts or im plem enting dem ocracy-related reform s in a rigid, top-down fashion.
^ U n ite d  States Agency for International Developm ent. "Dem ocracy and the U.S. 
National Interest” (30 January 2002). - h ttpy /w w w .usaid.gov/dem ocracv-dusni.htm l -• [6 
March 2002],
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U SA ID 's dem ocracy assistance programs support the State D epartm ent's analytical 
model that assum es a fixed set o f  conditions associated with three distinctive phases o f  
transition from authoritarianism  to democracy: opening, breakthrough and consolidation. 
The reorganization o f  USAID in 1994 revealed a new dedication to utiliz.e USAID more 
em phatically to forward United States strategic interests. The decision to increase the use 
o f  funding through NGOs rather than through country governm ents and the removal o f 
Congress' previous ability to ear-mark aid for certain countries gave the State 
Departm ent m ore control over the agency. The agency 's increased em phasis on 
dem ocracy prom otion and assistance followed from new Am erican foreign policy beliefs 
and prerogatives.
Throughout the 1990s and beyond, U SA ID 's dem ocracy assistance programs 
have used their standard model described above for installing dem ocracies to target 
countries with governm ents W ashington has wanted to underm ine, such as in Venezuela 
and Haiti, earlier in Nicaragua, and later in A fghanistan and Iraq. These program s have 
also been earnestly undertaken in countries such as El Salvador where nationalist or 
revolutionary groups have threatened the rule o f  local pro-U nited States elites or 
neoliberal regim es. Additionally, these program s have been applied in countries in 
transition, such as in South Africa and Eastern Europe. Over the course o f  the 1990s, 
USAID, worried about its own survival, portrayed foreign aid as a m eans o f  
“preventative diplom acy" for American foreign policy. Dem ocracy prom otion was 
depicted as a key facet o f  the agency 's usefulness at lending stability in an increasingly 
insecure world. In 1992. Atwood declared that U SA ID 's m ission would be redirected to 
focus on "preventative" diplom acy and agency literature and rhetoric becam e abundant 
with descriptions o f  brew ing threats to the I hiited States. D em ocracy was presented as a
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safeguard to help lessen these threats, thereby helping secure the agency 's viability and 
future funding. Program s featured stability-enhancing m echanism s, such as the conflict- 
resolving institutions m entioned previously. Agency literature em phasized that it was 
much less expensive for the country to work to prevent crises than for the United States 
to help pay for m ilitary operations, peacekeeping, hum anitarian relief, and financial 
bailouts.
In the 1990s, U SA ID ’s program s began to increasingly concentrate on the 
perceived least stable regions, such as central Europe and the new ly independent former 
Soviet republics, w ith dem ocracy prom otion the key focus and supposed key antidote.
The agency’s good governance and dem ocracy prom otion program s were designed to 
quickly install dem ocratic or m ore dem ocratic faces and features to transition and 
struggling states. USA ID  sim ultaneously worked on strengthening its relationship with 
the State D epartm ent and selling its good governance agenda to it. the administration. 
Congress, and special interest groups. As described, dem ocracy and good governance 
prom otion were also increasingly portrayed as being linked to econom ic liberalization, an 
issue favored by the Republicans in Congress.
The agency’s dem ocracy and good governance program s appealed to concerns 
with both challenges to the U nited-States-led world order and with opening up new 
m arkets for U nited States industry and exports. Thus the political map o f  a target country 
becam e reshaped by  the institu tion’s involvement. W hen prom oting dem ocratic 
m ovem ents and good governance would mean countering U.S. allies -as with the 
Zapatista peasants’ struggle against the M exican governm ent— funding w as denied.
W hen it did not, and m arkets availed them selves, assistance was granted. Though in 
public agency officials denounced the use o f  United States’ assistance to foster
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political loyalties, as had often been the case during the Cold W ar.5 aid to further 
entrenched strategic interests continued. Haiti, for example, escaped United States aid 
cuts despite its clear violation on good governance principles. Fiji and Zim babw e, on the 
other hand, both were seen as less strategically relevant to Am erican foreign policy goals, 
and both received USAID funding reductions. The reason cited was their failure to 
achieve dem ocratic political system s.5X
U SA ID 's increased em phasis on good governance and dem ocracy prom otion in the 
1990s was encouraged by a variety o f  factors. Its promotion o f  dem ocracy and good 
governance was a m eans o f  continuing to support its entrenched foreign policy interests 
under a new, more interventionist guise, as well as to spread the United States' tree 
market ideology and to firm  up the Am erican-led status-quo internationally.
Important and influential constituencies in the United States question the value o f 
dem ocracy assistance efforts, and this is reflected in congressional debates and decisions. 
N eo-isolationist sentim ents persist, particularly when economic downturns are felt by 
Am ericans. Left-wing dem ocrats and m oderate or conservative republicans are also wary 
about intervening in the political affairs o f  other countries, which dem ocracy assistance 
entails or at least approaches. G iving its good governance program s a hum an rights 
elem ent, with program s to support women and the m ost m arginalized in societies, helped 
satisfy the left-w ing Dem ocrats, and U SA ID 's econom ic expediency argum ents 
supported by its good governance reform s helped satisfy conservative republicans. The
5 Pakistan, for exam ple, has been awarded about $60 billion in foreign aid over 
the last four decades to help ensure its allegiance to Am erican foreign policy goals. See 
Tim othy J. Bork, “M ake Foreign Aid Bring About Good G overnance." International 
H erald Tribune (28 Septem ber 2001).
^Joseph  Fitchett. "New Agenda in Aid: G overnance." International Herald  
Tribune (23 April 2001).
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peace dividend promised by using I JSAID 's particular style o f program s also helped 
relieve concerns o f  this latter group. There was also the question o f  how to show the 
success o f  dem ocracy assistance efforts in quantifiable ways for all o f  U SA ID 's 
stakeholders. In the post-Cold W ar world. United States foreign policy was increasingly 
driven by dom estic political interests. In the early 1990s the Bush A dm inistration and 
Congress developed a bipartisan fram ework intended assess the effectiveness o f  tax­
payer funded dem ocracy assistance program s -  the Government Perform ance Results Act 
(GPRA). The GPRA, which was used for U SA ID 's dem ocracy assistance program s as 
well as for those o f  other agencies, m andated that such efforts be evaluated in an 
"objective, quantifiable and m easurable form." "Strategic Objectives" were required for 
each field m ission goal area, and "Interm ediate Results" were reported to Congress on a 
yearly basis. USAID project officials had to strive to impress Congress and the W hite 
House in this way. This is largely why the agency 's good governance and dem ocracy 
prom otion program s becam e so technocratic. The agency created its own very 
m ethodological assessm ent tool, som ething EU program s shy away from. W orld Bank 
program s do not see as urgent a need for, and UNDP program s have not embraced, 
perhaps since human developm ent is not easily quantifiable. In the m id-1990s, U SA ID 's 
Center for D em ocracy and G overnance authorized the creation o f  a 277-page H andbook  
o f  D em ocracy and G overnance Indicators ,5> Various dim ensions o f  each focus area o f 
the agency 's program s are described and quantified, with charts and specific numerical 
indicators. U SA ID 's ability to tangibly dem onstrate its successes has shaped its
^U nited  States A gency for International D evelopm ent's Center for Dem ocracy 
and Governance, H andbook o f  D em ocracy and Governance Indicators  (August 1998). 
<http: w w w .u sa id .g o v  our w ork 'dem ocracy and governance publications pdfs pnacc39 
O.pdf • [20 M ay 2005).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
dem ocracy assistance strategies and program s. The GPRA process in particular has 
forced the agency to support Am erican econom ic and foreign policy goals in its 
program m ing decisions.
Am erican foreign assistance has never had the wholesale approval that European 
foreign assistance has often had. Instead, groups in American society have always 
struggled to control the United States' policy toward the Third W orld. Som etim es the 
m otivation has been hum anitarian, and often it has just been part o f  the drive for m ore 
pow er.60 Over the years, pressures and constraints imposed on USAID grew, and the 
organization became more com plex and m ore beholden to diverse groups with diverse 
goals. Also, all o f  a sudden, with the end o f  the Cold War, USAID faced the crisis o f  
having to please groups and individuals who were in the midst o f  the process o f  forming 
their revised dom estic and international outlooks, and with its com plex and often less 
than clear system in place. Additionally, m any o f  the previous m otivations for 
supporting the developm ent o f  the Third W orld ended with the collapse o f  communism 
as a viable alternative to liberal democracy. The world was no longer a chessboard 
played by the United States and the Soviet Union, with each country serving as a 
potential pawn. Unsurprisingly, this led to a crisis within USAID itse lf that in many 
ways m irrored the larger identity crisis o f  United States foreign policy and the country 's 
national interests.
Even before George Bush becam e president in 1988. U S A ID 's reputation and 
budget were approaching reaching their low points. In the late 1980s and into the early
60Princeton N. Lyman. “ Beyond Aid: A lternative M odes o f  Cooperation." in 
Cooperation fo r  International D evelopm ent : The United States and  the Third World in 
the 1990s. eds. Robert J. Berg and David E. Gordon (Boulder: Lynne Rienner. 1989). 
302.
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1990s, USAID faced m ore criticism  and perhaps m ore new pressures than ever hefore. 
G ridlock in the United States C'ongress since the 1970s impeded coherent policy-m aking 
in m any realms, including foreign assistance. This gridlock over foreign aid particularly 
reached new heights in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Proposals were m ade to abolish 
USAID altogether or to m ove m any o f  its functions to the State Departm ent and other 
federal departments. This was at a tim e when the agency, still entangled in old 
com m itm ents, faced unprecedented new dem ands. In the 1990s, form er com m unist 
countries were attem pting to m ake the transition to democratic regim es and ethnic 
violence was erupting in an alarm ing m anner w ithin state borders. Also, various trends 
exerted new pressures on United States foreign assistance generally, such as the country 's 
tendency to assum e the lead in peace-keeping and peace-making; the increase in 
prom inence o f  global issues such as the environm ent, health, and hum an rights; and the 
potential turm oils o f  globalization. Further, the rise o f  the Internet was allow ing the 
NGO m ovem ent to develop and m obilize in an unprecedented maimer, which intensified 
pressure on politicians and governm ent. The early 1990s was a heady yet precarious time 
for the United States, and the role its foreign aid would assume in the post-C'old-W ar 
world was far from clear. President George Bush barely had tim e to reorient h im self or 
the nation to the new world that quickly unfolded during his presidency. His foreign 
policy showed at times deftness and at tim es lack o f  an overriding strategic vision. It was 
not until Bill C linton becam e president in 1993 that a specific post-C’old-W ar American 
foreign policy doctrine began to be form ulated. Foreign aid was potentially vital to this 
strategy o f  international engagem ent and leadership, and many o f  C lin ton 's  top advisors 
greatly valued foreign aid as a diplom atic tool. Other factors, however, w ere gathering to 
dim inish the perceived value o f  Am erican foreign aid. Public support for it was at an all-
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tim e low .61 Further, the 1994 elections gave the Republicans the lead in the Senate, 
establishing further obstacles to the prioritization o f  foreign a id /’" USAID needed to 
resurrect its image m ore than it ever had before.6' U SA ID 's rhetoric em phasizing the 
uncertain post-Cold-W ar world evidences concern that it was losing security in its 
position in the United States governm ent. USAID needed to dem onstrate its viability.64 
D em ocracy and good governance were portrayed as imparting stability.6' By linking
61M andelbaum , 441. The Clinton adm inistration attempted to increase support for 
USAID with its 1994 Peace. Prosperity, and Dem ocracy Act, which would have radically 
restructured USAID and allocated all funding for Am erican bilateral and m ultilateral 
assistance into a single account. This act, which was partly designed to overcom e 
legislative obstacles to foreign aid allocation, was never introduced in the Senate and 
never discussed out o f  com m ittee in the House o f  Representatives due to perceived 
resistance to it. See United States A gency for International Developm ent, "A  History o f  
Foreign A ssistance” (30 January 2002). • http: Avww.usaid.gov about usaidhist.htm l. ■ 
[19 M arch 02],
62Hoy, 36. Som e argue further that the role o f  Congress relative to that o f  the 
president had increased by 1990, as a result o f  the increased impact o f  foreign issues on 
Am erican voters. See, for exam ple, Barry Blechman, The Politics o f  N ational Security: 
Congress and U.S. Defense Policy  (New York: Oxford University Press. 1990).
63Ibid.. 35.
64W hen Andrew Natsios was confirm ed as the new USAID A dm inistrator in 
April, 2000, he was cited as saying that Am erican developm ent assistance was a 
“powerful instrum ent for the president to influence the course o f  events around the 
w orld.” United States A gency for International Development, "A H istory.”
65In the 1990s. USAID contended that the post-Cold-W ar world was at first 
glance much less dangerous than it was during the Cold War. At second glance, it 
argued, perhaps the threats were sm aller but no less insidious. Terrorist incidents, 
regional conflicts, w eapons proliferation, and illegal drug activities could and had 
threatened regional and international peace. Rising powers like China, a resurgent 
Russia, or regional coalitions o f  various forms could soon challenge the United States. 
A nti-A m ericanism  had only grown since the Soviet Union collapsed, and even many 
dem ocracies perhaps were not as stable as they appeared. See. for exam ple. United 
States A gency for International Developm ent. Fiscal Year 99 Annual Perform ance Plan 
(W ashington. D.C.: USAID. 1998).
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developm ent with dem ocracy and good governance, developm ent efforts, specifically 
those o f  USAID, were given new relevance and utility.
In the post-Cold-W ar world, the United States was not only the key prom oter but 
also the principal creator and m ajor beneficiary o f  the w orld 's liberal arrangem ents. The 
status quo was not at the time so bad. A m erica was the w orld 's preponderant power 
econom ically and militarily. It also had the m ost soft power, or cultural and ideological 
influence. The United States had a large national debt, but m ost people were 
com fortable, m any were prosperous, and the country was the w orld 's strongest pow er in 
virtually every m easurable and im m easurable way. The United States governm ent 
wanted to protect the status-quo internationally, and that meant protecting and defending 
the United States' hegemony. Sim ilar to that o f  Bush, the Clinton adm inistration 's 
strategy o f  "engagem ent and en la rgem en t' was based on the view that the US needed to 
rem ain heavily involved in international politics to prevent threats to unipolarity. 
Spreading liberal dem ocratic values and m arket econom ics, it was believed, would help 
preserve and strengthen the United S tates 's  relative and absolute power. U SA ID 's 
dem ocracy and good governance prom otion were part o f  this strategy. Spreading and 
firm ing up these Am erican values helped reinforce Am erican hegemony. Sim ply put, it 
was easier for the United States to lead like-m inded nations, or at least nations with 
sim ilar institutions and governance system s. Spreading liberal dem ocratic values and 
m arket econom ics, it was believed, would help preserve and strengthen the U S 's  relative 
and absolute power.
U SA ID 's dem ocracy and good governance prom otion were part o f  this strategy. 
Spreading and firm ing up these Am erican values helped reinforce Am erican hegem ony. 
Sim ply put. it was easier for the United States to lead like-minded nations, or at least
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nations with sim ilar institutions and governance systems. As then Joint Chiefs o f  S taff
Chairm an Colin Powell said in 1992.
The decline o f  the Soviet threat has fundam entally changed the concept o f 
threat analysis. . . . W e can still plausibly identify some specific threats—North 
Korea, a weakened Iraq, perhaps even a hostile Iran. But the real tlireat is the 
unknown, the uncertain ...the prim ary threat to our security is instability and being 
unprepared to handle a crisis or a war that no one expected or p red ic ted 6h
Determ inations
W hereas EU dem ocracy assistance tends to be too loosely construed and 
adm inistered, U SA ID 's dem ocracy assistance program s follow an overly rigid model. 
USAID dem ocracy assistance in the 1990s and beyond is based on an analytical model 
that assum es a fixed set o f  conditions associated with three distinctive phases o f  
transition from authoritarianism  to dem ocracy: opening, breakthrough, and consolidation. 
Little attention is given to the underlying conditions in transitional countries— their 
econom ic levels, political characteristics, institutional legacies, cultural and ethnic m ake­
up, sociocultural traditions, or other structural features.
U SA ID 's definition o f  dem ocracy assistance and its actually policies and 
program s tends to narrowly focus on prom oting free m arkets and Am erican -style 
dem ocracy that imparts a sense o f  stability. USAID funds American NGOs to carry out 
politically sensitive projects that could dam age United States bilateral relations if  the 
Am erican governm ent funding went directly to foreign NGOs. In the 1990s. the focus o f  
U SA ID 's dem ocracy assistance program s shifted betw een the concern to prom ote 
econom ic objectives and the concern to prom ote national security goals.
6f’C'ited in Amos Jordan. Michael Ma/.arr. and W illiam l  avlor. American Xatiotial 
Security  (Baltim ore: Johns Hopkins. 1999), 544.
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V i  (I
CHAPTER VII 
CO NCLUSIO N
The prom otion o f  democracy and good governance in the 1990s and beyond has 
been largely portrayed as a generic endeavor that IDIs engage in for sim ilar reasons. A 
m ore careful study reveals that different IDIs have and continue to sponsor dem ocracy 
and good governance policies and program s that differ in substance in im portant ways 
that often reveal m ore about the donors them selves than their stated beneficiaries. 
D em ocracy and good governance prom otion in the 1990s and later has often been a 
continuance o f  institutional priorities and prerogatives under new, impactful guises. The 
world in the l990s had changed markedly, and developm ent program s were due to also 
change— yet IDI agendas often rem ained largely the same, perhaps sim ilar but m ore 
interventionist, with new keywords and program  areas. "Institutional reform ’' and “rule 
o f  law’’ program s m ay have appeared categorically the sam e for the UNDP, W orld Bank. 
EU, and USAID, yet these and other new developm ent program s supporting dem ocracy 
and good governance were quite distinctive and revealing o f  IDIs' particular m otivations 
and aspirations.
In the 1990s, the UNDP concentrated on the hum an aspects o f  developm ent, 
prom oting program s that focused on peop le 's  choices and capabilities and that did not 
intentionally com prom ise the well-being o f  present or future generations. The U N D P 's 
strategy recognized the limitations o f  a sole reliance upon market forces, and sought to 
prom ote the em pow erm ent o f  the poor, equity, and environm ental respect. The concept o f  
good governance had been linked to the U N D P 's core m ission since the mid 1990s with 
the prom otion o f  sustainable human developm ent. Good governance was considered to be
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the prim ary m eans for achieving this. The UNDP urged countries to develop their own 
views o f  good governance and sponsored program s that prioritized m eeting the needs o f  
the poor and those otherw ise disadvantaged. M arket reforms w ere encouraged, hut not at 
the expense o f  protecting and enhancing hum an welfare. Environmental considerations 
were also given special attention in the U N D P 's dem ocracy and good governance 
prom otion program s and policies.
The U N D P 's good governance program s reflected this institutions' disdain for 
elevating neoliberal econom ic concerns above hum an welfare and environm ental 
considerations. The UNDP has historically been and remained in the 1990s a forum and 
locus o f  pow er for m iddle-incom e and low -incom e country priorities. Helping shape 
g lobalization 's effects so that the poor are not neglected or harm ed has been a key aspect 
o f  the U N D P’s agenda, and this agenda revealed itse lf in this IDEs dem ocracy and good 
governance program s and policies in the 1990s.
The W orld Bank is an entirely different type o f  institution, and it is no surprise 
that the content o f  its good governance policies and program s w as quite different from 
that o f  the UNDP. Though some observers view- the expansion o f  the B ank 's governance 
prom otion m erely as “m ission creep" or the tagging on o f  popular ideas and program s to 
a lim ited and static agenda, this w'as not the case. The expansion o f  the W orld B ank 's 
agenda to include governance concerns and then the B ank 's subsequent w idening and 
broadening o f  its governance program s and policies revealed informed reiterations o f  
N orthern pow er concerns. W ith the B ank 's allegiance to the interests o f a small group o f  
rich countries and to a com m on agenda o f  trade liberalization, deregulation, and stringent 
intellectual property rights protection, there was very little room  in its good governance 
prom otion for prioritizing equity and help for the most m arginalized. Increased
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protection o f  intellectual property rights served to consolidate the technological 
m onopoly o f  TNCs. It imposed the private rights o f  m ultinational com panies over 
national constitutions, since TNCs and investors were able to take legal action against 
national governments. International arbitration panels, controlled by wealthy countries, 
w ere not likely to favor the interests o f  poor, technologically backw ard companies.
The W orld B ank’s governance concerns arose initially because its previous SAPs 
were not generally effective. Rent-seeking predatory states were reversing or m eddling 
w ith the SAP economic reform  process because o f  vested power interests and elites’ 
strong desires to m aintain the status-quo. The W orld Bank realized this at an opportune 
tim e for its increased political intervention, with the fading o f  the Cold W ar and 
increased international acceptance and even support for dem ocracy prom otion and 
political intervention. To its public sector reform program s, it added rhetoric and 
program s designed to em pow er civil society as a positive counterbalance to a (negative) 
state. This was som ew hat effective, yet the W orld Bank cam e to understand that without 
certain broad social support for the reform  process, it could not m ove forward and 
consolidate reforms. Including equity and distributional concerns in its program s built 
broader bases o f  support for good governance that facilitated its “success." The W orld 
B ank never changed its goals o f  wanting to open m arkets, have its loans repaid, and 
rem ain in business; it simply changed its means. The fact that the resultant program s and 
policies appeared m ore socially conscious and more pro-Southem  interests was a pleasant 
side effect for the often-m aligned W orld Bank, as well as a sign o f  hope for many 
disem powered in the Third W orld. But the W orld Bank’s N orthern-dom inated power 
structure rem ained intact.
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In contrast to the World Bank, the HU's position on the governance issue has been 
m uch broader and political since the early 1990s. The EU has openly and 
unapologetically endorsed dem ocracy (neoliberal, social, and other types) and a version 
o f  good governance promotion that has em phasized conditions conducive to reliable 
m arkets, peaceful societies, and protected human rights. These trends in EU developm ent 
policy m anifested EU institutional prerogatives and revealed stakeholders' agendas in the 
1990s. The E U 's dem ocracy and good governance promotion in the 1990s revealed 
concerns w ith econom ics, security, and hum anitarianism . W ith viable trading partners, 
sound institutions and laws protecting the market were encouraged. In regions deemed 
threatening, clear renderings o f  criminal law and punishm ent were stressed. In all 
regions but m ost particularly the ACP region, w here France had special interests, hum an 
rights protection and citizen em powerm ent were emphasized. Human rights was 
conceived very broadly, to include indigenous people, m inorities, women, children, the 
disabled, and lesbians and gays, all groups that citizens o f  EU m em ber states care about.
The E U 's  program s were distinct in other ways as well. Conditions were often 
not enforced, to avoid controversy, and developm ent officials did not prescribe a “one- 
size-fits-alF  m odel o f  democracy. Local civil society m em bers were invited to 
participate in the conception o f  desired political regim es and conditions, which is 
characteristic o f  European continental values and norms. The E U 's heavy use o f  NGOs 
to carry forth its developm ent work helped m ake this diversity and particularity o f  
political parties and regim es possible, as did the fact that the EU does not fund political 
parties.
The E U 's dem ocracy and good governance prom otion in the 1990s had m any 
prom ising qualities, such as its focus on local context and its stress on social and
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econom ic inclusiveness. The problem  was that aid was poorly coordinated and 
conditionalities were so poorly enforced that they lost meaning. The EU lacked 
structured links betw een the official policy levels and the civil society agencies and 
actors to obtain com plem entarities in efforts. Part o f  the problem  with EU good 
governance assistance has been that it has reflected the agendas o f  a union in its 
form ative stages, representing twenty-five states with different goals. EU good 
governance and dem ocracy prom otion policies and program s were often not enforced due 
to the tentative nature o f  the EU itself in the 1990s. The concern for hum an rights 
evidenced in its policies was adm irable and suggestive o f  EU aspirations, yet other 
priorities were inconsistently revealed as well as being inadvertently enforced.
W hereas EU dem ocracy assistance tended to be too loosely construed and 
administered, U S A ID 's dem ocracy assistance program s followed an overly rigid model. 
USAID dem ocracy assistance in the 1990s was based on an analytical model that 
assumed a fixed set o f  conditions associated with three distinctive phases o f  transition 
from authoritarianism  to dem ocracy: opening, breakthrough, and consolidation. Little 
attention was given to the underlying conditions in transitional countries— their econom ic 
levels, political characteristics, institutional legacies, cultural and ethnic m ake-up. 
sociocultural traditions, or other structural features. U SA ID 's definition o f  dem ocracy 
assistance and its actual policies and program s tended to narrowly focus on prom oting 
free m arkets and A m erican-style dem ocracy that im parted a sense o f  stability the United 
States desired. USAID sponsored Am erican NGOs to carry out politically sensitive 
projects that could dam age United States bilateral relations if  the funding went directly to 
foreign NGOs. In the 1990s, the focus o f  U SA ID 's dem ocracy assistance program s 
shifted between the concern to prom ote econom ic objectives and the concern to prom ote
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national security goals. This o f  course was revealing o f  the Am erican governm ent's 
interest. USAID was m ore beholden than ever to the governm ent due to faltering support 
for its mandate. Its good governance and dem ocracy prom otion em phasis had a strong 
institutional survival impetus, revealed in its pro-m arket and pro-A m erican foreign policy 
programs.
Despite the agenda m otivating IDIs, it would be a great loss if  aid donors' concerns 
with good governance in the developing world were to decrease. W hile some good 
governance and dem ocracy assistance program s are clearly self-serving, the governance 
issues in the South are real and in som e cases acute, and these issues will continue to 
challenge aid officials for years. Large areas and populations o f  A m azonian and urban 
Brazil, Angola, Bolivia, Cam bodia, Colom bia, Nepal, Pakistan. Philippines, Sierra 
Leone, and m any other countries are still be governed by gangs, thieves, and guerrillas 
instead o f  by any sort o f  legitim ate governm ent authority. Civil conflicts continue to be 
waged, terrorizing m any and displacing large num bers o f  people. Public servants 
continue to be recruited and promoted according to personal and political connections 
rather than m erit. M oney still buys court rulings. Investors still need to pay heavily for 
political protection. Despite all the pitfalls o f  external involvem ent in sensitive and 
difficult political issues, aid donors can contribute to the wulfare o f  m illions in the South 
with democracy good governance support.
D em ocracy rests on rules, institutions, and political practices through which 
voters regularly and constitutionally replace or m odify their leadership by the exercise o f 
representative political power. As em erging dem ocracies battle through their unfinished 
transitions and progressively m ove towards consolidation, dem ocracy assistance needs to 
experience a qualitative leap forward. Second generation dem ocracy aid requires m oving
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away from traditional technical assistance, often fragm ented and m echanistic, to more 
com prehensive assistance and political m odes o f  interv ention. The concept o f  political 
dialogue based on pacts for dem ocratic developm ent appears to offer a prom ising avenue 
to reinvigorate the concept o f  partnership, a cornerstone o f  developm ent cooperation and 
aid effectiveness.
Experience has confirm ed the com plexity o f  providing effective good governance 
and dem ocracy assistance in support o f  societal transform ation processes that also 
improve the daily lives and the well-being o f  citizens. Institutions can protect people as 
well as m arkets, and anti-corruption program s can save precious rare resources and 
dollars for social needs. A ttention needs to be paid to people as dem ocracy and good 
governance program s are devised and implem ented. The UNDP has the right idea, but 
lacks funding to m ake the notew orthy difference it strives to make. The W orld Bank is 
im proving by em bracing som e hum an rights concerns, but its reasons for doing this 
largely tie back to its m arket m otivations. The EU lacks coordination and organization, 
but its insistence on hum an rights protection is adm irable and substantial. USAID is 
what it is—a foreign policy arm o f  the United States governm ent. It should not pretend to 
be otherwise.
The good governance and dem ocracy prom otion program s and policies in the 
1990s reflected both broad international trends and the unique pow er structures o f  
particular IDIs. Good governance prom otion appealed to both poor and rich countries. It 
was a goal on which the Burkina-Faso and the United States could agree. It promised 
m ore independence to the South and less responsibility to the North. It held out a 
promise o f  m ore unity, m ore peace, and more prosperity for all. Even for corrupt Third 
W orld leaders, the idea was som ewhat compelling, for it was less directly threatening
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than strict conditionalities and it meant that potentially m ore aid would be forthcoming.
In some sense, its broad agenda, subject to various translations and perm utations, 
contained a widespread appeal.
Scholars o f dem ocracy agree that international actors have been able to influence 
the dem ocratization process in a country when they have prov ided clear expectations and 
married them with incentives. Neoliberalism  is fundam entally and principally a political 
project o f  em bedding m arket values and structures w ithin not only econom ic, but also 
w ithin social and political life. Its goal is to reshape power relations. Nevertheless, among 
neoliberals, there have alw ays been differences over how far this process should extend 
and by what means it should be achieved. Economic globalization, privatization, and free 
trade tend to widen the gap between rich and poor. The sufficiency o f  bottom -up paths to 
dem ocracy have them selves been increasingly questioned. The dem ocracy-generating 
ability o f  civil society certainly depends on there being effective links between civil 
society, locals representing different key interests, and the political arena. W ithout 
previous reform to the state and political institutions, it is unlikely that increased space 
for civil society can help a society advance towards more dem ocratic ways. Dem ocracy 
prom otion requires for an appropriate balance between bottom -up and top-down 
dynamics. Dem ocracy support requires operational instruments and procedures that can 
respond to newly arising opportunities for reform processes. The com plexities o f  
dem ocracy and good governance promotion should not be understated, and now. as the 
new m illennium  progresses, there is a fairly long record o f  experience in diverse regions 
upon which it is im portant to draw. IDIs should advance neoliberal concerns, but they 
are not truly helping if  people and the quality o f  their lives are not the most important 
aspect o f  the process.
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